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The fair trial of those accused of historic child sexual abuse 
Abstract 
The question which this research addresses is whether recent developments in law and practice 
concerning the prosecution of those accused of historic child sexual abuse (HCSA) especially 
taking into account the heightened public concern with this issue, may operate to compromise 
the right of the defendant to a fair trial in such cases, particularly with regard to the procedural 
and evidential safeguards which support that right. 
An historical and sociological survey of the problem of child abuse and a consideration of the 
impact on the criminal justice system of the intense public concern about child abuse provide 
the context for a forensic examination of four specific areas of concern: the investigatory 
methods of the police in such cases; particular problems arising from the delay in the 
DOOHJDWLRQVEHLQJPDGH FKDQJHV WR WKH UXOHV UHODWLQJ WR µEDGFKDUDFWHU¶ HYLGHQFH DERXW WKH
complainant (Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 and Sexual Offences Act 2003); 
DQGFKDQJHV WR WKH UXOHV UHODWLQJ WR µEDGFKDUDFWHU¶ HYLGHQFHDERXW WKHGHIHQGDQW LQ VH[XDO
offences cases (Sexual Offences Act 2003).  
The study considers the available data and the extensive legal, historical and sociological 
literature concerning child sexual abuse, relevant international and municipal statute and case 
law and the case papers of some men convicted of historic child sexual abuse who maintain 
their innocence and volunteered their assistance to this study.  
It concludes that heightened public concern about child abuse has played a significant role in 
developments of relevant law and practice which may at times give rise to significant 
miscarriages of justice; that a long period of delay before charges are brought presents 
VLJQLILFDQW HYLGHQWLDO FKDOOHQJHV WR D IDLU WULDO WKDW SROLFH PHWKRGV RI µGLS VDPSOLQJ¶ DQG
interviewing in the investigation of such cases may operate to compromise the reliability of the 
evidence obtained; that current restrictions on the questioning complainants about their past 
character and sexual history may hinder the proper testing of prosecution evidence; and that 
the current rules on the admissibility of evidence about the past character of the defendant may 
have an unfairly prejudicial effect. Suggestions are offered as to how the current law and 
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Chapter I Introduction 
 
 
(i) The problem of HCSA  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to discover whether recent law enforcement practices and 
reforms in the law of evidence in the UK may operate to compromise the right to a fair trial 
of defendants in historic child sexual abuse (HCSA) cases. These cases concern claims that 
are not made by children contemporaneously with the alleged events, but by adolescents or 
adults years or even decades later. For example, the Stormont Inquiry in Northern Ireland was 
VHWXSWRH[DPLQHFODLPVRIDEXVHLQFKLOGUHQ¶VKRPHVZKLch date back to 1922.1  
In the past twenty-five years, many countries, including the UK, have recognised that child 
sexual abuse exists on an unacceptable level. There is also widespread recognition that 
instances of such abuse that occurred years ago but were not reported or pursued at the time 
should, once allegations have been made, be vigorously investigated and prosecuted where 
appropriate. Both current and historic child abuse have been major issues of public concern 
for many years now. There can be no doubt that historic cases continue to impact in the 
present on those who suffered from them. Many public allegations have been made of HCSA, 
numerous high-profile investigations have often followed, and in many cases resulted in 
prosecutions and convictions. 
It was suggested that paedophile rings were operating in the Kincora hostel for boys in East 
Belfast in the 1980s. Concern over organised paedophilia also resurfaced in North Wales in 
1991 with the Bryn Estyn care homes cases.2 Operation Rectangle, begun in 2007 and which 
ran for several years, was a police investigation into 1960s allegations of physical and child 
sexual abuse in Haut de la Garenne in Jersey which resulted in seven convictions.3 Large-
scale police operations, including Operation Yewtree, have been launched in the UK after 
hundreds of allegations of HCSA were made against the late BBC presenter Jimmy Savile 
                                                          
1
 %%&1HZV1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGµ6WRUPRQWFKLOGDEXVHLQTXLU\WRGDWHIURP¶2FWREHU%ULWDLQ¶V
oldest person to have been charged with HCSA allegations (between 1974 and 1983) is aged 101; see Press 






Guardian 7 January 2011. 
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and other former BBC employees.4 More recently, the Metropolitan police have received 106 
allegations of historical child sexual abuse dating from the 1970s at 32 football clubs and 
have identified 83 suspects.5 
According to the Office for National Statistics, there were 88,106 police recorded sexual 
offences in the year ending March 2015, an increase of 37% compared with the previous 
year. This is the highest figure recorded by the police and the largest annual percentage 
increase since the introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) in April 
2002.6 Almost 30 000 registered offenders have been convicted of offences against children.7 
While abuse scandals have surfaced and continue to surface, the attempt to quantify the 
amount of such abuse on a national scale is very difficult, especially as child victims will 
frequently not report the crime or may well be ignored or disbelieved if they do. It is 
estimated that 38 per cent of all rapes recorded by police are committed against children 
under 16 years of age.8 Trends in recorded crime statistics can be influenced by whether 
victims feel able to and decide to report such offences to the police, and by changes in police 
recording practices.  
 
For example, while there was a 17 per cent decrease in recorded sexual offences between 
2005/06 and 2008/09, there was a seven per cent increase between 2008/09 and 2010/11. The 
latter increase may in part be due to greater encouragement by the police to victims to come 
forward and improvements in police recording, rather than an increase in the level of 
victimisation.9  
 
There can be no doubt that child sexual abuse is a major problem in the UK and many other 
countries in the 21st century. The police have not been slow to respond to the heightened 
                                                          
4
 /2¶&DUUROOµ-LPP\6DYLOHURZGHHSHQVDIWHUFODLPVRIDEXVHE\DQRWKHU%%&SUHVHQWHU¶The Guardian 17 
2FWREHU6HHDOVRµ7KH'DPH-DQHW6PLWK5HYLHZ5HSRUW- DQ,QGHSHQGHQW5HYLHZLQWRWKH%%&¶V




13 Dec 2016; https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/dec/13/met-police-106-allegations-of-sexual-abuse-
at-london-football-clubs 
6





statistics/?_t_id=1B2> Accessed on the 19 Oct 2016. 
8
 H M Government, The Government Response to the Stern Review: An Independent Review into How Rape 
Complaints are Handled by Public Authorities in England and Wales, March 2011, p.8. 
9
 Ministry of Justice, Home Office and the Office for National Statistics, An Overview of Sexual Offending in 
England and Wales 10 January 2013, p.8. 
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public concern about HCSA and to the pressure on the criminal justice system to address it. 
There have been numerous investigations, prosecutions and convictions.10  
 
However, a survey of the literature relating to CSA and HCSA, reveals significant concerns 
about the fairness of various elements of the investigation and prosecution processes 
involved, and also a significant incidence of miscarriages of justice in these cases, in the 
sense of failures of the criminal justice system resulting in the unjust conviction and 
imprisonment of defendants. 
For instance, in 7KH*UHDW&KLOGUHQ¶V+RPH3DQLF11 as well as in his much more in-depth 
book The Secret of Bryn Estyn,12 Webster argued that whilst a number of genuine child abuse 
SHUSHWUDWRUVKDYHEHHQFDXJKWE\SROLFHµWUDZOLQJ¶PHWKRGVRWKHUVKDYHEHHQZURQJIXOO\
convicted. Others have questioned whether such methods are safe.13 Examples of HCSA 
convictions which have been overturned by the Court of Appeal include the following.  
In R v Basil Rigby Williams and Michael James Lawson,14 fresh evidence from two former 
care home residents directly undermined the evidence of two of the complainants. As 
concerns the Rigby Williams case, there had been police contamination of evidence. The 
sheer number of suspects of HCSA found in the police trawl into care homes which were 
contained in a list ZKLFKLQFOXGHGWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VQDPHwas considered by the Court of 
Appeal in itself to be prejudicial to Lawson's case when it was accidentally revealed to the 
jury, and made his conviction unsafe. 
In $QYHU'DXGࣟ6KHLNKY7KH&URZQ 15 the appellant had been forensically disadvantaged at 
his original trial because a log book, which would have proved that he did not work at the 
care home at the time a resident claimed to have been sexually assaulted by him, was no 
longer available. 
In R. v B16 a complaint of sexual abuse had been made 30 years after incident. Whilst the 
Court of Appeal held that an order of a stay for abuse of process due to the delay and limited 
evidence available in itself was not required, the convictions were not safe. B had been 




_time_for_a_national_consensus/> 6 Mar 2013. 
11
 R Webster, (Orwell Press 1998). 
12
 R. Webster, (Orwell Press 2005), p.591. 
13
 '5RVHµ$EXVHU¶ZDVQHWWHGLQDSROLce trawl ± EXWLVKHLQQRFHQW"¶7KH2EVHUYHU-DQ 
14
 [2003] EWCA Crim 693. 
15
 [2006] EWCA Crim 2625. 
16
 [2003] EWCA Crim 319. 
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unable to defend himself or effectively cross-examine the complainant. In the interests of 
justice, the convictions were set aside. 
Despite the genuine and widespread problem of HCSA, these miscarriages of justice, and 
misgivings such as these about the prosecution process, show that there are cogent grounds 
for further research into the reliability of due process at all stages of HCSA investigations and 
prosecutions today. 
 
The research question 
 
The research question which emerged wDVWKLVµ0ay recent developments in law and 
practice concerning the investigation and prosecution of those accused of historic child sexual 
abuse (HCSA), especially taking into account the heightened public concern with this issue, 
operate to compromise the right of the defendant to a fair trial in such cases, particularly with 
regard to the procedural and evidential safeguards which support that right?¶ 
 
(ii) Issues to be addressed 
 
The following issues emerged from the research as the most germane to this inquiry, and they 
are examined in this thesis. 
 
(a) The heightened concern about HCSA: how has the problem been perceived, and 
how has public pressure impacted upon the development of law and practice in 
HCSA cases?  
 
(b) Police investigations of HCSA: have the police introduced possibly unsafe 
methods of investigation relating to the identification of possible suspects, and 
maintained unsafe older procedures relating to the procedures for interviewing 
suspects? 
 
(c) Does the delay, now often of many decades in HCSA cases, in bringing charges 
inevitably compromise the quality of the evidence, and the opportunity properly to 
test the evidence in these cases? 
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(d) Do the recent restrictions on the questioning of complainants about their past 
character and sexual history (Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 and 
Sexual Offences Act 2003) hinder the proper testing of prosecution evidence in 
HCSA cases? 
 
(e) Do the recent changes to the rules relating to the admissibility of evidence about 
the past character of defendant in sexual offences cases (Sexual Offences Act 
2003) have an unfairly prejudicial effect on the trial of a defendants in HCSA 
cases? 
 
(iii) Methodology and sources 
 
This study of the elements which may operate to compromise historic child abuse 
prosecutions ± puEOLFSUHVVXUHLQYHVWLJDWRU\PHWKRGVGHOD\TXHVWLRQLQJWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶V
sexual history and revealing the past character of the defendant ± aims to achieve an holistic 
and new understanding of a very particular and multi-faceted problem. Of course, many 
issues can be broken down and approached in similar ways, but it is submitted that the 
investigation and prosecution of HCSA is an issue that cannot properly be understood 
without analysing distinctly each of these discrete elements while bringing them all under 
consideration, for the purpose of assessing their impact on the process under investigation. 
Scholarly, governmental and wider literature 
A wide range of literature in the form of academic research in books and articles, 
parliamentary, governmental and non-governmental organisations reports, journalism and 
other papers is drawn upon in order to provide an historical and sociological context of the 
problem and its prosecution, including the conceptualisation of childhood and awareness of 
child abuse, legal reform in the 19th, 20th and 21st century, µPRUDOSDQLF¶theory, and the 
impact of heightened public concern on policy, law and practice. The Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board provided primary data on compensation awards given to sexual 
offence/child sexual abuse claimants over a given period.17 The impact of this context on the 
development of law and practice is analysed in this study with a particular focus on those 
developments that present a challenge to the fairness of the investigation and prosecution of 
HCSA defendants today. 
 
                                                          
17
 <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/criminal-injuries-compensation-authority>. 
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Police handbooks, government reports, scholarly literature on police investigation methods 
 
Police handbooks, government reports and scholarly literature on the psychology of police 
interviewing techniques are drawn upon to provide an account and analysis of the 
investigatory methods of police in child abuse casesLQFOXGLQJµWUDZOLQJ¶IRUVXVSHFWV
offering inducements and inadequate interviewing procedures, and to provide a basis for the 
assessment of the safety of criminal proceedings  
 
Municipal law 
Municipal legislation and appellate case law relating to criminal law, procedure and evidence 
(in particular the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, the Criminal Justice Act 
2003) is subjected to a close analysis in respect of its development and application to the trial 
of defendants in HCSA cases for the purposes of considering its impact on the fairness of 
such trials. 
 
Human rights law 
 
Three articles of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (commonly known as the European Convention on Human Rights 1950) are of 
particular relevance to this study, and a critical analysis of their application to the 
investigation and trial of HCSA cases shows how the imperative of maintaining a fair trial of 
the accused has had to compete with the increasingly recognised imperative of maintaining 




A µhuman rights¶ dimension is important for any critical study that seeks WRµJHWDPRUH
adequate purchase of the miscarriage-of-MXVWLFHSKHQRPHQRQ¶DQGthat is particularly so since 
the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force.18  
 
Under Article 6 (1), defendants facing criminal charges are entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal and under (6) (2) 
shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty. Article 6 is drawn upon in this study, with 
                                                          
18
 01DXJKWRQµ5HGHILQLQJ0LVFDUULDJHVRI-XVWLFH¶%ULW-&ULPLQROS 
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regard to the analysis of the pre-trial, trial and appellate rights of the defendant and the 
assessment of whether or not the human rights of the defendant may have been compromised 
under English law. 
 
Article 3 has been construed so as to minimise psychological harm, humiliation or degrading 
treatment to vulnerable victims. In this respect, the rights of victims, including at the trial 
stage, have been recognised by the European Court of Human Rights.19 The 9LFWLPV¶
Directive 2012/29/EU concretised and imposed on signatory states the positive obligation 
indicated in Article 3. The significance of this Directive and how it may impact on the 
fairness of proceedings is discussed in Chapter V.20 
 
A sexual offence trial may involve Article 8 issues where the defence applies to cross-
examine the complainant on an aspect of his/her prior sexual conduct.21 The Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 restricts the cross-examination of complainants on their 
sexual lives, and further restrictions were introduced under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
Directive 2012/29/EU mandated special recording measures for all vulnerable victims. 
+RZHYHUWKHSURVHFXWLRQPD\SODFHDGHIHQGDQW¶VVH[XDOOLIHXQGHUIXOOVFUXWLQ\EHIRUHWKH
court (if he is accused of sexual offences). The current position is that there has to be a fair 
EDODQFHVWUXFNEHWZHHQDYLFWLP¶VSHUVRQDOLQWHJULW\DQGWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWWRDIDLUWULDO22  
 
Scholarly literature on the law and procedure concerning evidence in criminal trials in 
England and also other common law jurisdictions (Australia, Ireland and the USA) is drawn 
upon in analysing specific issues in relation to the impact upon fairness of delays in bringing 
proceedings in HCSA cases, such as statutes (and bars) of limitation, abuse of process, 
UHDVRQVIRUFRPSODLQDQWV¶GHOD\SURKLELWLRQFRUURERUDWLRQIRUHQVLFGLVDGYDQWDJHand 
recovered memory and multiple allegations.  
 
Comparison regarding delay in prosecution with other EU jurisdictions  
Also in relation to the issue of delay, enquiries were made of ministries of justice and 
embassies of the other twenty-seven members of the European Union, as to their current law 
                                                          
19
 Mihova v Italy 25000/07, Second Section, 30/03/2010; see also Doorson v. the Netherlands (26 March 1996, 





 Stubing v Germany No. 43547/08, 12 April 2012, para 55. 
22
 Y v Slovenia (Application No. 41107/10), 28 May 2015, para 105. 
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in relation to delayed complaints of child sexual abuseµbad character¶ evidence in such 
trials, time bars etc. Respondents helpfully provided relevant sections of their criminal codes 
which governed the time bars used in sexual offence cases.  
 
As a result comparison was enabled between the situation in English law and that of several 
other European Union jurisdictions. EU member states are all party to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC). The CRC may be said to form part of a constitutional tradition 
common to the member states and thus constitutes also a general principle of EU law by 
virtue of Article 6(2) of the EU Treaty.23 These countries are also, like the United Kingdom, 
party to the European Convention on Human Rights. In addition, lengthy delays between the 
offence and trial of child abuse also occur in these jurisdictions.  
 
While comparing the position in England and Wales with other EU jurisdictions, it must be 
recognised that comparative research between common law and civil law systems has 
inherent problems. However, these issues are not considered to present obstacles to this 
study. The aim was to inform the study of the criminal justice system in England and Wales 
with regard to the processing of HCSA cases, with a consideration of how these matters are 
approached in jurisdictions with similar problems and a common overarching system of 
values and rights. 
 
Differences between the inquisitorial civil law and adversarial common law systems are more 
in styles of argumentation and methodology than in the content of legal norms, but similar 
results are often obtained by different reasoning.24 Neither system is inherently superior. The 
European Union is becoming a mixed jurisdiction overall ± there are many legal systems 
under a single EU legal framework which have adopted laws and directives taking 
precedence over national laws.25 Therefore, there is a growing convergence within the EU 
between the two legal traditions of civil and common law.26 By comparing other 
jurisdictions, the legal mindset (mentalité) which characterises other cultures informed the 
study of the domestic situation.27  
                                                          
23
 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Child Trafficking in the European Union Challenges, 
Perspectives and Good Practices, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009, p.10. 
24
 &3HMRYLFµ&LYLO/DZDQG&RPPRQ/DZ7ZR'LIIHUHQW3DWKV/HDGLQJWRWKH6DPH*RDO¶9LFWRULD8QLYHUVLW\
Wellington Law Review (2001), p.840. 
25
 :7HWOH\µ0L[HG-XULVGLFWLRQV&RPPRQ/DZY&LYLO/DZ&RGLILHGDQG8QFRGLILHG¶/RXLVLDQD/DZ
Review, Spring 2000, Vol 60, No 3, p.679. 
26
 :7HWOH\µ0L[HG-XULVGLFWLRQV± &RPPRQ/DZY&LYLO/DZ¶8QLI/DZ5HY-3), p.591. 
27
 *6DPXHOµ&RPSDUDWLYH/DZDQGLWV0HWKRGRORJ\¶ in µ5esearch Methods in Law (edn) Watkins, D. and 
Burton, M., (Routledge, London and New York, 2013), p.103. 
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Although the survey was limited in scope and response it did provide valuable information 
that helped to bring into focus the challenges (and different possible responses) facing 
prosecutions of this sort face when brought many years after the matter complained of. 
 
Case details of those convicted of HCSA but who protest their innocence 
The details of recorded cases in law reports, official and non-governmental organisation 
publications, journalism, scholarly and other literature and other sources are analysed for the 
purpose of identifying areas on concern for this study, and drawn up throughout the study. 
These include high profile and less well known cases. Discussion of miscarriages of justice in 
HCSA cases has often focused on exceptional cases rather than what might be called more 
routine miscarriages.28 Miscarriages of justice may arise due to human error, malpractice or 
corruption; they may also be facilitated by specific procedures of the investigation and 
prosecution of offences in the criminal justice system.29  
However, many defendants who have been convicted of HCSA and have subsequently 
complained that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, do not in fact succeed in establishing 
that a miscarriage occurred. Copies of the original case papers of such defendants were also 
considered to be a valuable source for the identification and analysis of concerns at the heart 
of this study. 
Contact was made with a law firm which deals in HCSA cases and some volunteers came 
forward as a result. An DGYHUWLVHPHQWLQWKHLQPDWHV¶PDJD]LQHInside Time 30 (a Prison 
Service-approved publication which has a circulation of 40 000 and is available to the general 
inmate population) was used to identify potential volunteers. The advertisement, which had 
been placed in Inside Time, elicited a large response. Whilst more than 110 responses from 
prospective volunteers had been received, it would not have been practicable to have perused 
all the cases. The sample had to be reduced to a total of 20 cases. Only cases that had been 
appealed, and where WKHMXGJH¶VVXPPLQJXSDWWKHRULJLQDOWULDODQGFRXQVHO¶VRSLQLRQRQ
appeal were in the file. In the end, a small sample, six cases, raised issues of law and 
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 Fn 18, Naughton, p. 167. He argues that by looking at all types of cases which are routinely successfully 
DSSHDOHGUDWKHUWKDQWKHH[FHSWLRQDORQHVZHFDQJHWDPRUHDFFXUDWHSLFWXUHRIZKHUHµMXVWLFHLQHUURU¶OLHVLQ
the criminal justice system. 
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 Ibid, p.172. 
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 <http://www.insidetime.org> 
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procedure for discussion which helped to inform the chapters of this thesis. The cases and 
issue arising are itemised in Appendix D.31 
 
Police Commissioner for Kent  
 
Ann Barnes, then Police Commissioner for Kent, also provided information concerning 
HCSA investigations recorded by Kent Police, and this informs the consideration of police 
investigation methods in Chapter III. 
 
(iv) Ethical considerations 
 
Safeguarding subjects from harm 
A number of ethical considerations arose concerning the acquisition and use of volunteer 
GDWD7KHUHVHDUFKSDUWO\LQYROYHGWKHH[DPLQDWLRQRIFRSLHVRIDSSHOODQWV¶FDVHILOHVSuch 
cases are confidential and of a highly sensitive nature for both complainants, defendants and 
witnesses. Documents pertained to trials involving living people, the evidence of victims, 
defendants, witnesses and the casework of their legal representatives and the police. No party 
at any point was harmed by the research.  
It is clearly in the interests of those who claim to be victims of a miscarriage of justice to be 
able to participate in studies where areas of potential miscarriages of justice have previously 
been overlooked by legal practitioners and academics. 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
The complainants of sexual offences, where a conviction has been obtained, have victim 
status and the right to anonymity for the rest of their lives under section 1 of the Sexual 
Offences (Amendment Act) 1992. There was no breach of anonymity in reviewing or 
commenting on these cases, or at all. The research was seeking to identify legal issues only. 
Consideration must also be given to the fact that inmates convicted of HCSA offences are 
termed vulnerable prisoners because they are segregated from the main wings where bullying 
has been known to occur.32 Any human party or identifiable source therefore had to be 
securely anonymised, and was. 
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Confidentiality 
It was imperative that no human subjects would be harmed by the publication of case 
materials or by any identification of the parties involved. This was achieved by substituting 
names of parties with letters of the alphabet not connected with their names. 
The purpose of the study was to identify and discuss possible defects in due process, 
including points of law which had already been raised at the Court of Appeal. Much of the 
data to be perused was already in the public domain.  
 
The University of Kent Research Ethics Advisory Group approved contact with potential 
volunteers and their case files. The advertisement placed in the publication Inside Time stated 
what was being sought - volunteers who claimed to have been wrongfully convicted of 
HCSA offences, be willing to put this to proof and to contact this study via a University 
mailing address.  
 
Other ethical issues 
Provision was made to enable the volunteers to be able to withdraw from the study in writing. 
The prisoners were responding to the advertisement placed in Inside Time - a general appeal 
for volunteers. Prisoners therefore initiated contacting this study via the University address 
given therein.  
Case files and correspondence were stored on secure premises. There was also a poste 
restante base at the University for correspondence to and from volunteers and their legal 
representatives so as not to give out any personal address. Case files were returned by 
UHFRUGHGGHOLYHU\WRWKHYROXQWHHUV¶OHJDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVDIWHUSHUXVDO7KHWLPHIUDPHIRU
acceptance of volunteer documentation was two years. 
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Chapter II The heightened concern in society about child sexual abuse and the impact 
of that concern on the law and criminal process 
 
 
Clearly, one important factor in the background of all investigations and prosecutions of child 
abuse is the heightened atmosphere of public anxiety, fear and outrage in which they take 
place. 7KLVFKDSWHUDGGUHVVHVWKHTXHVWLRQµHas this affected the development of policy and 
law, and the practice of police officers and prosecutors, in such a way as to compromise the 
fairness of the process?¶  
8QGHUWKHKHDGLQJµ&RQVWUXFWRIFKLOGDEXVH¶Lt provides an historical and sociological 
account of the conceptualisation of childhood and the growing understanding of, and concern 
about, child abuse over recent centuries. It explores the ways in which that state and society 
at large have dealt with the increasing recognition of the need to protect children and young 
people from harm both by means of moral condemnation and the creation of and/or 
improvements in sexual offence laws designed to protect minors and prosecute offenders. 
8QGHUWKHKHDGLQJµ7KHKHLJKWHQHGFRQFHUQDERXW&6$¶the chapter explores the intense 
modern focus on child sexual abuse as expressed by the public, the media, commentators, and 
politicians. It considers first the extensive study of those other instances of heightened public 
anxiety, fear and outrage that haYHEHHQFKDUDFWHULVHGDVµPRUDOSDQLFV¶7KHUHZLOOEHDbrief 
review of the literature, - Cohen1 then Goode and Nachman,2 - focusing in particular on the 
FRQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUNRIµPRUDOSDQLF¶. This will be followed by a consideration of the 
HYLGHQFHWKDWVXFKµSDQLFV¶GRLQDUHDVRWKHUWKDQ&6$LQIOXHQFHWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI
legislation, the incidence of prosecutions and the conduct of legal process in such a way as to 
compromise fairness to those accused of crimes. 
The chapter will then explore the application of µmoral panic¶ theory to CSA itself. It will 
assess the usefulness of the µmoral panic¶ category for our understanding of the heightened 
concern specifically surrounding CSA today. It will then consider whether any evidence has 
emerged showing that the heightened atmosphere in relation to CSA has influenced the 
development of legislation, the incidence of prosecutions or the conduct of the legal process 
                                                          
1
 S Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (Routledge, 2006).  
2
 E Goode and B-Y Nachman, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance (Blackwell, 2001). 
P a g e  |   
in such a way as to compromise fairness to those accused of CSA offences. Both evidence 
from the literature and further evidence relating to this area will be examined. 
 
(a)  Construct of child sexual abuse 
(i) On childhood 
 
Laws concerning the protection of children and childhood are manifestations of how society 
regards its young. Childhood policies and practices are shaped by competing images and 
discourses of the child. 
The concept of the child and childhood has been shaped by developmental markers - 
bioloJLFDOSV\FKRORJLFDODVZHOODVFXOWXUDOHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOFKDQJHV$µFKLOG¶FDQEH
based on physical development and is therefore a young person between the stages of birth 
and puberty.3 Adolescence as a concept - the post-puberty but not fully mature phase of 
teenagers - only dates back from the early 1900s.4 In legal systems in many countries, a child 
is below the age of majority, under the age of full legal responsibility. Once sh/e has reached 
majority, childhood officially ends and the person becomes an adult. 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child GHILQHVFKLOGKRRGDVµEHORZWKH
DJHRI\HDUV¶5 The UNCRC wording intentionally does not specify when childhood 
begins. Being more precise would have would have threatened universal ratification because 
of the implication for moral and cultural debates surrounding abortion and related issues,6 At 
the same time, Article 6 of the Convention on the Rights of the Children refers to his/her 
inherent right to life and to the States Parties¶REOLJDWLRQWRHQVXUHWRWKHPD[LPXPH[WHQW
possible, the survival and development of the child. States Parties are urged to take all 
possible measures to improve perinatal care for mothers and babies.7 Thus children are now 
protected by human rights legislation - which gives them a status with entitlements. These are 
modern understandings of what a child may be, but it will be seen that it is not a static 
concept. 
                                                          
3
 Oxford Dictionary online: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/child?q=child>. 
4
 -HQNLQV3µ:DWFKLQJWKH5HVHDUFK3HQGXOXP¶Sexual Development in Childhood edited by J Bancroft, 
(Indiana University Press 2003), p.8. 
5
 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, Part I, Article 1 ;< http://www.ohchr.org>. 
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 R Hodgkin and P Newell, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Third 
(GLWLRQ8QLWHG1DWLRQV&KLOGUHQ¶V)XQGS 
7
 Ibid, p.84. 
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Childhood, as it is now understood, has only existed for a few hundred years. As far as can be 
discerned from the medieval period, children were treated like adults as soon as they were no 
longer dependent on their mothers, from about the age of seven.8 Life was shorter then. 
Between the ages of 14 and 40 - the childbearing years - DZRPDQ¶VOLIHH[SHFWDQF\ZDVKDOI
WKDWRIDPDQ¶V$QWHQDWDOFDUHZDVFHUWDLQO\OHVVHIILFLHQWWKDQLWLVQRZ&KLOGELUWKZDVOHVV
sanitary, and put the mother at a high risk of fatal infection. Complications in birth were more 
frequently fatal too, as, although midwives existed, they had little medical knowledge and 
their hygiene was poor.9  
Children were regarded as assets for the family, whatever the social class. Girls would be 
expected to marry early for their security and for the economic advantage of the family and 
bear children to continue the bloodline. Boys would be trained to work at family trades or 
learn how to manage estates. Adults and children occupied the same worlds and spoke the 
same language to each other. The union of young people of the opposite sex would have been 
decided by the family or tribal custom at the onset of their puberty.10 There were sound 
reasons for the social acceptance of adolescent pregnancies in the Middles Ages; girls were 
less likely to miscarry or die from childbirth at that age because they had more iron in their 
blood.11 In their twenties, however, the risk of mortality in childbirth was higher. Other 
practical reasons for early marriage included acquiring estates and family alliances.12 
Whilst early marriage was the norm, there were still laws protecting girls from predation, 
from the medieval era onwards. Regulation of sexual activity with minors in England dates as 
far back as 1275, whHQD:HVWPLQVWHUVWDWXWHPDGHLWDFULPHWRµUDYLVKDPDLGHQZLWKLQDJH
ZKHWKHUZLWKRUZLWKRXWKHUFRQVHQW¶- the first rape law. Edward Coke later interpreted 
µZLWKLQDJH¶DVµWKHDJHRIPDUULDJH¶ZKLFKZDVWKHQ\HDUVRIDJH7KHILUVWODZ
prohibiting child sexual abuse was made in 1576, which made it a felony to µunlawfully and 
carnally know and abuse any woman child under the age of 10 years¶.13 
Significantly, most people were unlettered during the medieval era, time was spent 
developing children for their adult roles. With the arrival of the printing press, adulthood 
became a symbolic rather than biological achievement.14 Broader political and cultural 
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changes in the 18th century such as the Enlightenment conceived human beings as 
autonomous and rational and distinguished adults from children. The philosopher Locke 
DJUHHGZLWK3ODWR¶VLGHDOWKDWDGXOWVZHUHUHVSRQVLEOHIRULPSULQWLQJYDOXHVRQWKHtabula rasa 
RIWKHFKLOG¶VPLQG- values such as literacy, education, reason, self-control and shame - to 
form the civilised adult. Rousseau, by contrast, regarded children as being inherently virtuous 
and requiring protection from the corrupting influence of adult society. The former 
emphasised nurture, the latter nature. Their philosophies, emphasising the needs to educate 
children, persist into modernity.15  
Childhood was therefore emerging as a concept, but children continued to be treated as adults 
in practice until the 1870 Education Act which made rudimentary education compulsory for 
them.16 Until then, children were more likely to be found working all day in dangerous, dirty 
and exhausting places of industry for the survival of themselves and their families.  
Whilst the welfare needs of children were beginning to be addressed by the late 1800s, their 
moral and sexual welfare would emerge around this time as well. It was not until 1875 that 
the age of consent was raised to 13 years. This was because 19th century moral reformers 
drew the age of consent into campaigns against prostitution.17  
Western concepts of childhood are derived from romantic notions of inherent innocence 
which persists into modernity.18 Sexuality has become the exclusive realm of adults, whereas 
the innocent child is asexual, vulnerable, naïve and requires protection from this realm. This 
perceived vulnerability of children to sexual danger has caused a permanent state of 
heightened concern around children ever since child sexual abuse emerged as a major social 
problem from the 1980s onwards. Where legislation prolongs childhood,19 it also denies 
children personhood and citizenship, thereby privileging adults over children.20 
Policy development within the UK - a highly industrialised and urbanised western democracy 
- has been strongly shaped by welfare perspectives rooted in philanthropic and charity work, 
IRXQGHGRQGLVFRXUVHVDURXQGFKLOGUHQ¶VQHHGVDQGRIGHVLUDEOHRXWFRPHVLQWHUPVRIKHDOWK
development, and education.21 The British government embarked on a fundamental reform of 
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FKLOGUHQ¶VVHUYLFHVXQGHUWKHKHDGOLQHµ(YHU\&KLOG0DWWHUV¶including major legislation, 
&KLOGUHQ$FW,QWKH8.WKHUHLVVWLOODPELYDOHQFHWRZDUGVPDNLQJFKLOGUHQ¶VULJKWV
explicit - the UK is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC 
1989), though reforms embracing rights principles are now found, such as the appointment of 
D&KLOGUHQ¶V&RPPLVVLRQHU$UJXDEO\WKHSDUDGLJPRIFKLOGKRRGKDVQRZVKLIWHGIURPRQH
ZKHUHWKHFKLOGZDVSHUFHLYHGDVDKXPDQµEHFRPLQJ¶WRRQHZKHUHVKHKDVKXPDQULJKWV
where the default has changed from being a considered a worthy cause to exercising inherent 





show how certain societies place a value on their early integration into work and economic 
contribution.23 The Western view of child development places psychological rather than 
economic value of the child to parents, socialisation goals associated with separation and 
independence, and a style of rearing encouraging autonomy and social development. In 
traditional agrarian societies, the emphasis is on obedience training with little scope for play, 
choice or the modern exploration of ideas and interdependence and respect for parental 
authority.24 $FKLOG¶VGHYHORSPHQWLVDIIHFWHGE\PLFURV\VWHPV- their everyday settings and 
relationships in home, school and community - mesosystems - which are relationships 
between micro-systems such as home and school, and exosystems which are influences 
impacting on the quality of childhood e.g. political issues, such as inequalities in resources, 
provisions and opportunities.25 
Childhood is a series of interacting systems which are socially constructed. There are 
variations in how childhood is understood and experienced and how it is applied to individual 
and groups of children in relation to their age, gender, maturity and social status and cultural 
background. Childhood entails being socially and culturally processed by nurture, 
communication and education - to acquire cognitive and social skills perceived as culturally 
relevant and valuable to the community.26 Society has artificially prolonged childhood by 
                                                          
22
 Fn 6, R Hodgkin, and P Newell, op cit, pp 28-30. 
23
 Fn 21,Woodhead, p.17. 
24
 Ibid, p.19. 
25
 Ibid, p.18. 
26
 Ibid, p.21. 
P a g e  |   
extending education. Young people are now mandated to participate in some form of 
education or training until the age of 18 in the UK.27  
6RFLHW\¶VDPELYDOHQFHWRZDUGVWKH\RXQJ 
A bifurcated view of children persists. Children of today may be viewed as requiring special 
care and attention, but there is also a tendency at times to treat children as adults. This 
occurred when two-year-old James Bulger was killed by two ten-year-old boys, Robert 
Thompson and Jon Venables.28 Social outcry over such an unusual tragedy led to the 
abolition of doli incapax29, the presumption that a person aged fourteen or under does not 
understand that what they have done is seriously wrong. Public outrage was followed by the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶Vimmediate reaction to the two accused being found guilty. The minimum 
FKLOGUHQ¶VWDULIIIRUPXUGHUZDVUDLVHGIURP\HDUVWR- which the European Court of 
Human Rights overturned in 1999.30 
7KH&RXQFLORI(XURSH¶V&RQYHQWLRQRQWKH3URWHFWLRQRI&KLOGUHQagainst Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse31 criminalises child prostitution and child pornography. The 
GHILQLWLRQRIµFKLOG¶- aged up to18 - is broad, because it includes sexually immature, 
pubescent as well as sexually mature beings. Raising the threshROGRIµFKLOG¶WRLVDSROLF\
designed to protect children from the predations of adults who organise and consume child 
pornography, yet it has also been argued that this legislation is difficult to implement and 
repressive because it compromises the right of an adolescent to have respect for his privacy 
under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This issue arose in Austria, 
where the age of consent to sexual intercourse is 14, and age for purchasing pornography is 
16,32 but this country had signed the agreement concerning the European Union Council 
Framework Decision 2004/68/JI  ³RQFRPEDWLQJWKHVH[XDOH[SORLWDWLRQRIFKLOGUHQDQGFKLOG
SRUQRJUDSK\´ZKLFKGHILQHVµFKLOG¶DVEHORZWKe age of 18. The 2004 Decision has been 
criticised on the basis that it may incriminate young people who create, disseminate and 
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access pornography but not reach the perpetrators and disseminators of child pornography.33  
Member states in the EU found it difficult to harmonise their national legal orders with the 
QHZGHILQLWLRQRIµFKLOG¶XQder the 2004 Framework Decision. Judge Hofmeister considered 
the consequences of the Framework decision as retrograde: 
7RWUHDWDGROHVFHQWVVXGGHQO\DV³FKLOGUHQ´LQWKHOHJDOVHQVHDQGWRFRPELQHWKLV
with VHULRXVFRQVHTXHQFHVDFFRUGLQJWRFULPLQDOODZLVDFOHDUFRQWUDGLFWLRQ«LQFDVH
of the so-called protection of adolescents against depictions it may happen that 
adolescents might be offenders and victims at the same time.34 
The Decision was replaced by the more comprehensive Directive 2011/93 of the European 
Council and Parliament which provided a new framework for dealing with sexual abuse, the 
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography but the provision of the Decision 
relating to the definition of a child remains. 
Anti-abuse measures may therefore compromise the sexual autonomy of these young people 
and be punitive on those whom the law was designed to protect. In England, child protection 
measures have already adversely affected the sexual autonomy of young people where one 
party is over-age and the other a minor where the age gap between them is slight. A reluctant 
Judge Sylvia de Bertodano placed a 17-year-old male for a short term on the sex offenders 
register. He had consensual sex with a girl who was almost 16 but the judge had no choice 
but to convict him of a sexual offence with a minor.35 The judge was also aware of the social 
stigma attached to him being classified as a sex offender and she apologised to him in court 
for being legally compelled to sentence him thus. 
It is paradoxical that children may be criminalised under measures designed to protect 
children and childhood, as illustrated in the cases discussed above. It has to remembered, 
however, that it has only been relatively recently that children have been afforded rights and 
protection from economic and sexual exploitation. Whilst the new legislation against sexual 
exploitation may be perceived as being somewhat overprotective of the young, in general, 
modern child protection measures and sexual offence laws serve to address the prior 
inadequate safeguarding of children from sexual abuse. The concept of child abuse and the 
evolution of child abuse sanctions are discussed next. 
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(ii) Typology of child abuse 
 
The concept of child abuse has been shaped by several perspectives including social, penal, 
medical and social welfare. 
Child abuse is the way in which certain kinds of action are understood and to be regarded as a 
serious social problem demanding action.36 It is a concept based on community standards of 
appropriate and reasonable child care. Child abuse or child neglect in any particular society is 
a product of social negotiation between individual values and beliefs, social norms, and 
professional knowledge about children, child development and family relationships.37 Child 
abuse may involve harm inflicted by a perpetrator who may be held morally accountable for 
the following types of abuse - sexual, physical, emotional abuse and physical neglect. 
Child sexual abuse - intergenerational sex - is of the greatest concern to the public and 
welfare professionals.38 Sexual abuse is now a widely recognised problem, but the legal 
protection of minors and the pursuit of offenders only fully developed in the latter part of the 
20th century. Children making claims of abuse to family, friends, law enforcement and in 
court were often disbelieved. Spencer points out the incongruity of the former judicial 
warning to juries about the danger of convicting an accused of a sexual offence on 
uncorroborated evidence, whilst there was no duty to warn about the danger of convicting on 
the evidence of madmen, convicts or recidivist perjurers.39 Until recently, public knowledge 
about sexual abuse was minimal.40  
:RUGVVXFKDVµFKLOGDEXVH¶µFKLOGQHJOHFW¶DQGµVH[XDODEXVH¶KDYHQRFRPPRQO\DFFHSWHG
PHDQLQJVEXWDUHµHYRFDWLYHWHUPVZKLFKDSSHDODVPXFKWRWKHHPRWLRQVDVWRWKH
LQWHOOHFW¶41 Child abuse is multi-faceted: facts and figures on child abuse will therefore be 
dictated by the kinds of abuse that are included. Data may be based on any report of abuse 
whether or not a prosecution leads to a conviction, e.g., as recorded by the Crown 
Prosecution Service. Researchers may include any combination of these facts; estimates of 
abuse that go unreported may also feature in statistics. 
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The concept of child abuse may also include newly identified areas of the problem, although 
the existence of this problem is longstanding e.g. genital mutilation. It is estimated that 750 
million males have been circumcised worldwide for cultural, religious and medical reasons, 
and it is often done at birth.42 Female children are circumcised for cultural reasons: about 140 
million girls worldwide, usually performed on girls from the age of three onwards. This 
practice was outlawed in the UK under the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985.43 It 
is now a criminal offence for teachers, social workers or healthcare workers who suspect a 
case of female genital mutilation of any child in their care to fail to report it under s.5B of the 
Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. There is also a duty to prevent the children from being 
radicalised by terrorist ideology.44  
7KHSUDFWLFHRIµEUHDVWLURQLQJ¶- a tradition in Cameroonian society, where puberty-aged 
girls have their developing breastVSHUPDQHQWO\IODWWHQHGZLWKKRWREMHFWVWRµSURWHFW¶\RXQJ
females from unwanted male sexual attention and advances - has been highlighted by 
officials and the media in the UK as a newly recognised form of child abuse.45  
Social policies can also lead child abuse and neglect and suffering. Recent government 
welfare cuts measures have led to the eviction and removal of more than 64 000 homeless 
families from London, relocating them to cheaper areas irrespective of the consequences this 
may have on family welfare. Some councils threatened to remove into care children of 
parents reluctant to move out. Newly relocated children lose continuum in their education, 
there have also been cases of child deaths and neglect which occurred post-relocation which 
might have been prevented had these vulnerable children remained monitored by social 
services at their former address.46 
Who are the child abuse offenders? 
According to the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, based on reports 
of children aged 11-17 years, 4.8% have experienced contact abuse,47 of these children 90% 
were abused by someone whom they knew, 34% of the children who had experienced contact 
abuse by an adult did not tell anyone about it. Child abuse may also be defined according to 
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the context in which it is found. Most victims of CSA are acquainted with their abusers: 30% 
have been abused by relatives, including brothers, fathers, mothers, uncles or cousins, called 
familial abuse. Only 5 % of CSA is committed by a biological father or stepfather; 60% of 
CSA is perpetrated by acquaintances such as friends, babysitters or neighbours and may be 
termed extra-familial abuse.48 Most sexual abusers are therefore not strangers.49 The extra-
familial abuse cases also include intra-familial cases, where the caregivers are unrelated, such 
as children in day care centres, foster care or similar settings. Abuse by caregivers occurring 
in care homes and schools may also be described as institutional child abuse. This thesis will 
be examining cases which may be either familial or extra-familial, though all cases will have 
the commonality of being historic.  
Ideology of child abuse 
The 19th FHQWXU\8.¶V0HGLFDO:RPHQ¶V)HGHUDWLRQ- an early feminist movement began to 
argue that all forms of adult-child sexual contact, not just rape, could be harmful, including 
touching and exhibitionism.50 Child sexual abuse was also publicised by the feminist anti-
rape movements of the 1970s. Public figures and non-feminists then campaigned against 
CSA in the 1970s and 1980s. Politicians subsequently created government policy to protect 
children.51 Feminists had also exposed the problem of incest in the patriarchal family, they 
also challenged: prior legal definitions of abuse which downplayed or ignored non-
penetrative acts, the complicity of children being sexually abused, the consent of children to 
being party to prostitution, pornography, and intergenerational sex and victim blaming. 
Radical feminists thought that the State embodied the interests of men. It was men who held 
power (Marxist feminists emphasized economic power, too) and control over other members 
of society - therefore, legislative and policy responses to child sexual abuse were enforcing 
patriarchal familial relations.52 Men also account for the vast majority of sexual offences, 
therefore feminists thought that either men were inherently more likely to offend for 
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biological reasons (radical view) or at least due to normative masculine gender practices 
structured by reference to the masculine ideal (moderate view).53 
Post-modern feminists later contended that whilst cultural explanations explaining the 
phenomenon of CSA should be acknowledged, the approach of this theory was too narrow. 
For example, it does not explain why only a small minority of men as a whole are offenders, 
it was neither informed by adequate empirical research nor explanatory depth; nor did it 
provide a framework for changing the dispositions and behaviour of sex offenders.54 Sexual 
offenders are heterogeneous, with psychological variables in impulsivity, deviant sexual 
preferences and intimacy deficits.55 Whilst the feminist perspectives had utility in articulating 
the external influences which accounted for the diversity of offenders and offences, justifying 
social policies aimed at preventing the sexual abuse of children, they did not offer guidance 
on causation and treatment of sex offenders and tended to be dismissive of the value of 
psychological research.  
Child welfare 
UK legislation now responds to child abuse through personal violence and sexual offences 
statutes. The Children Act 1989 protects children specifically from being abused in 
institutions, particularly residential care, foster homes and day care centres. The provisions 
QHLWKHUH[SOLFLWO\XVHVWKHWHUPµFKLOGDEXVH¶QRUGHILQHVZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVWKLVEXWLWGRHV
RIIHUPHFKDQLVPVIRUUHPRYLQJFKLOGUHQµDWULVN¶RIDEXVHHJFRXUWRUGHUVFDQEHPDGH
c.41, Part 1, section 1(3)(e) concerning the welfare of the child. 
The UK has issued guidance for professionals in its papers, Keeping Children Safe in 
Education56 and Working Together to Safeguard Children57 with definitions of specific 
aspects of child maltreatment. They both describe four distinct categories of maltreatment:  
Physical abuse: including the hitting, kicking, baby shaking or other physical aggression 
likely to hurt or cause significant harm to a child; 




3URFHHGLQJV¶vol 3 p.4. 
54
 Fn 52, Purvis and Ward: op cit, p.304. 
55
 Ibid, p.310. 
56
 Department for Education, Keeping Children Safe in Education ± Statutory Guidance for Schools and Colleges, 
July 2015. 
57
 Department for Children Schools and Families, Working Together to Safeguard Children (2015), pp 92-93. 
P a g e  |   
Emotional abuse: the persistent emotional maltreatment of a child such as to cause severe and 
SHUVLVWHQWDGYHUVHHIIHFWVRQWKHFKLOG¶VHPRWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW 
Sexual abuse: forcing or enticing a child or young person to take part in sexual activities, not 
necessarily involving a high level of violence, whether or not the child is aware of what is 
happening. It may involve physical contact, non-contact activities, encouraging children to 
behave in sexually inappropriate ways, prostitution and sexual exploitation of a child for 
financial or commercial gain.  
1HJOHFW$SHUVLVWHQWIDLOXUHWRPHHWDFKLOG¶VEDVLFSK\VLFDORUGHYHORSPHQWDOQHHGVLQWHUPV
of health, education, emotional development, nutrition, clothing, shelter, safety and safe 
living conditions. 
The European dimension to the child abuse problem 
Keir Starmer, the former Director of Public Prosecutions advocated that all professionals 
should be required by law to report child sexual abuse, making non-reporting a crime. But the 
department for Education ruled out introducing comprehensive mandatory reporting and 
insisted that existing professional guidelines were adequate.58  
But as confirmed by the decision of A v United Kingdom,59 member states which adhere to 
the European Convention on Human Rights are under a positive duty to protect children from 
physical and sexual abuse where such harm amounts to torture, cruelty, is inhuman or 
degrading under Article 3. 
Concerted efforts by EU member states to agree to sanction child abuse are evidenced in 
Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 
on combating sexual abuse, the sexual exploitation of children, and child pornography which 
aims to harmonise legislation of these types of offences throughout the European Union. This 
Directive sets out twenty types of sexual offence under four categories - sexual abuse, sexual 
exploitation, child pornography and the online solicitation of children for a sexual purpose.  
There is scope for legislators in the UK to mandate the reporting of all types of child abuse to 
law enforcement, otherwise the state may be breaching its duty to prevent harm to children 
under Article 3 of the ECHR. In E and Others v. the United Kingdom60, the Court determined 
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that prolonged sexual abuse of the applicants met the threshold of an Article 3 violation by 
the State. The Court was satisfied that the social services should have been aware that the 
children in that case had been at risk of sexual and physical abuse. A failure to take 
reasonably available measures which could have had a real prospect of altering the outcome 
or mitigating the harm is sufficient to engage the responsibility of the State. In E.S. and 
Others v. Slovakia,61 the Court extended this liability to cover not just inaction by individual 
social workers, but also procedures within the system that lead to inadequate protection.  
EU member states are under a duty to cooperate with each other in prosecuting child abuse 
cases.62 Legislative harmonisation can also be seen ± all member states now have in common 
a minimum age of consent and are obliged to impose legal sanctions on those who commit 
sexual offences against children.63 
 
Domestic measures to safeguard children from abuse 
 
,QWKH8.WKH&KLOGUHQ$FWZDVFRQVLGHUHGWREH³WKHPRVWFRPSUHKHQVLYHDQGIDU
UHDFKLQJRIFKLOGODZ´64 Children may be protected by multi-agency services from child 
abuse and neglect where such reports come to their attention under section 10 of the Children 
Act 2004. Such agencies include district councils, police, probation, youth offending teams, 
health agencies, service providers under section 114 of the Learning and Skills Act 2000 and 
the Learning and Skills Council for England. Section 11 of the same places safeguarding of 
children duties on these agencies, to promote child welfare, safe staffing procedures, share 
appropriate information, undertake relevant staff training, and comply with any other relevant 
government guidance.  
However, there may also be vulnerable children who have not yet been noticed by child 
protection services. Despite the fact that the UK is a signatory to the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, which includes the right to special protection for 
refugee children under Article 22, there are still children of asylum seekers being held in UK 
detention centres. Since 2010, at least 127 minors have been wrongly classified as adults and 
held in these centres.65 
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Child neglect is the commonest type of abuse 
 
Poverty in households causes children to suffer from neglect, wilful or otherwise. Schools in 
the UK may provide breakfast clubs66 to undernourished children where the household is on 
the breadline, but there will be families where the parents do not accept that such measures 
are needed or do not know that they can prevent the neglect of their children. 
 
The medical journal, The Lancet, published figures on child abuse and neglect in high-
income nations showing that child neglect is at least as damaging as physical or sexual abuse 
in the long term, but receives the least scientific and public attention. Eighty per cent of 
neglect cases are due to parents or parental guardians. Children who are exposed to one form 
of abuse are often subjected to others on multiple or continuous occasions. In low-income 
nations, the same problems exist, but girls are at higher risk of infanticide, sexual abuse and 
neglect, whereas the boys appear to be at greater risk of physical punishment.67 
Finkelhor found that, in the United States, child neglect featured as the most frequent kind of 
child abuse; 47% of cases were substantiated, physical abuse comprised 25% and sexual 
abuse, 15%.68 He estimated the prevalence of child sexual abuse (adults who disclosed that 
they had been sexually abused in childhood) to be about 20% of women and 5-10% of men.69 
Most perpetrators are men: 90%.70 
This section has served to illustrate that child abuse does not appear to have socio-economic 
or cultural boundaries; nor are the doors closed for previously overlooked or novel kinds of 
child abuse.71 It will now be shown how child abuse is connected with historical values and 
how the concept has evolved from society regarding children as property subject to the power 
of their families and society, to one where children have acquired rights by law designed to 
protect their childhood.  
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(iii) Historical development of the awareness of child sexual abuse as a problem 
meriting legal reform 
 
This section illustrates that child abuse has only been recognised from the late 19th century 
onwards as a distinct phenomenon from which children have a right to be protected. 
The past reveals how much the concept of child abuse has evolved as well as how it has been 
dealt with. The 21st century saw the codification of sexual offences and the creation of laws 
which recognised newer types of child sexual abuse.  
 
19th century 
Child sexual abuse in the 19th FHQWXU\ZDVµGLVFRYHUHG¶E\SHRSOHFRQFHUQHGDERXWWKH
treatment of thousands of underage and girls just over the age of consent who worked in 
brothels. Philanthropists were showing an ongoing heightened sense of concern for the moral 
welfare of children.72 Child abuse was not a new discovery at that time, but was being 
KLJKOLJKWHGDQGDGGUHVVHGLQDPRUHRUJDQLVHGZD\,Q3ROORFN¶VUHYLHZRIThe Times of 
child cruelty reports, out of 385 tried cases of neglect, physical and sexual abuse, only 27 per 
cent of those accused thereof had been found not guilty, indicating, that law and society was 
aware of and condemned child abuse long before the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 
1889.73  
The sexual abuse of boys had been identified in France by research conducted in 1850s; 
however, these findings were never translated into English. From the 1860s onwards, child 
sexual abuse was discovered by the coalescence of the interests of social purity and child 
welfare movements.74 Prosecutions of child sexual abuse by the Associate Institute for the 
Protection of Women and Children were recorded in the 1860s.75 Child abuse, as viewed by 
the Victorians, was premised on the Christian moral economy of social purity which included 
the eradication of prRVWLWXWLRQDQGSRUQRJUDSK\DQGVDYLQJµIDOOHQ¶JLUOFKLOGUHQ76 
In 1885, the Society of Friendless Girls was set up in England, consisting of 160 branches 
aiming to abolish prostitution. The purity campaigners later lined up with progressive 
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feminist organisations to lobby for raising the age of consent in Britain and other Anglophone 
countries.77 
Child prostitution also was publicised in Pall Mall Magazine when a journalist, William T. 
Stead, wrote a series of articles on the existence of juvenile prostitution in London as well as 
the state-controlled trafficking of young working class English girls to brothels on the 
continent.78 Public outcry ensued in 1885. Disparate groups such as Anglican bishops and 
socialists joined together to protest against the sexual abuse of children. Religious 
philanthropic pressure groups had also played a vital role in bringing to the fore concerns 
about welfare of street children, young offenders, children at work and those looked after by 
Poor Law authority institutions, giving rise to government intervention and state legislation.79 
Cases of child sexual abuse were also documented around the same time in the United States 
by workers of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCC) from 1880 -
1910.80 Records showed that SPCC workers were more prepared to accept allegations of 
sexual abuse than before. The work of the SPCC sufficiently impressed upon visitor Thomas 
Agnew, a banker, who subsequently set up the Liverpool SPCC in 1881 and the London 
Branch in 1884.81 Another SPCC member, Samuel Smith, successfully advocated for the 
abolition of the oath for girl victims of sexual assault as part of the criminal law 
amendments.82 Previously, it had been accepted that adult witnesses understood the nature of 
oath, but in the case of children, the trial judge would question them on whether they 
understood what this would involve.83 
Victorians, who idolised the concept of the family unit, were less certain about the nature of 
childhood and adolescence and their developmental phases.84 The child had an inferior status 
compared with an adult: it was not defined by sexual development. In the Victorian era, 
working class girls were seen as morally inferior and seductive beings, by those who opposed 
raising the age of consent.85 They feared that by late adolescence, girls were physiologically 
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mature and possessed sufficient understanding about how to use the law to blackmail unwary 
men.86 
Sexual activity of adults with children was also condoned on erroneous medical grounds. It 
was also believed that having sex with virgins was a cure for impotence and depression; 
therefore, brothels could be seen as being advantageous to men.87 The myth about the 
curative property of sex with virgins for VD sufferers persisted in both literate and 
comparatively illiterate societies.88 
Middle class parents were concerned about the welfare and moral upbringing of their 
daughters, but the children of working class parents who themselves were put out to work 
from the age of twelve upwards, could not be watched over in this way, as they were often 
away from their families in servile posts. Middle class males perceived working class girls as 
adults, whereas their own daughters of the same age were not afforded this status.89 
The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 raised the age of consent from thirteen to sixteen, 
However, there had been objections and it took four years for the Bill to become enacted. 
Stead had conducted investigative journalism by purchasing a girl and prepared her for export 
to the Continent.90 The child was turned over to the Salvation Army instead and Stead 
exposed the trade in girls in Pall Mall Gazette. The publicity spurred further debate of The 
Criminal Law Bill by Parliament in July 1885.  
Alfred Dyer, an evangelist and publisher specialising in pamphlets and books advocating 
social purity91 had gathered evidence from licensed brothels in Belgium that young girls were 
being held against their will. Prostitution of young English girls abroad was permitted, due to 
a legal loophole which did not make it illegal to induce a girl over thirteen to become a 
prostitute. Moreover, Somerset House was known to have forged birth certificates for girls 
under twenty-one.92 The National Vigilance Association which featured prominently in 1885 
in the year of legislative change, also made the sexual exploitation issue wide-ranging when 
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it branched out in 1899 to form the International Bureau for the Suppression of Traffic in 
Persons.93 
The Criminal Law (Amendment Act) 1885, created and extended a particular, historically and 
culturally specific type of childhood much in the same way that the Education Acts aimed to 
do, so that by 1899, children to the age of 12 were mandated to attend state schools.94 Critics 
of this law who had been against the raising the sexual age of majority, argued that 
patriarchal society was attempting to control the sexuality and maintain the purity of females, 
as similar provisions did not apply to males. Those who advocated raising the age of consent 
to 16, primarily the Social Purity movement, sought to tighten moral controls on sexuality as 
well as the desire to prevent child prostitution. The boundary of 16 was designed to protect 
women, rather than being viewed as the age when they had the ability to reach their own 
decisions.95 It was not until 1979 that a Policy Advisory Committee on Sexual Offences 
justified retaining the age of consent at 16 on other grounds; the physical harm a potential 
pregnancy or abortion could have on an underage girl, psychological harm, damage to her 
education and her immaturity. The retained age of consent also offered legal certainty about 
the time she was deemed capable of consent.96 
The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 made it a felony for a man to have sexual 
intercourse with a girl under ten, but a misdemeanour if aged between ten and twelve, with 
VSHFLDOSURYLVLRQVDOORZLQJSDUHQWVWRFKDUJHDJLUO¶VµDEGXFWRU¶IRUORVVRIKHUVHUYLFHVLIVKH
were under sixteen. Debate about reforming the age of consent laws included those who 
thought that the law should have stayed at twelve and those who would have accepted 
twenty-one. The age of sixteen was therefore a compromise between the two extremes.97 
Although many girls had been coerced into prostitution, for most of them it was voluntary, a 
way of life given the limited life chances and choices before them. Users of prostitutes - 
middle and upper class men, would have preferred to have kept the status quo of the prior 
lower age of consent to prevent themselves and their sons from being criminalised by the 
proposed raising of the age of consent. Hopwood, M.P., and social reformer Josephine Butler 
thought that the status quo of the lower age should be retained because prostitute girls would 
lose their freedom of choice and their economic livelihood.98 There was thus a growing 
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awareness that children should be legally protected from certain types of abuse, but the 
reforms had focused on eradicating prostitution and trafficking of girls and women and were 
therefore not comprehensive.  
20th century 
The first half of the century was notable for the consolidation of the law relating to children 
and their protection. The Children and Young Persons Act 1933, following the Children and 
Young Persons Act 1920 and the Children Act 1908, brought together the relevant provisions 
and represented a landmark with regard to a basic framework regarding the law in relation to 
the children and their protection. 
The framework had many problems to deal with. It was clear, for example, that child sexual 
abuse is not only limited to child prostitution. Adult-child sexual contact was also occurring 
in the home. Sexual intercourse between parents and their children became a criminal offence 
in the Punishment of Incest Act 1908. Sexual abuse was also occurring in institutions such as 
care homes, hospitals and schools. In 1916, a Royal Commission on Venereal Diseases stated 
that outbreaks of venereal disease (VD) were frequent in institutions.99  
Venereal disease in children was discussed in the medical journal The Lancet in 1925: it 
disclosed that seventeen girls aged 6-10 were living at a well-administered care home and 
suffering from gonorrhoeal vulvo-vaginitis.100 However, the paper concluded that the VD 
was due to innocent transmission or by a fomite (accidental transmission) by sitting on 
unclean toilet seats, towels, baths and rectal thermometers. Doctors knew, in reality, that such 
infections were passed on by adult sexual intercourse with children, but they were complicit 
in finding excuses for their diagnosis or concluded that the child had contracted the VD 
before entering the institution.101 Clinical diagnosis of sexually transmitted diseases in 
children was not new: in Denmark from 1871-80, 803 children under the age of one and 535 
between one and 15 had been infected, mainly with syphilis. A study there a decade later 
found 17 children hospitalised with gonorrhoea. A Danish Commission found it difficult to 
determine the source of these infections, even though nowadays there would be the automatic 
assumption that they had been sexually transmitted.102 Ill children were not yet viewed as 
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victims of sexual abuse, but as vectors of venereal disease (VD).103 There were some who 
VSRNHXSDJDLQVWWKHµPLVJXLGHGPHGLFDOHIIRUWV¶RIPHQZKRFODLPHGWRKDYHVex with 
virgins merely to rid themselves of VD. Early feminists regarded these men as culpable of 
committing morally indefensible acts.104  
The Royal Commission had given rise to the setting up of VD clinics that were accessible to 
the public in the 1920s. Doctors also had child patients living with their parents who also had 
contracted VD, but their hands were often tied in reporting the abuse, as it was the right of the 
father to refuse to have the child treated.105 The National Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) did not have the power to investigate the rape of a child 
ZLWKRXWKHUIDWKHU¶VFRQVHQW)DWKHUVFRQYLFWHGRIFKLOGDEXVHFRXOGDOVRPDNHWKHLUFKLOGUHQ
live with them when they were released from prison.106  
At a Joint Select Committee in 1920, it was stated that Salvation Army care homes with 
children aged 13 to 16, were rife with sexual abuse. 107 The NSPCC, over 29 years, had dealt 
ZLWKRYHUFDVHVRIJLUOµYLFWLPVRILPPRUDOLW\¶ZLWKFDVHVLQ/RQGRQDORQH7KHUH
had hitherto been concern over the law which offered immunity to men accused of rape who 
assaulted girls, but whose defence was that they believed the girl to be over 16. Also, charges 
of rape would often be reduced to indecent assault or not prosecuted at all.108 
In 1922, following pressure from child protection lobbyists and feminists, the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act was brought in to penalise assaults on girls aged 16 and under.109 Section 1 
of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (CLA) 1922 first provided that it should be no defence 
to a charge or indictment for an indecent assault on a child or young person under the age of 
16 to prove that he or she consented to the act of indecency. .110 
Under Section 2 of the CLA 1922 the time bar for prosecuting sexual intercourse with a girl 
under 16 had been extended. Originally in 1885, section 5 of the CLA had limited 
prosecutions to three months; section 27 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1904 
had extended this to six months. The CLA 1922 further extended the limitation period to nine 
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months. Section 1 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1928 made a further increase to 12 
months. 111 
The law gave girls under 16 a legal victim status not seen before, but its protection did not 
extend to girl prostitutes and it had to be balanced with criminalising girls and women over 
16 who sexually assaulted boys under 16. Furthermore, there was even a Home Office 
Departmental Committee on Sexual Offences against Young Persons in 1924-25, which made 
recommendations on how to deal with the sexual abuse of young people, but it was deemed 
too radical to be implemented at that time.112 
Feminists and social purity movements pressed on with advocating raising the age of consent 
from 16 to 18 years. The National Vigilance Association collected newspaper cuttings of 
trials showing how trivially the courts were treating victims of rape and sexual assault and 
how leniently they were dealing with offenders. Campaigners also wanted to have loopholes 
in the law closed due to political compromise or unforeseen consequences, such as the lack of 
an offence covering the situation where a man obliged a child to touch his genitals, (which 
was not criminalised until after 1959). They were also dissatisfied with the loophole where a 
man could be exempt or acquitted with his justification that he believed that an under-age girl 
he had intercourse with was over the age of consent.113 
 
The criminal justice system was criticised at the Departmental Committee on Sexual 
Offences against Young Persons in 1925 for failing to consider the problems that victims of 
sexual abuse encountered.114 The judiciary, magistrates, probation officers, police, moral 
purity and rescue movements and feminists such as the Six Point Group and the National 
Council for Women, debated on how to reconcile the rights of the accused with securing 
higher conviction rates for sex offenders. Some progressive recommendations were made at 
this Committee, such as using specially trained women to deal with victims. It was at this 
time that campaigners exposed how victims were being further victimised by the criminal 
justice system and therefore they needed special protections and procedures;115 they also 
advocated that women doctors should perform examinations and a woman should be with the 
victim at court. The CoPPLWWHH¶V5HSRUWDOVRDGGUHVVHGWKHSV\FKRORJLFDOWUDXPD\RXQJ
complainants underwent when they had to go court to give evidence and retell their 
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experiences as well as face the accused.116 However, it was not until the 1990s, that 
modifications were made by the criminal justice system to make it victim-friendly.117 The 
reluctance of the court to facilitate legal changes may be ascribed to divisions within moralist 
and feminist coalitions who focused on the controversial issue of advocating harsh 
punishment by redefining sexual offences as serious criminal acts.118  
 
Smart asserts that the legal profession itself was an obstacle to the reconceptualisation of 
child sexual abuse. An editorial in a 1926 edition of the Law Journal criticised the Committee 
5HSRUW¶VUHFommendations based on the fallacy that children may lie or make false 
allegations. Additionally, it was not content with the idea of having female-only medical and 
support staff for complainants, as this would disadvantage a falsely accused man, since they 
µZRXOGEHGHWHUPLQHGWRFRQYLFWKLP¶ 
Senior legal establishment figures also opposed the changes, including the then Lord Chief 
Justice and the Director of Public Prosecutions.119 Lawyers saw proposed changes as an 
assault on civil liberties and on the rights of the accused to an adversarial trial which required 
corroboration and the right to face the accuser in open court.120 Judge Cecil Whitely had 
initially been prepared to argue for changes in procedure, including the relaxation of 
corroboration rules, and a tribunal system of questioning, but finally he also demurred. The 
court system itself was biased in favour of male defendants, according to this 1925 Report, 
because female magistrates and jurors were deliberately being excluded from sexual assault 
cases.121 
Appeals against sexual abuse convictions were commonplace and were held against the 
backdrop of the evidential requirement for corroboration and the mind-set that children who 
make such allegations should be disbelieved, even among professionals such as psycho-
analysts.122 Psycho-analysis was a new science to in the 20th century. In 1916, Sigmund Freud 
had stated that:  
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You must not suppose, however, that sexual abuse of a child by its nearest male 
relatives belong entirely to the realm of fantasy. Most analysts will have treated cases 
in which such events were real and could be unimpeachably established.123 
 
However, Litin stated in the 1950s that: 
 
We can see now that in years past patients were lost or driven into psychosis by our 
failure to believe them because of our conviction that much of their accounts must be 
fantasy.124 
 
From the 1930s onwards, two feminist associations - the National Vigilance Association and 
the Association for Moral and Social Hygiene - found ways of countering the perception that 
abused children were devoid of innocence and unworthy of protection because violating a 
µNQRZLQJ¶FKLOGZDVUHJDUGHGDVDOHVVHURIIHQFHWKDQYLRODWLQJDQµLQQRFHQW¶FKLOG125 
Therefore, the NVA focused on the plight of very young girls under 10 who could be viewed 
DVZKROO\µLQQRFHQW¶YLFWLPVRIDEXVHDVRSSRVHGWREHLQJDXWKRUVRIWKHLURZQPLVIRUWXQH
7KH$06+ODEHOOHGDGXOWVH[XDOZURQJGRHUVVµUHSHDWRIIHQGHUVZLWKVHULRXVPHGLFDO
FRQGLWLRQV¶EXWWKHLUHIIRUWVWRUHGHILQHWKHVH[XDODEXVHRIFKLOGUHn were curtailed with the 
onset of war in 1939.126  
 
The culture of disbelieving children who reported being abused and women, who made 
allegations of rape, persisted until late in the 20th century. ,QWKH8.YHU\\RXQJFKLOGUHQ¶V
testimony about sexual abuse they had suffered was deprecated. In R v Wallwork 127 Lord 
*RGGDUGVWDWHGWKDWLWZDVµULGLFXORXV¶WRVXSSRVHWKDWDQ\YDOXHFRXOGKDYHEHHQDWWDFKHGWR
the value of a five-year-ROG¶VHYLGHQFH7KHSROLF\RIWallwork was reiterated in the R v 
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Arguably, this cultural attitude still exists. For instance in 2010, only 2,135 people were 
convicted of child abuse, although police had been notified of more than 23 000 alleged 
offences.130 Kelly holds the view that even today, legacies remain sedimented into 
institutional cultures and practices, creating a risk of over-identification of false allegations 
by police and prosecutors.131 Feminists have previously pointed out that according to the 
historical construction of rape in law, the words of a woman alone were not considered 
reliable and required special evidentiary rules.132 Judges in sexual offence trials would warn 
MXULHVDERXWWKHGDQJHUVRIFRQYLFWLQJWKHDFFXVHGZKHUHWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VWHVWLPRQ\ZDVWKH
sole piece of evidence. In most other cases, there was no need for corroboration. It was not 
until 1994, that the decision was taken to abrogate the mandatory requirement for 
corroboration in sexual offence trials when it passed the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act under section 32 (1) (b). 
 
Physical assaults on children as a modern social concern 
 
Child welfare groups did exist in the 19th and early 20th century to combat delinquency, 
QHJOHFWDQGWKHµSUREOHP¶IDPLO\EXWFKLOGDEXVHZHOIDUHJURXSVZHUHVHWXSPXFKODWHU
Victorian doctors might see cases where the child has actually been severely battered when 
chastised, with evidence of bruising to the body, but which they passed off as being 
V\PSWRPDWLFRIµULFNHWV¶133 
 
By the mid-20th century, the NSPCC started to bring prosecutions against people who beat 
children. Socio-legal reactions which prevailed in this era, were piecemeal, and did not 
recognize the concept of child abuse as a definite social problem. US paediatricians 
discovered parental physical abuse by means of X-ray technology from the 1940s onwards. 
Dr Caffey showed the relationship between two conditions of multiple fractures to the long 
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bones and inflammation around the skull which were signs of trauma. In 1955, Woolley and 
Evans were prepared to ascribe this damage to children to parental indifference, alcoholism, 
irresponsibility, and immaturity caused by uncontrolled aggression. By 1962, Dr Kempe had 
publicised this type of damage in the Journal of the American Medical Association by calling 
LWµEDWWHUHGFKLOGV\QGURPH¶134 'U.HPSH¶VDUWLFOHDFFRUGLQJWR5RELQLVRIWHQDssociated 
with the rediscovery of child abuse as it was validated as a serious concern.135 
Apart from raising the profile of abused children, Dr Kempe also advised doctors to breach 
patient confidentiality and report their suspicions to law enforcement and child protection 
DJHQFLHVµ%DWWHUHGEDE\V\QGURPH¶UHFHLYHGDWWHQWLRQLQLQ%ULWDLQZKHQ*ULIILWKVDQG
Moynihan pointed out in the British Medical Journal that diagnosed brutal violence against 
children is almost always inflicted by parents; that doctors were failing to detect this through 
erroneous diagnosis. Physical child abuse was also highlighted by paediatricians and forensic 
pathologists who published a number of articles in Medicine, Science and the Law. The 
British Paediatric Association published the memorandum The Battered Baby. It argued that 
a purely punitive attitude towards violent parents was not wholly helpful, and that other 
interventions, such as medical and welfare agencies, should also be involved.136 Doctors in 
casualty departments who suspected sexual abuse in young patients by a parent were 
reluctant to violate the principle of doctor/patient confidentiality and report this to police and 
become involved in a criminal justice process that would forfeit their time and ability to 
control the outcome of diagnosis. 
Forensic pathologists could be more proactive, as their work was court and criminal justice 
based anyway. Paediatricians were more involved than doctors, as the health of children was 
their specialism, and they were able to raise the profile of their profession by attracting 
resources and status to the physical abuse in an era where they were being side-lined by the 
popularity of drug treatments for serious or fatal diseases and the falling birth rate in the late 
1960s and early 70s. In the 1970s, the NSPCC set up a battered child unit, diffused child 
abuse as a social problem, and moved away from its punitive, legalistic role and assumed a 
professional role geared towards the treatment and rehabilitation of families who battered 
children. The NSPCC looked to the US abuse detection/prevention models to help it, even 
bringing Dr Kempe from the US who spent a year researching there from 1969-70.137 The 
focus on violence towards children may also have galvanised the feminist movement to 
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highlight the cause of domestic violence inflicted on women by their partners and spouses 
from the 1970s onwards. 
Despite the diffusion role the NSPCC played in highlighting child battery as a major issue, 
central and local governments were not paying much attention to it. It took a cause célèbre to 
consolidate the problem. A child, Maria Colwell, had been killed by her stepfather. The Press 
took an interest in this case, mainly due to an official enquiry set up by Sir Keith Joseph, who 
blamed the cycle of poverty for such abuse. The enquiry sparked campaigning on other issues 
affecting child welfare: concern over the reorganisation of social services, and the difficulty 
of prospective carers and parents in being able to foster and adopt children. By 1974, 
Government interest - the report on Maria Colwell - had firmly placed child abuse as a major 
social concern. Subsequent scandals and reports helped to consolidate and reify the child 
abuse problem,138 which led to greater co-operation between professionals and agencies to 
identify children at risk of abuse. Reification is the final stage of the development of a 
problem as a recognised social concern. Central government was now more involved. It 
published the Department of Health and Social Security circular, The Non-Accidental Injury 
to Children, which was concerned with individual cases and the local organisation of 
services. A 1976 DHSS circular recommended the involvement of senior police officers to 
share confidential information with other agencies on abuse cases.139 
Psychological studies from the 1970s onwards indicated that children making allegations 
about sexual matters were less likely to lie and were also capable of providing much more 
reliable evidence than had previously been assumed.140  
Institutional child abuse  
 
Whilst venereal disease diagnosed by doctors had brought attention to sexually abused 
children in charity-run homes in the 1920s, the care homes environment came to public 
attention again in the 1980s because of allegations of physical and sexual abuse of child 
residents. 
 
From the 1960s, there had been a change in the way care homes were managed as social work 
and new ways of thinking dominated welfare, especially in child care law, policy and 
practice, until the 1980s. Society at that time labelled children in care as being either passive 
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children/victims or as adults/villains.141 Such children had difficulties within their families 
leading to their truancy, running away or criminality; some were disabled, had emotional 
and/or behavioural difficulties and could not be cared for by their own families. They were 
therefore emotionally and welfare-dependent on the care homes and their providers. 
Complainants of child abuse in these homes had difficulty in persuading police to take the 
matter further, because they were perceived as quasi-delinquents whom the police initially 
assumed were telling lies. Social workers were informed by psycho-analytic theory and 
EHKDYLRXUDOSV\FKRORJ\µFRQWULEXWHGLQWKHLURZQZD\WRWKHDEXVHRIFKLOGUHQLQFDUH¶142 
 
From the 1983-89, one hundred and thirty-two children in care homes in Staffordshire had 
EHHQVXEMHFWHGWRµSLQGRZQ¶ZKLFKZDVDIRUPRIVROLWDU\FRQILQHPHQWZKLFKFRXOGODVWIRU
days or even months. This regime included humiliating the child with baths on admission, 
special clothing, a strict routine, and inappropriate bed times. Pindown was then an accepted 
method of dealing with delinquent children, as the practice was routinely recorded in log 
books.143 
 
In Leicestershire, care homes owned by Frank Beck were investigated for physical, sexual 
and emotional abuse of the children from 1973-86. Beck and his colleague, Colin Fiddaman, 
were tried and convicted of sexually abusing children under their care.144 Beck had initially 
received support from two successive directors of social services, senior management, field 
and residential social workers as well as three psychiatrists.145 Stein argues that pindown at 
WKH6WDIIRUGVKLUHKRPHVUHJUHVVLRQWKHUDS\LQ/HLFHVWHUVKLUHDQGµFRQIURQWDWLRQDO¶SK\VLFDO
restraint methods at Aycliffe, were sanctioned forms of child abuse.146 7KH%HFNWULDOµFDPH
to be regarded as the model on which all future care home police operations should be 
EDVHG¶147 
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Another major inquiry, the Waterhouse Report - centred on the North Wales care homes -
FRQFOXGHGWKDWZLGHVSUHDGDEXVHRIER\VKDGRFFXUUHGLQFKLOGUHQ¶VUHVLGHQWLDO
establishments in Clwyd between 1974 and 1990.148 Fifteen convictions of care home staff 
were obtained following a police inquiry. Care homes in Gwynedd had been criticised, 
mainly for the level of physical cruelty inflicted on the child residents. Stein argues that it 
ZDVQRWFRQFOXVLYHWKDWWKHUHKDGEHHQSDHGRSKLOHULQJVRSHUDWLQJLQFKLOGUHQ¶VKRPHVEXW
investigating police officers found that there were paedophiles at senior management level 
who employed other paedophiles and other adults outside of the care homes. Child abuse 
FRXOGDOVREHIRXQGLQWKHIRUPRIµV\VWHPRXWFRPHDEXVH¶ZKLFKLVWKHIDLOXUHRIWKHODZ
policies, practices and procedures to protect and promote looked-after children.149 
 
By the mid-1980s, some well publicised surveys of the general public and health service 
professionals suggested that many more sexual offences had been committed than had 
generally hitherto been recognised. There was heightened awareness of this possibility in 
light of the Cleveland abuse scandal.150 Cleveland social services had a good track record in 
response to issues of child care. In 1987, a new social worker, Susan Richardson, was 
appointed as a child abuse consultant. She worked with Dr Higgs, a consultant paediatrician, 
on suspected child abuse case referrals. Dr Higgs was convinced of the validity of an anal 
dilatation test to diagnose suspected child abuse, which had been clinically researched by Dr 
Wynne and Dr Hobbs.151 The research of these latter doctors had been published in The 
Lancet. However, Dr Irvine and Dr Roberts were not convinced of the validity of this test and 
advised that police surgeons should be allowed to give second opinions.152 The inquiry found 
thDW'U+LJJVµODFNHGDSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHIRUHQVLFHOHPHQWVRIKHUZRUN¶DQGWRRIL[HGLQKHU
EHOLHILQVHSDUDWLQJFKLOGUHQIURPWKHLUSDUHQWVWRSHUPLWµGLVFORVXUH¶XQGHUSODFHRIVDIHW\
orders. The Cleveland report recommended, inter alia, that children suspected of being 
DEXVHGVKRXOGQRWEHVXEMHFWWRUHSHDWHGH[DPLQDWLRQVRUFRQIURQWDWLRQDOµGLVFORVXUH¶
interviews for evidential purposes. It also advised that social services, police and the medical 
profession should work collaboratively when assessing child abuse cases and permit medical 
diagnosis and physical signs that led to it to be the prime consideration except in 
straightforward cases. It also highlighted the problem of the lack of help for adults who had 
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been abused as children and abusers who wished to confess to such offences but hitherto had 
been prevented from so doing. 
 
Two extreme cases of physical abuse of Jasmine Beckford and Kimberley Carlisle had also 
been well publicised.153 The Pigot Committee154 had the impression that the incidence and 
severity of all types of child abuse had increased in recent years. The NSPCC had been 
tracking child abuse cases through its own child protection register research. From a survey, 
Child Abuse Trends in England and Wales 1983-1987, which was published in 1989, cases of 
sexual abuse had increased eightfold from 0.08 to 0.65 per thousand. The Department of 
Health issued figures in 1988: 25 000 children had been placed on child protection registers 
because of various types of abuse and a further 14 400 registereGFDVHVZHUHRIµJUDYH
FRQFHUQ¶155 
 
The Conservative government thought that it had already addressed concerns these inquiries 
raised when it implemented the Children Act 1989 (in the same year that that the Convention 
of the UNICEF Rights of the Child was signed), but by 1997 William Hague set up a review 
of the safeguards for looked-after children in England and Wales.156 By 2000, there were 32 
separate police investigations of care homes across England and Wales. From 1997, the new 
Labour Government moderniVHGFKLOGUHQ¶VVHUYLFHVRQFHLWKDGDFFHSWHGWKHLGHDVRIWKH
Utting Report (People like Us) which advocated for greater supervision of care homes and the 
accountability of staff working therein.157 These measures allowed outside bodies to monitor 
the care homes environment with the creation of Commission for Social Care Inspection for 





In 1989, the Pigot Committee recommended modernising and improving the way in which 
child victims of sexual offences could give their evidence, by video-recorded interviews 
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conducted with them by police, social workers, doctor or other appropriate interviewers; 
these recordings would then be substituted for use as evidence-in-chief at trial. The 
Committee had to consider the implications of the proposed changes: the extent to which they 
would conflict with the hearsay rules - recorded testimony as an out of court statement - as 
well as maintaining the robustness of testing the evidence against defendants by means of the 
cross-examination in order for them to have a fair trial.159 It was proposed that interviews 
should be conducted to conform to evidence-in-chief rules: namely, that they should avoid 
asking questions which suggest the answer and not assume that facts are established that are 
likely to be in dispute.160 The Committee agreed that it was possible to make use of out-of- 
court testimony of children in this manner, because provision had already been in place to 
accept the evidence of children out of court under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 
under sections 42 and 43 which permitted a magistrate to accept a sworn deposition from a 
medical practitioner in cases where a child claimed to have been sexually or physically 
assaulted but was physically or mentally unfit to give evidence in court. 
 
Social services and police officers had already been running joint schemes to interview 
children soon after an alleged assault, video-record it and present it as the FKLOG¶VHYLGHQFHLQ
chief in court.161 These measures had the advantage of presenting fresher evidence at trial and 
spared child complainants from the trauma of having to give evidence in court in person or 
from being intimidated by the presence of the defendant and the courtroom ambience.162 
The Pigot Report thought it paradoxical that child victims who seemed to give perfectly clear 
accounts of abuse against them were not permitted to do so in court. Those victims who were 
permitted to give evidence in court faced the further obstacle of their credibility, because of 
the rules on uncorroborated evidence (evidence that is supportive of, but independent of, the 
complaint that a sexual offence took place) which defaulted in favour of the defendant due to 
a special judicial care warning issued to them.163  
 
The Committee thought that judges should be disinclined to issue such a warning unless they 
were absolutely convinced that their reasoning is unassailable.164 To jurors, the warning 
might be construed as official information that women claiming to have been raped and 
FKLOGUHQPDNLQJDOOHJDWLRQVRIVH[XDODEXVHZHUHIDUPRUHXQWUXWKIXOWKDQWKHMXU\¶VRZQ
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experience and knowledge might indicate; that at best, the warning would be ignored by 
juries and at worst, they might acquit defendants who might have been convicted had they 
been permitted to evaluate the evidence in the usual way.165 
 
The reasons for this care warning had been articulated in R v Henry.166 Judges had to use 
clear and simple language that would without doubt convey to the jury that in cases of alleged 
sexual offences it was really dangerous to convict on the evidence of the woman or girl alone. 
The Pigot Committee realised that the corroboration rules in their current state would dilute 
the value of the proposed out-of-court video testimony of child complainants because of the 
question of whether such testimony would be regarded by the court as hearsay as well as 
possibly being uncorroborated and therefore subject to the mandatory care warning.167  
The Law Commission also recommended reform to mandatory care warnings. The Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 abolished the corroboration rules under section 32 (1).  
The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA) was based on the findings of 
the Pigot Report 1989.168 0RVWRIWKLV5HSRUW¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVZHUHILQDOO\HQDFWHG
except for the recommendation that cross-examinations of such witnesses should be 
conducted by a neutral specialist interviewer as occurs in most of continental Europe.169  
 
This legislation gave special treatment for complainants aged 18 or under and witnesses 
under section 16, which sets out the measures are available to eligible witnesses. Included in 
the YJCEA special measures are witness screenings from the accused (section 23), live link 
evidence (section 24) video-recorded evidence-in-chief (section 27), video-recorded cross-
examination or re-examination (section 28) and examination of witnesses through 
intermediaries (section 29). Furthermore, complainants are no longer permitted to be cross-
examined in person by the accused (sections 34 and 35). 
 
Whilst the YJCEA made proceedings less daunting for vulnerable or intimidated witnesses, 
including children, allowing evidence from victims to be given behind a screen, pre-recorded 
video or live video link had serious implications for the right of the defendant to a fair trial 
under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is a principle of criminal 
law that a defendant has the right to face his accusers literally. Verbal answers of victims and 
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witnesses and analysis of the way in which a witness responds to questioning are important to 
the case.170 
 
Background to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
 
7KH/DERXU3DUW\¶V:KLWH3DSHUJustice for All proposed changes to the law which would 
make it easier to convict criminals by relevant inferential evidence.171 The rationale 
underpinning these changes was that the rights of the defendant needed to be counterbalanced 
with the competing rights of the victim. Considering the rights of victims and defendants as a 
balancing act was misleading and inaccurate, as increasing the rights of one party does not 
QHFHVVDULO\GHFUHDVHWKHULJKWVRIWKHRWKHU:DVWKH3DSHUUHDOO\DERXWYLFWLPV¶ULJKWVRU
YLFWLPV¶LQWHUHVWV"172 9LFWLPV¶ULJKWVDVHQYLVDJHGE\WKHSURSRVHG9LFWLPV¶&KDUWHUWREH
enforceable, needed to be underpinned by legislation.  
 
Liberty, a human rights organisation, conceded that taking away protections for defendants 
could well lead to more convictions of the guilty, but expressed concern that it would also 
lead to a greater number of innocent people being convicted. The cornerstone of the legal 
system was protection against wrongful conviction. However, the Government decided that 
juries were being prevented from hearing evidence that was relevant to facts in issue under 
the similar fact principle and it proposed a much wider ranging application thereof, even 
creating a special statute for its terms of use under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which 
extended the use of bad character evidence. This type of evidence covers a wide range of 
conduct, not just previous convictions or strikingly similar prior conduct which was the test 
under DPP v Boardman.173 
 
Furthermore, any prosecution case relying on previous convictions was less likely to have 
other and sufficient evidence established the guilt of the accused; yet the jury would then be 
tempted to convict on the basis that the previous convictions stereotyped the defendant and 
made it more likely that he was guilty.174 Whilst bad character evidence had already been 
used against defendants, such as strikingly similar conduct or if the defendant claimed to be 
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RIJRRGFKDUDFWHULQFRXUWWKHSURSRVHGUHIRUPVZRXOGLQFOXGHµRWKHUPLVFRQGXFW¶RU
µDQ\WKLQJVXJJHVWLQJDFULPLQDOWHQGHQF\¶LQFOXGLQJFKDUJHVRUSUHYLRXVDUUHVWVWRLPSXWH
unwholesomeness of character.175 
 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 created a shield for complainants and non-defendants from 
attacks on their credibility by forbidding the use of evidence which is deemed to be irrelevant 
under s.100 (1), (2) and (3). The CJA 2003 also permitted juries to hear about the prior 
misconduct of defendants in a wider variety of contexts under s.101 (1), including any prior 
VH[XDOPLVFRQGXFWGHHPHGWREHµUHSUHKHQVLEOH¶EHKDYLRXUXQGHU s.112 (1). Reprehensible 
behaviour also included charges that were being tried concurrently to the trial in question. In 
sexual offence trials, the prosecution may wish to establish that the defendant has a 
propensity to commit similar sexual offences under section 103 of the same Act.  
 
Judges were entrusted with the task of deciding whether or not to allow juries to hear bad 
character evidence and assessing whether the probative value of the evidence would outweigh 
its prejudicial effect. Revisions to bad character deployment were designed to secure more 
convictions, particularly in sexual offence cases. The Law Commission was aware of the 
prejudicial nature of previous convictions against children, given the findings of a jury study, 
the Lloyd-Bostock Report.176 One Q.C., who wrote that it was insulting to juries to assume 





There had already been codification of the law by the Sexual Offences Act (SOA) 1956 but 
the Labour Government also reformed the SOA in 2003, which radically overhauled existing 
OHJLVODWLRQDQGLWDOVRLQWURGXFHGQHZVH[XDORIIHQFHV7KHOHJDOGHILQLWLRQRIµFKLOG¶KDVQRZ
been extended the age of 16 to 18 under section 45(1) of SOA 2003. Specific legislation on 
child rape at section 8 also makes it an offence to cause or incite a child under 13 to engage in 
sexual activity. There is now an offence of causing a child to watch a sexual act under section 
12. Section 15 covers sexual grooming of a child is and is designed to prohibit the 
befriending or establishment of an emotional connection of a child to encourage them to have 
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sexual activity with the offender or to be trafficked for such purposes. Sections 45-51 also 
cover indecent photographs of children aged 16 or 17. The question of whether a photograph 
is decent or not is still governed by earlier legislation -section 1 of the Protection of Children 
Act (PCA) 1978 - and it is for the jury to determine whether or not an image is indecent. PCA 
1978 also prohibits the making, distribution, showing and advertisement of indecent 
photographs. It also extends to pseudo-SKRWRJUDSKVµDQLPDJHZKHWKHUPDGHE\FRPSXWHU
JUDSKLFVRURWKHUZLVHZKLFKDSSHDUVWREHDSKRWRJUDSK¶DQGFDQLQFOXGHDQ\LPDJHZKHUH
the dominant impression conveyed is that the person shown is a child, notwithstanding that 
some of the characteristics are those of an adult (Archbold 31-107). This legislation was not 
superseded by section 160 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 which prohibits possession of 
indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs of children. The offence of abuse of position of 
trust is found in sections 16-24; abuse of children through prostitution and pornography in 
sections 47-51. The SOA has also extended checks for convictions to a wider range of 
offences to vet those who care for or supervise children.178 There are still gaps in child 
protection ± the SOA 2003 did not mandate or even provide for the non-reporting of sexual 
abuse as occurs in other jurisdictions179. There have been plans to mandate teachers to report 
FKLOGDEXVHDQGWRVDQFWLRQWKRVHZLWKLPSULVRQPHQWZKRµZLOIXOO\QHJOHFW¶WRGRVR180 
Child abuse detection rates have improved with child protection measures. The reporting of 
sexual offences increased by 9% in all sexual offences for the year ending June 2013 
compared with the previous year: from 51 252 to 55 812. The spike in reports may be due to 
Operation Yewtree investigation connected with allegations made against Jimmy Savile. 
These figures include rape and all other sexual offences. There are crimes which continue to 
go unreported or unrecorded; therefore caution is needed when offering these figures. The 
Office for National Statistics suggests that the Yewtree Operation had a wider effect in 
encouraging both current and historical complaints to be filed, even though the data excluded 
the Metropolitan Police (London) area. Ten per cent of all reported sexual offences for that 
period were historic ± alleged offences that were 20 years old or more; but also, there was a 
five per cent increase in reports of allegations that were less than a year old from the date of 
commission.181 
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Professionals handling suspected cases of child abuse are encouraged to work together to 
share intelligence. Every local authority must now have a Local Safeguarding Children Board 
as required under s.13 of the Children Act 2004. Each Board comprises a representative of 
the area and a Board partner of that authority, which may include a district council, a chief 
police officer, staff from the probation board, a member of the Strategic Health Authority or 
any other type of partner prescribed by the Secretary of State. The Board is entrusted to 
safeguard and promote child welfare under s.11 of the Children Act 2004. 
 
Undoubtedly, children are now better safeguarded from sexual predation and exploitation 
than ever in the UK. Mandatory criminal background checks are made by the Disclosure and 
Barring Service (DBS) on adults working with and caring for children as professionals and 
volunteers. However, until 2013, any caution or non-custodial offence of a non-sexual and 
irrelevant nature had to be declared by the applicant as well, which gave employers the option 
of refusing to hire or dismissing an employee with such a background, affecting 6000 people. 
It was held that neither the Police Act 1997 nor the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 
were compatible with Article 8 of the ECHR which guarantees a right to respect for a private 
and family life.182 Four million adults now have to apply for DBS checks;183 until an 
employer is satisfied with the results of a police check, prima facie, any non-vetted potential 
employee could be regarded as a risk (in terms of abuse) to children. Whilst the DBS does 
help to eliminate those who may have a sexual offences record who may pose a risk to 
children, it has its limitations as children can still be abused by those who pass DBS checks. 
Child protection measures have more than likely caused a decrease in physical and sexual 
abuse. According to NSPCC figures, the average rate of child homicides has decreased by 30 
per cent in England and Wales since 1981.184 However, in 2015-16 there were 41 homicide 
prosecutions in child sexual abuse cases, a rise from 17 in the previous year.185 
The overall reduction in reports of child abuse is also borne out in US research.186 From 1993 
to 2004, there was a 40-70% reduction in various forms of child maltreatment and child 
victimisation, including sexual abuse, physical abuse, sexual assault, homicide, aggravated 
assault, robbery and larceny. Finkelhor and Jones point out that that the decline of reported 
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sexual abuse (in the US) could also be due to changes in investigatory standards, decreased 
reporting to agencies and reduced funding. However, they also think that that there is an 
actual decrease in reports of CSA, as the decline in agency statistics is paralleled by declines 
in victim self-reports from at least two other sources: data on sexual assault to teens by 
known persons and a state-wide survey of students in Minnesota.  
Successful CSA prosecutions in 2015-2016 rose from 5,387 to 6,217 and is the highest 
volume the CPS has ever recorded.187 Critics of the criminal justice system will argue that the 
conviction rate is still low, but these figures should be contrasted with rape prosecutions. In 
2014-15, out of 4536 prosecutions for rape in England and Wales, 56.9% resulted in a 
conviction. In 2015-16 the rape conviction rate rose slightly to 57.9%188 
 
False allegations 
There are indications that false allegations (those where no offence is found to have occurred) 
have increased recently, particularly in the institutional setting. The Coalition Government 
obtained data from 116 out of 150 local authorities in England. It found that 12,086 
allegations of abuse had been made by schools in 2009-10. The Department for Education 




The Crown Prosecution service conducted research for the first time to attempt to quantify 
false allegations in rape allegations.190 Its Report also acknowledges the very damaging 
impact that a false allegation can have on the person falsely accused. Reputations can be 
ruined and lives can be devastated as well.191 During the period of the review 2011-12, there 
were 5 651 prosecutions for rape as well as 35 prosecutions for making false allegations of 
rape.192 The CPS had discounted possibly true allegations that were subsequently retracted as 
had occurred in the case of one complainant in 2010.193 Accepting that the percentage of false 
allegations revealed in this study appears to be small, the CPS recommended urgently 
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informed national debate about the proper approach to the investigation and prosecution of 
VH[XDORIIHQFHV7KHGHEDWHQHHGVWRH[WHQGZHOOEH\RQGWKH&36DQGSROLFH¶194 
 
 (b) The heightened concern about CSA  
It may be helpful, before exploring the relevance of moral panic theory to public concern 
about CSA, to mention some instances of that concern, and reactions to it. 
In the 1990s, the UK government revealed plans to create DVH[RIIHQGHUV¶UHJLVWHUZKLFKLQ
turn, led to media and social demands for community notification. The tabloid paper News of 
The World launched an outing of paedophiles by naming and showing photographs of them 
as well as where they lived, which led to YLJLODQWHV¶DWWDFNVRQVRPHLQGLYLGXDOV7KH
government was forced to reconsider how to monitor, supervise, treat and house sex 
offenders as well as what policy and legislation to adopt.195  
7KHµSDHGRSKLOH¶FRQFHSWLPSOLHVWKDWFKLOGVH[RIIHQGHUVDUHlonely, outcast and predatory, 
locating the threat on the individual rather than in social, cultural or bureaucratic institutions. 
The result is that debate and policies which would be deemed unacceptable if applied to 
µRUGLQDU\¶PHQKDYHEHFRPHDOORZDEOH notwithstanding that most children are assaulted by 
people whom they know.196 Kitzinger contends that it is unhelpful to dismiss the media as 
interfering and sensationalist or even blame the press for media hype; the media are merely a 
forum for public debate. Media coverage occurs because individuals or collectives have a 
motive in seeking out media publicity. 197  
For instance, Sarah Payne, an eight year old girl, was found murdered in Sussex in July 
2000.198 Roy Whiting, who had previously been convicted and imprisoned for abducting and 
indecently assaulting a nine-year-ROGJLUOLQZDVIRXQGJXLOW\RI6DUDK3D\QH¶V
murder.199 The then Home Office Minister Beverley Hughes, responded to the conviction by 
DJUHHLQJZLWK0UV3D\QH¶VFDOOIRUDµ6DUDK¶V/DZ¶ZKLch would involve parents if 
paedophiles moved into their neighbourhoods.200 Her mother consistently campaigned for the 
tightening of sex offender monitoring and supervision via the tabloid News of the World 
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QHZVSDSHU¶VFor Sarah campaign.201 The popular press acts as a mirror of public concern as 
well as being an advocatory organ. Whilst the media does not act alone in being a driving 
force for social and legal change, it unquestionably plays a prominent part.  
However, popular journalism tends to oversimplify issues, which leads to the stereotyping of 
the issue or class of person who is considered to be a threat to the fabric or morals of 
society.202 It may also mislead the addressed audience. Tabloid journalism has used the 
FRQFHSWRIWKHµSDHGRSKLOH¶IRUFRPPHUcial gain, presenting stories to readers that are 
sensationalised and personalised and, at times misinforming them and hindering sensible 
discourse on the subject.203 It is now known that the media actively exploited the family of 
Sarah Payne, when private investigators working for the News of the World were found to 
have hacked into a mobile telephone given to Mrs Payne over an 11-year period.204  
$FFRUGLQJWRWKHQHZVSDSHU¶VFor Sarah website, most of the campaign aims of greater child 
protection against sex offenders set out by the newspaper materialised in laws and measures 
RYHUUHFHQW\HDUV7KHVHZHUHDLPVZKLFK0UV3D\QHDGYRFDWHGWKRXJKWKHSDSHU¶V
campaign further called for general disclosure to the community about the whereabouts of 
sex offenders. Mrs Payne herself stated publicly that she preferred controlled access to 
information about sex offenders, particularly knowledge of the whereabouts of predatory 
paedophiles and how they were being supervised.205 
The risks of full notification became apparent in light of the vigilantist attacks that occurred 
subsequently to the tabloid paedophile outing campaign as well as the publicised attacks on 
innocent parties such as the paediatrician Yvette Cloete,206 who had been wrongly identified 
as a paedophile.207 Several years prior to this incident, the release of Robert Oliver, who had 
sexually assaulted and killed Jonathan Swift, had been given widespread publicity by 
newspapers which took a proactive role in public safety. This had led not only to the outing 
of genuine paedophiles, some of whom were beaten up and driven away from their homes, 
but also not less than 30 cases of men wrongly suspected of child abuse underwent the same 
treatment. In one case in 1997, a young girl died after the house in which she was staying was 
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burnt down.208 Restricted community notification was therefore an attempt to avoid vigilante 
action which might drive offenders underground and endanger innocent parties.  
Intense media coverage in the 1990s stereotyped sexual abusers of children as being 
RXWVLGHUVWKHPHGLDDQGVRFLDOSROLF\PDNHUVIRFXVHGGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\RQµVWUDQJHU
GDQJHU¶209 More recently, there has been a shift in policy and law in the UK which 
acknowledges that CSA is far more likely to occur in the family setting; hence, the right of 
female parents to obtain knowledge from the police as to whether a new partner may have 
sexual offence convictions.210 Politicians have a vested interest in meeting popular demands 
as voiced in the media to placate and attract voters; but has the constant spotlight over 
paedophiles been at the expense of other facets of child welfare? Jenkins states that 1990s US 
lawmakers who were most keen to implement predator statutes and Internet regulation also 
cut back on social welfare programmes that actually increased child and family poverty with 
the concomitant effects of youth crime, substance abuse and domestic violence. He states 
ZLWKLURQ\WKDW&RQJUHVVKDGDOUHDG\GHDOWZLWKµUHDO¶FKLOGDEXVHLQLWVRYHUKDXORIWKHVH[
offender laws.211 Prioritisation when dealing with specific types of child maltreatment does 
appear to be influenced by media highlighted extreme cases. In the UK in 2000, there were 
30 300 child protection plans in place. This had declined to 25,700 in 2002. Some 
commentators, including Finkelhor and Jones, thought that the decline in child protection 
activity (also a trend in a number of industrialised nations) could be ascribed to some success 
in child protection policies.212 However, since the high profile killing of Peter Connolly in 
2007, there has been increase in the implementation of child protection plans, from 26,400 in 
2006 to 29,200 in 2008, 34,100 in 2009 and 39,100 in 2010.213  
The heightened public concern over paedophiles may also have impacted on the upbringing 
of children, LQFOXGLQJDGHFUHDVHLQWKHQXPEHURIPDOHUROHPRGHOVIRUER\V&KLOGUHQ¶V
FKDULWLHVVXFKDVWKH1DWLRQDO&KLOGUHQ¶V+RPHVDQG&KDQFH8.VWDWHGLQWKDWRQHLQ
five men did not want to volunteer to work with children in case they were labelled as 
paedophiles.214 The education sector likewise witnessed a sharp decline in the number of 
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early years (to age 5) male teachers in schools, particularly primary schools. In 2008, only 
two per cent of this workforce was male.215 A Daily Telegraph article suggested why this 
PD\EHVRµ&ULWLFVVD\PHQDUHGHWHUUHGIURPZRUNLQJZLWK\RXQJFKLOGUHQEHFDXVH«WKH\
PD\EHEUDQGHGSDHGRSKLOHV«WKHDEVHQFHRIPDOHLQIOXHQFHLQFODVVURRPVPHDQVWKDWPDQ\
pupils grow up without important role models, and can lead to problems wiWKGLVFLSOLQH¶216  
In 2013, only 21 per cent (4 100) of teachers training to work in the primary (5-11 years) 
sector were men. Research conducted by Nottingham Trent and Bedfordshire Universities 
still indicates that men fear being falsely labelled as paedophiles, one reason for the 
reluctance of men (in this highly feminised occupation) to work with children.217 
The fear of paedophilia has therefore not only created palpable social angst, but may also 
have dissuaded significant numbers of adults, particularly males, from working with children. 
7KLVFULVLVPD\EHGHVFULEHGE\VRPHFRPPHQWDWRUVDVEHLQJDµPRUDOSDQLF¶3KHQRPHQDGR
not arise spontaneously, but are a combination of interweaving factors. There have always 
been social and moral crises, and commentators have attempted to find ways of explaining 
them by identifying any common and recurring features which bear the hallmarks of crises in 
general. It will be seen, however, that notwithstanding considerable research in the area of 
social crises, earlier conclusions require revision; but still, µmoral panic¶ theory still retains 
the value of offering a background as to how and why crises occur in the first place. 
(i)  The theory of µmoral panics¶ in relation to CSA 
How does a problem achieve problem status in the first place?218 Social constructionism is 
useful for analysing the rhetoric of claims makers, their vested interest and power in 
society,219 but µmoral panic¶ theory takes this idea a step further, because it also takes on 
board the dynamics which lead to social reaction to a perceived problem. Stanley studied the 
effects of the reportage of Mods and Rockers hooliganism at Clacton in the 1960s to find out 
whether the phenomenon was a µmoral panic¶. The fact of an altercation was not in dispute; 
however, it was considered that the public and politico-legal reaction to a minor incident was 
immoderate, hostile, volatile, repressive and often irrational.220   
                                                          
215






 E Goode, E. and B-Y Nachman, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance (Blackwell, 2001), pp. 
88-89. 
219
 J S 9LFWRUµ0RUDO3DQLFVDQGWKH6RFLDO&RQVWUXFWion of Deviant Behaviour: Theory and Application to the 
&DVHRI5LWXDO&KLOG$EXVH¶6RFLRORJLFDO3HUVSHFWLYHVvol 41 no 3, p.544. 
220
 M De Young, The Day Centre Ritual Abuse Moral Panic (Jefferson N.C: McFarland 2004), p.2. 
P a g e  |   
When Cohen investigated the media-reported incident of hooliganism at the Clacton seaside 
during Whitsun in 1964, he noted that newspapers exaggerated and distorted facts about the 
extent of violence and damage the offenders had caused.221 The media had sensitised the 
public to the events; there was the impression that the hooliganism would occur again and 
needed to be contained. One consequence of sensitisation is that public hysteria is hyped up 
DQGDµZURQJ¶VWLPXOXVPD\EHFKRVHQDVWKHREMHFWRIDWWDFNRUIHDU7KHVFXIIOHVDQG
vandalism, which broke out between certain Mods and Rockers one Bank Holiday week-end, 
were reported in such a way that subsequently tarnished the reputation of youths who looked 
like Mods and Rockers. 
Future outbreaks of trouble were pre-empted in English seaside resorts elsewhere as a result 
of the media coverage, with disaster containment tactics being employed by the authorities, 
the police and the lawmakers. Future expected week-end/holiday gatherings of youths at 
these other seaside places were monitored by the police who despatched arriving youths back 
home (placing them effectively on curfew) and had police wagons and dogs ready to deal 
with anyone who looked like trouble. Undoubtedly, there were some who did fall into this 
category and did cause physical harm and criminal damage. 
However, the press employed hyperbole and repeated false stories to provoke mass hysteria 
ZKLFKLQWXUQLQIOXHQFHGVRFLHW\¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGVZKDW0RGVDQG5RFNHUVV\PEROised and 
how they should be dealt with in the future.222 Many law-abiding youths who merely enjoyed 
the fashion of the Mod and Rocker culture, were stigmatised as troublemakers. Any rumour 
of future youth gatherings at resorts would lead to a warning phase as, if an impending 
disaster were due to occur.223 Accordingly, the public and the public authorities expected that 
violence and destruction were more likely than not to take place if nothing were done to pre-
empt it. Thus, certain civil liberties were suspended and/or eroded for an apparent benefit of 
youth crime prevention: young people were placed under local authority and police curfew, 
depriving them of freedom of movement; the freedom of expression and to gather for a 
cultural purpose (enjoying peer company and music), was disrupted; police enhanced powers 
and tactics were heavy-handed and a number of youths complained that they had been rough-
handled, and remanded for offences they had not committed.224 This begs the question of 
whether clampdowns are a typical result of heightened concerns generally.  
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Sociologists have researched why and how certain matters caused social alarm and attempted 
WRILQGDSDWWHUQRIEHKDYLRXUIRUFULVHVRULJLQDOO\FRLQHGDVµPRUDOSDQLF¶,WPD\EHKHOSIXO
to dissect the elemenWVRI&RKHQ¶VGHILQLWLRQWRVHHLIWKH\UHIOHFWWKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIVRFLDO
concerns. The concept of moral panic was expanded by Stanley Cohen from the original use 
of the term by Jock Young 225 who described it as being: 226 
1. A condition, episode, person or group of persons defined as a threat to societal values 
and interests; 
2. (a) Its nature is presented in a stylised or stereotypical fashion by the mass media;    
(b) The moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-
thinking people;  
3. Socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping 
are evolved or resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates 
and becomes more visible.  
4. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something that 
has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight.  
5. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective 
memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might 
produce changes in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself. 
The term µmoral panic¶ is strictly sociological, comprising specific criteria which attempt to 
explain and analyse the occurrence of marked eras of crisis. In the past, the term has been 
used to capture reactions to the anti-social behaviour of teenagers (anti-hooligan drives), 
political extremism (McCarthyism), religious cults (witch-hunts), alcoholism (temperance 
movements), drug misuse (vigilantism), pornography (censorship campaigns), heightened 
perception of criminality (law and order crusades), and public health issues which have the 
effect of defining and defending the moral boundaries of society, establishing or tightening 
moral certainty in times of perceived moral decline. 
 
(ii) How µmoral panics¶ shape law and legal processes 
Acute societal disapproval can of course lead to responses that are not only predictable, but 
also appropriate and acceptable from the informal to the legislative. They can equally well 
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provide a fertile soil for less healthy or constructive responses. In the past µmoral panics¶ 
have led to false accusations of crime against innocent people stereotyped as deviants, e.g., 
the Nazi programmes of extermination against the disabled, gypsies, communists, and of 
course Jews in the Holocaust. These have been attended by and promoted through 
legitimising juridical procedures, from those persecuted in religious witch hunts, or anti-
Communist persecution to those in satanic cults accused of ritual child abuse.227 In some 
instances, the subject-matter of a µmoral panic¶ may cause social outrage and raise enough 
emotion to impair the judgment of ostensibly impartial decision-makers such as the judiciary. 
For instance, the way in which the media portrays terrorism and terrorists may have 
FRQWULEXWHGWRXQQHFHVVDU\OHYHOVRISDQLFDQGIHDUWDUJHWHGDWWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLF¶V
consciousness and the development of legislation with negative social ramifications.228 
A domestic moral panic can also become international. On September 11, 2001, New York 
EXLOGLQJV7ZLQ7RZHUVDQG:DVKLQJWRQ'&¶VKHDGTXDUWHUVRIWKH86'HSDUWPHQWRI
Defence, the Pentagon, were attacked by al Qaeda terrorists, killing 2,996 people. In the US 
and elsewhere, widespread condemnation of terrorism and terrorists were publicly stated; 
State criminality and/or encouragement for human rights allegations was neutralised and even 
disappeared through discursive strategies.229 
Rather like wartime policy and legislation, human rights may be compromised in the interest 
of the state and the nation. For example, in November 1974, the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army was accused of being responsible for the bombing of a pub in Birmingham by 
explosion devices. These explosions at that time were the most injurious and serious blasts 
caused by terrorists acts in Great Britain.230 The public mood in the aftermath of the bombing 
was such that it placed great pressure on law enforcement and political and legal authorities 
to find the perpetrator(s) and therefore they had to be seen to be addressing the issue as a 
matter of urgency.231  
The historian and writer, Ruth Dudley Edwards, later recalled  
³$VDQ,ULVKLPPLJUDQWZRUNLQJLQ/RQGRQ,KDGmarvelled too that no one was 
unpleasant to me at this time, but all the same the Birmingham bombs caused an 
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eruption of public fury. The ripple effect of such events is usually underestimated. As 
well as the sorrow of family, friends and colleagues of the GHDGDQGLQMXUHGWKHUH¶V
the anger and fear that grips communities that now feel nowhere is safe. Allied to that, 
the escalating violence had led to a perception that the liberal Labour government was 
soft on terrorism. There were attacks on Irish bars, businesses and community centres, 
protest strikes in Midlands factories and a refusal by airport workers in Manchester 
and Liverpool to handle flights bound for Ireland. Within a few days, the Home 
Secretary, Roy Jenkins, had introduced a Prevention of Terrorism Act with powers he 
GHVFULEHGDV³GUDFRQLDQ´DQG³XQSUHFHGHQWHGLQSHDFHWLPH 
The ripple effect was also to be seen in the actions of the police, who were so 
desperate to be seen to be nailing the killers that they would charge the wrong people 
over the M62, Guildford and Birmingham bombs. And a flawed justice system would 
find them guilty."232 
Some men, knRZQDVWKHµ%LUPLQJKDP6L[¶ZHUHGHWDLQHG$ORFDOIRUHQVLFVFLHQWLVW
VZDEEHGWKHGHWDLQHHV¶KDQGVZLWKHWKHU*ULHVVWHVWWRWU\WRILQGexplosive traces. Two of 
the suspects tested positively, were interrogated extensively and several of them signed a 
confession after being beaten and tortured and threatened by the investigating police. The 
prosecution case was mainly based on the forensic results of the Griess test, the confessions 
and a dearth of circumstantial evidence. Moreover, the Six were beaten and tortured by prison 
warders and inmates whilst they were on remand; their injuries were examined and reported 
by a doctor who made a guarded statement as to how these had been inflicted. The trial 
proceeded on the basis on dubiously obtained confessions and flawed forensic evidence of 
explosives supposed to have been handled by the Six which was possibly contaminated by 
the pathologist.233 Moreover, the accused were also convicted on circumstantial evidence. 
Lord Denning doubted whether the police had sufficient evidence on which to charge, let 
alone convict the men.234 The Six were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.235 
Their first appeal failed, as did their attempt to sue the authorities for their beatings by both 
police and prison officers. They were freed at a much later date, after a long public campaign. 
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In 1973 the Irish Republican Army was reported to have had been actively targeting civilians 
in England in a bombing campaign, one hallmark of which was the use of nitro-glycerine 
explosives.236 Bombs had been placed at the Old Bailey; the Ministry of Agriculture and an 
army recruiting office, Great Scotland Yard, Whitehall; New ScotlDQG<DUGDQGWKH%%&¶V
armed forces radio studio in Dean Stanley Street, killing one and injuring 215. 
 
Against the backdrop of fatalities and injuries in pubs in Guildford, Woolwich, and 
Birmingham in October and November 1974237 it is not difficult to see why the public 
authorities were under intense pressure to prevent future attacks and bring the perpetrators to 
book. At the end of 1974, seven Irish people (Maguire Seven) had been accused of supplying 
nitro-glycerine explosives to the Guildford pub bombers (Guildford Four). Paul Hill, Gerard 
Conlon, Patrick Armstrong and Carole Richardson spent 14 years in prison before their 
convictions for two IRA bomb explosions in Guildford on October 5 1974 were quashed by 
the court of appeal in 1989.238 
Judith Ward was also tried and convicted of murder in respect of the Euston, army bus and 
defence college bombings.239 Apart from Ms Ward, the other prisoners unsuccessfully 
appealed their sentences immediately. The appellants continued to protest their innocence. 
Information then accumulated, partly from IRA sources, that they were innocent. Chris 
Mullin, then a Labour MP, wrote a book that also added to the public campaign. In 1985, 
World in Action made a documentary which highlighted the forensic aspects of their cases.240 
Fresh evidence was obtained in order to launch new appeals on their behalf. A litany of 
complaints was levelled at the way the investigating police had gathered their evidence and 
how expert witnesses had represented their findings to the jury.241 
In summary, the appeals were allowed on the following grounds: 
Guildford Four: R v Richardson & Ors242 
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Evidence of police witnesses relating to the µFRQWHPSRUDQHRXV¶QRWHVallegedly made during 
WKHLQWHUURJDWLRQDQGµFRQIHVVLRQV¶RIWKHDSSHOODQWVZDVKHOGWREHfalse following 
examination of the documents on which the notes were made. 
Birmingham Six: R v McIlkenny & Ors243  
Both the scientific evidence of contamination by nitro-glycerine and the evidence relating to 
the confessions obtained by the police were held to be unreliable following the admission of 
fresh evidence. 
Maguire Seven: R v Maguire & Ors244  
The failure of forensic science witnesses (bound by the same common law duty of disclosure 
as the prosecution) to disclose relevant test results was found to be a material irregularity in 
the course of the trial. 
Judith Ward: R v Ward245  
The shortcomings that contributed to a miscarriage of justice in this case were: the 
suppression and misrepresentation of test results by the forensic scientists, fresh evidence on 
the unreliability of the scientific tests, the failure of treating psychiatrists to reveal the 
DSSHOODQW¶VWUXHPHQWDOFRQGLWLRQIUHVKHYLGHQFHRQKHUSHUVRQDOLW\GLVRUGHUDQGWKH
suppression and misrepresentation of evidence by prosecution lawyers.  
All these appeal cases illustrate how the British legal system was capable of causing injustice 
and imprisoning innocent people. In a climate of heightened social fear, the principles of 
human rights and the fair trial of the accused had been compromised, on more than one or 
two occasions.  
The Irish appeal cases showed that it was time to reappraise and improve the justice system. 
The Birmingham Six trial defendants had originally complained of police and custody 
brutality; photographs of the accused as remanded inmates taken by a doctor bore out this 
complaint.246 In 1984, Parliament introduced the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 
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and PACE Codes of Practice247 which were designed to avoid police malpractices. PACE had 
not issued from the injustice to the Birmingham Six, but other issues concerning the later 
%UL[WRQULRWVZKHUHµFRPSOH[SROLWLFDOVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFIDFWRUV¶FUHDWHGD
µGLVSRVLWLRQWRZDUGVVSRQWDQHRXVYLROHQWSURWHVW¶E\HWKQLFPLQRULWLHV248 The riots led to the 
Scarman Report. Racial disadvantage and inner city decline played a part in creating 
FRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHULRWVEXWDOVRWKHSXEOLF¶VORVVRIFRQILGHQFHPLVWUXVWLQWKHSROLFHDQG
their methods of policing. The PACE was implemented to set out the way police officers 
were to carry out their duties. It stated specific codes of practice for police procedures and 
established the rights of people detained by the police for a specific offence.249 
The Irish cases also highlighted a defect in the appellate system: that judges may overlook 
legitimate points of law and therefore deprive the appellant of his right to re-appeal such as 
had occurred in the Birmingham Six appeal case. Without independent reviewers, these 
appellants might never have been freed on a re-appeal. In 1997, the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission (CCRC) was set up to review cases to refer them back to the Court of Appeal on 
WKHJURXQGVRIRYHUORRNHGRUµIUHVK¶HYLGHQFH250 The establishment of this body represented 
a formal acceptance that miscarriages of justice can and do occur in the UK. Additionally, the 
CCRC is independent of the judiciary, which is particularly relevant when the court system 
itself is accused of causing injustice in the execution of its duties. 
7KH,ULVKSULVRQHUV¶FDVHVDUHDFOHDULQVWDQFHRIµIRONGHYLOV¶DOOHJHG,5$ERPEHUVZKR
DOOHJHGO\WKUHDWHQHGWKHSHDFHDQGVDIHW\RI%ULWLVKVRFLHW\ZKRHYHQWXDOO\EHFDPHµIRON
KHURHV¶251 for many people and not only in the Irish community in Britain. They were seen as 
victims of miscarriages of justice engendered by the British justice system itself. In terms of 
&RKHQ¶Vµmoral panics¶ model, many criteria were met: the real threat and harm caused to 
society by the 1970s bombing campaigns; the need for society to hold someone accountable 
for this act (the demonisation of terrorists); successful appeals were brought against 
convictions and legal proceedings were brought against police and prison officers, less 
successfully. The problem was supposed to have been resolved when the authorities tried to 
deal with those accused of the crimes (the law enforcement/legal system was the coping 
mechanism). Progressive legal and institutional changes did follow in the long term, (such as 
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the PACE and its Codes and the institution of the CCRC) but only after the vindication of the 
prisoners in the above Irish cases. The µmoral panic¶ over IRA terrorism did not recede after 
the release of the prisoners; if anything, these prisoners may have symbolised the blatant 
prejudice faced by the Irish in Britain and caused lingering resentment until the Belfast 
Agreement in 1998 was brokered and signed.252 
(iii) Problems with µmoral panic¶ models  
2QHSUREOHPZLWK6WDQOH\&RKHQ¶VFRQFHSWRIµmoral panic¶ according to Goode and Ben-
Yehuda is that his definition lacked precision.253 They distinguished separate elements in the 
original Cohen definition and it will be argued in this chapter that the five criteria this 
subsequent µmoral panic¶ model proposed still show that certain modern concepts of CSA do 
not fit squarely in the µmoral panic¶ paradigm. The five key elements are: 
1. Concern - UDWKHUWKDQ&RKHQ¶VµIHDU¶DERXWWKHSRWHQWLDORULPDJLQHGWKUHDW 
2. Hostility - moral outrage towards the folk devils who embody the problem and 
agencies who are ultimately responsible.  
3. Consensus - widespread agreement that the threat exists and something should be done. 
Influential groups and the media should share this consensus. 
4. Disproportionality - an exaggeration of the number or the strength of the cases in terms 
of the damage caused, moral offensiveness and potential risk if ignored. 
5. Volatility - the panic erupts and suddenly dissipates without warning. 
It will be argued later in this chapter that the child abuse problem does not answer all of the 
fluid criteria of the Cohen model nor the more rigid ones of Goode-Ben-Yehuda, principally 
EHFDXVH&6$LVDSUREOHPWKDWLVXQOLNHO\WRGLVDSSHDU6RPHµPRUDOSDQLFV¶KDYH
disappeared entirely in the sphere of sex and sexuality. For instance, in the UK there is no 
ORQJHUDµPRUDOSDQLF¶RYHUWKHDYDLODELOLW\RIFRQWUDFHSWLYHVWRXQPDUULHGZRPHQ254 nor is 
KRPRVH[XDOLW\DFULPHGHFULPLQDOLVHGXQGHUWKH6H[XDO2IIHQFHV$FW2WKHUµSDQLFV¶
however, such aVWKH0RGVDQG5RFNHUV¶SKHQRPHQRQKDYHGLVDSSHDUHGWKRXJKWKHWKHPH
of youth crime appears at later dates. For instance, Antisocial Behaviour Orders used to be 
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PHWHGRXWWRRIIHQGHUVDJHGRUDERYHZKRVHµKDUDVVLQJ¶DIOH[LEOHGHILQLWLRQEHKDYLRXU
could be controlled by a magistrate on a lesser standard than required by criminal law.255 
µ0RUDOSDQLFV¶RYHU\RXWKWKHUHIRUHGRUH-emerge in the media. 
7KHWHUPµPRUDOSDQLF¶LVDOVRIUDXJKWZLWKDPELJXLW\DQGDOVRJLYHVWKHLPSUHVVLRQWKDW
VRFLHW\LVµIHQGLQJRIIPRUHGHPRQVWKDQKHOOFDQKROG¶DQGKDVEHHQXVHGFDVXDOO\E\SUHVV
and social commentators, thereby digressing from its value as a tool for analysing and 
explaining social concerns.256 7KHSKUDVHµPRUDOSDQLF¶DSSHDUVWRFRQWDLQDQHYDOXDWLYH
judgment, but it is not clear whether the term is necessarily pejorative. It might connote a 
reaction to a non-existent problem, an inappropriately strong reaction to a problem that does 
exist, or simply any reaction to an emotionally fraught problem. In short, it is ambiguous 
whether the term conveys a judgment about the truth and proportionality of the concerns that 
HQJHQGHUWKHµSDQLF¶ 257 
The Cohen theory may be too limited to be used as a tool for modern social theoreticians 
analysing the latest social concerQV6RPHDXWKRULWLHVWUHDWWKHµPRUDOSDQLF¶FRQFHSWDVD
product of its time because Cohen was analysing a social problem particular to the 1960s, the 





Cohen himself admits that his seminal work Folk Devils and Moral Panics was informed by 
the sixties fusion of labelling theory, cultural politics and critical sociology.261 &RKHQ¶V
QDUUDWLYHRIµPRUDOSDQLF¶DOVRDSSHDUV to be more concerned with the creation of laws and 
policies of social control that bring folk devils to trial rather than what goes on in trial itself. 
De Young argues that sex offender trials are a constituent part RIWKHµPRUDOSDQLF¶UDWKHUWKDQ
the reVXOWRILWZKLFKSUHYLRXVµPRUDOSDQLF¶DQDO\VWVKDYHRYHUORRNHG262 With hindsight, it is 
VHHQLQFHUWDLQµSDQLFV¶VXFKDVWKHGD\-care child abuse in the 1990s (U.S.), that the legal 
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system, far from being a rational and calming force which transcends passion and prejudice, 
DFTXLHVFHGWKHUHWR7KHµPRUDOSDQLF¶PRGHOLVDOVRUHWURVSHFWLYHLQQDWXUHDQGWKHUHIRUH
addresses the oversights of legal action in the past and cannot serve to address current defects 
in a given legal system. 
%HVWDUJXHVWKDWRQHVKRXOGGLVWDQFHRQHVHOIIURPLQDSSURSULDWHXVHRIWKHWHUPµPRUDOSDQLF¶
RUµPHGLDK\VWHULD¶DQGGLVFHUQWKHmotives RIDQ\µFODLPVPDNLQJ¶263 Claims makers take a 
certain stance of an issue and attempt to present their argument authoritatively using 
µJURXQGVZDUUDQWVDQGFRQFOXVLRQV¶264 The rhetoric that prevails has the power to govern our 
outlook on an issue, how we feel it affects us and how it should be dealt with.  
7KHUHLVVFRSHIRUVD\LQJWKDW&RKHQ¶VµPRUDOSDQLF¶WKHRU\LVOLPLted in its analysis and 
outdated. That is not to say, however, that the theory has no place in social theory; rather, it is 
of greater complexity than the original research revealed.265 McRobbie and Thornton agree 
that the original balance or relations which µPRUDOSDQLF¶VRFLRORJLVWVVDZH[LVWLQJEHWZHHQ
media, agents of social control, folk devils and moral guardians, have given way to a much 
PRUHFRPSOLFDWHGDQGIUDJPHQWHGVHWRIFRQQHFWLRQVWKHWHUP¶VµDQWKURSRPRUSKLVPRI
society as a single person experLHQFLQJVXGGHQIHDUDERXWLWVYLUWXH¶REIXVFDWHVUDWKHUWKDQ
enlightens on the underlying causes of social phenomena.266 0DQ\µPRUDOSDQLFV¶UHPDLQ
preoccupied with moral values, social regulation and boundary demarcation, but modern 
µPRUDOSDQLFV¶DUHQRWPonolithic and are continually contested.267 
:DWQH\FULWLFLVHVWKHµPRUDOSDQLF¶PRGHOIRULWVHPSKDVLVRQWKHVWDWHDVDSULPHPRYHULQ
social panics, thereby overshadowing grassroots movements.268 For instance, the Portsmouth 
community itself initiated protested against the relocation of paedophiles on the Paulsgrove 
Estate in 2000.269 But Marsh and Melville point out that the vociferous campaigning for 
hardline measures to be taken against criminals by News International via its UK tabloids the 
Sun and the News of the World encouraged an atmosphere that sparked a series of brutal 
attacks on suspected paedophiles both in Paulsgrove and elsewhere in the UK. 270 
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Moral panics may overlap and reinforce each other. For instance, the 1980s US day care 




Is the child sex offender a person who threatens society? 
It is generally accepted by most societies that intergenerational sexual intercourse with 
minors is taboo or illegal or both.272 The sex offender is a recognised deviant or folk devil 
according to the Cohen definition. Sex offenders are sometimes mislabelled paedophiles in 
the press e.g. the Daily Mirror FDUULHGWKHKHDGOLQHµ-DLOHG3DHGRSKLOH-HUHP\)RUUHVW
attacked by another inmDWH¶)RUUHVWKDGDEGXFWHGDQGKDGVH[ZLWKDQXQGHUDJHWHHQDJHJLUO






The concept of the paedophile has become the dominant way through which sexual threats to 
children are articulated, but the concept is laden with ideas and assumptions which confine 
thinking about this issue to a very narrow focus.276 The term sex offender is more accurate 
since it embraces all kinds of offence. Sex offenders did not achieve their distinct or 
especially menacing status until the late nineteenth century when sex crimes formed part of 
the new Western episteme.277 
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Children KDYHLQPRUHUHFHQWWLPHVEHHQDFFRUGHGWKHVWDWXVRIµYXOQHUDEOH¶DQGWKH\DUH
regarded as if they are innately so from their physical and other perceived immaturities.278  
The concept of children as a vulnerable group dates from the 1980s and 1990s.279 In terms of 
legal personality, children were recognised as a distinct group by the Prevention of Cruelty to 
and Protection of Children Act 1889. This was the first Act for the prevention of cruelty to 
children and it enabled the police to enter homes if a child were in danger or arrest anyone 
who was ill-treating one.280 
However, young people have at times, especially teenagers, have also been perceived as folk 
devils. Critcher recalls the threat of binge drinking from the 1990s which was subsumed into 
a wide panLFRYHUµ\REFXOWXUH¶ZKLFKOHGWRWKH9LROHQW&ULPH5HGXFWLRQ%LOO281  
,Q&RKHQ¶VVWXG\RI0RGVDQG5RFNHUVWKHIRONGHYLOVZHUH\RXQJSHRSOHZKRKDG
committed acts of violence and criminal damage.282 Hier notes however that the portrayal of 
children as victims of folk devils have appeared at a growing rate alongside more traditional 
LPDJHVRIKDUPIXO\RXWKDVµIRONGHYLOV¶283 
Throughout the ages, media and society have been concerned over children, the next 
generation, what they are doing, or what is beLQJGRQHWRWKHP,Q:HEVWHU¶VYLHZ 
If we briefly survey the role which has been played in medieval and modern history by 
collective fantasies, one fact which will almost immediately become apparent is that 
many of the most powerful historical fantasies involve children and the need to 
protect them. For although we sometimes assume our own anxieties about the 
vulnerability of innocent children are distinctively modern, this is very far from the 
case. 
He cites the examples of allegations of ritual murder against the Jews in Norwich in 1144 
who were alleged to have tortured and murdered a Christian child.284 The element of an 
DVFHUWDLQHGSHUVRQWKHµSDHGRSKLOH¶ZKRSRVHVDWKUHDWWRVRFLHW\FKLOGUHQLQSDUWLFXODULV
therefore satisfied in the Cohen moral panic theory.  
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Child abuse as a threat to society 
There is evidence of social concern over child abuse as being a significant issue. For instance, 
the Howard review of state monitoring sex offenders in 1996 showed concern at élite-
level;285 the broadsheets published this information to the public and the tabloids became 
proactive. Jenkins states that from 1986 the British news media reported almost daily on 
sexual abuse and sexual assaults against children.286 Whilst it was possible that there was an 
upsurge of the occurrence of these crimes, the press coverage may have represented a sudden 
exaggeration and discovery of phenomena that had long been in existence. The media focus 
DWWUDFWHGSXEOLFLQWHUHVWZKLFKJDYHWKHFKLOGDEXVHSUREOHPWKHVWDWXVRIDµPRUDOSDQLF¶287 
Public demonstrations about community-based offenders showed a clear social movement to 
address the problem.288 
Child abuse was, and still is, a definite social concern. There are hard facts to support the 
complaint that children have been abused and that until better scientific techniques were 
adopted, the problem often went undetected. Child sexual abuse started to become a concern 
for professionals in 1857, when Ambrose Tardieu researched thousands of such cases. 
However, his successors criticised his findings on child sexual abuse. Freud was also 
criticised for acknowledging CSA when presenting his seduction theory to psychiatrists in 
Vienna in 1896, hence abandoning his theory for another which proposed that children were 
traumatized by projections of their own fantasies, not sexual abuse.289 Technology assisted 
the diagnosis of physical abuse as a major social problem in the 1960s, though the problem 
had existed for millennia. From the late 1970s onwards, the nascent social problem of child 
sexual abuse gradually appropriated the generic term child abuse.290 Child abuse as a real 
problem was not necessarily prompted by an increase in abuse but an awareness of it borne 
out by medical evidence.291 Child abuse is a definite problem that is interlaced with phases of 
µPRUDOSDQLF¶7KHFKLOGDVDYLFWLPRIDEXVHKDVEHHQLPEXHGZLWKDXQLYHUVDOLW\WKDWPDNHV
it powerful and a strong symbol in the language and rhetoric of crime control policy;292 even 
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to the extent that international press discourses on child sexual abuse have more frequently 
juxtaposed the image of the habitual paedophile with the symbolic figure of the victim to 
GHQRWHDVSHFWUXPRIKDUPIDFLQJFKLOGUHQLQWKHPRGHUQZRUOG¶293 
Has there been a stylisation of the child abuse problem in the media? 
There is evidence to suggest that the media have stimulated the fear of child sexual abuse 
which has been gleaned from academic study of the language employed in newspaper 
headings and articles. This has been discussed earlier, but essentially there is a high degree of 
VW\OLVDWLRQHPSOR\HGE\VRPHWDEORLGVWRRXWWKHµSDHGRSKLOHV¶.LW]LQJHUVWXGLHGV
headlines in some of the tabloids at the height of paedophile scares where the tone is at times 
µRYHUWO\SURYRFDWLYH¶DQGHPRWLRQDOLW\-loaded, at others, sloganized. She does give the caveat 
KRZHYHUWKDWµLWLVIXQGDPHQWDOO\XQKHOSIXOWRGLVFXVVPHGLDDQGFRPPXQLW\UHDFWLRQVDVD
µPRUDOSDQLF¶EHFDXVHWKHFRQFHSWLPSOLHVWKDWWKHSDQLFLVWRWDOO\XQMXVWLILHG«¶7KHWKHRU\
fails to pay attention to the procHVVHVWKURXJKZKLFKDµPRUDOSDQLF¶LVHQJHQGHUHGDQG
therefore offers a way of glossing over rather than truly investigating public reactions. To 
DFFXVHWKHPHGLDRIIRPHQWLQJK\VWHULDDQGFUHDWLQJµO\QFKPRE¶YLROHQFHLVHTXDOO\
inadequate and ignores ke\LVVXHVWKURXJKZKLFKFRPPXQLW\UHDFWLRQVHYROYH¶294 Problems 
arise when the media present certain myths related to sex offenders that run contrary to the 
data supported by empirical research e.g. identifying sex offenders as being compulsive, 
homogeneous, specialists and incapable of benefiting from treatment.295 In fact, they are 
heterogeneous, with a number of subgroups, including adolescents, males and females, 
offenders with learning disabilities and. mental health problems296. Past myths about sex 
offendiQJKDYHDOVRDULVHQIURPKLJKSURILOHFDVHVRIFKLOGPXUGHUDQGµVWUDQJHUGDQJHU¶VXFK
as the Sarah Payne murder which are rare occurrences. The murder of April Jones in 2012 
was committed by an acquaintance of her family.297 The most common form of CSA is 
considered to be father-daughter, followed by offences committed by uncles and brothers.298 
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A third of all sexual offences are committed by juveniles from 13 to 17 years who commit 
illegal sexual acts. Within this category, offences against children under twelve years of age 
are typically committed by boys aged between twelve and fifteen years.299 Are young people 
ZKRFRPPLWWKHVHRIIHQFHVSHUFHLYHGDVµSDHGRSKLOHV¶E\WKHPHGLDDQGWKHSXEOLFGHVSLWH
the official starting-point IRUDµSDHGRSKLOH¶EHLQJDJHGRUPRUH"300 The image of the 
paedophile is infinitely malleable and will remain so while we are told what they are rather 
by the media, rather than finding out about them for ourselves from more accurate sources.301 
These myths DIIHFWWKHSXEOLF¶VRYHUDOOSHUFHSWLRQRIVH[RIIHQGHUVDQGWKHLUFULPHVZKLFK
in turn can affect public policy. Coverage of violent and sensational crimes that are 
disproportionate to their levels in official data also exaggerates public fears of victimisation, 
especially for sex crimes.302 
Have socially accredited experts pronounced their diagnoses and solutions to child sexual 
abuse and what kind of coping mechanisms have emerged? 
The media coverage and public debate about child abuse has sometimes stemmed from 
solutions offered by public officials. When Michael Howard proposed legislation in 1996 to 
monitor sex offenders in the community, the media reported the proposal. Whilst the 
broadsheets published the details that the paedophile register information would be restricted 
to certain professionals/law enforcement personnel, the tabloids detailed the deficiency of the 
monitoring system since it denied the same information to the public. The News of the World 
campaigned for the outing of paedophiles in the community following the death of Sarah 
Payne in 2000.303 
The public itself became proactive in discovering the identity and whereabouts of sex 
offenders. The fear of paedophiles in the community was acted upon by the government in its 
review of monitoring of child sex offenders and piloting of the sex offender disclosure 
scheme in 2011, with the concession to the public that parents could consult police about the 
criminal backgrounds of their partners.304 Though the media played a proactive role in the 
campaLJQWRµRXW¶VH[RIIHQGHUVWKHSXEOLFKDGDOUHDG\EHFRPHFRQFHUQHGLWVDZDUHQHVVRI
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child abuse heightened by policy and procedures set out by Michael Howard. The grassroots 
response to sex offenders - public campaigns and demonstrations following media publicity - 
signified how insecure the people felt about sex offenders known by officials in their 
neighbourhood but unknown to them.305 The campaigns for wider disclosure arguably 
became part of a coping strategy which ostensibly afforded greater ownership of child 
protection to parents than as presented to them by the politico-legal system. The radical 
overhaul of the law by the Sexual Offences Act in 2003 met some of the demands of sex 
offender monitoring and tougher laws on sex crimes generally; it was therefore a formal 
means of addressing and assuaging public concern.306 
Is the child abuse phenomenon novel or has it been in existence long enough but suddenly 
comes into the limelight? 
Child abuse is universal in time and place, but key events/panics do raise its profile. The ill -
treatment of children by adults has been well documented in history and was regarded as 
QRYHOWKHQ1HZWHFKQRORJ\KDVKHOSHGWRLGHQWLI\FKLOGWUDXPD,QWKH86.HPSH¶VPHGLFDO
research on battered children firmly placed child abuse a social concern in the 1960s.307 
There is therefore no exact time when child abuse became recognised; because of different 
definitions of the phenomenon, it is now perceived as an evolving social construction.308 
µ0RUDOSDQLFV¶RIFKLOGDEXVHDUHFRQFHrned may they arise serially. A new kind of abuse 
restarts the cycle until a new law is introduced, reform of an existing one or change in the 
activities in law enforcement agencies until the topic is re-raised.309 The child abuse 
phenomenon therefore has not appeared spontaneously: it has been kept alive by a 
FRPELQDWLRQRIµPRUDOSDQLFV¶RYHUWKH\HDUVLQYROYLQJIDFHWVRI&6$DQGNH\HYHQWVRIUHDO
cases which heighten public awareness that have triggered strong public reaction and 
administrative action. 
Does the concern about CSA have serious and long-lasting repercussions so as to produce 
such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself? 
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The ways in which laws are conceived, crime is reported and stories are constructed are not 
neutral, but rely on unacknowledged assumption regarding social issues such as sexuality, 
gender, race, ability, and in respect of child abuse, childhood. These unacknowledged 
assumptions reinforce normative categories of identity regarding the proper roles of men, 
women and children and structure the ways in which we can understand sexual abuse.310  
The reality of CSA as portrayed by the mass media is less important in determining public 
attitudes and actions taken toward the deviance than the rhetorically constructed panic over 
it.311 Society has mainly been preoccupied with extra-IDPLOLDO&6$VXFKDVµVWUDQJHUGDQJHU¶
and institutions such as care homes and schools and of all the possible responses to this issue 
- psychological, educational, social or welfare-oriented - official action will inevitably take 
the form of penal sanctions imposed by the criminal justice system on these outsider 
figures.312 
There have been numerous legislative changes which indicate great strides in child 
protection, including the Children Act 1989 stemming from issues in the management of 
child protection articulated in the Cleveland Report.313 The Sexual Offences Act 2003314 
included closing legal loopholes as caused by the abuse of new technology (the Internet). 315 
Government policy also attempted to monitor children in its policy document Every Child 
Matters316 which aimed to combine services in social care, welfare and wellbeing as well as 
FUHDWHVWDWXWRU\ORFDOFKLOGSURWHFWLRQERDUGV7KHSKUDVHµFKLOGSURWHFWLRQ¶ is multi-layered 
with complex rhetorical implications for family control and individual responsibility.317 
Impact on society caused by attenuated concern over child abuse 
The concern over extra-familial abuse may have the knock-on effect that more professionals 
working with children may suffer false accusations. The vulnerability of professionals has 
been highlighted by the teaching union NASUWT that false allegations made against them by 
children have become commonplace.318 
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A 2011 census survey for the Department for Education, provides some insight into the types 
of allegation reported to Local Authority Designated Officers. In the reporting period April 
2009 - March 2010, 116 local authorities had received 12,086 allegations of abuse, of which 
2,827 had been made against school teachers. 56% of these allegations were physical in 
nature. About one third of allegations were found to be substantiated, however, 19% were 
unfounded, 2% malicious, 25% were unsubstantiated (neither implying guilt nor innocence) 
and the outcomes of the remaining 21% of cases were unknown. 319 
The sacralisation of children and public fear and revulsion over paedophiles allow for a rare 
moment of consensus in morally uncertain times. Human rights issues such as whether to 
mandate WKHLVVXLQJRIFLWL]HQV¶LGHQWLW\FDUGVRULQWURGXFHQHZDQWL-terrorism laws can erode 
civil liberties in the interests of child protection, e.g., the mandatory databasing of children 
admitted to accident and emergency hospital wards to identify potential victims of abuse and 
the policing by vetting of millions of people who work with or who come into contact with 
children.320 Apart from civil liberties issues surrounding child protection rhetoric and policy, 
there is now a climate that is inhospitable to intergenerational encounters; with professionals 
and adults in contact with children now having to weigh up how their interaction with 
children will be interpreted by others, anxious that this interaction should not be 
misconstrued.321 There have therefore been considerable and durable changes in social 
awareness and policymaking issuing from child abuse discourse. 
Does the Goode/Ben-Yehuda model transpose successfully to the child abuse concern? 
It would appear that the fourth and fifth elements, of the Goode/Ben-Yehuda moral panic 
model - disproportionality and volatility - are lacking in the general social concern of child 
abuse. On the subject of disproportionality, one cannot argue that a given episode of fear or 
FRQFHUQUHSUHVHQWVDFDVHRIDµPRUDOSDQLF¶LIHPSLULFDOLQIRUPDWLRQDWWHVWVWRWKHH[LVWHQFH
of a problem. Even though knowledge acquisition may be flawed and facts gleaned may not 
be absolutely certain, where available information points to the existence of the problem 
(such as CSA), there will be confidence that it is an area of concern. 
,QµFODVVLF¶&RKHQµPRUDOSDQLF¶WKHRU\WKHUHLVDOVRWKHH[SHFWDWLRQWKDWWKHFODLPVPDNHUV
such as the media, have exaggerated and distorted facts and figures to gain support for their 
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argument that something must be done to resolve the occurrence of a given concern. Since 
the actual numbers of abused children are difficult to prove, it is difficult to state with 




In other words, such legislation can stem from claims making which appeals to emotion 
rather than rationality. Moral panics cloud the truth about the dimension of child abuse in the 
UK. It is the most difficult of all areas to capture in rational debate. Even allowing for cases 
that will be dropped or acquitted or appealed, as well as the fact that other cases may go 
unreported, thousands of children in the UK will have been sexually abused.323 The NSPCC 
states that there were 47 008 police-recorded sexual offences against children in the UK in 
2014-15.324 In 2015, of 49 690 of children in England had been subject to child protection 
plans.325  
 
Yet, other aspects of child abuse have been overshadowed, such as child welfare cuts.326 On 
the topic of volatility, if one applies the Goode and Ben-Yehuda criteria which attempted to 
UHILQH&RKHQ¶VPRGHOLWLVIRXQGWKDWWKHFKLOGDEXVHSUREOHPODFNVWKHYRODWLOLW\RISUHYLRXV
µPRUDOSDQLFV¶DVLWFXUUHQWO\VKRZVQRVLJQRIDEDWHPHQWLQHither the UK or US whence 
PXFKRIWKHFKLOGSURWHFWLRQOREE\LQJGHULYHV,QDFODVVLFµPRUDOSDQLF¶WKHIHYHUSLWFK
which characterises a society is not typically sustainable over a long stretch of time.327 The 
IHDURIFKLOGDEXVHLVDµPRUHRUOHVVFRQVWDQt and abiding element in society and therefore it 
ODFNVYRODWLOLW\¶328 The child abuse problem is constant and unlikely to diminish in the 
future.329  
The modern concepts of child abuse have a durable quality. Society in the 1990s became 
more sensitive to sexual violence and exploitation, rape, incest and child abuse and sexual 
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harassment as women became more active in working and political life than before. 330 It is 
likely that threats to children will remain a central social issue however reconceived and 
seemingly irrespective of errors caused by the credulity of non-existent or unfounded 
problems such as ritual satanic abuse or unreliable therapeutic techniques or the forensic 
failings of the ritual abuse cases in the US and the misdiagnoses in the period of organised 
abuse allegations in Cleveland and Orkney in the UK. 
In America, there were visible patterns of concern about sex offenders in the 20th century 
which peaked and troughed with peaks of interest in sex offenders and the demand for 
legislation occurring every thirty-five years. It has been said that since 1995 in America, the 
child abuse phenomenon has become part of its enduring political landscape, a meta-narrative 
with the potential for explaining all social and personal ills.331 
De Young regards CoKHQ¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIµPRUDOSDQLF¶DVEHLQJVRPHZKDWOLWHUDU\DQG
incomplete for her analysis of the US day centre ritual sexual abuse trials. De Young is surely 
right that the theory is in need of a makeover if it is to retain its explanatory and analytical 
power in a complexly differentiated, multi-mediated, late-PRGHUQZRUOG'H<RXQJ¶V
research into successful appeal cases of convicted day centre providers in the late 1980s/early 
1990s revealed a significant number of serious technical irregularities that resulted in the 
appeal court quashing the convictions.332 Points of law which had been successfully argued in 
those cases included the following:  
1. A conviction was overturned because the trial judge had disallowed the cross-
examination of a child witness about a manifestly false allegation of CSA against the 
FDUHFHQWUHSURYLGHU¶VZLIH 
2. In another case, the state investigators had improperly destroyed audiotapes of the 
early interviews with some of the alleged victims, depriving the defence of evidence 
to be used to cross-examine them; 
3. A juror disclosed that she wanted to convict X because she did not want to be seen as 
condoning CSA; 
4. $UHWULDOZDVRUGHUHGZKHUHFKLOGUHQ¶VWHVWLPRQ\ZDVDOORZHGRWKHUWKDQWKHDOOHJHG
victim, thereby prejudicing the jury; 
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5. A trial judge in another case had disallowed the defence to have access to discovery 
sanctioned documents; 
6. 2QHDFFXVHG¶VFRQYLFWLRQZDVRYHUWXUQHGEHFDXVHWKHWULDOMXGJHKDGDOORZHG
prosecutors to introduce unrelated, irrelevant and inadmissible evidence, thus 
depriving her of her due process rights.333 
/LPLWDWLRQVRI86UHVHDUFKLQµPRUDOSDQLF¶DQDO\VLV  
American sociologists like Jenkins and de Young have made great inroads in attempting to 
DQDO\VHFKLOGDEXVHµPRUDOSDQLFV¶ZKLFKRFFXUUHGWKHUH+RZHYHU their research on child 
DEXVHµPRUDOSDQLFV¶WHQGVWREH86FHQWUHGUDWKHUWKDQFRPSDUDWLYH6RFLRORJLVWVDWWHPSWWR
use a universalistic science and avoid theoretical ethnocentrism but their research will be 
constrained by different national conditions leading to differences of theoretical emphasis.334 
An instance of such difference is illustrated here: the US ritual satanic abuse cases were 
influenced in part by evangelical beliefs that children were being subjected to such abuse by 
day centre providers. APHULFDQµPRUDOSDQLF¶WKHRU\LQJHQHUDOLVDOVRIRFXVHGRQWKH
psychological impact such as anxiety and stress, portraying interest groups as just another 
IRUPRIFROOHFWLYHEHKDYLRXUZKHUHDV%ULWLVKµPRUDOSDQLF¶DQDO\VLVSDUWLFXODUO\IRFXVHGRQ
Marxist influenced economic factors especially the 1970s.335 De Young and Bandes argue 
convincingly that attending to the psychological impact is vital in questioning whether 
apparently rational institutions such as the justice system may let emotionality rule their 
critical faculties in criminal trials involving child abuse.  
Psychological and legal impact resulting from moral panics 
Child abusers are perceived as a symbol of the deepest evil; in societies such as the US and 
the UK, the use of ever more stringent measures by legislators and politicians is designed to 
contain and destroy the threat.  
To fail to convict such a person, or to fail to punish him adequately, is a symbolic act: 
a sign of disrespect to the victims and a failure to protect society. In such cases, the 
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drive to convict and punish colours every aspect of the legal process, often in ways 
that are difficult to detect.336 
Jenkins describes how a demagogic bidding war takes place to impose the harshest penalties 
for the condemned behaviour. In times of enhanced awareness of the most extreme forms of 
&6$VXFKDVFKLOGPXUGHUµWKHUHZHUHHYHQGLYLGHQGVLQSURSRVLQJODZVVRH[WUHPHWKDWWKH
courts would find them unconstitutional, as judges could then be left with the stigma of 
having failed to defend chiOGUHQ¶337 6RFLHW\¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGVWKHVH[RIIHQGHUPD\DOVR
have the effect of enlarging the control culture and infringing constitutional protections 
DIIRUGHGWRµQRUPDO¶YLROHQWFULPLQDOV([LVWLQJUHVHDUFKWHQGVWRSURYLGHHYLGHQFHWKDW
suggested that the public were punitive in their views towards sex offenders; that they felt 
sentences given for convicted offenders were too lenient; consequently, there was a gap 
between the public, and, for example, judges in terms of views on appropriate sentences.338 




essentially present: a perceived threat (child abuse), the identification of a folk devil 
responsible for the threat (the accused day care providers), the rapid build-up of public 
concern, official response and resulting social change. However, she argues that there were 
special features of the day centre panic such as its virulence and the reification of ritual 
satanic abuse, even though there was no evidence to corroborate the existence and therefore 
the reality of ritual satanic abuse, which KDGWREHFRQVLGHUHGEH\RQGWKH&RKHQµPRUDO
SDQLF¶H[SODQDWLRQ340 
It seems clear that there are similarities with research into ritual satanic abuse cases and 
HCSA cases. Although the US day centre complainants were actual children whose 
statements were contemporaneous rather than adults complaining many years later, there are 
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similar procedural and legal points that emerged pre-trial, during trial and post-trial which did 
call into question the safeness of trying and convicting the accused on the available evidence. 
In both the ritual satanic abuse cases and many historic ones, there was a lack of forensic 
evidence to bolster the allegations; both the UK and US allow oral testimony whether 
corroborated or not, to try to convict an accused for serious offences. This clearly facilitates 
prosecutions where there is no possibility of obtaining forensic evidence and such testimony 
is useful where it can be shown that the witness is competent, truthful, and reliable. False 
allegations do occur, however, some of which may stem from the witness interviewing 
process itself, as had occurred in the US. The child complainants in the day centre 
prosecutions were sometimes interviewed by therapists who believed that any conflicting 
statement made by a child meant that s/he ZDVµLQGHQLDO¶DQGZDVVXIIHULQJIURPVH[XDO
abuse accommodation syndrome and numerous therapists and parent-experts subscribed to 
the ideology of credulity because children could neither lie nor fantasise about something 
they had not experienced.341 
De Young analysed not only what the day centre abuse defendants were charged with and 
FRQYLFWHGRIEXWDOVRWKDWµPRUDOSDQLF¶LQHYLWDEO\LQIOXHQFHGWKHZD\WKHSROLFHDQGFRXUWV
handled the accused. She analysed appeal court rationales for overturning most of the 
convictions of convicted day-care providers and found out that most of the original trials 
suffered serious procedural and legal flaws which rendered them unsafe. In a similar vein, it 
is necessary to assess whether UK historic convictions of CSA are more likely to contain 
serious procedural and legal errors against the backdrop of the moral panic of past and 
present CSA in UK society. 
(iv) Heightened concern about child abuse and its impact on policy and law 
Concerns over child abuse require contextualisation as well as an explanation as to why it has 
been high-profile in recent decades. As we have seen, the term µchild sexual abuse¶ did not 
acquire its present cultural and ideological significance until the mid-1970s, even though the 
term has a long history.342 The child abuse problem has received various degrees of attention 
in different eras, sometimes for logical and comprehensible reasons; at other times, the 
perceived significance of the threat grows and diminishes without any change in the real 
threat potential of the condition itself. The profile of child abuse has at times been raised by 
µTXLHW¶FRQVWUXFWLRQVXFKDVWKURXJKWKHmedical research findings of Kempe or the rhetoric of 
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FODLPVPDNHUVRUµQRLV\¶RQHVVXFKDVPHGLD-exposed extreme cases such as the deaths of 
Megan Kanka343 or Sarah Payne.344 Zgoba goes as far to state that child predation cases are 
the most vilified in both the media and the criminal justice system, as cases of child 
abduction, molestation and homicide consistently receive media prominence, unlike similarly 
violent cases and have risen so high on the agenda that they have all but eclipsed neglect, 
deprivation and cruelty of children.345  
The papers in one of the cases provided by a convicted person for this research study show 
that his WULDOZDVFRQWHPSRUDQHRXVZLWKWKHQHZVRI6DUDK3D\QH¶VGHDWK346 S was tried in 
June 2001 and convicted of sexual assaults against his two biological children (rape on three 
occasions and cruelty on four occasions all occurring between 1977-1985). A character 
witness statement obtained as part of an appeal, suggests that one of the reasons that S was 
convicted may have been the meGLDYLOLILFDWLRQRI6EHIRUHKLVWULDO6DUDK3D\QH¶VGHDWKKDG
been highly publicised in July 2000. It was claimed that this extreme, high profile case of 
child abuse was still fresh in the minds of the media and the general public, and told against 
him at trial. The convictions were not overturned. 
Examples of classic µmoral panics¶ in child abuse allegations 
There have been cases in recent history which demonstrate that clinical and psychological 
misdiagnosis led Western society to believe that there were outbreaks of ritual satanic sexual 
abuse (RSA) and organised abuse which were not substantiated.347 These cases were classic 
µmoral panics¶ which had far-reaching policy consequences for both alleged victims and 
accused alike. They may be deemed classic µmoral panics¶,348 because, with hindsight, 
reactions to the discovery of RSA were not merely disproportionate, they were also 
unwarranted. 
A true µmoral panic¶ -the USA ritual satanic abuse of children in McMartin daycare centre 
trials  
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There were fifteen child day-care centre investigations in the US and the trials of 38 
defendants from 1983 (the first of which took place at the McMartin day care centre) to 1991. 
Whilst many of the charges were dropped or the jury gave not guilty verdicts, subsequent 
trials of the 14 remaining allegations often ended in very long sentences.349 Many of these 
childcare providers were incarcerated based on unsubstantiated allegations and most were 
released on appeal. It was only in November 2013 that the Kellers (convicted in 1992, 
sentenced to 48 years in prison) were released when the prosecution doctor from that trial 
subsequently recanted his testimony.350 Frank Fuster, was convicted in 1985 and sentenced to 
165 years in prison and is the last person convicted of CSA at a day centre to remain in 
prison.351 
Both the UK and US are countries where there is a higher percentage of women in the 
employed sector than before, with many families leaving very young children in nurseries, 
and older children are often left at school longer to participate in after-school activities where 
available.352 Inevitably, this leads to the greater institutionalisation of children with teachers 
DQGFDUHUVEHLQJOHIWLQFKDUJHDQGFDUHRIWKHFKLOG¶VHGXFDWLRQDQGVRFLDOLVDWLRQ,WLV
therefore logical that the time at which the fear of child abuse is manifest should also 
coincide with social upheaval in the shape of change within the family as mothers participate 
more in the employed sector.  
$PHULFD¶VPDVVSDQLFRYHUFKLOGDEXVHFRPPHQFHGLQWKHVZKHQ a combination of 
factors kindled hysteria more akin to a classical µmoral panic¶ with a few qualifications. The 
number of social, ideological, professional and political forces had contributed to a growing 
cultural anxiety about satanic menaces to children. A series of mini-panics was precursory to 
the infamous McMartin Preschool trials and not less than 15 other day care centre 
investigations (1983-1991) in its wake.353 This included fear of demonic influences in heavy 
metal music, fortune-telling, urban legends about Satanist child abductors, satanic child 
pornography rumours and satanic child sex rings, against the backdrop of Christian 
evangelism that was popular then. In 1983, a preschool child was said to have made a 
VWDWHPHQWµYDJXHO\VXJJHVWLYHRIVH[XDODEXVH¶6RFLDOZRUNHUVEHFDPHLQYROYHGZKRKDG
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also been claims makers about child satanic abuse. The allegation became infused with 
Satanism as well sexual abuse. Social workers using repetitious suggestive interviewing 
techniques, discovered 369 more past and present alleged victims who had been enrolled at 
McMartin. They also had great influence on lecture circuits and as expert witnesses in 
trials.354 The allegations did not cease and extended to accusations against those wholly 
unrelated to the day school as well. An accusatorial atmosphere had emerged which was 
spread by the news media which reported stories which evoked strong emotional responses 
and vilified the day nursery staff. In the prevailing atmosphere, numerous trials against day 
care staff took place which led to lengthy sentences against them, some being multiple life-
sentences for individuals. In many cases, the courts overturned convictions and ordered 
retrials. The appeals indicated a scepticism for the claims makers of ritual satanic abuse; the 
radical change may well have led to the creation of a new folk devil: the overzealous, short-
sighted professional bent on proving sexual abuse of any kind leading to a new µmoral panic¶ 
- µWKHEDFNODVK¶355 
Ritual satanic abuse of children µmoral panic¶ in Orkney and the Cleveland forensic 
fallibility scandal 
In 1980s England, child abuse also became a visible issue when it was profiled by the media: 
WHOHYLVLRQSURJUDPPHVVXFKDV(VWKHU5DQW]HQ¶VChildwatch. Between 1985 and 1987, the 
broadsheet newspaper The Times gave a fourfold increase in coverage of CSA, became a 
regular topic for documentaries and soap opera storylines.356 The media therefore enhanced 
social awareness about CSA. It was therefore not surprising that a greater awareness of CSA 
among professionals would galvanise them into investigating cases of CSA. The zeal of well-
intentioned professionals, combined with the limitations of their training, would result in 
accusations against a number of innocent people and removing their children from them in 
familial abuse allegations: the infamous Cleveland affair. The latter part of the 1980s saw a 
µmoral panic¶ which centred on child abuse within the family, especially within Cleveland, 
where social workers sought the removal of many children from their parents in light of a 
disputed diagnosis of sexual abuse by two paediatricians.357 Claims and counterclaims by 
professionals and parents were presented to politicians and ultimately concluded at the 
MXGLFLDOµ&OHYHODQG¶LQTXLU\7KLVLVDQH[DPSOe of a µmoral panic¶ in cases which were 
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never substantiated; but they had dire consequences both for alleged victims. Children had 
also been removed by social services from their families in Broxtowe, Nottingham in October 
1987 because of allegations that children were being systematically subjected to ritual satanic 
abuse. Ten men and women were convicted of sexual, physical abuses and neglect supported 
by medical evidence. However, allegations of organised ritual satanic abuse made by the 
children placed in foster care were unsubstantiated by the fact that their foster carers had 
contaminated their accounts.358 1990-1991 had also seen ritual satanic abuse cases across 
Britain, from Rochdale to the Orkney, leading to dozens of children being taken into care and 
parents being accused of bizarre crimes; yet nobody was convicted of any crime related to 
Satanism. Growing media scepticism into ritual satanic abuse, a subsequent inquiry 
conducted by Jean La Fontaine for the Government in 1994, supported the findings of a Joint 
Enquiry Report which found that there was no evidence of RSA either in the Broxtowe cases 
or in the satellite cases.359 
The Cleveland child abuse scandal 
At times, claims makers with esteemed clinical credentials have been persuasive about 
children being sexually abused, with serious consequences for the accused and the child - 
only to have their research counterclaimed. An outstanding example of this is to be found in 
the 1980s Cleveland sexual abuse investigations which led to the Butler-Sloss Inquiry360 to 
seek the truth about the extent of abuse as diagnosed. The intensity of the Cleveland affair in 
terms of the investigation itself and media coverage, impressed upon leading academic 
authors on child abuse to neologise the term post-Cleveland to describe the aftermath years of 
µWKHILUVWPDVVVH[XDODEXVHFDVHLQ%ULWLVKKLVWRU\¶361One hundred and twenty one cases of 
suspected child abuse were diagnosed by Dr Higgs and Dr Wyatt. Children were placed in 
foster care or removed from their families permanently. Dr Higgs continued to examine the 
children regularly and based on her findings, she had some of the foster carers arrested for 
CSA as well. Cases involving 96 alleged child victims were dismissed at court trials; 26 cases 
involving children from twelve families were found by judges to have been misdiagnosed.  
However, there remained the question as to whether any of the suspected cases of CSA 
turned out to be true. In The Times it was reported that Wyatt and Higgs confirmed that 5 of 
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the 121 children whose cases were considered by the public inquiry under Lord Justice 
Butler-Sloss had since been referred to the social services on suspicion of having been 
sexually abused again. 362 Senior Cleveland council officials had been concerned about the 
DIWHUPDWKRIWKHSXEOLFLQTXLU\DQGEHOLHYHGWKDWDµUROOHUFRDVWHU¶RISXEOLFRSLQLRQKDG
helped to sway decisions by courts and that some children who had been abused were being 
returned home without any legal protection and could face further abuse. It is significant that 
the public mood, after the Cleveland revelations, heavily supported parents whose children 
had been removed from them and most children had been returned to them. Therefore, social 
services had to be cautious when re-referring the five cases in question and made 
investigations without immediate removal of the alleged victims or else they would risk 
another outcry that their intervention was unwarranted. 
Whilst the reflex anal dilatation (RAD) technique had been an important but relatively 
unexplored sign of possible sexual abuse by its proponents; for those not directly involved or 
alienated from the sites where the knowledge of RAD was obtained, the sign and the 
technique came to be seen as part of a web of practices for illegitimately policing the 
family.363 The Cleveland cases in the UK were brought about by professional over-reliance 
on the uncorroborated results of the RAD test for sexual abuse.364 Until the clinical diagnosis 
was challenged by professionals, the findings were sufficiently authoritative to incriminate 
parents of sexual abuse. Since RAD appeared to have no evidential basis, the reaction to 
professional diagnosis and serious consequences for the families involved (removal by social 
services of children from their families) the incident can be justly classified as a µmoral 
panic¶. Cohen supports this view, stating that a whole gamut of professionals ranging from 
µVRFLDOZRUNHUVSROLFHSDHGLDWULFLDQVGRFWRUVODZ\HUVSDUHQWVORFDODQGQDWLRQDO
politicians, and then a judicial inquiry - lacked minimal consensus as to what the whole 
HSLVRGHZDVDERXW¶365 
Tainted investigations of allegedly sexually abused children in Oude Pekela, Holland 
µMoral panics¶ of this kind issuing from the findings of professional claims makers have also 
happened in other countries, such as clinical misdiagnosis of child abuse in Oude Pekela, 
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Holland in the 1980s.366 This triggered a panic and pursuit of more potential alleged victims 
of abuse and of alleged child abusers by a significant section of the community there. 
In the small Dutch town of Oude Pekela, two young boys had engaged in sex play in which 
they had caused some anal damage to each other. One of the boys was examined by the 
family physician, Dr Jonker, who proclaimed that the child had been sexually abused by a 
stranger, notwithstanding the explanation offered that one child had pushed a twig into the 
anus of the other. Dr Jonker proclaimed to an audience of 300 in a public house, as well as in 
a follow-up meeting, that there were child molesters at large who may well have abused their 
own children as well. The doctor informed the audience about possible signs of abuse in their 
FKLOGUHQDQGµXUJHGSDUHQWVWRTXHVWLRQWKHLUFKLOGUHQ¶6XEVHTXHQWO\KXQGUHGVRIUHSRUWVRI
child abuse were given by parents, teachers, and social workers. The methods used by the 
interrogators to elicit these reports may be gleaned from the comment of one infant school 
WHDFKHUµ:HSXWWKHPDWHDVHFDPHXSZLWKH[DPSOHVRIZKDWZHGLGDVZHJRDZD\ZLWK
VRPHRQHDQGVRPHWLPHVSXWZRUGVLQWRWKHLUPRXWKV¶3DUHQWVKDGEHFRPHSHUVXDGHGWKDW
there were masterminds of child pornography who were abusing the children. The Dutch 
police thought otherwise and declared the episode to be a burst of mass hysteria. No physical 
damage had been found on any child, apart from the two who had reportedly sustained their 
injuries in mutual sex-play and the accounts given by the children under interrogation were 
confused and discrepant. The police were placed in the awkward position of having to 
account for the investigation outcome. A public announcement that they had failed to find the 
perpetrators would have exposed them to public criticism of being inefficient, but equally, a 
public declaration that there had been no abuse would have led to accusations of a cover-up. 
To deflect criticism and in an effort to search for the truth, the Dutch government appointed a 
psychiatrist, Dr Mik who employed dubious questioning techniques and elicited results which 
led to him publicly concluding that the reports were true. The findings made headlines for 
several weeks and he was honoured by politicians and the Dutch Queen. But others, such as a 
XQLYHUVLW\SURIHVVRUZHUHLQFUHGXORXVRI'U0LN¶VPHWKRGVZKLFKZHUHSXEOLVKHGLQDe 
Telegraaf on the 22nd January 1988. 
Both the UK and Dutch cases of clinical misdiagnosis illustrate that moral panics, initially 
localised, can become matters of national and international importance. The erstwhile 
champions of child protection - the clinicians - EHFDPHWKHQHZµIRONGHYLOV¶- the 
personification of evil, stripped of all favourable characteristics and imbued with exclusively 
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negative ones, once their rhetoric had been challenged and displaced. The UK media, as a 
UHVXOWRIWKH&OHYHODQGVFDQGDOGUHZWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VDWWHQWLRQWRWKHIDFWWKDWWKHFKLOG
protection system that had been set up to tackle child abuse appeared to have as many 
negative consequences for children and their families as it did positive ones.367 One of the 
negative consequences included the intrusive anal dilatation test which had been challenged 
by a US study which indicated that more than results half of non-abused children also showed 
positive in the test,368 therefore most cases of CSA would go undetected on such a limited 
and dubious test. The results of the (sometimes repeated testing) caused distress to children 
and their families. Whilst the Cleveland Report discussed false allegations of abuse made 
against the parents and scrutinising the doctors involved, there was also concern that there 
would be a renewed denial that children were actually being abused and harmed. 
The Cleveland affair was pivotal in changing who would be in charge of child protection in 
the future as critics of the prevailing system advocated reform in social and legal services. 
From 1984 onwards, the Department of Health set up an intergovernmental working party to 
review public child law as it then stood, following a critical report by a House of Commons 
Select Committee. Its recommendations were published in a 1985 Review of Child Care Law. 
The Law Commission reviewed private law concerning children and produced four 
discussion papers between 1984-88, followed by the report Review of Child Law: 
Guardianship and Custody. The Children Act 1989 was based on the draft Bill that was 
GHVLJQHGWRHQFDSVXODWHERWKWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VRZQSURSRVDOVDQGPDQ\RIWKRVHFRQWDLQHG
in the 1987 Government White Paper The Law on Child Care and Family Services.369 This 
Act was designed to recast existing law for children into a single, coherent instrument. It 
included children living in families, in need of local authority services or in want of 
protection from abuse. It was designed to be intelligible to parents, relatives, foster carers, 
child minders, child care professionals and judges to further the best interests of children in 
their care. 
Apart from establishing more concretely what the rights and roles of children and parents 
were, this legislation also had the effect of lessening the role social workers and medics 
SOD\HGLQGHWHUPLQLQJZKRZDVDµFKLOGDWULVN¶DQGRIIHUHGDIUDPHZRUNGHWHUPLQLQJWKH
roles of the police, courts and social services. Some social workers had already come to 
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prominence over their lack of diligence in identifying child abuse which had dire 
consequences in the 1980s, as the following inventory shows: 
In the Tyra Henry case, (1984) Lambeth council social workers had been found to be too 
trusting of the family, where the father had battered and bitten her. By the time she was 
identified as a victim of child abuse, she died in care from the injuries inflicted by the father. 
In that same year, Heidi Koseida was starved to death by her parents, despite a neighbour 
complaining about abuse to an NSPCC inspector, the inspector refused to intervene and 
pretended he had visited the child in a cover-up. Kimberley Carlisle was starved and beaten 
to death by her stepfather and mother in 1986. Four key social work and health care staff 
were found to have failed to apply the necessary skills, judgement and care in her case. 
Sixteen-month-ROG'RUHHQ0DVRQ¶VPRWKHUDQGKHUER\IULHQGZHUHLPSULVRQHGIRU
PDQVODXJKWHUDQGQHJOHFWIURPWKHFKLOG¶VELUWKVKHZDVGHHPHGµDWULVN¶EXWSODFHGXQGHU
the supervision of an inexperienced and untrained social worker.370 The legal discourse 
shifted to accommodate the evidence, feelings and wishes of children.371 The Cleveland 
µmoral panic¶ therefore left some positive and durable outcomes legacy in terms of social and 
legal reforms. 
In the UK in the 1990s, there were mass investigations of historic allegations of CSA in 
youth residential care homes. Social workers, child protection workers and journalists 
thought that residential care homes for young people had been infiltrated by paedophile 
rings.372 This concern was given wider currency in the press and broadcasting media in the 
mid-1990s. The police were briefed to accept the possibility that there was widespread abuse 
as narrated by the media: their operations expanded from North Wales to Cheshire and 
Merseyside. The concern over organised abuse influenced the ways in which the police 
conducted their investigations. If a complaint had been made by a former resident, the police 
would seek corroboration by interviewing other residents as possible contemporaneous 
witnesses, but this included actively seeking more complaints against the accused by other 
residents as well.  
By 2000, about a hundred investigations of child abuse were in progress. Hundreds of 
complaints were made.373 There was a fashion in child protection services to apply the 
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µJUDGXDOGLVFORVXUHPRGHO¶RU&DOLIRUQLDPRGHOWRHOLFLWDOOHJDWLRQVIURPZLWQHVVHVZLWKWKH
UHVXOWWKDWFHUWDLQZLWQHVVHVLQWHUYLHZHGRQVHYHUDORFFDVLRQVHYHQWXDOO\µGLVFORVHG¶DEXVH374 
As Webster points out, there is no empirical evidence for the validity of the model; he agreed 
however that such a technique may facilitate genuine disclosure, but the witnesses were also 
suggestible and liable to make false allegations.375 As had occurred in the US day-care cases 
in the 1990s, an increasing number of those UK care workers imprisoned in the era of fear of 
institutional abuse have had their convictions overturned in the early 2000s.376 This begs the 
question of whether the heightened concern of CSA in approved schools and community 
homes377 affected the judgment of law enforcement and legal institutions which set aside 
objectivity as a result of intense public pressure to convict the guilty. 
It also calls into question whether the mode of police investigations and interrogations during 
the residential care homes panic may have had a lingering wider impact on the present way in 
which trials of historic CSA are still being conducted.  
One official response to the heightened concern of HCSA in England, which acts as a coping 
mechanism for dealing with the problem, has been the public inquiry.378 Consider recent 
examples. An inquiry was set up into police and council cover-ups of widespread historic and 
recent perpetrations of child abuse as evidenced by the discovery of mass organised child 
sexual exploitation in Rotherham.379 An inquiry has been launched by the Metropolitan 
police into allegations of HCSA in football clubs in the UK.380 The Football Association 
plans to conduct its own internal review to determine if more could have been done to 
prevent alleged abuse. 381The Independent Inquiry into Sexual Abuse has been set up to 
examine claims made against local authorities, religious organisations, the armed forces, 
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 E.g., see R v Basil Rigby Williams and Michael James Lawson [2003] E.W.C.A. Crim. 693. Anver Daud 
ࣟSheikh v The Crown [2006] EWCA Crim 2625. 
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 Webster. Bryn Estyn, approved schools became community homes in 1974 when responsibility for them 
passed from the Home Office to social services departments. 
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 S Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, (Routledge Classics 2011) p.90. 
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 House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee - Third Report of Session 2014-15 
µ&KLOG6H[XDO([SORLWDWLRQLQ5RWKHUKDP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 BBC Sport Football child sex abuse claims: What has happened so far? 15 Dec 2016; 
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public and private institutions and people in the public eye.382 This official reaction indicates 
that the heightened concern about HCSA in the UK currently shows no sign of abating. 
In Justice for All, the paper stated that the views of victims would inform any further changes 
to limiting the questions a rape victim could be asked under cross-examination about their 
previous sexual history. 383 This document predates the passing of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 which restricted the circumstances in which a FRPSODLQDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHUSUHYLRXV
sexual history could be explored in cross-examination.  
(v) Conclusion 
We have seen how the intense contemporary concern with child abuse has deep roots. With 
the growing understanding of childhood as a distinct stage of human development came a 
conception of the legal personality of the child, with its attendant status and entitlements. In 
particular, the vulnerability of the child was recognised and the need for its protection. 
Furthermore, as the understanding grew of how children could, and should, be recognised as 
being subject to abuse, the recognition of different types of abuse proliferated, such as sexual, 
physical, emotional, neglectful and genital mutilation.  
The campaigning of religious bodies, philanthropic groups, the press, politicians and 
ZRPHQ¶VJURXSVresponding to the changing attitudes in society to children, played a major 
part in the arrival of legislation to protect children from the second half of the 19th century 
onwards, for example from prostitution, or with respect to the age of consent as in the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885. It was in the 1880s that the NSPCC first developed. 
In the 20th century continuing concern from these quarters and also feminist organisations 
about the moral and physical welfare of poor children, and about the conduct of Poor Law 
institutions, led to government intervention and more legislation, such as the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 1922 which penalised assaults on girls aged 16 or under. The Children and 
Young Persons Act 1933 consolidated the existing provisions with respect to the legal 
framework concerning children and their protection. 
It was in the later 20th century, however, that the pressure increased in particular with regard 
to the processes of the investigation and prosecution of offences involving children. Concern 
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 Justice for All (CM 5563 July 2002), para 2.29, p.45. 
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shifted from the existence of substantive legal protections, to the processes by which the 
problem was identified, investigated and prosecuted. From the 1970s onwards there were 
many high profile individual cases of abuse and neglect, such as the Maria Colwell, Jasmine 
Beckford and Kimberley Carlisle cases. There were also burgeoning investigations of 
institutional abuse as in North Wales, and the Cleveland Inquiry and the Orkney µVDWDQLF
DEXVH¶affair, both reasonably seen as instances of tKHDSSHDUDQFHRIµPRUDOSDQLF¶ 
The Times coverage of CSA cases quadrupled in the 1980s. This continued through the 
1990s. By 2000 there were 32 separate ongoing police investigations of care homes across 
England and Wales. Sarah Payne was murdered in 2000. In 1989 the Pigot Committee 
reported on its consideration of the rules of evidence in cases involving children, and the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 was based on its report.  
The 1999 Act marked this shift of the focus of concern in the history of the prosecution of 
CSA cases in terms of the impact of the reforms on the safeguards available to defendants in 
such cases. For example, the 1999 Act made it more difficult for defendants to confront and 
cross-examine complainants in CSA cases. This Act and the Criminal Justice Act 2003 are 
considered in detail in Chapters V and VI of this study. This legislation can be seen to have 
emerged after an intense period of media and political pressure. 
As is clear from the Cleveland and Orkney cases, public concern can reach an intense pitch, 
DQGLWLVDOVRFOHDUWKDWVXFKDQDWPRVSKHUHFDQGULYHSROLF\DQGOHJLVODWLRQµ6DUDK¶VODZ¶LV
such an example. But dRHVWKHVRFLRORJLFDOFDWHJRU\µPRUDOSDQLF¶KHOSIXOO\FKDUDFWHULVHsuch 
public concern about CSA, at least over the last 40 years or so? To a limited extent only. As 
explained above, it may be useful in terms of identifying particular moments in that history, 
but LWPD\EHPRUHDSSURSULDWHWRWDONDERXWµKHLJKWHQHGFRQFHUQ¶$PRUDOSDQLFmay 
suggest, and sometimes usefully suggest, that public opinion has been roused on a mistaken 
basis. There can be no doubt however that CSA exists and on a large scale. A very concerned 
or even angry reaction may be appropriate, and may not fairly be charDFWHULVHGDVµSDQLF¶
Furthermore, the category also seems to have a tighter application to more isolated or 
infrequent instances of anti-social or deviant behaviour. CSA is a sustained and endemic 
problem. 
Having said that, it is also clear from the examples given in this chapter that whatever label is 
attached to it, heightened public concern can drive not only policy and legislative change as 
may well be natural and appropriate, but can also in individual cases put excessive pressure 
P a g e  |   
on the procedures and safeguards which exist to do just to those accused of criminal offences. 
This is clearly demonstrated, for example, in De Young¶VVWXGLHV, as described above, of the 
prosecutions RIWKHµGD\FDUH¶FDVHVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV. It is clear too from the accounts 
given above that public pressure caused the unjust investigation and prosecution of those 
imprisoned for the IRA bombings in Birmingham and Guildford in the 1970s.   
The story leading up to the present prosecution of HCSA cases is a fraught one. It is the story 
of the changing conception of childhood, of the recognition of child abuse, protective 
legislation, increasingly intense public concern about the issue, occasional panics, 
investigations, public inquires, and further legislation focusing on the criminal justice 
procedural issues of investigation and prosecution. It is the story too of the emergence of 
miscarriages of justice when public feeling is running high, in other sorts of cases and in 
HCSA cases too. 
It is a story that engages deep feelings for children and for their protection, fears about the 
threats that they face, and dark suspicions of others. The perception of its incidence within 
the family is particularly challenging. It is striking that sexual intercourse between parents 
and their children became a criminal offence only in the Punishment of Incest Act 1908. This 
heightened awareness about CSA has rendered society and the criminal justice system ever 
more vigilant about the problem, and ever ready to suspect or conclude that abuse has 
occurred. Some now some feel WKHUHLVDµFOLPDWHRIPLVWUXVW¶384 surrounding the many 
people who care for or educate children. This too should put us on our guard when 
considering matters of due process for defendants in HCSA trials. 
It is not surprising that the issue has put considerable pressure on the fair investigation and 
trial of those suspected of crimes against children. Indeed that is the conclusion which 
emerges from this exploration and analysis of the history and the relevant literature. The 
heightened public concern about child sexual abuse, which has been prominent at certain 
periods since at least the late 19th century, and has been intense for more than thirty years in 
this and other countries, has undoubtedly played a significant role not only in the 
development of law and practice concerning both the law relating to children and their 
protection generally but also in the investigation and prosecution of these offences, and 
furthermore has also undoubtedly contributed to miscarriages of justice of the sort noted 
above for example in this country, in Holland and in the United States of America. 
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An awareness of the roots and development of the recognition and reaction to the incidence 
of CSA, and of the pressures that can be, and have been, exerted in this are (and in other areas 
where public concern is heightened and engaged) is crucial to a full understanding and 
consideration of the detailed issues concerning the prosecution of HCSA cases which are 
raised in this study in relation to methods of investigation, delay in bringing charges and the 
rules relating to the admission at trial of bad character evidence relating to both complainants 
and defendants. 
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One scholar, Zuckermann, has commented that in criminal cases the roots of miscarriage of 
justice usually lie in the police investigation; and that any form of legal process is bound to 
remain vulnerable to errors made by the police.1 This chapter sets out to explore whether the 
past and current methods of the police for pursuing historic allegations of CSA are 
procedurally and evidentially sound, and whether any shortcomings can be identified in the 
present system that PD\FRPSURPLVHWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWWRDIDLUWULDO 
In historic allegations, notably in the pursuit of child sexual abuse in the care homes across 
England and Wales from the 1990s onwards, the police were briefed to seek out potential 
victims of CSA by the innovative and extant method termed µdip sampling¶. This chapter will 
focus on dip sampling - the method, its merits and demerits - and the related area of the 
interrogation process of potential prosecution witnesses. The problem of unregulated 
interviewing techniques applies not only to dip sampled prosecution witnesses, but also to 
any point of contact between police and prosecution witnesses in any criminal investigation, 
and will be considered in both dimensions.  
The issue of dip sampling, also referred to as µWUDZOLQJ¶, is a method often encountered in 
complex abuse cases, which may be institutional or non-institutional. Complex abuse can 
occur in families and day care, as well as in other provisions such as youth services, sports 
clubs and voluntary groups and via the use of the internet.2 
7KHLQYHVWLJDWLRQRI+&6$FDVHVLQWKLVPDQQHUKDVRIWHQEHHQWHUPHGµUHYHUVHSROLFLQJ3¶DV
there is no usually no crime scene, no witnesses, and perhaps a single complainant. On 
receipt of an allegation or suspicion, the police identify the cohort of likely victims and 
interview a considerable number of ex-residents of the care homes.  
Concern about the dip sampling method was expressed in relation to the high-profile case of 
David Jones. Jones was a football manager, who, before this career, worked in a Merseyside 
residential care home in the 1980s. In 1999, he faced 20 charges of historic child neglect and 




 Home Office: Complex Child Abuse Investigations: Inter-agency Issues, May 2002. 
3
 5:HEVWHUµ1HZ6WDWHVPDQ6SHFLDO5HSRUW+RZWKHSROLFHWUDZOWKHLQQRFHQW¶-XO\ 
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sexual abuse.4 The allegations had been elicited by the police dip sampling witnesses whom 
they interviewed from his former workplace. He initially had two accusers: a convicted 
arsonist and a convicted armed bank robber. The police found four more former resident 
complainants subsequent to this. Two of these dropped out as the trial began. One of the 
accusers admitted, when being cross-examined, that he had concocted his story and claimed 
he had been given guidance by the police to plug holes in his testimony. Jones¶FDVH
collapsed in 2000. Prior to the ACPO Handbook 2009 revisions designed to improve HCSA 
investigations, raise a concern about how many defendants, other than David Jones, might 
have been subject to a miscarriage of justice?5  
As part of its terms of reference, a Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) was asked to 
look at whether police methods of trawling for evidence involved a disproportionate use of 
resources and produce unreliable evidence for prosecution; and whether there was a risk that 
the advertisement of prospective awards of compensation in child abuse cases encouraged 
people to come forward with fabricated allegations.6 
The HASC concluded that there was a strong argument for introducing a general requirement 
to record police interviews of complainants and other significant witnesses on video or 
audiotape, with audio-taping of interviews as a mandatory requirement where videotaping 
was not practicable.7  
It was no coincidence that at the time of the HASC inquiry there followed the publication of 
two major guidance documents, 8 which demonstrate that child protection agencies were 
cognisant of past shortcomings in investigatory methods. These documents were: the ACPO 
Handbook on The Investigation of Historic Institutional Child Abuse, issued in March 2002 
DQGWKH+RPH2IILFH¶VComplex Child Abuse Investigations: Inter-agency Issues, May 2002. 
7KH$&32+DQGERRNQRWRQO\UHYHDOVWKHGLSVDPSOLQJPHWKRGDQGWKHSROLFH¶VRZQ
assessment of the efficacy of the method, but also responses to past criticism about aspects of 
operational methods, such as the poor recording of meetings with potential witnesses about 




 Fn 3, Webster. By 1999, the number of care workers implicated by trawled allegations exceeded 3000 
suspects. 
6
 Home Affairs Select Committee 7KH&RQGXFWRI,QYHVWLJDWLRQVLQWR3DVW&DVHVRI$EXVHLQ&KLOGUHQ¶V+RPHV 
Fourth Report of Session 2001-02, vol I, (HC 836 - I), p.7. 
7
 Ibid, vol I, para 45, p.19. 
8
 The Senior Investigating Officer Handbook clarified that justification should be made before an investigation 
using the dip sample method is launched. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) does not produce 
prescriptive guides but guidance demonstrating recommended or good practice. Changes were made to the SIO 
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what was stated by the parties. Some police officers had been criticised for mentioning the 
prospect of compensation to interviewees as an inducement to obtain the allegations. In the 
2009 version of the ACPO Handbook, it was recommended that police personnel keep logs of 
every encounter with interviewees. Notably, however, it still fails to offer guidance on the 
mode of questioning the police should adopt in these interviews. 
 
Whilst the dip sampling method employed by investigating police and the interviewing 
methods they use may be viewed as two separate issues, they are also interlinked. Firstly, dip 
sampled witnesses do not come forward of their own accord; secondly, their statements have 
often been obtained by opaque interrogatory methods. 
 
In 1991, the North Wales police initiated investigations into cases of alleged HCSA in care 
homes. Webster states that the police began to look for allegations actively from former 
residents rather than wait for allegations to be made spontaneously and invite them to make 
complaints, sometimes against specific workers. By 1994, the North Wales investigation had 
spread to Cheshire, then Merseyside. By 1998, investigations using this modus operandi had 
spread to South Wales; by 2000, almost a hundred investigations were in progress using this 
method.9  
The 2002 HASC was tasked with examining problem areas for potential miscarriages of 
justice in HCSA investigations, including police dip samples. It concluded that the adopted 
police dip sampling method per se should not be prohibited, but it was concerned about how 
investigations were conducted in terms of the approach of and interview techniques with 
potential complainants and witnesses.10  
At the time of the HASC inquiry, 34 of the 43 police forces in England and Wales had been 
LQYROYHGLQLQYHVWLJDWLRQVLQWRDOOHJDWLRQVRIFKLOGDEXVHLQFKLOGUHQ¶VKRPHVDQGRWKHU
institutions. All of the allegations related to historical abuse, said to have occurred several 
years - often decades - ago. In Merseyside alone, the police investigated 510 former care 
workers suspected of child abuse. Of those, 67 individuals were charged, resulting in 36 
convictions and nine acquittals. In the remaining 22 cases, the prosecution was either 
discontinued or dismissed by the judge.11  
                                                          
9
 R Webster, The Secret of Bryn Estyn, (The Orwell Press, 2005), pp.3-4. 
10
 Home Affairs Select Committee, Fourth Report, Session 2001-2002, The Conduct of Investigations into Past 
&DVHVRI$EXVHLQ&KLOGUHQ¶V Homes HC 836 I, para 27. 
11
 Ibid, para 1 of Introduction. 
P a g e  |   
More recently there have been 63 police investigations of HCSA in Britain in schools, 
FKLOGUHQ¶VKRPHVDQGFKXUFKHVGDWLQJEDFNWRWKHVLQYROYLQg 133 arrests of alleged 
perpetrators.12 In 2014, a Labour MP, Barry Sherman, claimed that the National Crime 
Agency was still using the dip sampling method under Operation Pallial; it is therefore an 
extant practice13and therefore an ongoing concern to critics of the method. 
In the 1990s, thousands of care homes ex-residents were interviewed, having been canvassed 
under the dip sampling procedure. Did the police efforts show that child abuse occurred 
frequently in this context - BBC radio suggested in 1996 that abuse therein was the norm 
rather than the exception 14 - or was the investigatory process itself also generating 
questionable accounts of abuse? 
 
There is a dearth of literature on aspects on the trawling method; however, lawyers and 
researchers have previously paid particular attention to the issues surrounding the taking of 
witness statements. Heaton-Armstrong advocated the audio taping and videotaping of 
prosecution complainants witnesses as far back as the early 1990s; they continue to do so.15 
Summers argues that in most cases, multiple complaints normally serve as powerful 
corroboration which indicate that a crime was committed, but with the caveat that cases 
which have suffered from evidential contamination by the dip sampling interviewing process 
are devalued and may be unsafe.16 ,Q:HEVWHU¶VERRNThe Secret of Bryn Estyn17, he explores 
in detail the mass scale police investigations of alleged abuse in care homes which took place 
from 1991 onwards. 
 
This chapter seeks to draw together available literature in order to look at the specific 
elements of dip sampling, including past problems with the ways in which the police have 
interrogated potential victims and prosecution witnesses. There are a number of problems 
associated with the trawling technique of investigation: 
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 R Webster, fn 14, (Orwell Press 2005). 
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x Whilst it may be common for police to appeal to witnesses to recent accidents 
involving victims, in HCSA investigations, the police may use dip sampling try to 
identify a cohort of possible victims from residential care homes where decades may 
have passed and the witnesses are regarded as vulnerable by nature of their looked-
after status. What are the implications of this alternative method of seeking potential 
complainants and witnesses?  
x Interviewing witnesses: there are several aspects to this. Sexual assault victims are 
interviewed on police premises in most cases, yet they may be interviewed virtually 
anywhere in HCSA investigations; nor does the interview have to be electronically 
recorded. How do interview questions impact on the evidence of prosecution 
witnesses? Also, does repeat interviewing occur in historic CSA investigations and if 
so, what are the risks? 
x Can police evidence gathered by the dip sampling and interviewing methods also 
become contaminated and/or affected by collusion between the witnesses whom they 
canvass?  
x How do police record interviews, when an electronic method is not used, and what 
happens when the interview is subsequently recorded as a witness statement? 
x Are there grounds for arguing that the police offer inducements, coaching or pressure 
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(i)  Description of the dip sampling technique 
In complex investigations of HCSA, the police often use dip sampling to seek witnesses. This 
may occur where there are no records of former child residents in institutions. Webster was 
critical of the way in which police gathered evidence for such prosecutions under the dip 
sampling method.18 
The Home Affairs Select Committee offered a definition of dip sampling (or trawling) as it 
was asked to consider whether this particular method used by police to investigate historic 
institutional CSA cases produced unreliable evidence which could lead to miscarriages of 
justice. Trawling is not a technical term but is used pejoratively by its critics to describe the 
police practice of making unsolicited approaches to former residents from many of the 
institutions under investigation, but refers to the process when the police contact potential 
witnesses who have not been named or even mentioned. In a trawl, the police will contact all, 
or a proportion of, those who were resident at the institution under investigation during the 
period when the abuse was alleged to have occurred.19 
The 2002 $VVRFLDWLRQRI&KLHI3ROLFH2IILFHUV¶+DQGERRNDFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWWKHPHWKRG
was innovative: 
Historic and institutional child abuse enquiries differ considerably from the normal 
major investigations undertaken by forces. The importance of the approach to 
potential and actual witnesses necessitates the development of skills and techniques 
not normally associated with major enquiries.20 
Claire Curtis-Thomas MP complained about police interviewing methods of potential 
witnesses at the HASC in 2002: 
The police will plant suggestions producing narratives that fit their case rather than 
WKHWUXWK«DNLQGRILQGLUHFWFROOXVLRQGHYHORSVWKURXJKZLWQHVVHV¶XQUHFRUGHG
contact with members of the same police team.21 
                                                          
18
 Fn 3, Webster. 
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 HASC Report 2001-02, vol I, para 12, p.8. 
20
 Association of Chief Police Officers The SIO Handbook ± The Investigation of Historical Institutional Child 
Abuse, (ACPO, March 2002), p.24.; hereafter, for footnotes, the ACPO Handbook (2002). Now superseded by 
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Children, Second Edition. 
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At the HASC, David Rose, then Special Investigations Reporter for The Observer newspaper, 
complained that trawling for potential victims was an absolutely unregulated process, almost 
tailor-made to generate false allegations.22 
Dip sampling involves going through the available records at care homes to see who was on 
the roll following a complaint or referral to the police. It is a random sampling of 10 percent 
or 50 names of potential witnesses, whichever is the greater number, of those who lived 
together at the care home or who were roughly the same age.23 There are several ways in 
which the dip sampling method can be applied. The records may be used to select witnesses 
randomly or in a more targeted manner: by age group of the witness, his/her period of 
residence or the period of employment of the suspected offender. Those targeted under the 
dip sampling method could be approached by a letter drop as the quickest and most cost-
effective way of seeking them. 
 
The dip sampling method was used for the first time in 1990 by Leicestershire police to 
follow up allegations of HCSA that had been made against Frank Beck, who had been 
officer-in-FKDUJHRIVHYHUDO/HLFHVWHUVKLUHFKLOGUHQ¶VKRPHVEHWZHHQDQG,WZDV
subsequently used by North Wales, Cheshire and Merseyside police. By the end of the 1990s, 
two-WKLUGVRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VSROLFHIRUFHVXVHGWKLVPHWKRGGR]HQVRIFDUHZRUNHUVZHUH
convicted.24 
Under normal police methods of investigation, the police receive a crime complaint and then 
find out whether the suspect has committed any crimes.25 The dip sampling method employed 
by the police in investigations of HCSA involved a suspect or an allegation, followed by an 
attempt to find the crime, often in a random fashion. In sexual offence cases, which normally 
occur in private, there is less chance of an interviewee being an eyewitness, although in 
close-knit environments, such as care homes, where many people shared the same 
accommodation, including communal bedrooms, there could have been opportunities for 
contemporaries to have heard or seen something in this proximity. Instead, the police may 
interview former residents to find out whether they were also victims of other incidents of 
abuse which they have not previously disclosed. It is, of course, possible that some suspects 
were serial offenders who abused other children as well as the primary complainant. In the 
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care homes environment, Birch and Taylor suggest that successful paedophiles are likely to 
have manipulated their victims and therefore it would have been difficult to find 
corroboration either then or now.26 
The issue is whether other interviewees were making valid, corroborative complaints, or 
whether they were encouraged to make unreliable or false allegations. False allegations in 
this context may issue from narrative constructed by the police investigatory methods or it 
may even be a combination of police and interviewee narratives. Where the investigatory 
process itself has affected the quality of evidence, this is called contamination. The elicited 
evidence may not necessarily be false in the sense of being perjurious. The contamination 
may be insubstantial or substantial: it is a question of degree whether a flawed investigation 
has crossed the threshold of denying the accused a fair trial. 




In HCSA cases, a successful prosecution outcome may depend on witness corroboration of 
the alleged abuse which can be done by combining complaints obtained by the dip sampling 
method. It is already known that interviews occurring sometime after an event are prone to 
errors when biased questioning procedures are used.27  
The ACPO Handbook 2002 itself also criticised aspects of the dip sampling method, as it 
could be rather hit-and-miss as it had the potential to miss either witnesses or offenders.28 
Other shortfalls of this method set out in the Handbook included letters posted by the police 
which might breach confidentiality or which failed to reach their intended recipient. It also 
raised the issue of the impersonal nature of the method, the welfare of the recipient upon 
reading the letter and whether the recipient would have the requisite degree of literacy to 
understand its contents and his honesty of response. This latter concern expressed in the 
Handbook shows that the police themselves were aware that false allegations could be 
generated by the letter-drop method. 
 






Current Directions in Psychological Science, (2008) 17, pp.386-390. 
28
 ACPO Handbook (2002). 
P a g e  |   
In the ACPO revised 2009 Handbook, operations now involve setting up a Strategic 
Management Group to monitor approaches in contacting further potential witnesses and the 
conduct of any subsequent interviews to ensure that any doubts about the validity of the 
evidence are fully addressed. Also, it oversees the overall process for gathering corroborative 
and additional evidence. The revised Handbook acknowledges that there have been prior 
concerns about the dip sampling method. It advises Senior Investigating Officers (SIOs) to 
record the rationale for making approaches in this manner in the SIO policy file, having a 
clear witness/victim approach protocol; accurately recording conversations with potential 
witnesses and victims (electronically recorded at the earliest possible stage) and consulting 
the Crown Prosecution Service with regards to the use of these methods.29 These revisions to 
the guidebook indicate that the police are cognisant that past investigations were fraught with 
problems. 
 
One concern for past criminal investigations generally, revealed in the 1990s study Research 
paper No. 4 Supervision of Police Investigations in Serious Criminal Cases30 was that, 
sometimes, senior police officers supervising junior officers, had adopted a laissez-faire 
attitude as to how junior officers would conduct interviews (with suspects) and they did not 
bother to listen to the interview tapes.31 7KXVLIWDSLQJRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VLQWHUYLHZVZHUH
to be made mandatory, (the electronic recording is still prescriptive in the 2009 Handbook) it 
would be of little value where those who are supposed to listen to, or view the tapes, fail to 
do so. According to a 1991 study Preparing the Record of Taped Interviews,32 it was 
confirmed that both prosecutors and defence lawyers rarely listen to the tapes, preferring the 
prepared summaries instead. Baldwin assessed the accuracy of these summaries by listening 
to 200 tapes from four police districts and compared them with prepared summaries. He 
found that about half of them were misleading and even if not misleading, many of them 
were prolix, because young officers were not trained in the art of précis writing. They had a 
tendency to focus on incriminating statements and to omit exculpatory material, making it 
unsafe for defence lawyers to rely on summaries. Arguably, best practice involves lawyers 
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listening to the tapes before reading the summaries even though it takes time and has 
financial implications. 
Although the Police Handbook 2009 intended to bring in safeguards to prevent innocent 
people from being accused of HCSA, most of the following conditions can apply to such 
investigations before and post-2009: 
x Witnesses/possible victims of historic CSA can still be interviewed in places other 
than police interview suites; 
x There may still be no record of what was said between the police and the approached 
witness/the witness who approached the police at the very first encounter, as it is not a 
mandatory requirement; 
x Investigations of child abuse may be carried out by either the police or social services 
or both. In the past, in some cases, the investigators were not trained in how to 
conduct child abuse case interviews. Some police officers were not even child 
protection unit (CPU) trained. Even where officers were CPU trained, they focused on 
video recording children and interviewing them, using child psychology techniques 
they had been taught. Whilst this afforded the police some procedural guidance, they 
were not offered guidance on the legal principles which formed the basis for the 
protocol.33 The law of evidence was not particularly stressed in the training which 
they and other child protection personnel received. 
 
The police can also make repeat visits to witnesses/complainants without recording the 
specific reasons why additional approaches were necessary enabled them to draft and redraft 
MG11s (witness statements taken by the police). This begs the question of whether the police 
on repeat visits were seeking clarification of prior statements/additional information. The 
witnesses or records of their accounts may be deliberately doctored by the police in cases 
where the officer firmly believes a particular person to be guilty and he perceives the existing 
evidence to be insufficient to secure a conviction. Falsification of evidence and manipulation 
RIZLWQHVVHVE\WKHSROLFHLQWKLVFRQWH[WLVNQRZQDVµQREOHFDXVHFRUUXSWLRQ¶34 Yet the 
police are under a duty to presume the innocence of the accused from the outset of the 
investigation. The European Court of Human Rights stated in Hajnal v Serbia 35 that: 
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The Court reiterates that the presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 will be 
violated if a judicial decision or, indeed, a statement by a public official concerning a person 
charged with a criminal offence reflects an opinion that he is guilty before his guilt has been 
proved according to law. 
McConville and Hodgson looked at interviews between the police and suspects; their 
study indicated that the police sought to elicit confessions of guilt, rather than to elicit 
information or seek evidence as to the commission of an offence. That the police may 
proceed in a way that distorts the account given by a suspect or imprints their bias upon it 
cannot be discounted.36 
(iii) 7KH*RYHUQPHQW¶Vreply to concerns raised by the HASC report 2002 
The Government, in its Reply to the HASC report in 2002, disagreed with the claim that there 
were significant numbers of people who had been subjected to a miscarriage of justice 
because of defects in police investigatory methods, mainly because of a lack of hard and 
consistent evidence to substantiate the assertions. It did not think that significant numbers of 
complainants or law enforcement/prosecuting bodies were fabricating or conspiring to make 
allegations or that fabrications were going undetected; nor that significant numbers of 
complainants as prisoners or ex-offenders were making false allegations. Meanings of false 
allegation and miscarriage of justice had not been properly discussed and defined either. 
Discussion about the extent of miscarriages of justice caused by false allegations had been 
unbalanced and failed to use facts where possible.37 
It is submitted that miscarriages of justice may be latent, because the degree of evidential 
taint arising from the methods used by the police to investigate historic cases may never 
come to light where the interview was not properly recorded. Until investigations are 
properly recorded from the outset, one cannot determine whether an allegation was made by 
the complainant independently or whether it was triggered by flaws caused by collusion and 
/or contamination. Nor can it be ascertained whether the allegations came to light through the 
ZLWQHVV¶IUHHQDUUDWLYHRUDVSHFLILFPRGHRILQWHUURJDWLRQRUZKHWKHUWKHFRPSODLQDQW
subsequently visited the police or vice versa or what was said by the parties in these 
subsequent interviews.  
                                                          
Ribemont v. France, 10 February 1995, §§ 35-36, Series A no. 308; and .DUDNDúDQG<HúLOÕUPDNY7XUNH\, 





 The Conduct of Investigations iQWR3DVW&DVHVRI$EXVHLQ&KLOGUHQ¶V+RPHVApril 2003, Government Reply 
Cm 5799. 
P a g e  |   
 
The HASC recommended a clear set of prescriptive guidelines for such investigations and 
subsequent prosecutions; in particular, there was an urgent need for the proper recording, 
either audio or visual, of police interviews of complainant and other significant witnesses.38 
Notwithstanding the criticism of the dip sampling method by concerned participants in the 
HASC in 2002, the Government decided dip sampling should continue to be permitted but 
that the police should justify their decision to use it.39 The Government also placed trust in 
inter-agency Strategic Management Groups (SMG) to safeguard against the risk of eliciting 
allegations against innocent people. An SMG is normally convened within one working day 
of referral of a case of complex child abuse and is normally chaired by the police. 40 The 
60*¶VWDVNLVWRDFWDVDVWHHULQJJURXSIRUPXODWHSROLF\DQGSURFHGXUH7KH60*ZLOO
normally set and record the terms of reference for, and lead the investigation. Members of the 
SMG may include a core membership of a director or deputy director of FKLOGUHQ¶VVHUYLFHV, 
commander, police senior investigating officer, local authority head of service/child 
protection manager, local authority legal adviser, senior health representative, press officer, 
probation, NSPCC and third sector organisations.41 
 
The SMG should ensure that investigators have full access to information held by individuals 
and agencies affected by the investigation; ensure staff safety, support, collaboration and that 
agencies commit sufficient resources; have in place safeguards for the innocent, as well as 
securing and accessing expert legal advice. The SMG must monitor carefully any approaches 
used in the contacting of further witnesses and the conduct of any subsequent interviews and 
to ensure to address any doubts about the validity of evidence, as well as scrutinising the 
overall process of gathering corroborative and additional evidence. It must consider further 
issues about the complexity of the investigation, the time lapse since the alleged offences 
occurred as well as the motivation of and the vulnerability of potential witnesses. 
Interviewers may not raise the issue of compensation during interviews with possible victims; 
nor must they discuss it when the witness volunteers it. SMGs must have in place a suitable 
venue and interviewing procedures in accordance with Achieving Best Evidence used for 
gathering and recording evidence to prevent criticism that police officers prompted the 
witnesses.42 
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(iv) &DVHVWXG\RIµ+¶LOOXVWUDWLQJWKHSLWIDOOVRIWKHGLSVDPSOLQJPHWKRG 
H was a care home employee, arrested by police in 1995 and charged with historic allegations 
of CSA alleged by six former care home inmates.43 He was convicted on some allegations 
and acquitted on others. The jury accepted the allegations of three out of the six complainants 
and delivered a mixed verdict for which received a four-year prison sentence. The 
complainants had been identified by the police investigation method of dip sampling, which 
H maintained had tainted the presentation of the case against him. 
The police not only contacted the care home where H used to work, but also advertised for 
PRUHZLWQHVVHVRQUDGLRDQGDWDSXEOLFPHHWLQJRISDUHQWVZKRVHFKLOGUHQDWWHQGHGWKH%R\V¶
Brigade of which H had been an officer. Out of the vast pool of 2000 people whom the police 
could have contacted, only six people made allegations against him, all of whom had criminal 
records and knew each other contemporaneously at the care home. Although six witnesses 
might appear to be a large number, the apparent corroborative value is questionable. 
One of the six complainants contacted a former colleague of H and explained to her that the 
SROLFHKDGSHUVXDGHGKLPWRVLJQWKHZLWQHVVVWDWHPHQWZKLFKKHQRZZLVKHGWRUHWUDFW+¶V
colleague advised him to see a solicitor about the retraction. The communication made to her 
E\WKHFRPSODLQDQWKDGDOVREHHQUHFRUGHGDQGVHQWWR+¶VVROLFLWRU7KHUHZDVWKHUHIRUHQR
doubt about the existence of the phone call and its contents.44 
Two of the other complainants were discredited by the jury at trial. One of the complainants 
admitted in court that he was lying under cross-examination. 
The  reveals that the interviewing officer of a potential witness was attempting to elicit 
allegations by psychologically pressurising the interviewee to make corroborative allegations 
by suggesting that he was suppressing his victimhood. The witness - R - was contacted by 
police via a card sent to him in his letterbox. R arranged for a police officer to visit him. R 
was interviewed by the police and he spoke favourably of H.  
R stated that H was the only care worker he had time for. However, the police said that others 
had been abused by H; also the others had said that R was the favourite of H. 
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The officer told R that H had been accused of CSA. The officer suggested R was a victim, as 
KHZDV+¶VIDYRXULWH+ZRXOGUHSDLUKLVELF\FOHIRUKLPEXWWKDWSHUKDSV5ZDVQRWKLVW\SH
maybe he preferred blue-eyed blond haired boys. 
R denied this. The police repeated that there was something that R was not telling them. H 
made a statement to the contrary, that nothing had ever happened. This is evidenced in a 
ZLWQHVVVWDWHPHQWPDGHDIWHU+¶VFRQYLFWLRQLQWRVXSSRUWKLVJURXQGVRIDSSHDO+H
continued that: 
The worst kind of treatment that anyone would have got was a box round the ears. X 
got compo (compensation) and somebody suffered to make that possible. Young people were 
DEXVHGE\ZKRP,GRQ¶WNQRZEXW+ZDVDOULJKWIRUPH. 
(v) Problems arising from police interviewing techniques 
 
The interview technique employed above is not only designed to lead the witness to make 
specific allegations, but also the repetition of the same leading question shows the tenacity of 
the interviewing officer to obtain a positive finding of abuse. It has been suggested that 
repetition within and between interviews is a potentially suggestive interviewing technique, 
on the grounds that repetition can sometimes constitute a form of negative feedback 
indicating to the interviewee that previous answers to a question are unacceptable. 45 
It has been shown that accuracy of recall of interviewee reporting is reduced where choice 
questions, rather than open ended questions, are used.46 It is accepted that there will be 
occasions when leading questions may be inevitable, particularly in the non-contentious 
context e.g., asking for the name, address and age of the interviewee. Sometimes a question 
cannot be framed in any way other than a leading question if it is a relevant matter in dispute. 
However, given the gravity of the allegations the police were following up, biased 
questioning techniques risked generating false charges against the accused. 
Interviewee R, above, had denied that H had abused him, but the police were insistent that 
there was something he was not telling them. This is known as tKHµDVNHGDQGDQVZHUHG¶
technique.47 This is where the interviewee has responded to a question that s/he has 
unambiguously answered in the immediately preceding part of the interview. This should be 
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contrasted with simple repetition of a question that has not yet been answered. The aim of the 
former technique is to suggest that the firm answer (in this context, a denial of being a victim 
or a favourite) is somehow inadequate or wrong.48 The interviewee is also being led into 
thinking that he was a victim (of child abuse) by inference, because he was a favourite of H. 
7KLVWHFKQLTXHKDVEHHQFDWHJRULVHGDVµLQWURGXFLQJLQIRUPDWLRQ¶WKDWZDVQRWSUHYLRXVO\
offered by the interviewee.49 It has been suggested that a witness with no stake in the 
outcome of an inquiry may not be susceptible to answering in the way the interviewer wishes, 
evidence that would be favourable for a prosecution. However, even a witness who intends to 
be fair and honest, may, it was stated by Beck J in Maves v Grand Trunk Pacific Rail Co: 
...due to a lack of education and exactness of knowledge of the precise meaning of words or 
appreciation at the moment of their precise meaning, or of alertness to see what is implied in 
the question requires modification, honestly assent to a leading question which fails to 
express his real meaning, which he would have completely expressed if he were allowed to do 
so in his own words.50  
The judge also offered other reasons for acquiescence: suggestibility, inexperience and 
human laziness.51 Witnesses may also be psychologically inclined to agree with a police 
officer during an investigation or counsel in the courtroom during a trial, on the basis that 
such professionals would not assert something unless s/he believed it had occurred.52 In either 
context, interviewees may also be nervous and prefer to give a definite and inaccurate answer 
than be seen to faltering or foolish.53 
Leading questions can have a negative impact on the fairness of proceedings for defendants. 
Research on leading questions has indicated that when one half of the subjects had heard 
biased questions about a defendant which implicated him to a greater degree of seriousness 
for a violent offence and another half heard unbiased questions, 41 per cent of the subjects 
who heard the questions returned a guilty verdict, compared with 22 per cent of subjects who 
heard the unbiased questions.54 
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Criticism over the possible coaching of prosecution witnesses and complainants could be 
remedied by introducing rules on how the police question them, in the same way that there 
are rules for controlling the way witnesses may be questioned in the courtroom. 
The duty of both prosecution and defence barristers is to refrain from distorting the accounts 
of their own witnesses when they give their evidence-in-chief. As Keane puts it, the party 
FDOOLQJWKHZLWQHVVPD\EHVRUHO\WHPSWHGWRSXWZRUGVLQWRWKHZLWQHVV¶PRXWKWKXV
explaining what he wants him to say.55 Evidence which is adduced by asking leading 
questions is inadmissible, and the weight to be attached to it may be reduced. Leading 
questions are phrased in such a way as to suggest the answer sought. Keane gives the context 
of questioning in a trial of assault in which two types of question could be asked, the former 
where the prosecution asks his witness: Did X hit you in the face with his fist? (leading), and 
the latter which is the proper procedure: Did X do anything to you? Followed up with, if the 
ZLWQHVV¶UHSO\LVDIILUPDWLYHWhere did X hit you? How did he hit you? At each stage the 
witness is being controlled so that he answers the relevant question without being 
manipulated or allowed to be side tracked on irrelevant issues. The opposing side is then 
entitled to cross-examine this witness in a leading manner as set out in Parkin v Moon.56 
Courtroom procedures, therefore, are a means of safeguarding the contamination of testimony 
by questioners, but paradoxically, the same cannot be said for police questioning procedures 
which will produce the very first evidence that will be elicited by the prosecution at trial in 
WKHVDPHZLWQHVV¶RUDOWHVWLPRQ\,IWKHSULPDU\HYLGHQFHLVDOUHDG\IODZHGE\SURFHGXUHWKLV
can therefore have a knock-on effect on the value of the elicited oral testimony in the 
courtroom. The very first encounter of the witness with the police sometimes may not even 
be on record. 
 
Simple measures can be taken to avoid biased questioning of witnesses during their 
examinations-in-chief and re-examinations and the same safeguards can be applied to police 
investigations, namely, by using interrogatives. These questions are brief and give 
LQWHUYLHZHHVRZQHUVKLSRIWKHDQVZHUVµZKR¶µZKHQ¶µZK\¶µZKHUH¶µKRZ¶µGHVFULEH¶DQG
µH[SODLQ¶57 Once the interviewee has supplied answers, then the tactic may change to more 
exploratory, closed questioning but without supplying information not already narrated by the 
witness. Alternatively, the interviewer can use cognitive interviewing techniques, which also 
give the interviewee ownership of his narrative.  
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The literature on police interviewing techniques in the UK has tended to focus on how they 
affect interviews with suspects due to prior concerns about police eliciting false confessions 
of suspects under duress. In 1981, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 
recommended systematic reform of the criminal investigative process to strike a balance 
between the powers and duties of the police and the rights and duties of suspects.58 As a 
UHVXOWRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V5HSRUWWKH3ROLFHDQG&ULPLQDO(YLGHQFH$FW3$&(ZDVSDVVHG
in 1984. Prior to the passing of PACE, any unrecorded interrogations of suspects could be 
criticised for masking the interrogation techniques of the police and the kind of inducements 
or threats made to the suspect. 
Prior research supports the theory that suggestible witnesses can succumb to police 
psychological tactics. They can be led into making allegations. The research examined the 
kind of pressures which might affect the reliability of what a witness says. Suggestibility 
relates to the tendency of people to give in to leading questions and interrogative pressures.  
Research suggests that the potentially distorting influence of leading questioning is likely to 
be heightened when the questioner is perceived as a figure of authority (such as a barrister), 
when the subject experiences a high level of stress (such as that often experienced by 
witnesses in court), and when suggestions are subtly embedded in questions (as they 
frequently are during cross-examination). 59 
(OOLVRQDQG:KHDWFURIW¶VRZQVWXG\RIPRFNZLWnesses tallied with prior research of 
Gudjonsson60 in suggesting that witnesses will not admit to the fallibility of their memories 
and are therefore susceptible to suggestion in interrogative contexts. In their study, only 17 
per cent of witnesses would reply in a cross-examination that they had no recollection of an 
incident or did not have an answer.61 
 
There are also problems with witness networking, which is permitted even in the 2009 
Handbook. If not done carefully, the validity of the witness statements may be questioned. 
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The updated version of the Handbook allows networking where registers and records are not 
available to locate witnesses:  
Although the enquiry team might ask witnesses about the whereabouts of other 
potential witnesses, they should discourage them from speaking to other witnesses on 
behalf of the police.62 
As long as the police are still able to interview witnesses as they see fit, the apparent 
corroborative value of multiple allegations, obtained by the dip sampling method, can be cast 
into doubt where they fail to record the interview. 
Mark Merett, a former resident of a South Wales care home gave evidence to the Home 
$IIDLUV6HOHFW&RPPLWWHHZKLFKZDVDVNHGWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHLVVXHVUHJDUGLQJµFROG-FDOOLQJ¶
police investigatory methods.63 The evidence reveals how the police attempted to lead Merett 
into making allegations similar to those already made by some of his peers: 
µ,ZDVLQWHUYLHZHGE\6RXWK:DOHV3ROLFHRQWKUHHRFFDVLRQVDQGGXULQJWKHVH
interviews I was amazed that the police openly named suspects who were known to me 
and they confirmed that these suspects had been named by other former residents. 
Even though I made the police aware of my medical condition (I am epileptic), they 
continued to pressurise me into making a complaint, which I did not do. I found the 
whole experience very distressing and I felt that I was being bullied by the police into 
making a complaint. 
,ZDVKRUULILHGZKHQ,ZDVDVNHGGXULQJWKHLQWHUYLHZ³'LG0U%WRXFK\RXXS"GLG
KHWRXFK\RXUSHQLV"2WKHUSHRSOHKDYHFRPSODLQHGWKDWKHGLG´ 
At this moment I was appalled and explained that nothing of that nature ever went on 
at the school. The police pointed out that they had been in touch with other former 
residents who had made complaints. After hours of questioning, I still maintained that 
nothing ever KDSSHQHGWRPHZKLFKLVWKHWUXWK¶ 
The interrogation style that was used on the interviewee is suggestive and is known as co-
witness information, which involves telling a child or adult witness what has supposedly 
already been said or observed. It is a highly influential technique, which creates pressure to 
conform to what other witnesses are supposed to have said and induce stereotypes that 
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influence responses to other questions.64 In this particular case, this interviewee did not yield 
to the suggestive questions, even after hours of questioning. However, given that certain 
residents in institutional care were psychologically vulnerable, they were at risk of being led 
to make unreliable statements65 whenever pressurising interviewing strategies were 
employed. 
There are a number of contexts in which vulnerability is found (Merett mentions his medical 
condition, epilepsy, which could be classified as a vulnerability): mental disorder, (such as 
mental illness, learning disabilities, personality disorder), abnormal mental state - anxiety, 
mood disturbance, phobias, bereavement, intoxication, withdrawal from drugs or alcohol), 
intellectual functioning (borderline IQ scores) and personality - suggestibility, compliance 
and acquiescence. Suspects are as vulnerable to suggestible interrogations as prosecution 
witnesses. Gudjonsson reviewed 34 serious crimes convictions from 1989-2009: 27 for 
murder, 1 attempted murder, 1 conspiracy to rob and 1 sexual assault. 
The Court of Appeal heard psychological/psychiatric evidence in 23 cases, (68%); the 
convictions were overturned mainly on the basis of the psychological vulnerability of the 
defendants e.g., susceptibility to false confessions. In one case, there was evidence of 
police/procedural improprieties; ten other cases (29%) had been tainted by police/procedural 
impropriety and these convictions had been overturned. This research has helped to inform 
and improve the police interviewing process in the UK to identify vulnerable interviewees, 
but more work needs to be done.66 
(vi) Repeat interviewing   
Concern over police interviewing tactics surfaced after the Court of Appeal had decided to 
TXDVK(QJLQ5DKLS¶VFRQYLFWLRQIRUWKHPXUGHURIDSROLFHPDQduring the Tottenham Riots in 
1985. Rahip was aged 19 at the time of his arrest; he had learning difficulties and was 
illiterate. He had been repeatedly questioned by police over the murder: over five days, on 10 
separate occasions, lasting over 14 hours. There was also no solicitor present.67 The appeal 
was based on suggestibility tests which uncovered a striking inability to cope with 
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interrogative pressure.68 These findings, together with confirmation of other psychological 
vulnerabilities, led to the Appeal Court quashing the conviction on the grounds that it was 
unsafe and unsatisfactory.69 Suggestibility is relevant where the interviewee is placed under 
some pressure by the police by way of either leading questions or negative feedback.70  
As regards the effects of repeat questioning on interviewees (to which Rahip had been 
subjected), Memon asks what kind of consequence it has whether or not the interviewee was 
asked leading questions. There is a lack of sufficient data on witnesses who are interviewed 
following lengthy delays and the effects of repeated interviews. 
The ways in which the police contacted potential witnesses, by letter drops and through direct 
questioning, demonstrated that they were actively seeking complainants of child sexual 
abuse. Furthermore, once they had found potential witnesses, the 2002 version of the ACPO 
Handbook permitted police operatives to make repeated visits to the complainant. 71 
(vii) Comparing police interviewing techniques with children and adults 
Prior research on interviewing potential crime victims indicates how susceptible interviewees 
are to having their narrative constructed by the interviewer and thus having their evidence 
contaminated by the interview process. This susceptibility applies whether the interviewee is 
an adult or a child. Garven and Wood analysed transcripts from the simulated scenario of the 
McMartin Preschool case.72  
In the 1980s, seven teachers from McMartin Preschool, California, US, were accused of 
using rituals to sexually abuse children over a ten year period. It was one of the longest and 
most expensive trials in US history, spanning from the early 1980s and concluding only in the 
early 1990s. All charges were dropped against five of the teachers, but two remaining 
defendants Peggy McMartin Buckey and her son, Raymond were tried, with the former being 
acquitted of all charges and the latter being partially acquitted. Juries in two separate trials 
failed to reach verdicts on the remaining counts against him and prosecutors dropped all 
charges against him in 1990.73 
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In the US it is permitted to canvas jurors post-trial about their verdict. After this trial, the 
jurors criticised the several hundred investigative interviews conducted by the Los Angeles 
VRFLDOVHUYLFHDJHQF\DFWLQJIRUWKHSURVHFXWRU¶VRIILFHDVEHLQJOHDGLQJ74 However, 
research could not be carried out to affirm this until 1997. Researchers Garven et al identified 
six problematic techniques in the original McMartin interviews:75 
x Suggestive questioning, which involves introducing new information into an 
interview when the interviewee has not provided the information in the same 
interview, e.g., one of the McMartin scripts shows an interviewer asking a child 
whether the child had seen the naked pictures (the information about the naked 
pictures had not been supplied by the child). This tactic is evident from the papers 
volunteered for this study in the case of H where the police officer suggested to R that 
KHZDV+¶VµIDYRXULWH¶DVKHZRXOGUHSDLUELF\FOHVIRUKLPWKHUHIRUH+PXVWKDYH
sexually abused R. At minimum, this method risks diminishing the accuracy of any 
statement that R would give. Prior research by Loftus et al76 suggests that adults are 
susceptible to suggestive questions, although this affects children more so.77 
x µ2WKHUSHRSOH¶78 this is where the child has been told that the interviewer has already 




that R was the favourite of H. This technique is designed to pressurise the interviewee 
into modifying his behaviour so that it is consistent with others.  
x 3RVLWLYHDQGQHJDWLYHFRQVHTXHQFHVQRWWREHFRQIXVHGZLWKµ\HV¶DQGµQR¶DQVZHUV
given by the interviewer. This technique is designed to induce the child into making a 
statement by praising the personal qualities of the statement-maker, e.g., he is being 
or expected to be helpful/clever. Negative consequences were also found in one 
McMartin interview:79 
µ$UH\RXJRLQJWREHVWXSLGRUDUH\RXJRLQJWREHVPDUWDQGKHOSXVKHUH"¶7KLV
technique is also called reward and punishment. As far as interviews with adults are 
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concerned, incentives for suspects could be the promise of a more lenient sentence for 
a guilty plea, or for complainants, it could be being informed during the interview of 
the prospect of compensation being for making allegations against the accused.  
x Asked and answered questions:80 in this instance, the interviewer is trying to force the 
interviewee to make a choice. E.g., a child denies remembering naked pictures, and 
repeatedly denies this when pressed, then the interviewer asserts that he should (sense 
of obligation) think about that for a while, as his memory will recall it. This is 
repetition combined with suggestive questioning which may cause a change of 
response. 
x Inviting speculation.81 the interviewee is asked to give an opinion or speculate about 
past events or view a simulated scenario. In one McMartin interview, a child was 
shown a doll and asked whether s/he thought it as possible that he had touched the 
doll, (which represented the victim) and the child is asked where X would have 
WRXFKHGLW7KLVVLPXODWLRQLVDNLQWRWKHµRWKHUSHRSOHVDLG¶WDFWLFDERYH 
 
Garven and Wood examined the effect of two of the above techniques by interviewing sixty-
six children of preschool age: social incentive and social control. The children were 
introduced to a graduate school visitor who, inter alia, was briefed to wear an unusual hat, 
make comments about it to them, read them a story for twenty minutes and place story book 
themed stickers on the backs of their hands afterwards. One week later, the children were 
interviewed about this visitor. True and false facts were told to them by the interviewer. It 
was found that children were twice as susceptible to making allegations of wrongdoing by the 
visitor in the social incentive condition as those where it had been implied by the interviewer 
in the suggestive control situation. Children in the social incentive condition also became 
more acquiescent as the interview proceeded.  
Thirty-VL[RIWKHVHFKLOGUHQPDGHIDOVHDOOHJDWLRQVZKHUHµ0F0DUWLQ¶LQWHUYLHZLQJ
techniques had been used, compared with 17% for thirty children interviewed with simple 
suggestive questions. The McMartin techniques were found to be more effective at eliciting 
false allegations than simple suggestive questions.82 
As a result of this empirical research into interviewing techniques, guidelines were issued in 
child interviewing techniques which recommended open-ended questions and advised 
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interviewers to refrain from using suggestive techniques that introduced outside information 
or the negative characterisation of the alleged perpetrator.  
Schreiber et al have also expanded research on interviewing techniques with children by 
analysing real transcripts of the evidence of child witnesses from the McMartin Preschool 
case (14 transcripts), as well as from the case of Kelly Michaels who had been convicted of 
sexually abusing 20 school children in New Jersey (20 transcripts); she was subsequently 
released on appeal in 1993. These transcripts were then compared with those conducted by 
child protection services (CPS) from other cases in the Western US (20 transcripts).83 In both 
the McMartin and Michaels cases, the researchers found suggestive questioning techniques, 
though there was a variation between the two; whereas with the CPS cases only a few 
contained inappropriate suggestive techniques and this was with younger children.  
It has been found that cognitive interviewing (CI) techniques are the best for eliciting the best 
and most evidence from interviewees. Whilst analysis of the McMartin interviews with 
children shed light on the quality of evidence elicited from children, Compo, Gregory and 
Fisher conducted a field study of real-life police interviews with adults.84 The researchers 
listened to 26 interviews that South Florida police officers had conducted with witnesses, 
(57%), victims (35%) and witnesses-turned-suspects (7%) in a variety of crime cases.85 They 
aimed to find out whether the police were putting into practice the recommendation by freely 
available police manuals to use cognitive interview skills. Cognitive skills comprise the 
following positive techniques: relaxing the interviewee at the beginning of the interview, 
telling him what is expected of him, i.e., the witness talks and the interviewer listens with 
long pauses before questioning is continued if necessary; allowing the witness to take time to 
answer; context reinstatement (getting the witness to visualise mentally to help his 
recollection of events); asking him to provide as detailed a response as possible, and allowing 
the witness to be non-FRPPLWWDOE\WKHLQWHUYLHZHUDFFHSWLQJWKHDQVZHUµGRQ¶WNQRZ¶
Negative techniques are negative rapport building, such as insulting or intimidating the 
witness distractions such as a noisy place where the interview takes place, incompatible 
TXHVWLRQLQJQRWLQOLQHZLWKZLWQHVV¶FXUUHQWWUDLQRIWKRXJKWVXJJHVWLYHTXHVtioning 
(introducing information not previously provided by the witness), multiple questions (several 
in one sentence) and complex questions (those that are incomprehensible to the witness).  
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Sixty-five per cent of interviewers had used some form of rapport building, 8% context 
reinstatement, 6% of interviewees were allowed to take their time, 4% of interviewers 
H[SUHVVHGWKHLUH[SOLFLWH[SHFWDWLRQVRIWKHLQWHUYLHZEXWRQO\ZHUHDOORZHGWKHµGRQ¶W
NQRZ¶DQVZHURSWLRQ1HJDWLYHWHFKQLTXHVZHUHSUHSRQGHUant. Suggestive/leading questions 
were asked an average of 5.87 times per witness interview and they were interrupted on 
average 5.67 times. 87% of all interviews contained leading or suggestive questions, 80% 
interruptions, 44% negative rapport building and 26% distractions. 
The implications of the findings are that police officers were not following the manuals 
which advise them to use generally recommended interviewing principles, such as the open-
ended techniques found in cognitive interviewing and which also advise them on best 
evidence witness interviewing.86 
,WZDVIRXQGWKDWWKHSROLFHUDUHO\HQJDJHGLQµSRVLWLYH¶LQWHUYLHZLQJWHFKQLTXHVWKDW
FRPSULVHFRJQLWLYHLQWHUYLHZLQJ7KHSROLFHXVHGPDQ\µQHJDWLYH¶WHFKQLTXHVVXFKDV
interrupting the witness or asking them questions that were too complex. Most questions were 
FORVHGDQGWKHUHIRUHUHVWULFWHGWKHLQWHUYLHZHH¶VDXWKHQWLFQDUUDWLYH 
UK police forces have received improved guidelines on how to conduct interviews, whether 
generically, by attending courses on cognitive interview methods the PEACE system 
(Planning and Preparation, Engage and Explain, Account, Closure and Evaluation has been 
used since the 1990s)87 or by the issuing of national guidance in structured interviews88 
including child abuse investigations. Since 2009, the PEACE system has become part of the 
Professionalising Investigation Programme (PIP) where the most basic level, Level 1 has to 
EHWDXJKWIRUSROLFHLQYHVWLJDWRUVLQWHUYLHZLQJZLWQHVVHVDQGYLFWLPVLQµYROXPHFULPHV¶HJ
robbery. Level 2 is designed for interviewing witnesses in serious and complex 
investigations, e.g., institutional child abuse. It has not been easy for police to change from 
the structured interview approach (pre-determined questions) to CI, which involves listening 
to the free narrative of the interviewee then forming questions on the information s/he has 
provided.89 7KLVREVHUYDWLRQKDVEHHQERUQHRXWLQ&RPSR¶Vet al analysis of recordings of 
real interviews police conducted with witnesses, victims and suspects in the US where the 
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police were supposed to use CI techniques for those particular cases but frequently failed to 
do so.90 
In the UK, the ACPO Handbooks also now offer better guidance on what should be excluded 
from an interview e.g. mention of inducements. Methods of interviewing were not discussed 
in the 2002 Handbook, and the only way one can discern what kind of interviewing took 
place (most interviews would not have been electronically recorded at that time) is by looking 
at police witness statements to see if there is any indication as to how the witnesses were 
questioned and responded, or in the case of H (volunteered for this study), by finding out 
IURPRWKHUZLWQHVVHVWKHPVHOYHVKRZWKHSROLFHTXHVWLRQHGWKHP0HPRQ¶VPHWD-analysis of 
the available literature on interviewing skills indicate that only a few studies have used police 
officers and civilians as witnesses in real-life contexts, and only a small number of studies 
have used police or professional interviewers (real-life) to conduct the cognitive interviews in 
their studies, though there does appear to be an increase in the study of samples from 
vulnerable populations ± children and older adults ± since the meta-analysis in 1999 by 
.&WKQNHQet al using a modified form of cognitive interviewing.91  
However, as the literature on empirical studies of police interviews shows, the quality of 
interviewee evidence is also affected by the willingness of interviewers to adhere to the 
advice contained therein. If police interviews were mandatorily recorded, the contents of the 
recordings could be independently monitored to offer feedback to interviewers and further 
training, if necessary. Cognitive interviewing skills are still a valuable way of eliciting 
evidence from witnesses: they produce greater rHFDOOIRUDGXOWVDQGWKHHOGHUO\WKDQµVWDQGDUG¶
LQWHUYLHZVZKLFKVLPSO\LQYROYHDVNLQJµ7HOOPHZKDWKDSSHQHG¶IROORZHGE\WKH
LQWHUYLHZHU¶VTXHVWLRQVEDVHGRQWKHQDUUDWLYHDQGLWHOLFLWVIHZHULQFRUUHFWUHVSRQVHVIURP
children, though arguably children in past surveys were found to find answering cognitive 
questions difficult and this gave rise to calls for modifications to the original CI model.92  
They are further enhanced by instructing interviewees not to guess or confabulate details but 
state that they did not know instead.93 Although the benefits of cognitive interviewing 
GHFUHDVHRYHUWLPHZKLFKLVREYLRXVO\SHUWLQHQWWRKLVWRULF&6$FDVHVµDUDWKHUVXEVWDQWLDO
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advantage for the cognitive interviewing remains in terms of correct details (recall) following 
WKHPRVWH[WUHPHGHOD\¶94 
There are cognitive methods which allow interviewees of all ages to assist memory retrieval: 
one of the best is mental context reinstatement (MCR). Hershkowitz, Orbach, Lamb, 
Sternberg & Horowitz interviewed alleged victims (aged 4 to 13 years) of abuse using the 
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development protocol with or without MCR. 
They found the MCR resulted in proportionally more details when it was followed by an 
open-ended invitation to elaborate.95 The MCR instruction to report everything is more 
effective than other cognitive interviewing techniques for all ages of interviewee whether 
adults or children with an age-range of 8-9 years and 5-6.96 
One CI method that led to less confabulation and which was generated by the interviewee 
was mental context reinstatement by means of inviting him/her to draw a detailed sketch of 
what they saw. This enabled the interviewee to generate their own cues rather than relying on 
the interviewer to direct them towards relevant cues.97 
Both ACPO Handbooks, 200298 and 200999 still lack model questioning techniques to be used 
when interviewing prospective prosecution complainants and witnesses. The witnesses and 
complainants in HCSA cases were, and can still be, interviewed, in the manner the police see 
fit. In the research case study of H, the locus of interviewing a former care home resident - R 
- in a HCSA investigation was his own home, not a police interviewing suite. The police 
made repeat visits, and persisted in so doing as they expected that he would eventually 
disclose abuse allegations if pressurised in this way. The police asked the witness leading 
questions: the name of their suspect and the specifics of prior allegations. There was no 
solicitor present to monitor what was said between the police and the interviewee.  
Until the PACE was passed in 1984, there was a lack of regulation of the conduct of police 
interviewing process of suspects. Wolchover and Heaton-Armstrong argue that there are 
strong reasons for introducing the mandatory recording of interviews with complainants,100 
apart from the fact that police were poorly trained in interviewing suspects and witnesses. 
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Suspects, prior to creation of the PACE codes were interrogated in custody in potentially 
coercive circumstances. These conditions carried the risk that suspects had made confessions 
under duress which were actually false, or because they were fabricated by the police. 
PACE ensured that, when suspects were interrogated, any questions put to them were to be 
recorded on audiotape. PACE also protected the police from criticism that they could be 
coercing the suspect, leading him or offering him inducements. It also prevents the doctoring 
RIWKHVXVSHFW¶VRXW-of-court statement, because the audiotapes are timed. The period of the 
VXVSHFW¶VGHWHQWLRQTXHVWLRQLQJDQGWKHQDPHVDQGUDQNRIWKHLQYHVWLJDWLQJDQGFXVWRGLDO
officers are logged. 
Code E of PACE 1984 deals with the mandatory tape recording of interviews with suspects in 
the police station. Code F deals with the visual recording with sound of interviews with 
suspects. Under Code F, there is no statutory requirement on police officers to record 
interviews visually. However, the contents of this code should be considered if an 
interviewing officer decides to make a visual recording with sound of an interview with a 
suspect. There are few reasons for not changing the present system of interviewing witnesses 
by recording what they say under PACE conditions. There may be obstacles, such as a lack of 
chrRQRORJ\RQWKHSDUWRIWKHZLWQHVV¶QDUUDWLYHRUSHUKDSVWKHVSHDNHUZLOOKDYHDVWURQJ
dialect or not be a fluent speaker of the home language. However, these problems can be 
remedied by the police or the Crown Prosecution Service making a résumé of the chronology 
along with creating a transcription of the evidence.  
 
A Royal Commission on Criminal Justice appraised the efficacy of the PACE provisions in 
1991 following several high-profile cases of miscarriage of justice. 101 Under PACE, police 
notes were to be taken simultaneously with the interview of the suspect; subsequently, the 
comprehensive audio-taping of interviews was rolled out. The Royal Commission found that 
PACE had led to a reduction in the frequency of interviews and use of unacceptable interview 
tactics, but some forms of questioning still led to concern about the potential for false 
confessions and types of person susceptible to making false confessions.102 Another identified 
problem was the lack of supervision and monitoring of interviews, even though supervisors 
of interview tapes were readily available. Interviews did not always take place at the police 
station and these were therefore unregulated. 
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More positively, there was greater supervision in special squads and major enquiries and a 
reduction of disputes in court about what was said in a taped interview. The Crown 
Prosecution Service was sometimes found to be at fault for producing poor transcriptions to 
prepare and conduct the prosecution, which led to civilian summarisers being used. 
Nowadays, The Crown Prosecution (CPS) itself has a code of practice governing the editing 
of witness statements so as to prevent evidence from becoming tainted. Editing may be 
permitted in several circumstances. The CPS may be asked to make up a composite statement 
where the witness was interviewed under section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. Where 
the CPS is combining statements,103 it has to ensure that the witness signs the new statement. 
The drafting of composite statements under the Practice Direction must be undertaken by the 
CPS, not the police. The problem under the present witness-taking system, of course, is that 
the CPS are handling witness statements which have previously been created by the police, 
therefore, the CPS may at times be editing statements elicited under the opaque methods used 
to interview the witness. This is, therefore, not a failsafe method of preventing evidence 
tampering.  
There are several reasons for concern about the proper recording and interviewing skills and 
production of hard copies of witness statements. If not properly monitored and applied, 
defendants in HCSA are at risk of being denied a fair trial. This encumbers the judiciary with 
the task of working out whether allegations have been constructed by the police and to decide 
what weight the jury should attach to contaminated evidence, but they may not be able to 
detect whether police contamination has occurred. Electronic recording of interviews would 
cause fewer errors when the witness statements were typed up and there would therefore be 
less querying of clerically generated inconsistencies. Moreover, the interviews could form the 
evidence-in-chief of prosecution witnesses, meaning that they would not appear in court until 
the cross-examination stage, which has already become permitted for trials governed by 
section 17 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, which allows eligible 
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(viii) Collusion issues: accidental and deliberate collusion 
 
Interviewees solicited under the dip sampling process can be put into contact with each other 
via witness networking, websites and e-mails.104 The ACPO Handbook allows the police to 
seek out possible witnesses in this manner. Another questionable method is the use of a 
standard letter of inquiry, to a sample of former residents to seek information. The 2002 
Handbook pointed out that when using the media, the police should protect the integrity of 
the investigation and avoid prejudicing it.105 Whilst the intention might have been to help 
victims to recall their accounts better by the pooling of information and to allow them to 
support each other, putting former care residents into contact with each other also invites the 
criticism that witnesses can collude with each other. This problem calls into question the 
validity and safety of the acquisition and use of such evidence. Whilst cognitive interviewing 
techniques are now recommended to investigating police officers in the UK,106 evidence 
elicited by cognitive interviewing can still be tainted by accidental or non-accidental 
contamination where witnesses have been allowed to come into contact with each other. 
There are also complications with the use of mental context reinstatement (an element of 
cognitive interviewing). It is a time-consuming process, as it necessitates numerous pauses 
and a slow, deliberate style of presentation, with the officer providing the retrieval cues. As 
officers often interview witnesses of the same crime, they may subsume such information 
these witnesses provide into their MRC instructions, with the possibility of inadvertently 
introducing leading/suggestive retrieval cues during the MRC procedure.107  
 
Examples of police putting pressure on witnesses to make allegations of HCSA 
Some of the dangers of the dip sampling method were exemplified by solicitor Chris Saltrese 
at the HASC session.108 In April 1996 Terence Hoskin was convicted of physically and 
VH[XDOO\DEXVLQJIRUPHUFDUHKRPHUHVLGHQWVRI6W$LGDQ¶V, Community Home, where he had 
been headmaster from 1974 to 1982. 
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After studying the papers [for appeal]  I formed the view that the allegations against 
Mr Hoskin had been fabricated. The unused statements (that is, those statements which are 
not relied upon by the prosecution to prove any count on the indictment) were littered with 
examples of police introducing to potential complainants information which was highly 
SUHMXGLFLDOWR0U+RVNLQ«WKHPDLQFRPSODLQDQWLQWKHFDVHDOOHJHGWKDWKHKDGEHHQFDQHG
by Mr Hoskin on the bare backside after which Mr Hoskin had indecently assaulted him with 
WKHWLSRIWKHFDQH$VWDWHPHQWLQWKHXQXVHGUHDG³,FDQQRWUHPHPEHU0U+RVNLQWRXFKLQJ
me in an indecent manner or suggesting anything indecent to me whilst I was DW6W$LGDQ¶V´
I traced the maker of this unused statement to HMP Liverpool where he provided me with a 
VWDWHPHQWZKLFKLQFOXGHGWKHIROORZLQJ³$IWHUVXFKDORQJSHULRGRIWLPH,ZRXOGQRWKDYH
been able to remember the name of the Headmaster or the individual names of houses 
without police prompting. Nor do I recall ever being caned on the bare backside. I remember 
the police asking if when caned by Mr Hoskin, did he ever touch me with the cane in an 
indecent manner, that is, did he ever put the cane between my buttocks or touch my genitals? 
,UHSOLHGµQR¶WRWKLVMRNLQJO\DVNLQJWKHSROLFHZRXOG,JHWFRPSHQVDWLRQLI,VDLGµ\HV¶7KH\
UHSOLHGDORQJWKHOLQHVRIµ,VXSSRVHVR¶´ 
«+DGWKHLQPDWHGHFLGHGWRDFFHSWWKHLQYLWDWLRQWRPDNHDQDOOHJDWLRQKLV statement would 
KDYHUHDG³0U+RVNLQFDQHGPHRQWKHEDUHEDFNVLGHDQGWKHQSXWWKHFDQHEHWZHHQP\
EXWWRFNVHWF´2QFHSURGXFHGE\WKHSURVHFXWLRQDWWULDOWKLVHYLGHQFHDORQJZLWKVLPLODU
evidence gathered by police in a similar fashion) would appear compelling. The prosecution 
would present the allegations as being very similar and would, quite correctly, assert that 
there had been no collusion between complainants who had not been in contact with each 
other for more than 20 years. The jury in Hoskin, as in the great majority of multi-
FRPSODLQDQWFDUHKRPHWULDOVZHUHIDFHGZLWKWKHTXHVWLRQ³:K\DUHFRPSODLQDQWV
DOOHJLQJVRPHWKLQJYHU\VLPLODUDERXWWKHGHIHQGDQW"´2QFHFROOXVLRQKDVEHHQUXOHGRXWWKH
only credible answer is that the defendant must in fact be guilty. There is very little a 
GHIHQGDQW¶VODZ\HUVFDQGRLQWKLVVLWXDWLRQWRLQWURGXFHXQXVHGVWDWHPHQWVLQRUGHUWR
criticise police methodology is to run the risk that the jury are made aware of even more 
allegations against the defendant and it is a risk that most lawyers are not prepared to take. 
«LWVKRXOGEHUHFRJQLVHGWKDWLWLVH[WUHPHO\GLIILFXOWIRUDQRIILFHUWRFDUU\RXWVXFK
interviews without suggesting what the enquiry might be about.109 
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Summers and Winship state that criminal cases in which there are multiple witnesses are 
commonplace, and in most cases there will be no argument that the statements of the 
witnesses are not their own accounts, as they will be wholly independent of one another, or, if 
not, statements will have been obtained soon enough after the event so as to negate any 
likelihood of cross-contamination.110 However, there are instances when cross contamination 
can occur. For example, the witnesses may be known to each other or are from the same 
family. In the care homes sexual abuse context, the witnesses were often contemporaneously 
living in the same place. Once they are put together again, there may be deliberate collusion, 
or inadvertent contamination between the witnesses; or because the police have expressly 
permitted it, as stated in the ACPO Handbook 2002 on allowing witnesses to be put into 
contact with each other. 111 Contamination of the evidence is not only possible through 
witness networking, but also by the manner in which the police asked leading questions to 
residents of care homes subsequent to the making of a statement by the first complainant. 
Webster concedes that the dip sampling method could yield genuine cases of historic CSA 
but warns about the inherent dangers of the method for the innocent: 
In cases where allegations are trawled, juries are not able to assess individual 
complaints on their own merits. The whole purpose of trawling is to try to prove that abuse 
has taken place not by finding supporting evidence but by multiplying the number of 
complaints against a particular suspect...112This method continues to be used because it 
works; it usually results in convictions, police forces have found a way of destroying the 
presumption of innocence and obscuring the weakness of individual complaints. 
(ix) Contamination arising from other investigatory methods 
Contamination of evidence is not solely a problem encountered by eliciting complaints under 
the dip sampling method. As Wolchover and Heaton-Armstrong point out, for as long as 
police officers take down in writing (in their notebooks) witness statements, the content of 
the statement is likely to be influenced by the way in which the investigator perceives the 
case and receives and formulates the narrative.113 They invariably exclude the questions, 
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which may be leading and suggestive, they can be highly selective and even quite inaccurate, 
and they may be seriously distorted versions of what the witness actually said.114 
Accordingly, as the investigating officers control what is included in witness statements, 
DWWHPSWVWRXVHDVWDWHPHQWWRYDOLGDWHRUGLVFUHGLWFRQVLVWHQF\µRIWHQGHJHQHUDWHLQWRD
IDUFH¶115 It may well be that the witness is a genuine victim of CSA, but a tactical defence 
lawyer will effectively present to the jury that there is no way of finding out this, where 
police constructed the case, thereby offering the defendant the benefit of the doubt. Equally, 
the police could have planted allegations that are false, but because of the recording methods 
they used, there is no way of finding out how the witness was interrogated and what was put 
to him.  
 
(x) Inducements 
The issue of inducements contaminating police investigations of HCSA 
Readers of posters, websites and emails found out about child abuse investigations and 
compensation for making allegations of a sexual nature against staff at institutions. The 
police did not see a problem with seeking complainants by this means. One police force 
stated that while it (the mode of obtaining victims) may open the door to a false allegation, it 
is not an incitement per se to making a false allegation.116 
 
The case studies of the two witnesses, Mr Merett and the witness R (in the case of H 
volunteered for this study), show that they did not succumb to police pressures117 and/or 
inducements themselves. However, in the HASC 2002 session, Linzi McDonald, a partner 
solicitor at Kingsley Napley, suggested that the drafting of these letters provided a flawed 
basis for the investigation. She cited the David Jones case. The standard letter mentioned the 
subject of the police investigation: 
 
...really set up the problem because people know what is being investigated and what 
evidence the police are looking for. Certainly in my case we had evidence to suggest 
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that at least two, if not all of our complainants, were doing this for financial 
compensation.118 
McDonald submitted that there was a real danger in trawling for witness under the dip 
sampling method because inducements to interviewees had come to light: 
«:HKDGGHIHQFHZLWQHVVHVZLOOLQJWRFRPHIRUZDUGDQGJLYHHYLGHQFHDWRXUWULDOWR
the effect that complainants against Dave Jones had admitted to our witnesses that 
they had lied about the allegations of abuse in order to obtain financial compensation 
through the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme.119 
Birch and Taylor cite the Canadian Kaufman Report120 which argues that myths and 
stereotypes, such as using the bad character of the inmates of care homes to rebut allegations 
of abuse, skew the investigative process, leading to unwarranted assumptions about whether 
or not abuse had occurred.121 In terms of compensation pay-outs to complainants of child 
abuse under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Award scheme (about of third of 
complainants seek compensation overall), not all of them are successful, as CICA itself seeks 
corroboration of the complaints alleged; reasons for late disclosure and it will reduce or 
refuse a pay-out where the claimant has a substantial criminal record.122 They also argue that 
the police may not be the only source about the possibility of CICA pay-outs, as the facts are 
fUHHO\DYDLODEOHYLDWKHPHGLDE\SXEOLFLW\RUE\WKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VRZQFRQWDFWZLWK
solicitors.  
The inducement factor ± the availability of compensation from the CICB - will be examined 
in this chapter. 
 
Example of compensation being offered as an inducement 
Mark Merett gave the following evidence at the HASC: 
While being interviewed by the South Wales police, it was pointed out to me that other 
former residents would be receiving tens of thousands of pounds in compensation and 
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if I made a complaint I could be entitled to the same. I regarded this as a financial 
incentive. I still see some of my former school mates and they have confirmed that 
they have been offered money by the South Wales police in return for a complaint.123 
The ACPO must have accepted that investigations could be criticised in the way Merett had 
suggested. In April 2002, a prohibition was placed on police officers discussing 
compensation to interviewees.124 The 2009 Handbook reiterates this prohibition: 
 
«FULPLQDOLQMXULHVFRPSHQVDWLRQshould not be discussed as there have been 
examples of the defence challenging complaints as being purely motivated by a desire 
for compensation.125 
 
The ACPO Handbook had been cognisant of the criticisms defence lawyers made about 
compensation being an inducement for the making of allegations.126 In 2011, the CICA in 
answer to a question for this study127 about the amount of compensation which had been 
awarded to HCSA claimants, from 1991 onwards) provided the following information: 
 
For applications made before 1 April 1996, the Scheme was based on the common 
law - cases were assessed in the same way personal injury claims were dealt with in 
the civil courts. In 1996, the system changed when the tariff of injuries was 
introduced. This is a list of fixed compensation payments for each injury.  
 
She was also able to obtain the post-1996 awards: 
 
[W]e do not have an award for rape or sexual abuse. We consider compensation 
under the terms of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme (the Scheme), which is set by 
Parliament and pays awards based on the injuries someone sustains rather than the crime of 
which they were a victim. Where your request stated rape or sexual assault, I have based my 
search on awards paid for sexual offences (which are classed as an injury in the tariff of 
injuries). I can confirm from 1 April 1996 to date we have paid out £383,771,157 in awards 
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where the main award paid has been as a result of a sexual offence. This excludes any 
additional awards paid for pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases directly attributable 
to the sexual offence.128 
 
It is therefore difficult to compute awards given to claimants specifically in HCSA cases. 
What is known is that a law firm which processes CICA awards, Jordans, had been 
advertising in the magazine for prisoner inmates Inside Time from 2004-2009 with the 
IROORZLQJµ&RPSHQVDWLRQ¶µ:HUH\RXLQ6W:LOOLDP¶VFDUHKRPH0DUNHW:HLJKWRQ"¶ 
By 2010, one hundred former residents of St Williams had become clients of the law firm, 
claiming that they have been abused.129 The police are therefore not the only source of 
knowledge about compensation, even though they have been criticised for inducing 
allegations by informing interviewees about their eligibility for CICA awards.  
 
(xi) Audio recording 
 
There has been prior concern over the way in which the police have contact with prosecution 
witnesses in sexual offence cases, not only in terms of the site of the interview and the 
interviewing techniques employed by the police as discussed, but also, the lack of mandatory 
reliable recording. 
 
David Calvert-Smith QC (former Director of Public Prosecutions) at the HASC in 2002 
agreed that doing so would avoid the risk of coaching or contamination of evidence; it would 
establish independently what was said between the police officer and the witness. He also 
encouraged the police to contact the DPP at an early stage of an investigation so that it could 
provide advice about the legal or evidential implications of issues arising during an 
investigation. This had been confirmed in the subsequently issued Home Office guidance on 
complex child abuse investigations, which stressed the importance of continuous advice and 
interaction between each agency throughout the investigation and any resulting 
prosecution.130 
Audio taping of police interrogations of suspects is mandatory under the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). Wolchover and Heaton-Armstrong state that the wealth of 
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protective formalities under PACE were designed to mitigate the adverse effects of the 
inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation.131 However, there is currently no 
requirement for the police to do likewise with prosecution witnesses. Not everyone agrees 
that tape recording prosecution witnesses should be mandatory. At the HASC, Peter Garsden, 
thought that it was a fallacy that false allegations existed in any significant numbers; that 
under-disclosure rather than exaggeration, is more common;132 that extending taping would 
not be cost effective, and that complainants deserved better legal protection to spare them 
from the trauma of the trial process with the use of video links and pre-recorded evidence.133 
It has also been argued that audio and tape recording conversations with witnesses at the first 
instance may not always be practicable.  
However, historic cases differ from police call-outs: the allegations which are made years 
later can and should be made by the complainant at the police station which is well equipped 
to record witnesses calling there. In the past, the police had been known to visit the homes of 
potential witnesses where the mode of interviewing them could not be scrutinised. Timothy 
Hackett, a solicitor who gave evidence to the HASC, believed that trawling led to unreliable 
evidence being obtained.  
«WKHSROLFHand the former resident are not tape recorded and frequently there are 
only limited notes on the conversation available. It would be open to any unscrupulous 
officer to suggest names to the residents (and) inadvertently, to give information which could 
helSWKHSRWHQWLDOFRPSODLQDQWWRLGHQWLI\WKHµVXVSHFWV¶DQGWKHUHIRUHDJDLQFRXOGOHDGWR
false allegations.134 
The HASC 2002 recommended that interviews with complainants and significant witnesses 
should either be video recorded or mandatorily audio-taped.135 Arguably, cases in which there 
have been dip sampling and witness interrogations which have not been audio or videotaped 
(usually both conditions are present in HCSA investigations), are inherently flawed. If one 
were to be able to hear or view what the police asked witnesses in a recording, one could at 
least discern whether there had been improper any questioning. Furthermore, it is often hard 
to detect whether there has been contamination because it may be unclear which interviewing 
method was applied. 
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It may be argued that allowing the police to have a free rein on the questioning of 
complainants will enable them feel relaxed by asking them questions in an informal manner. 
However, any leading questions asked may result in a constructed, rather than free narrative. 
The comprehensive taping of interviews with complainants resolves this problem and was 
also suggested by the HASC in 2002: 
During this inquiry, we were given the impression that practices were gradually 
improving in this area. Professor Gudjonsson, a psychologist at Kings College 
London, cited the Independent Longcare Inquiry as one example. He said that the 
police arranged for potential victims of abuse to be assessed by clinical 
psychologists- including himself-to identify their vulnerabilities before they were 
interviewed. He explained that this approach enabled him to provide the police with 
advice about how to interview each witness, in the light of their vulnerabilities. The 
interviews were then conducted and recorded on video tape.  
Detective Inspector Andrew Parker said that within his unit in the Metropolitan, first 
disclosures by witnesses and the substantive interview of the witness were recorded 
on audio tape, wherever possible. 
It would appear that the police will continue to apply different methods of recording and 
interviewing recent complaints disclosed by women rape complainants, children disclosing 
recent abuse (electronic recording) from adult HCSA complainants (manual). For this study 
the following question was put by email to Ms Ann Barnes, formerly a Police and Crime 
Commissioner for Kent: 
Electronic recording is now increasingly used for the interviewing of complainants of 
rape, children and other vulnerable people in sexual offence investigations. It is also 
a mandatory requirement when interviewing suspects under the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984. It is asked why (adult) complainants of historic child sexual abuse 
are still not being electronically recorded by statute to safeguard the integrity of the 
investigation and the right of the defendant to a fair trial despite the Home Affairs 
Select Committee's Recommendations to implement electronic recording in 2002? 
The Commissioner agreed to obtain a reply from Kent Police, but the question passed on was 
edited so as to read: 
P a g e  |   
I would be most interested to hear your views on the ways in which the police 
currently interview potential prosecution witnesses and victims of child abuse. Is this 
flawed? 
Ms Barnes replied: 
 
The police do a good job but I have taken an oath to not interfere with operational 
SROLFLQJ,W¶VDYHU\FRPSOH[DUHDDQG,KDYHDVNHGWKHIRUFHWRSURYLGHDQRXWOLQHRI
how they interview witnesses/victims. From my perspective, there are always 
improvements that can be made to the policing system. But they are regulated because 
if the Chief Constable makes a mistake then him/his team are accountable to me if 
they are not correctly/legally getting the information they need in the right way.136 
 
Kent Police responded to the question in its edited form: 
 
Response from Kent Police 
 
The interviewing of children and vulnerable persons is a complex matter and the 
procedures used by all police forces to interview such persons are consistent with 
guidance published in 2007 by the Home office and Criminal Justice system in a 
document entitled - Achieving best evidence in Criminal Proceedings - Guidance on 
interviewing victims and witnesses and using special measures.  
In essence the process followed is that when there is an inference or evidence that a 
child or vulnerable person is either the victim of criminal offences or is a child in 
need then a strategy meeting between the police and social services will take place 
and agreement will be made whether or not to conduct a joint visit. 
Child in need visits will often result in a single agency visit (Social services) whilst 
those relating to the child being a victim of crime will be joint visits.  
The purpose of the visit will be to build a rapport with the child, establish in simple 
terms the nature of any allegation and to make a skeleton record of any offences 
disclosed. 
Permission will then be sought from any person with parental responsibility for the 
child to allow a video recorded interview to be conducted to secure a detailed account 
of any offences that may have taken place. All such interviews should be undertaken 
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by officers that have been formally trained in Achieving Best Evidence and are 
accredited to do so. 
It is this record that will be used as the basis for any evidence that the child may give 
in court. 
On some occasions officers may determine that a written statement is actually be a 
more appropriate means of proceeding but this is assessed on a case by case basis 
DQGZLOOEHEDVHGXSRQYLHZVDVWRWKHFKLOG¶VDJHWKHLUDELOLW\WRZLWKVWDQGJLYLQJ
evidence within a court room etc. 
Once court proceedings take place there is a mechanism in place which allows the 
Prosecution to apply to the court for Special Measures to be used such as the giving 
of evidence in camera via video link in a room outside the court, or removal of wigs 
and gowns by counsel within the court room.137 
 
The reply from the Kent Police does not address the specific question about interview 
methods with adult complainants and significant witnesses in HCSA cases. The answer 
focuses on interviews with children, which are already video-recorded. Since the interviews 
of recent complainants of rape and children are already routinely electronically recorded, it 
does not make sense to differentiate the treatment of fresh complaints from those where 
allegations are stale. 
 
(xii) Addressing the problem 
 
We have seen that there is evidence going back to the late 1980s and early 1990s that there 
was room for significant improvement in police interviewing techniques. As seen in 
%DOGZLQ¶VUHVHDUFKLQWKH:HVW0idlands from 1989 indicated that half of the written records 
of interview did not provide fair summaries of the interview and a third of records therein 
were misleading or distorted in some way.138  
 
It is not clear that the situation has changed. In 2009 the National Policing Improvement 
$JHQF\SXEOLVKHGWKHVHFRQGHGLWLRQRILWVµ*XLGDQFHRQ,QYHVWLJDWLQJ&KLOG$EXVHDQG
6DIHJXDUGLQJ&KLOGUHQ¶139 Even this welcome guidance is not clear about permitted 
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interviewing conditions and interviewing techniques. Furthermore, such handbooks must 
actually be used by officers, not ignored, as Compo et al found out in some instances in their 
sample US study.140  
 
From the 1990s onwards, the UK police interviewed complainants of allegations of 
institutional HCSA without the requirement to tape the interviews. Given that these 
allegations are emotionally laden, it is not unreasonable to surmise that the police would have 
been zealous to find perpetrators, but in so doing, were not bound by protocols to direct the 
interview in a transparent manner; nor were they properly instructed in how to interview 
complainants.  
 
The 2002 ACPO Handbook The Investigation of Historical Institutional Child Abuse141 now 
helpfully instructs officers not to mention the CICA compensation to interviewees, but fails 
to offer comprehensive protocols on the interviewing of potential prosecution witnesses, nor 





In investigations where the police have solicited, and brought together by dip sampling, other 
ZLWQHVVHVZKRPWKH\KDYHDSSURDFKHGUHSHDWHGO\WRµUHILQH¶WKHZLWQHVVVWDWHPHQWVWRILQG
the requisite standard of corroboration, the risk of miscarriages of justice to defendants is 
enhanced.  
A jury hearing (cross-admissible) multiple charges against the accused may not be told about 
possible reasons that so many complaints have been made against the defendant. The 
prosecution may assert that the witnesses are independent and that their accounts are 
therefore their own. However, this may not be the case. The 2002 ACPO Handbook stated 
that police could put witnesses back into contact with each other by witness networking, 
websites and emails. The danger of allowing witnesses to contact each other in this way is 
that the witnesses may accidentally or intentionally collude on their accounts. They then are 
no longer independent witnesses corroborating narratives that are authentically theirs. 
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These methods, subsequHQWO\GHVFULEHGDVµWUDZOLQJ¶E\FULWLFVZHUHGHVLJQHGWRPD[LPLVH
the chances of finding possible complainants of HCSA, but they are also apt to encourage 
unreliable and even false allegations to be made. 
Interviewing 
Without the adoption of electronic recording of all significant contact with witnesses in 
HCSA cases it has to be doubted that the process in such a fraught area of inquiry is as safe as 
it should be.  
 
Unrecorded encounters with interviewees run the risk that the police will ask more suggestive 
TXHVWLRQVDQGLQVRPHFDVHVWKHTXHVWLRQVZLOOEHEDVHGRQZKDWµRWKHU¶FRPSODLQDQWVDUH
supposed to have told the police, such as in the case of H. This method risks contaminating 
the evidence that otherwise might have had corroborative value. Prosecution (and defence) 
lawyers may not be able to detect how the police structured the questions put to the witness, 
other than from police notebooks, résumés and the subsequently typed up witness statements. 
In the future, should the CPS be tasked with asking the complainant or witness procedural 
questions about when and how they were interrogated and tape the answers at the pre-trial 
conference?  
 
If police interrogations with potential prosecution complainants and witnesses were recorded 
from the outset, cases could be screened for the extent of procedural defects, bribes and the 
quality of interrogation methods as well as being useful for improving standards in police 
practice. 
 
It is prosecution witness inconsistency which is the most common reason for acquittals.142 
Even allowing for the fading of the human memory, in crime cases, complainants and 
witnesses will be describing events that are completely outside the realm of their experience, 
and since the experience is exceptional, the central facts are likely to remain constant in their 
narratives; psychologists have shown that this narrative can be retrieved by using non-
suggestive cognitive interviewing techniques. The use of such techniques will aid the 
prosecution in eliciting the veracity and reliability of the evidence. 
If interviews are not electronically recorded, it cannot be known what the interviewee 
actually said and to what extent the police interrogation techniques shaped it. These witnesses 
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may be picked upon by defence counsel for apparent inaccuracies that were police -
generated, but because they confirmed that they read and signed their statements, they are 
deemed to have endorsed the police-created statement.  
The police will seldom admit that their statement taking was faulty in a trial, but may do so to 
facilitate a prosecution to avoid the conflict between what the witness actually said in the 
FORVHGVXUURXQGLQJVRIWKHSROLFHVWDWLRQZLWQHVV¶KRPHDQGZKDWWKHSROLFHLQWHUSUHWHGDQG
wrote down on his behalf.143 Apart from these occasions of the police admitting errors, the 
window of opportunity for the defence to challenge this conflict in a cross-examination may 
also enable perpetrators of HCSA to be wrongfully acquitted. Wolchover and Heaton-
Armstrong conjecture that many acquittals are attributed to witnesses being wrongly 
stigmatised as being inconsistent through the absence of an unchallengeable record of what 
they said to the police.144  
Until the procedure for statement-taking of all complainants is regulated and comprehensibly 
applied, using tamper-proof recording equipment, there may be doubt about the reliability 
and integrity of such vital out-of-court evidence, forming as it does the basis for the potential 
conviction of the defendant. 
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Chapter IV Prosecuting historic allegations: challenges to a fair trial 
arising from delay 
 
 
The case R v F 1 exemplifies the problems arising from a delay in a complaint being brought, 
in terms of the potential consequences for the prosecution of HCSA cases. F was appealing 
against his conviction for the sexual abuse of his daughter, N and step-daughter, K. The abuse 
was alleged to have occurred when the girls were aged between 2 and 13 years. However, the 
allegations were not reported until complainant K was in her forties and when N was slightly 
younger. They both claimed that the abuse took place when their grandmother was in hospital, 
DQGWKHLUDOOHJDWLRQVZHUHVXSSRUWHGE\ZLWQHVVHV)¶VH[-wife claimed to have personally seen 
F KDYLQJ VH[ ZLWK . +RZHYHU )¶V VHFRQG ZLIH DQG WKH FRPSODLQDQWV¶ \RXQJHU VLEOLQJV
testified that F had never had inappropriate relations with them; neither did they have reason 
to suspect that there had been inappropriate behaviour between him and the complainants. An 
application to stay the proceedings against F was made at the end of the trial, owing to the long 
delay between the alleged offences and trial date, and the trial judge refused this. However, the 
Court of Appeal overturned the conviction. This case now sets out propositions for courts 
concerning the conduct of prosecutions brought after a long delay. For an abuse of process 
application to succeed, the defendant would have to show that the delay had caused incurable 
prejudice to his case, as the Court of Appeal held in the later case of R v E.2 In the latter case, 
the complaints were some 36 years old, but it was held that the defendant, E could have a fair 
trial, because he had been entitled to argue that any allegations made to the police at earlier 
times were not pursued and as such were treated as unworthy of further action by the police at 
that time. 
This chapter looks at the meaning of historic allegations of sexual abuse and to what extent the 
fairness of proceedings against the defendant may be affected by the forensic disadvantage 
occasioned by the late disclosure of the complaints made against him. 
&ULPLQDOFRXUWVLQWKH8.KDYHLQFUHDVLQJO\EHHQSUHVHQWHGZLWKWKHVHGHOD\HGRUµKLVWRULF¶
cases in recent years. How old should a case be before there is consensus that a case is historic? 
How can defence cases be more prejudiced by an historic complaint than a recent one? After 
all, in delayed prosecutions, both parties and their witnesses may suffer from frailty of memory, 
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the difficulty in locating eyewitnesses and character witnesses from long ago, or obtaining 
independent evidence to give credence to their narratives. However, it is still the defendant 
who stands to lose liberty, livelihood and social standing if the complaints are prosecuted, let 
alone result in a conviction. Forensic evidence can be a valuable tool for challenging the 
FUHGLELOLW\DQGUHOLDELOLW\RIWKHGHWDLOLQWKHRSSRVLQJSDUW\¶VHYLGHQFHFurthermore, the lack 
of availability of a relevant piece of independent evidence is therefore especially problematic 
in sexual assault cases.  
This chapter is divided into the following sections: 
(i) What is an historic case?  
(ii) Statutes of limitation and judge-ordered time bars in European jurisdictions 
(iii) Comparative study of abuse of process applications in UK and Eire 





In R v F3 the appellant had successfully argued that he had been left with no material upon 
which to cross-examine the complainants: all he could assert was a flat denial without evidence 
to support it. The Court of Appeal agreed that no jury direction could compensate him for the 
prejudice caused by the delay of complaints which ranged from 30 to 40 years previously. 
Although there will inevitably be some delay between the report of a complaint and the staging 
of a trial, owing to the time it takes to process the complaint by the criminal justice system, it 
will be seen that historic allegations can involve complaints that involve a considerable time 
ODSVH 6RPH PD\ XVH WKH WHUP µGHOD\HG SURVHFXWLRQ¶4 others SUHIHU µSDVW¶ RU µhistoric¶5 
Connolly and Read define an historic case as being one where the allegation occurs at least two 
years after the incident. They computed this by reference to the civil law personal injury statutes 
of Canada (active in eight out of nine provinces) and the USA (in 21 states out of 50), where 
claims should be made within two years.6 Some cases coming to trial can have allegations 
dating back more than forty years, as has happened in Irish prosecutions of physical and sexual 
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 Fn 1, R v F. 
4
 P Lewis, Delayed Prosecution for Childhood Sexual Abuse (OUP 2006). 
5
 Home Affairs Select Committee, The Conduct of Investigations into Past Cases of Abuse in Children¶s Homes 
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abuse in State-run institutions.7 English courts have not set out any definite criteria for what 
constitutes an historic case but it may fall into one of two categories, as set out in R v LPB.8 
The case concerned an abuse of process application to stay an indictment of alleged HCSA 
committed by a stepfather against a female adult complainant. The complainant had alleged 
that she had been persistently sexually abused by the defendant over a period of 17 years, with 
the abuse ending 5 years before the date of her complaint. The complainant had not made prior 
disclosure due to natural reticence. The defendant tried to have the proceedings stayed on the 
grounds that the delayed complaint was an abuse of process. His application failed on the basis 
WKDWWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VUHWLFHQFHZDVQRWXQFRPPRQand was wholly understandable, and it was 
difficult to envisage any circumstances where such an application would be granted in advance 
of hearing the complainant at trial.  
This judgment identified two forms of delay in criminal cases: 
Type 1: between the investigation and trial of an offence. The judges in LPB9 accepted that the 
police investigation had been rapid and efficient, and that therefore there was no indication of 
misconduct, inefficiency or delay by police or the prosecuting authorities.10 
Courts abroad have previously dealt with Type 1 cases, when prosecuting Nazi war criminals, 
where the allegations are many decades old. For example, in 2009, Demjanjuk was charged by 
German prosecutors for participating in the murders of inmates of a Nazi camp which he 
guarded in 1943.11  
Type 2: between the commission of an offence and its report by the complainant.  
In LPB12 the application for abuse of process was based on the delay which took place before 
the facts were reported by the complainant, a delay which it was claimed, resulted, at lowest, 
in the risk that any trial of the defendant on these charges would be unfair.  
This thesis explores Type 2 cases, which are retrospective allegations of child sexual abuse. 
Historic child abuse allegations are treated differently by the courts, because even where 
allegations appear to be date-specific, the approach adopted by the criminal justice system is 
to regard the complainant as narrating an incident that occurred when s/he was a child, not as 





 [1990] 91 Cr App R 359. 
9
 Fn 8, R v LPB. 
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the adult they are at the time of reporting the alleged offence. Child sexual abuse cases are 
prosecuted after years have passed, because they involve special considerations about the 
reasons why disclosure of offences may be late. 
The reason for recent increase in prosecutions of HCSA cases stems from acceptance by the 
criminal justice system that many victims may conceal the abuse through a sense of fear 
and/or shame, being vulnerable to the dominion the adult had over them such as a family 
member or one who held a position of authority over them.13 Research has demonstrated that 
ODWHGLVFORVXUHFDQEHGXHWRDQXPEHURIUHDVRQVVXFKDVWKHYLFWLP¶VPLVWDNHQEHOLHIWKDW
abuse is normal;14 the victim may have been threatened by the assailant and or be 
embarrassed or feel complicit and blame himself/herself.15 The social perception of the 
credibility the complainant is not the only reason for his/her reluctance to report an offence.  
A Home Office study in 2013 on sexual offences contained feedback from 136 female 
volunteers aged 16 who had responded to a questionnaire about being victims of a serious 
sexual offence and how they had reported it. Twenty-eight per cent had left the incident 
wholly unreported; only fifteen per cent had reported it to both the police and another person. 
Fifty-seven per cent had told another person about the incident but not the police, of whom 
sixty-five per cent were friends, relatives or neighbours. Those who had failed to report the 
offence to anyone offered explanations, such as being too embarrassed to proceed; or they 
felt that the police would be unable to help; or the matter was too trivial to report; or that it 
ZDVDµSULYDWHIDPLO\PDWWHUDQGQRWSROLFHEXVLQHVV¶16 Such factors also lead to under-
reporting of sexual offences. 
Murder, child sexual and physical abuse are commonly encountered historic crime cases. In 
other criminal cases, such as theft, it is unlikely that an historic allegation would be allowed to 
proceed to trial since the evidence (e.g., the item alleged to have been stolen) is likely to have 
disappeared or been destroyed long ago. It is perfectly possible that an historic case may 
involve an overlap of the two types of delay: the complainant may have made a late disclosure 
to the police and it may take months or years for this complaint to be forwarded to the Crown 
Prosecution Service and the criminal courts.  
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7KHWHUPµKLVWRULF¶LVQRWVHWRXWSUHVFULSWLYHO\IRU8.ODZ\HUVLWZRXOGDSSHDUWREHDQ\ODWH
disclosure, ranging from a couple of years to many decades. This policy of flexibility in 
prosecuting old crimes can also be seen in other jurisdictions like Eire. The Irish Director of 
Public Prosecutions used to refuse to prosecute cases that were more than a year old in the 
1980s, but policy changed and from the 2000s onwards, delays of up to forty years were not a 
bar to prosecution.17  
The practice of staging late historic prosecutions (Type 2 cases) also may be viewed against 
the backdrop of victim-centred legislation in international law. In 1985, the United Nations 
adopted two resolutions dealing with the rights of victims: the Declaration of Basic Principles 
of Justice for Victims of Crime 1985 and Abuse of Power and the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
in 2006. The focus of the former was on victims of domestic crimes, while that of the latter is 
on victims of international crimes; more particularly, gross violations of international human 
rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law. The 2006 Principles were, 
in effect, an international bill of rights for victims.  
Transnational changes in social attitudes and law in favour of victims can also be seen as 
having an influence on UK law: for instance, the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 
2004. The language used in policy papers on sexual offences speaks of victims rather than 
complainants, e.g., a 2006 Consultation Report recommended the admission of prior 
consistent statements of witnesses. 
We would welcome views on whether Section 120(7)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 should be repealed in order to ensure that all relevant evidence of complaints 
made by victims in rape cases are admissible as evidence in a trial, irrespective of how 
much time has passed since the alleged conduct. 18 
There is now more favourable attitude in society towards complainants, which is also reflected 
in policymaking and legislation governing sexual offences, but even so, there will still be those 
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who find it difficult psychologically to report historic offences. Therefore, even where the time 
it has taken to make a complaint of abuse appears to be inordinate, the criminal justice system 
will attempt to balance prejudice the accused might incur with the right of the complainant to 
have the case heard. It is now accepted that delay in reporting a complaint is a common feature 
in child sexual abuse cases, particularly in the familial context.19 
Given that there has been a growing number of delayed prosecutions in recent years,20 courts 
both in the UK and abroad have adopted different mechanisms for assessing whether or not a 
defendant has been evidentially disadvantaged in challenging delayed complaints. The UK, as 
a common law jurisdiction, sets no statutory limit for prosecuting delayed complaints, whereas 
the opposite prevails under penal code provisions in many other EU member states, as will now 
be seen. 
(ii) Statutes of limitation and judge-ordered time bars in European jurisdictions 
 
The staleness of a complaint may be one of the reasons pleaded at an abuse of process 
application to stay a prosecution. Abuse of process applications occur in the UK and Eire, 
because these jurisdictions do not have a general rule of limitation or prescription of crimes. 
By contrast, other countries in the European Union operate statutes of limitation for serious 
crimes, including sexual offences. Officials from Embassies and Ministries of Justice of 
European countries, who were contacted for this study, provided more detailed information 
about time bars applicable to sexual offences which operate in their country.  
Examples of statutes of limitation operating in other European jurisdictions: 
Sweden 
Under the Swedish Penal Code, time bars are determined by the length of sentence for a given 
offence rather than the specifics of the offence: 
8QGHU &KDSWHU  µ2Q /LPLWDWLRQV RQ 6DQFWLRQV¶ 6HFWLRQ  QR VDQFWLRQ PD\ EH
imposed unless the suspect has been remanded in custody or received notice of the 
prosecution within. There is a range from: Category (1) Two years, if the crime is 
punishable by at most imprisonment for one year, up to category (5) which is twenty-
five years, if life imprisonment can be imposed for the crime. 





 Fn 4, Lewis: op. cit., p.1. 
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Norway also set up its time bar to match the severity of the offences: 
Norway*21 
In most cases, the period for the statute of limitation concerning a criminal offence, 
starts running at the time of the criminal act. For cases of sexual abuse of children, 
however, the period starts running when the victim turns 18 years of age. Thus the most 
serious acts of sexual abuse of children will not be time-barred until 25 years after the 
victim has turned 18 years of age. The Ministry is currently considering the abolishment 
of time-bars in such cases.22 
Denmark 
7KH'DQLVK0LQLVWU\RI-XVWLFH¶VUHSO\ 
Section 93 of the Danish Criminal Code sets out the limitation period of the various 
criminal offences in the Criminal Code, which varies from 2 to 15 years depending on 
the crime committed.  
Section 94 of the Criminal Code regulates the date from when the limitation period is 
calculated. According to section 94(4) in cases of sexual abuse of children under the 
age of 18 years the limitation period is calculated at the earliest from the date the victim 
attains the age of 21 years. Section 94(4) of the Criminal Code was amended by act no. 
633 of 12 June 2013, which raised the date from which the limitation period is 
calculated at the earliest from the date the victim attains the age of 18 years to the date 
the victim attains the age of 21 years. 
It follows from the preparatory works that the Ministry of Justice found it appropriate 
to calculate the limitation period from the date the child becomes 21 years of age 
because children often do not leave their parentV¶KRPHDVVRRQDVWKH\EHFRPHRIOHJDO
DJH ,WZDV WKH0LQLVWU\RI-XVWLFH¶VYLHZ WKDW WKHQHZ OLPLWDWLRQUXOHVZRXOGEHWWHU
reflect the age at which a child who has been sexually abused will be able to separate 
itself from its parents. 
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Thus the time bar for prosecuting CSA in Denmark commences when the victim is no longer 
under the dominion of the perpetrator. 
Austria 
The Austrian Federal Ministry of Justice responded with this information.23 
According to Sec. 57 para. 1 of the Austrian Criminal Code (CC), punishable actions 
liable to imprisonment for life or to imprisonment from 10 to 20 years or for life are 
not subject to the period of limitation. After a period of 20 years, the lifelong 
imprisonment, however is replaced by imprisonment from 10 to 20 years.  
The punishability of other offences expires through limitation. The period of limitation 
depends on the respective offence. 
«VHYHUH VH[XDO FKLOG DEXVH 6HF  RI WKH && LV WR EH SXQLVKHG ZLWK D SULVRQ
sentence of a minimum of one year up to ten years, in case of aggravating 
circumstances (e.g. the offence caused a severe bodily injury) the penalty is between 
five and fifteen years. In case of the death of the victim the perpetrator is to be punished 
with a prison sentence from ten to twenty years or for life.  
According to Sec. 58 para. 3 pt. 3 of the CC, the period of time until the victim of a 
punishable offence against physical integrity and life, against freedom or against 
sexual integrity has completed the twenty-eighth year of his or her life is not included 
in the period of limitation, in case the victim was a person under age (i.e. who did not 
yet complete the eighteenth year of his or her life) at the time the offence was 
committed.24  
This Ministry of Justice concluded by saying that collecting evidence is much more difficult 
years after a crime was committed, therefore wrong decisions are more likely than in a prompt 
MXGJPHQW¶ 
France 
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French criminal law distinguishes between major and minor sexual offences. For serious 
allegations, including rape, sexual touching of a person under the age of 15 or sexual touching 
committed by someone with influence or authority or by several people, the complainant can 
lodge a complaint until she reaches the age of 38 or 28 for other cases of sexual violation.25 
Finland 
Janne Kanerva, Counsellor of Legislation, Ministry of Justice, replied: 26 
The right to bring charges depends on the seriousness of an offence (what is the most  
penalty according to Penal Code concerning the offence in question). This is 
regulated in section 1, paragraph 2, chapter 8 of the Penal Code. However, we have 
in that section a special provision concerning child sexual offences, paragraph 5. In 
some offences, it is reasonable that right to brings charges exists at least some years 
after the child has reached the age of 18. In this context, paragraph 5 supplements 
paragraph 2. There are also international obligations concerning this issue (Article 
33 of 2007 Council of Europe Convention, Lanzarote Convention). Our provision 
reflects that obligation.  
The right to bring charges for sexual abuse of a child and aggravated sexual abuse of 
a child becomes time-barred at the earliest when the complainant reaches the age of 
twenty-eight years. The same applies to rape, aggravated rape, coercion into sexual 
intercourse, coercion into a sexual act, sexual abuse, pandering, aggravated 
pandering, trafficking in persons and aggravated trafficking in persons, directed at a 
person under the age of eighteen years. In the case of enticement of a child for sexual 
purposes referred to in chapter 20, section 8(b), the right to bring charges becomes 
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Estonia 
Reply from Tuuli Ploom, adviser in the Penal Law and Procedure Division Criminal Policy 
Department Ministry of Justice of Estonia27: 
In Estonia, the limitation period is 10 years in case of a criminal offence of a first 
degree and 5 years in case of a criminal offence of a second degree (Penal Code § 
81). 
All offences against sexual self-determination of minors (younger than 18) are crimes  
a first degree.  
But in the case of a criminal offence against sexual self-determination against a 
person younger than eighteen years of age, the limitation period of offence is 
interrupted until the victim attains eighteen years of age unless the reason for the 
criminal proceedings became evident before the victim attained such age (Penal Code 
§ 81 subsection 7 point 3).  
This topic is actually very important to us and the Ministry of Justice of Estonia is 
currently analyzing the possibility of extending the limitation periods in the case of a 
criminal offence against sexual self-determination against a person younger than 
eighteen years of age. 
Eire 
Reply from Christopher Quattrociocchi, Private Secretary to the Minister for Justice and 
Equality, Eire:28 
I am directed by the Minister for Justice and Equality, Ms. Frances Fitzgerald, T.D., 
to refer to your correspondence. 
 
The Dublin Archdiocese Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Catholic 
Archdiocese of Dublin and the Report by Commission of Investigation into Catholic 
diocese of Cloyne forms part of a broad collective examination of historical and 
institutional abuse in which many organisations, including agencies of the State, were 
found wanting in the steps to protect children and vulnerable persons. Widespread 
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recognition of these broad failings has led to significant legislative and institutional 
reform, including within religious organisations. 29 
 
Whilst Eire does not have a statute of limitation for sexual offences, the Dublin Archdiocese 
Commission of Investigation in 2009 pointed out that bringing alleged child abusers to justice 
was hampered in institutions run by the Church there due to statute of limitation under canon 
law applying thereto: 
Many of the complaints investigated by the Commission could be classified as 
historical complaints. Here the canon law and the civil law differ considerably. In 
Ireland there is no general statute of limitations with regard to serious criminal 
offences. In canon law, criminal actions, even of the most serious kind, were time 
barred after a certain period. Under canon law, this period was five years for most of 
the time with which the Commission is concerned (1975-2004). This is known as the 
period of prescription. This meant that, in canon law, many of the complaints made to 
the Church were time barred and could not be properly investigated.30 
England and Wales 
In contrast with the continental legal systems, English trials can only be time barred by a 
temporary or permanent stay if the judge considers that the defendant could not otherwise 
have a fair trial under the circumstances. This rationale for not passing a statute of limitation 
under English law was explained by Lord Rodger of Earlsferry in R v J: 31 
The law of England has no general rule of limitation or prescription of crimes. Provided 
that the defendant can have a fair trial, proceedings may be begun long after the alleged 
crime. And in recent years, especially in the area of sexual offences, there have been 
many prosecutions for offences that came to light only decades after they were 
committed when, for the first time, the victim or victims revealed what had happened. 
Such prosecutions are not without their difficulties but, in general, the stance of the law 
is that time does not run against iniquity. 
Mullis agrees with a more flexible approach to allowing late prosecutions, by reference to what 
happens in civil law claims involving childhood sexual abuse. He contrasts the flexible 
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equitable approach that the civil courts could take under the Limitation Acts, in contrast with 
the effect of time bars which operate cut-RIISRLQWVRQWKHµSULQFLSOHVRIFHUWDLQW\HYLGHQWLDU\
DQGGLOLJHQFH¶32 In tortious claims regarding personal and psychological injury alleged to have 
been inflicted on the claimant by the defendant in child sexual abuse claims, the perpetrator 
will have been known to the victim, the offences are sometimes continued over several years 
and increase in severity; the perpetrator is likely to have been in a position of dominion over 
him/her; in incest, the disclosure to a family member may have resulted in the confidant(e) 
disbelieving him/her. The victim may even feel responsible for allowing the abuse. These 
IDFWRUVPD\OHDGWRWKHYLFWLP¶VSV\FKRORJLFDOLQDELOLW\WRUHSRUWWKHDEXVHWRWKHDXWhorities 
much earlier or at all.33 
The Home Affairs Select Committee Inquiry34 in 2002 considered whether a UK statute of 
limitation should be imposed in historic crimes. The HASC concluded that whilst a limitation 
may protect innocent defendants from fabricated allegations that were difficult to refute, it 
would also prevent guilty defendants from being brought to justice. Instead, it was suggested 
that abuse of process hearings could be amended so that the prosecution would have to seek 
permission to prosecute and prove that the proceedings were not an abuse of process. Judges 
would then be in the position to impose a time limit, but that would not be an absolute bar to 
proceedings.35 
Comments on the two contrasting types of legal system 
Time bars operative in other EU jurisdictions would appear to be generous to complainants: 
they do not run until the complainant reaches adulthood and they do not come into force until 
several decades have passed thereafter, as explained by the Austrian Ministry: 
The Austrian criminal law already contains a rather long period of limitation. The 
abolition of time-bars for sexual abuse cases is not indicated at the moment. The lack 
of evidence would render a conviction almost impossible. However the re-opening of 
the case could lead to further victimisation of the victim.36 
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These jurisdictions are also prosecuting serious crimes decades after they were alleged to have 
happened; therefore the prospect of iniquity done to victims becomes infinitesimal. The next 
section shows how the UK and other common law jurisdictions decide when to stay an historic 
prosecution. 
 
(iii) A comparative study of process in delay cases: Australia, Eire, UK 
 
Commonwealth jurisdictions in general such as Australia, do not have a time bar for criminal 
offences; (the exception is New Zealand, which has opted for a ten-year limit for offences 
involving a prison sentence of three years or less for relatively minor crimes).37 There are 
differences in the way in which judges in Australia and the UK are asked to assess forensic 
disadvantage caused by a delayed prosecution in abuse of process applications. In Australia, it 
is a presumption where it is alleged, whereas in the UK, loss has to be proved.38 Another 
difference is that preliminary hearings on abuse of process are also heard in civil courts in Eire. 
They have evolved from being a party fault-based test, to one that now solely addresses whether 
delay and missing or lost forensic evidence prejudices the accused to the extent that he cannot 
have a fair trial,39 which is more akin to UK court guidelines for determining abuse of process. 
The UK case Attorney-*HQHUDO¶V 5HIHUHQFH 1R  RI 40 sets out the principles which 
underpin an abuse of process application: 
(i) proceedings may be stayed on the grounds of prejudice resulting from delay in the 
institution of those proceedings, even though delay has not been occasioned by any 
fault on the part of the prosecution; 
(ii) if the answer to (i) is in the affirmative, what is the degree of (a) the likelihood of 
and (b) the seriousness of any prejudice which is required to justify a stay of such 
proceedings? 
 
Lord Lane in this decision said that a permanent stay of proceedings should be the exception, 
not the rule, and should be applied even more rarely to cases where the delay was caused by 
the prosecution or the complainant, and never exercised merely due to the complexity of the 
case or where the defendant was to blame. The discretionary power of the court to stay 
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proceedings should only be exercised in the most exceptional of circumstances as reaffirmed 
in the Attorney-*HQHUDO¶V5HIHUHQFH (No 2 of 2001).41 
The leading case on the tests for abuse of process is still Bennett v Horseferry Magistrates; 
Court and Another.42 A stay can only be ordered where firstly, under the circumstances, it 
would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial, and secondly, where it would amount to a 
PLVXVHRISURFHVVEHFDXVHLWRIIHQGVWKHFRXUW¶VVHQVHRIMXVWLFHDQGSURSULHW\IRUWKHPWo be 
asked to try the case in the circumstances, although there can be an overlap of both 
considerations. Before ruling on a stay of proceedings, the courts need to ask whether the trial 
could be continued by means of excluding specific evidence or by giving directions to the jury. 
The evidence which is allegedly prejudiced by delay can also be adduced as a fact in issue for 
the jury to consider. If a case is stayed due to unfair prejudice caused to the accused, this is 
likely to be exercised after all the evidence has been given, as had occurred in R v Smolinksi.43 
In Smolinski, the appeal was against a conviction for one count of indecent assault upon a 
female, but the jury had been unable to reach a verdict on the other counts. The allegations had 
been reported to the police about 20 years after they were said to have been committed. The 
two complainants involved were sisters who had been about six and seven-years-old at the 
relevant time. The offences alleged in the first and second counts, one in respect of each 
FRPSODLQDQW ZHUH VDLG WR KDYH WDNHQ SODFH RQ RQH RFFDVLRQ 'HVSLWH WKH FRPSODLQDQWV¶
accounts agreeing in relation to those two counts, the jury had only convicted on one of the 
counts. At the trial, S had made an unsuccessful application to stay the proceedings for abuse 
of process on the basis that the lapse of time would prejudice the trial. 
The Court of Appeal held that it was right for the trial judge to leave the case to the jury but 
the conviction was unsafe. There had been discrepancies in the evidence and inconsistencies 
between the witnesses and it appeared that the older sister had needed reminding of alleged 
events by the younger sister. However, the most significant factor was that the jury had been 
unable to reach a conclusion as to the second count despite convicting on the first count, even 
WKRXJKWKHFRPSODLQDQWV¶DFFRXQWVKDGDJUHHG,WDOVRVWDWHGWKDWDSSOLFDWLRQVWRVWD\IRUDEXVH
of process should be discouraged in cases of this type where it was sometimes very difficult 
for young children to speak out and where it could take many years before matters came to 
light. Where evidence was given after many years had passed by, trial judges should exercise 
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very careful scrutiny at the end of the evidence to determine whether cases were safe to be left 
to juries. 
 
Fair trial issue ± µUHDVRQDEOHWLPH¶- concerning delayed prosecutions 
The UK courts may still try a case even if the time lapse breaches Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Defendants do have the right to have the case heard within a 
reasonable time under Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. They have 
to show the duration of delay, based on when they were formally charged,44 the reasons for the 
delay; whether the right was asserted (i.e., the applicant must have made an effort as timely as 
possible to complain about the delay), and whether the applicant has suffered prejudice thereby. 
However, these criteria form a high threshold to cross for applicants even where it appears that 
Article 6(1) has been violated. 45  
The UK courts are reluctant to stay proceedings temporarily or permanently, unless there could 
QRORQJHUEHDIDLUWULDO,QFDVHVZKHUHWKHUHKDVEHHQRUFRXOGEHDEUHDFKRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶V
rights under this Article, the UK courts would prefer to offer alternative remedies This was 
discussed by Lord Bingham in  the Attorney-*HQHUDO¶V5HIHUHQFH1R(of 2001):46  
It will not be appropriate to stay or dismiss the proceedings unless (a) there can no 
longer be a fair hearing or (b) it would otherwise be unfair to try the defendant. The 
public interest in the final determination of criminal charges requires that such a 
charge should not be stayed or dismissed if any lesser remedy will be just and 
proportionate in all the circumstances. The prosecutor and the court do not act 
LQFRPSDWLEO\ ZLWK WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V &RQYHQWLRQ ULJKW LQ FRQWLQXLQJ WR SURVHFXWH RU
entertain proceedings after a breach is established in a case where neither of conditions 
(a) or (b) is met, since the breach consists in the delay which has accrued and not in 
the prospective hearing. If the breach of the reasonable time requirement is established 
retrospectively, after there has been a hearing, the appropriate remedy may be a public 
acknowledgement of the breach, a reduction in the penalty imposed on a convicted 
defendant or the payment of compensation to an acquitted defendant.47 
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This approach is consistent with the ruling in Environment Agency v Stanford,48 where Lord 
%LQJKDP/&-VDLGWKDWµ7KHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHURUQRt to prosecute is for the prosecutor. Most 
of the points relied on in support of an argument of abuse are more profitably relied on as 
PLWLJDWLRQ¶49 
Thus the main reason for staying or dismissing proceedings is that either there can no longer 
be a fair hearing, or it would otherwise be unfair to try the defendant.50 The defendant has to 
show on a balance of probabilities that he would not get a fair trial if it went ahead.51 The only 
way in which a time bar can operate is by a judge authorising a stay of proceedings at an abuse 
of process hearing or if the trial judge decides to order one at some stage in the trial.52 Abuse 
of process applications normally fail for defendants, because current UK legal doctrine 
maintains that trial judges already have the power to stay the trial where such an abuse becomes 
transparent.53 
Judges are also entrusted with giving juries instructions on delay so as to remedy forensic 
disadvantages suffered by the accused. Current UK judicial practice adheres to the view that 
the rights of both the complainant and the defendant to have a fair trial can be protected by use 
of judicial directions to the jury.54 Judges are also empowered to exclude problematic evidence 
such as by using the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. Section 78 of PACE also provides 
a discretion for the court to exclude evidence against the defendant which would be unfair to 
adduce. The Codes of Practice issued under sections 66 and 67 of PACE 1984 have a similar 
function in criminal trials. The courts have an overriding duty to promote justice and prevent 
injustice through the mechanism of stay of proceedings, but the prosecution has to be so unfair 
and wrong for the courts to exercise this discretion. The decision of what is unfair and wrong 
turns on the facts of the individual case. Any decision must be made in fairness to the 
prosecution, the public and the defence, as set out in DPP v Meakin.55 Delay per se is not a 
sufficient ground for a trial or retrial to be stayed: it must affect the ability of the defendant to 
prepare for his case; R v Dunlop.56  
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The UK courts initially adopted a fault-based approach to abuse of process applications 
starting with LPB.57 The Court of Appeal stated that the delayed complaint was justified, as it 
FRXOGEHDVFULEHGWRWKHRIIHQGHU¶VFRQGXFWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHYLFWLPDQGWKH
family and other relationships within the family.58 
The problem with allowing a victim-centred approach to abuse of process applications is that 
where the defendant is complaining about the late disclosure, the judge may make the 
DVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHGHOD\LVDVFULEHGWRWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQGXFWKLPVHOIWKDWWKHUHIRUHKHPXVW
be guilty, which may subvert the presumption of innocence. Mullis and Lewis point out that 
this presumption may not be completely eroded, because it is the judge and not the trier of fact 
(the jury) who has to consider the fairness of proceedings. However, they also conclude that, 
µLIWKHRYHUULGLQJFRQVLGHUDWLRQIRUDVWD\LVWUXO\WREHWKHIDLUQHVVRIWKHWULDOWKHQH[DPLQDWLRQ
RIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VODFNRIIDXOWRUWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFXOSDELOLW\VKRXOGEHDYRLGHG¶59 
The Court of Appeal reviewed the case law on abuse of process in R v F.60  
The Court of Appeal quashed the convictions for sexual offences which were said to have taken 
place between 30 and 40 years ago. The mother of the complainant had stated that she had 
confronted the defendant 27 years prior to the allegations being reported to the police. The 
Court of Appeal accepted the points that there had been opportunity for the complainants and 
RWKHU ZLWQHVVHV WR FROOXGH RQH RI WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V ZLWQHVVHV KDG GLHG DQG UHOHYDQW
documentary evidence was no longer available to the defence. The Court issued five 
propositions for assessing abuse of process applications: 
(i) Stay of proceedings may be temporary or permanent on some or all counts on the 
indictment only if it is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that a fair trial would 
not be possible; 
(ii) The proper time for making an abuse of process application is after all the evidence 
has been called at the trial; 
(iii) Where prejudice is alleged to have been caused by the delayed prosecution, the 
court should consider what evidence directly relevant to the defence case has been 
caused through the passage of time. Vague speculation about whether a lost 
document or deceased witness might have assisted the defendant is not helpful, and 
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the court should consider what evidence has survived the passage of time and then 
examine the importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a 
whole; 
(iv) Where prejudice has been actually caused by reason of delay, the court should 
consider whether the trial judge can compensate for this by emphasising guidance 
to the jury in standard directions or by formulating special directions to the jury. 
Where important evidence has been lost over time, it may not be known which party 
that evidence would have supported. There may be cases in which no direction to 
the jury can dispel the resultant prejudice which one or other of the parties may 
suffer, depending on the facts of the case. 
(v) The court may take into consideration whether the complainant was at fault in 
coming forward so late, but when considerLQJZKHWKHURUQRW WKH FRPSODLQDQW¶V
delay is justified, it must bear in mind that victims of sexual abuse are often 
unwilling to reveal or talk about their experiences for some time and for good 
reason.61  
 
The question of whether or not the defendant can have a fair trial when delay and forensic 
disadvantage are pleaded is usually approached in two ways: the judge either looks at the 
specific complaints of disadvantage and rebuts them as was done in R v Wilkinson62 or 
determines whether the delay was justified, as set out in Attorney-*HQHUDO¶V5HIHUHQFH1R
1990).63 
In Wilkinson64 the appellant had tried to argue that his work records were no longer available 
and that these would have proved that he was not alone with the complainant on Sundays, 
however, this evidence was inconsistent with his out-of-court statement to investigating police 
officers that he had been at home most Sunday afternoons. Secondly, he argued that the lorry 
in which some of the assaults were said to have taken place, was unavailable, but the Court of 
Appeal thought that it was not impossible to discover what the nature of the lorry was. Thirdly, 
the Court was not persuaded that delay had caused medical evidence to be lost; as such evidence 
was only of relevance if obtained directly very shortly after the alleged incident.  
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An unjustified delayed complaint is not necessarily a bar to prosecution. In R v F,65 during the 
course of the original trial, the respondent, F, was being tried for sexual offences against the 
complainant, C, when she would have been aged six. The trial judge heard the reason for the 
complainaQW¶VGHOD\GXULQJWKHFURVV-examination and ordered a stay of the trial. The Crown 
appealed and the Court of Appeal held that an unjustified delay might make the judge more 
certain of prejudice, but that was a long way from the proposition that unjustified delay was by 
itself a sufficient reason for a stay. It was established in the Attorney-*HQHUDO¶V5HIHUHQFH1R
1 of 1990)66 that a stay of proceedings on the ground of unjustifiable delay will only be granted 
by the courts in exceptional circumstances where the defendant can prove that he would suffer 
such serious prejudice that a fair trial cannot be held. 
The victim-centred approach used to be part of the formula for assessing abuse of applications 
in Eire. In Irish HCSA cases which Ring analysed from 1997 to 2006, the reviewing courts 
KHDUG DSSOLFDWLRQV ZKLFK URXWLQHO\ LQFOXGHG WKH IDFWRU RI ZKHWKHU LW ZDV WKH DFFXVHG¶V
misconduct itself which had led to the late report of the offence, when deciding whether or not 
to stay a trial. The Irish High Court adopted the PC67 test, which came to be used as the standard 
PHDQVRIDVVHVVPHQW,IWKHMXGJHWKRXJKWWKDWWKHGHOD\HGUHSRUWZDVWKHIDXOWRIWKHDFFXVHG¶V
misconduct, implicitly he had assessed that the complaint was true, but if the defendant could 
show that he had suffered actual prejudice, the judge could still stay the trial.68 Since the test 
involved making a prejudgment of the accused, it risked violating his presumption of 
innocence. The abuse of process test was then revised so as to exclude the fault of the accused 
as a reason for the report being delayed under the new actual prejudice-based test in SH v 
DPP:69 
In this case, the developing jurisprudence as to delay in bringing a prosecution for 
offences of child sexual abuse was considered by the Court. The Court is satisfied that 
in general there is no necessity to hold an inquiry into, or to establish the reasons for, 
delay in making a complaint. The issue for a court is whether the delay has resulted in 
prejudice to an accused so as to give rise to a real or serious risk of an unfair trial. The 
Court does not exclude wholly exceptional circumstances where it would be unfair or 
unjust to put an accused on trial.70 
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Treatment of delay in comparable legal jurisdictions 
 
Under the newer test in SH v DPP, the defence must show on a balance of probabilities that 
the delay has resulted in prejudice that would give rise to a real and serious risk of an unfair 
trial. This is not a presumptive prejudice: the accused is required to offer details of the facts of 
the case which would give rise to prejudice.71 
Whilst the UK and Irish criminal justice systems are now geared towards accommodating 
complainants, by contrast, in the Commonwealth country Australia, Hamer shows that some 
state legislatures there still take on anachronistic view of complainants who make late 
disclosure.72 This is because judicial directions to juries may persuade them to acquit, given 
the strength of the recommendation, couched in terms similar to the former corroboration 
warnings on the danger of convicting the accused on the sole evidence of the complainant 
addressed to juries in sexual offence trials in the UK. 73 
According to Hamer, the strength of the direction known as a Longman74 warning, favours the 
accused, and therefore issues arising from forensic disadvantage are mitigated thereby. 
However, some jurisdictions have become victim-focused. The Longman warning has been 
replaced by Section 165(B) 4 Evidence Law applications to the judge. Defendants can still 
plead delay or forensic disadvantage, but it is no longer a presumption. The judge may use 
words informing the jury of this/these problem(s), but he must not suggest to the jury that it is 
dangerous to convict the defendant solely due to these issues.  
Hamer looked at the disparate state legal systems in operation in the states of Victoria and New 
South Wales in Australia. Some of them still automatically presume that the accused suffers 
prejudice in historic cases, New South Wales has maintained the orthodox position that µGHOD\
«FDXVH>V@DFWXDOSUHMXGLFHUDWKHUWKDQSRVVLEOHSUHMXGLFH¶75 the Victorian Court of Appeal 
indicated the warning [on delay] must be unequivocally favourable to the accused.76 Hamer 
thought, however, that this stance does not take into consideration the possibility that not all 
defendants suffer this prejudice. This presumption allows judges at trial to point out the 
possible drawbacks the accused may encounter on what Hamer regards as unduly favourable 
terms in the applicable jurisdictions. He argues that delay and forensic drawbacks should form 
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a separate application at a preliminary hearing, and if the judge rules affirmatively that the 
defendant may suffer prejudice, this can be readily remedied by neutral and balanced directions 
to the jury at the end of the trial.  
%\FRQWUDVW5LQJ¶VDQDO\VLVRISURKLELWLRQDSSOLFDWLRQVLQ(LUHVXEVHTXHQWWRWKHSH v DPP77 
UXOLQJVKRZWKDWGHIHQGDQWV¶FDVHVKDYHWRPHHWDYHU\KLJKWKUHVKROGRIVKRZLQJSUHMXGLFH
µZKHUH WKH ULVNRIDQXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\XQIDLU WULDO LV UDLVHG WR an unacceptably high level, 
because the Irish justice system places an over-reliance on trial judges to ensure due process 
and the role of the jury as an arbiter of fact, with little assistance from the appellate courts as 
to how to deal with evidential anGSURFHGXUDOSUREOHPV¶78 Ring questions whether directions 
to the jury safeguard the rights of the accused, as judges may be uncertain about how adequate 
their warnings are when having to instruct juries on delayed reporting, issues of balance of 
power in the relationship between the accused and the complainant, the inhibition of the 
complainant, corroboration and admissibility of evidence.79  
In the UK, it is not mandatory for judges to give directions to juries regarding delay. The 
decision to give directions is governed by the length of the delay, the cogency of the evidence 
and the circumstances in the case. It cannot be said that judicial directions are special in historic 
cases, because the judges have a general duty to ensure that proceedings are fair, though they 
PD\EHPRUHOLNHO\WRJLYHDGLUHFWLRQZKHUHWKHFRPSODLQW¶VHYLGHQFHLVXQFRUURERUDWHG80 
Where a judge should have included a judicial direction, or the direction was inadequate, a 
GHIHQGDQWPD\XVH WKLVDVDJURXQGRIDSSHDO WKRXJKKHPD\IDLOZKHUH WKHFRPSODLQDQW¶V
evidence was corroborated at trial, as had occurred in Hickson.81 It is not sufficient for judges 
to leave it to defence counsel in their closing speeches to plead the difficulties the defence had 
encountered owing to delay and forensic disadvantage. 
 
(iv) Types of evidence that may be affected by delayed complaint 
 
Historic allegations may be fraught with difficulties: there may be instances where a material 
witness or document may no longer be available or, in a less technological age, no proof of the 
whereabouts of the defendant. In date-specific allegations, independent evidence may resolve 
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an issue definitely, particularly in recent complaint cases. In 2001, the politician Neil Hamilton 
and his wife, Christine, were accused of sexually assaulting a woman in May of the same year. 
Telephone, credit card records, as well as closed-circuit television of the places where the 
couple were located at the time of the alleged crime provided an alibi.82 The Metropolitan 
police found no evidence to support the allegations that has been made against the couple and 
the investigation was dropped.83 
Had the sexual complaints against the Hamiltons been made years later, they might have been 
forensically disadvantaged, e.g., the telephone records might have been deleted after X years, 
the credit card details likewise, and the video showing their true alibi might have long been 
erased. A jury might be told on behalf of the defence that these independent data once existed, 
but not anymore. The jury would then have to consider whether the defendants were telling the 
truth about the existence of the independent evidence, even before being asked to consider 
whether it was relevant and material to an issue in dispute.  
The passage of time can affect the quality of evidence in a number of ways. For instance, the 
complainant may narrate that s/he was afraid of the defendant when s/he was young, which 
was the reason for the late report of the allegation: the defendant may want to correct an 
impression by the complainant that the relationship between them was abnormal. In R v 
Dutton,84 allegations of indecent assault had taken place over a four year period when the 
complainant was 10/11 years old. No complaint was made until the complainant was 29 years 
old. The Court of Appeal said that such cases inevitably involved substantial delay. The Court 
said that the judge, having decided there was no abuse of process, misdirected himself in failing 
to point out to the jury what was said by the defence about possible prejudice caused by the 
delay. 
The defendant may also be unable to call witnesses due to their death, unavailability or poor 
PHPRU\HLWKHUWRFRQWUDGLFWWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VWHVWLPRQ\RUWRFRUURERUDWHKLVRZQR v F85 and 
R v King.86 If the court considers that other witnesses could have been called instead, it will 
consider this point at an abuse of process session; R v B.87 Important locations may have been 
changed, sold or destroyed as had been an issue in R v Dutton.88  
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Documentary evidence may have been lost or destroyed. In Dutton, relevant social services 
records had been destroyed. Missing documents may also improve or diminish the credibility 
of other complainants. In R v Joynson,89 documentation was missing which might have proved 
whether the complainant had been abused by a person other than the complainant as attested to 
E\WKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VPRWKHUDWWULDOJoynson was also important in highlighting the fact that 
no judicial warning to the jury was a substitute for missing records. The courts should therefore 
be careful to consider whether missing or unavailable independent evidence is more than 
speculative in assisting a defence case.  
Sometimes the courts will decide that ostensibly relevant evidence is too speculative to be of 
value to rebut evidence. In R v B,90 the defendant faced multiple allegations from several 
complainants. One had claimed to have been assaulted by B when he had absconded, but had 
been returned to the care home by police; the other two claimed that the defendant had assaulted 
them on a minibus. A register, the only record available to assist the defence, proved the boys 
had been registered at the centre. The defendant, on appeal, argued that incident books, medical 
records and staff records were no longer available and this had caused him prejudice and his 
subsequent conviction. The appeal was allowed in part. The court quashed the conviction in 
relation to one of the complainants, because the defendant did not have the rota book available 
to establish his whereabouts on one particular night. However, the argument about whether 
potential witnesses who could have challenged the narratives of the other two complainants in 
the alleged minibus incident was regarded as being too speculative and the appeal judges 
thought the jury would have convicted B anyway. In Wilkinson,91 work records which might 
have proved alibi had been destroyed. Defendants may also try to argue that medical evidence 
was no longer available to disprove a rape or buggery as had been argued at the R v R appeal.92 
Alibis for particular times and dates may be difficult to show; as in R v R and Wilkinson. 
Evidence that was available to the defence, unused evidence from the police investigation/held 
back by the Crown Prosecution Service or evidence found post-trial may equally be supportive 
of prosecution evidence as well as for the defence. In R v Ely,93 a document which was used to 
support the appeal actually supported the evidence of one complainant, who had been adamant 
that he had been allowed to join a scout group early upon his arrival at the care home, even 
though the defendant denied this point at trial.  
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Hamer argues that defendants are not unduly prejudiced when a delayed prosecution is staged, 
because the credibility of the complainant is already placed in doubt by their late disclosure, 
and that lost evidence may be just as likely to be inculpatory as exculpatory,94 (as Ely95 shows). 
The UK criminal courts have acknowledged that missing evidence can have an adverse impact 
on the rights of the accused to exculpate him. In R v Burke,96 the appellant, a worker in a 
FKLOGUHQ¶VKRPHDUJXHGWKDWLWKDGEHHQLPSRVVLEOHIRUKLPWRKDYHDIDLUWULDOEHFDXVHGD\
book records which would have proved that the appellant had not been on duty on a particular 
morning when the complainant alleged the defendant had abused him, had been lost. The Court 
of Appeal quashed one count of a buggery charge dating from 1971, made by a 15-year-old 
care home resident based on the said argument.97 
Unlike the other counts involving the other complainants in that case, K. made only one 
allegation against the appellant. Crucial to the evidence of K. was that the offence occurred 
after he had been returned to Penhill at about midnight having earlier absconded and having 
been caught by the police. There was no real dispute that he had absconded at some time during 
the relevant period (more than once) ± that was confirmed by contemporary social services 
files. If the appellant was on night duty when K was returned, then that would be powerful 
HYLGHQFHLQVXSSRUWRI.¶VHYLGHQFH,IRQWKHRWKHUKDQGKHZDVQRWRQGXW\WKDWQLJKWWKHQ
sensibly no jury could properly convict. Absent contemporaneous records from Penhill or 
elsewhere meant that, it was not possible to tie down the exact date of the absconding and 
return (although K sought to do so). Even if that had been possible, the crucial documents 
which would have existed and would have shown whether the appellant was on duty (i.e., the 
duty rota and/or the form which would have been signed by whoever was on duty to 
acknowledge receipt of the boy) are missing.98 
The Court of Appeal has also been known to hold that the defendant or his defence team had 
overlooked locating alternative independent evidence such as the fact that there were probably 
other witnesses whom the accused could have called or whom his defence team elected not to 
call and that therefore he suffered no prejudice in presenting his case as in Ely.99 This decision 
placed the evidential burden on the defendant, not the prosecution. 
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Hamer goes as far to argue that in England and Australia, most delayed prosecutions have so 
far favoured the defendant, not the prosecution. There may also be cases where there may be 
few or no consequences caused by the delayed report, in which case, delay directions to the 
jury would be redundant, and in Australia, some jurisdictions specify that a defendant must 
actively complain of detriment due to delay for a judicial direction to be given.100 
Furthermore, he contends that prosecutions are based on the strength of the prosecution 
evidence, not its completeness. However, defendants who claim to be forensically 
disadvantaged are in the invidious position of being prejudiced by the lack of something that 
is no longer available to use.101 
It is submitted that in institutional settings, documentation would have been a normal part of 
the care home system and the presence or absence of a defendant at a date specific alleged 
event or engagement of service at the care home/school can be an effective alibi. Ring, citing 
the US case of Barker v Wingo,102 argues that there will be obvious prejudice to the accused 
where witnesses die or disappear through delay, and prejudice where witnesses are unable to 
recall accurately events of the distant past; but loss of memory is not always reflected in the 
record, because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown.103 Since the defendant is unable 
to produce the forensic evidence, it is presumed that there is no prejudice and the trial then 
proceeds, with the trial judge being left to direct the jury on delay issues.104 
Ring analysed reasons for granting stay of process in Eire; her conclusion illustrates how 
arbitrary the judicial decisions may be as to what constitutes a hindrance to a fair trial. 
In CK v DPP105 the death of three witnesses and the destruction of a van (the locus of an alleged 
assault) and its insurance records, were insufficient reasons for arguing prejudice through 
delayed report; yet in a case not involving delayed report, the issue of missing mobile phone 
call records was held to be a sufficient ground for halting the trial; R C v DPP.106 
In the UK, the Court of Appeal has had to consider whether missing records prevented the fair 
trial of the appellant. In R v Sheikh,107 the appellant had been convicted of indecent assault and 
buggery of two boys when he was a housemaster of a care home 26 years earlier. Sheikh had 
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already been convicted of these offences in 2002, had his convictions overturned 2004 and was 
retried for the same offences in convicted in 2005. 
The defendant had tried to argue at both trials that the staff roll and day book were missing, 
both of which would have been able to show that the opportunity for the defendant being able 
to abuse the children at the duty times alleged by them would have been minimal: 
(i) The appellant and (the complainant) MG were both present at the Home 
only during a specific and limited period, 1st-31st August 1980. 
(ii) The offences were shown to have been committed within a very narrow 
time frame on 29th or 30th August 1980. 
(iii) On the evidence of MG, the appellant was on duty during the evening 
preceding the alleged offences. 
(iv) The particular circumstances of the termination of the aSSHOODQW¶V
employment gave rise to a real possibility that he was on leave at the time 
of the offences. 
(v) It had been demonstrated by reference to other documents which survived, 
(day books etc.) that the missing documents would have been likely to 
include information directly bearing on opportunity or the lack of it.  
The judge at the retrial had refused to stay the proceedings after an abuse of process 
VXEPLVVLRQE\WKHGHIHQGDQW¶VEDUULVWHU+HWKRXJKWWKDWWKHWULDOXSWRWKDWSRLQWKDGEHHQ
fair, because the defence had conducted a thorough cross-examination of the available 
evidence. The judge had overlooked the point defence counsel had tried to make about the 
unfairness of proceedings through forensic disadvantage suffered by the defence. The Court 
of Appeal overturned the latter conviction: 
In these circumstances, we have grave doubts whether a judge who properly analysed 
the consequences of the missing documents would conclude that the trial was fair. If 
we are wrong, we have no doubt that a judge who carried out such an analysis would 
not necessarily reach the conclusion that the trial was fair.108 
The Court of Appeal had decided that the window of opportunity for the offences to have 
been committed was minimal. 
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The research volunteer case of F highlights how delay may lead to loss of evidence.109 F had 
been accused and convicted of anally raping X as a minor. This case was referred to the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission. The CCRC noticed that the original police notebooks 
were missing, mislaid over the years, so the contents of the notebooks could not be used to 
challenge prosecution witness inconsistencies. 
Issues arising from trying historic allegations have been acknowledged by the judiciary, but 
appeals on the grounds of the paucity of evidence do not necessarily succeed, since the 
judiciary does not wish to usurp the decision the jury reached if due process had been 
followed. Take the example of the R v W110 appeal case. Moses LJ stated that: 
Of course, all these cases are worrying. They are particularly worrying when they 
relate to events long ago and when the truth or otherwise of the allegations depends, at 
the end of the day, upon which of two people are believed. But there is no principle that 
where historic allegations of abuse have no supporting evidence and depend only on 
one witness, this court is bound to reach the conclusion that they are unsafe or that the 
case should not proceed at trial.111 
In this appeal case, the only point of law which was accepted by the Court of Appeal was appeal 
against sentence, where the trial court had erred in sentencing the defendant on a charge of 
producing indecent photographs. In the original trial, it was alleged as part of the case against 
him that he had made indecent photographs of his partner¶s natural daughter, even though those 
photographs were said no longer to exist µDIWHUVRJUHDWDGLVWDQFHLQWLPH¶,WLVSRVVLEOHWKDW
the uncertainty of the existence of the alleged photographs persuaded the Court of Appeal to 
UHGXFH WKH VHQWHQFH WKH GHIHQGDQW KDG RULJLQDOO\ EHHQ VHQWHQFHG EDVHG XSRQ WKH MXU\¶V
acceptance that they actually existed. The existence of the photographs was based on the ipse 
dixit of a prosecution witness. It is possible that the indecent photographs were indeed made 
and destroyed/lost/unavailable. Alternatively, the alleged existence of the photographs might 
have been complete fabrication, but the defendant was unable to persuade the jury that they 
never existed. The problem of lack of availability of forensic evidence in delayed prosecutions 
thus also affects sentencing decisions. 
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Where the accused asserts that he cannot or did not have a fair trial because of a loss of forensic 
material or witnesses, the judiciary is reluctant to accept this, unless it can be proved that lack 
of forensics would have been sufficient to counter a material fact in dispute.  
As Lord Bingham pointed out in R v Pendleton, 112 the question the Court of Appeal has to 
decide is whether the conviction is safe, and not whether the accused is guilty, and in a 
difficult case it is often wise for this court to test its provisional view by asking whether the 
fresh evidence if given at trial might reasonably have affected the decision of the trial jury to 
convict.113 
Unsafe convictions (miscarriages of justice) arise in a number of circumstances in criminal 
trials generally and sexual/HCSA cases specifically and these are identified next. 
When a defendant appeals his case, two issues now arise ± not only must the appeal court 
consider whether he was wrongfully convicted, but also whether he received a fair trial114 ± 
two similar, though not identical, logics. Procedural requirements of a fair hearing will differ 
according to the jurisdiction, but to determine whether the standard of fairness has been 
applied, the trial itself must be fair as a whole.115 Under the equality of arms principle, parties 
involved in the trial may not be privileged over other parties in the process. This is a concept 
LQFULPLQDODQGFLYLOODZZKHUHE\µHYHU\RQHZKRLVSDUW\WRVXFKSURFHHGLQJVVKDOOKDYHD
reasonable opportunity of presenting his case under conditions which do not place him at a 
substantial disadvantage vis-à-YLVKLVRSSRQHQW¶116 Under Article 6 (2) the defendant is 
entitled to be presumed innocent until found guilty pre-trial, during the trial and even post-
trial if he makes an appeal.117  
A study of appeal decisions involving sexual offences 
It is very difficult to have a conviction overturned. Most appeal cases are referred to the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission which has been extant since 1997.118 Out of 17 210 
applications to the CCRC from 1997-2013, only 353 had been quashed at the Court of 
Appeal.119 Under section 13(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, any conviction, verdict, 
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finding or sentence shall not be referred under any of sections 39 to 12 unless - (a) the 
Commission consider that there is a real possibility that the conviction, verdict, finding or 
sentence would not be upheld were the reference to be made.120 
CCRC-referred cases constitute only about three per cent of applications of any kind which 
were successful on appeal.121 Seventy-five per cent of applications over the period 1997-2013 
involved non-sexual offences against twenty-five per cent involving a sexual offence. The 
Court of Appeal quashed most of the sexual offence convictions. 
All cases on Westlaw122 since 2000 to 2013 were analysed for this study, and also those 
referenced by solicitors and barristers who habitually handle HCSA trials and appeals. In a 
total of 23 appeal cases found on this search, the convictions of 25 men were quashed. 
Therefore, issues arising from at least a couple of cases per year are sufficiently serious for the 
Court of Appeal to agree that the convictions were unsafe. Here are examples of successfully 
appealed HCSA cases.  
Complainant retraction and fabrication: R v Smolinski;123 
Judicial misunderstanding of joinder and severance under the old similar fact evidence rules; 
5Y2¶%ULHQ;124  
Recent complaint evidence that was not recent enough to qualify; R v Birks.125 
Included in the appeals are some cases where the defendant was forensically disadvantaged by 
the delayed prosecution and he had suffered a miscarriage of justice thereby: 
R v Sheikh126 missing documents; 
R v Chapman127 deceased key defence witnesses; 
R v Joynson128 allegations were over 35 years old, perpetrator might have been someone else 
DFFRUGLQJWRDFRPSODLQDQW¶VPRWKHUEXWLPSRVVLEOHWRDVFHUWDLQDIWHUVXFKDORQJSDVVDJHRI
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time without key documents. Neither a good cross-examination by the defence, nor a judicial 
direction to jury regarding effects of delay could cure the disadvantage caused to the defendant.  
In R v Clark,129 complaints issuing from hypnosis should have been challenged by a defence 
expert witness;  
In R v H,130 WKHMXGJH¶VGLUHFWLRQVWRMXU\RQWKHHIIHFWVRIGHOD\RQDGHIHQGDQW¶VFDVHKDGEHHQ
inadequate; 
R v Robson;131 FRPSODLQDQWV¶WHVWLPRQLHVZHUHVRGLVFUHSDQWWKDWWKHMXGJHVKRXOGKDYHUXOHG
that this testimony was no longer safe to be left to the jury; 
R v Siddall and Brooke;132 the complainant had made so many allegations of sexual offences 
against so many other people at various times, that the jury should have heard about them;  
R v Basil Rigby Williams and Michael James Lawson133 new witnesses for the defendant. As 
FRQFHUQV5LJE\:LOOLDPV¶FDVHWKHUHKDGEHHQFRQFHUQDERXWSROLFHFRQWDPLQDWLRQThe sheer 
number of suspects of HCSA found in the police trawl into the care homes by a restricted list 
was considered by the Court of Appeal to be prejudical to Lawson's case when it was 
accidentally revealed to the jury. It made his conviction unsafe'. 
In R v T134 the trial judge had not summed up properly on the use of bad character evidence by 
means of hearsay admitted under s.120(4) and s.120(7) of the CJA 2003, some of which had 
been inadmissible for certain complainants; the standard good character direction for the 
complainant was required. 
7KH&&5&¶VILJXUHVGRQRWIDFWRUIDLOHGDSSOLFDWLRQVWRWKH&RXUWRI$SSHDORU&RXUWRI$SSHDO
hearings. Being conservative about the extent of miscarriage of justice in HCSA cases, there 
ought to be concern that cumulatively, it is not just one or two people who have been wrongly 
convicted, but dozens. It must be remembered that those convicted of HCSA are convicted for 
years, sometimes more than a decade.  
Hamer argues that, especially in cases of familial abuse, few defendants can establish alibi by 
relying upon independent evidence.135 By contrast, in the context of the mass investigations of 
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HCSA in institutions, independent evidence is a key defence stratagem. Publicly-run 
institutions routinely keep records showing the admission of children (registers), where 
children were at a particular time or which school trip they were on (log books). Staff enrolment 
too would have been on record. Reformatory institutions would also have logged the conduct 
of the children whilst residing at the home. Some children may have suffered abuse and neglect 
in their family, and this may have been logged in social services records which may have been 
lost or destroyed over time.  
That may be true, but independent evidence of this sort is often missing or unavailable, and yet 
the Courts have been reluctant to give the benefit of the doubt to defendants. In R v Gillam,136 
the Court of Appeal thought that missing records would not have resolved the central issue of 
whether the offence was committed. However, if a complainant can be shown to have been 
lying about the facts recorded in independent evidence, that evidence would cast doubt on the 
reliability and honesty about the offences s/he alleges. 
µ0LVVLQJ¶ HYLGHQFH PD\ EH HLWKHU LQFXOSDWRU\ RU H[FXOSDWRU\ WKHUHIRUH LW LV DQ XQNQRZQ
quantity about whether a party has been disadvantaged.137 Hamer argues that the presumption 
of innocence is still retained by balancing summing up directions to the jury on forensic 
disadvantage,138 because the prosecution still has to prove the case against the accused, who 
need not prove anything. He reckons that the legal system and juries favour the accused in 
KLVWRULFWULDOVJLYHQWKDWWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VFUHGLELOLW\LVDOUHDGy affected by the tardiness of 
the disclosure and that where it is claimed that a defendant has been disadvantaged by the 
death/unavailability of his witnesses and independent forensic evidence, juries are more likely 
to give the accused the benefit of the doubt.  
Ring argues, however, that the prosecution should be asked to show why an alleged 
missing/lost/unavailable piece of independent evidence for the defence is not sufficiently 
relevant and should be disregarded.139 Also, the onus should be on the prosecution to show that 
WKH µUHOHYDQW DVSHFW RI D JLYHQ GHIHQFH FDQ EH SURYHQ E\ DOWHUQDWLYH PHDQV¶ LQ RUGHU WR
VDIHJXDUG WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V ULJKW WR D IDLU WULDO 7KLV VWXG\ FRQFOXGHV WKDW DGRSWLQJ 5LQJ¶V
proposals would enhance the fairness and safety of the trial of these cases.  
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(v) Conclusion 
Given the challenges to the safety of the criminal process in HCSA cases that are discussed in 
WKLVFKDSWHU WKHTXHVWLRQREYLRXVO\DULVHV µ6hould the UK introduce time bars to criminal 
offences, especially HSCA cases, as prevails under some European jurisdictions using legal 
codes?¶ 
It should be noted that some of these bars are operative only after decades have passed since 
the alleged incident, and that time only begins to run for sexual offences once the complainant 
reaches adulthood, thereby further extending the time limit. It seems unlikely that the UK will 
introduce statutes of limitation of the sort that currently exist in continental Europe. In any 
event, most delayed prosecutions would still occur under those regimes, because the most 
serious sexual offence crimes would fall under the category of longest prosecutable period.  
Whilst time bars do exist for summary offence in the UK, they are not used for serious 
offences such as child sexual abuse and are antithetical to the traditional legal maxim nullum 
tempus occurrit regi, - time does not run against the Crown (usually represented by a State) 
which allows it to start a criminal prosecution against anyone for such crimes at any time.140 
&LYLOFODLPVKDYHVWDWXWHVRIOLPLWDWLRQLQWKH8.ZKHUHWKHEXUGHQRISURRILVµEDODQFHRI
SUREDELOLWLHV¶DQGKDVEHHQVRVLQFHWKHV yet not where the standard of the criminal 
SURFHHGLQJVLVµEH\RQGUHDVRQDEOHGRXEW¶141 
Time bars are frequently encountered in civil law jurisdictions on the Continent. The UK 
was, and remains, the sole country within Europe which does not operate time bars for 
serious crimes such as sexual offences. The UK legal system determines whether a time bar 
should apply according to the merits of the individual case.  
$GYRFDWHVRIYLFWLPV¶ULJKWVPD\FRQWHQGWKDWWKHFULPLQDOMXVWLFHV\VWHPLQWKH8.LVIXOO\
capable of prosecuting HCSA allegations as long as care is taken to be mindful of the 
deleterious effects on the quality of case evidence caused by long lapses of time. In this study 
it has been shown that there have been successful appeal cases in which it was accepted that a 
fair trial had been impossible in consequence of the delay in bringing the proceedings. Such 
examples present strong grounds for implementing a statute of limitation. 
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)RUDGYRFDWHVRIYLFWLPV¶ULJKWVRIWKRVHVH[XDOO\DEXVHGLQ(QJODQGintroducing a statute 
of limitation would signify creating legal loopholes for sexual offenders, thus undermining 
the work of recent governments who have tightened up rules and laws designed to apprehend 
and convict them. However, procedural safeguards protecting the right of a defendant to a fair 
trial PXVWQRWEHGLVFRXQWHGRQWKHEDVLVRISURYLGLQJµORRSKROHV¶. 
$µFRQGLWLRQDO¶WLPHEDUZKHUHWKHUHLVUH-activation of the prosecutable period, subject to the 
GLVFRYHU\RIDVXVSHFW¶VGHR[\ULERQXFOHLFDFLG(DNA), could also be considered. In the 
United States, 27 states can suspend and therefore extend their statute of limitation where a 
perpetrator is identified through his/her DNA. For example, in Washington, statutes of 
limitation already apply to all categories and levels of sexual offence. If DNA is found and 
can be conclusively traced to a perpetrator, the legal authorities have one year by which they 
can prosecute him.142 
Notwithstanding these drawbacks and difficulties, and giving proper weight to the serious 
problems deriving from delay which are revealed in the appealed cases discussed above, it is 
submitted that serious consideration be given to introducing some sort of limitation period 
(perhaps qualified) in these cases. There is obvious merit in this context in the Danish time bar 
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Chapter V  'HYHORSPHQWVFRQFHUQLQJWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHU
evidence and its possible impact on the fairness of proceedings 
 
This chapter will discuss whether recent legislative changes in the admissibility conditions of 
HYLGHQFHRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHU%&(FDQKDPSHUWKHULJKWVRIWKHGHIHQGDQWWR
a fair trial in sexual offence cases. BCE may be sexual or non-sexual conduct, but in sexual 
offence trials, it is usually the former.  
Historic sexual offence cases often lack hard evidence. In the absence of contemporary real 
or documentary evidence, oral testimony will be the focus of the trial and its outcome. 
7UDGLWLRQDOO\SDUWLHVVHHNWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKHRWKHU¶VWHVWLPRQ\LVQRWFUHGLWZRUWK\E\
EULQJLQJLQFROODWHUDOLVVXHVVXFKDVWKHRSSRQHQW¶VSDVWPLVFRQGXFW7KHUHOHYDQFHRI%&(
is often contested and under the current statutory regime, applications are considered by 
judges at the pre-trial stage, where they must decide whether the BCE is likely to be relevant 
to a fact in issue and therefore admissible. If such evidence, believed by the defence to be 
key, is excluded, miscarriages of justice can occur.  
The question is whether statutes protecting complainants and witnesses from ostensibly 
irrelevant and intrusive questioning can lead to wrongfully convictions when such evidence is 
withheld from the jury. This chapter examines the effects and deficiencies of section 2 of the 
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976; some of these defects were subsequently remedied 
by the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, followed by further reform under 
section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  
This chapter will finally examine the reinforcement of rights for victims of sexual offences 
XQGHUWKH(8¶V9LFWLPV¶'LUHFWLYH(8:KLOVW(QJODQGDOUHDG\SHUPLWVVSHFLDO
protective measures for interviewing and cross-examining child complainants under the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (and also victims of sexual assault under 
VWKH9LFWLPV¶'LUHFWLYHDGRSWHGE\WKH8.LQEURDGHQVHOLJLELOLW\IRUVSHFLDO
PHDVXUHVZKHUHDQ\YLFWLPLVUHJDUGHGDVµYXOQHUDEOH¶SDUDRIWKH'LUHctive). This 
categorisation has significant implications for extending special pre-recording measures to 
adults reporting HCSA allegations. Does this Directive also affect the quality of the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWVWRH[DPLQHRUKDYHFURVV-examined these allegations made against him 
Article 6 (3) (d) of the European Convention on Human Rights?  
This chapter is set out as follows: 
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(i) Social and professional attitudes towards complainants  
(ii) The common law position of complainants in sexual offence cases 
(iii) S.2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 
(iv) Background policy which shaped the  
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999  
(v) Section 41 of the YJCEA 1999 and its remit 
(vi) Appeals referring to use of section 41 YJCEA 1999 
(vii) Is there still justification in allowing similar fact evidence  
against complainants? 
(viii) Is there still a place for section 41 of the YJCEA 1999 post section 100 of the CJA 
2003? 
(ix) Prior research on the judicial approach to section 41 of the YJCEA 1999 
(x) Comments on section 100 CJA 2003 
(xi) Child sexual abuse appeal case involving non-GLVFORVXUHRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VDOOHJHG
bad character 
(xii) 'LVSDULWLHVEHWZHHQWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VDQGGHIHQGDQW¶V%&(UXOHV 
(xiii) Human rights issues arising from the restrictions on the use of BCE of the complainant 
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(i) Social and professional attitudes towards complainants 
µ%DGFKDUDFWHU¶RIWKHFRPSODLQDQWFRYHUVDZLGHUDQJHRIFRQGXFWLWFDQPHDQDSUHYLRXV
conviction, discreditable conduct, bias, corruption or untruthfulness, provided that the 
HYLGHQFHLVUHOHYDQWWRWKHLVVXHRIWKHZLWQHVV¶FUHGLELOLW\,QVH[XDORIIHQFHWULDOVµEDG
FKDUDFWHU¶FDQDOVRFRPSULVHOLIHVW\OHFRQGXFWLQWHUPVRIWKHVH[XDOKLVWRU\RIWKH
complainant, whether with the accused or a third party.  
There are well-founded as well as anecdotal reasons for stating and suggesting that 
historically and even now, complainants of sexual offences have faced, and may still 
encounter, unequal and maltreatment by society and the criminal justice system. Women, 
who reported being raped, used to be viewed as agents provocateurs 143 and therefore the 
authors of their own misfortune. Those reporting a rape faced being disbelieved or were 
dismissed as being delusional. Concrete examples of this attitude in legal circles have been 
noted. In one contested rape trial, a UK judge as late as 1990 directed a jury: 
As WKHJHQWOHPHQRIWKHMXU\ZLOOXQGHUVWDQGZKHQDZRPDQVD\VµQR¶VKHGRHVQRW
always mean no.144 
A New Zealand judge had exposed his similar view on rape complainants in a courtroom as 
recently as 1996.145 However, there has been a widespread recognition in legal circles that the 
criminal system was heavily and unfairly weighted against rape complainants and favoured 
the accused. That this was largely due to the fact that there were a whole range of 
assumptions and myths which underpinned not only social attitudes about sexual violence, 
but also the response of the criminal justice system itself.146 
Complainants who went to trial, often faced being debased by the exposure of their private 
lives where this evidence was raised by the defendant. This latter problem was acknowledged 
by Lord Clyde in R v A: 
The intent of section 41 is to counter what have been described as the two myths. One 
is that because a woman has had sexual intercourse in the past she is more likely to 
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have consented to intercourse on the occasion in question. The other is that by reason 
of her sexual behaviour in the past she is less worthy of belief as a witness. 147 
The judiciary is encumbered with deciding whether BCE is of sufficient and admissible 
standard for a jury trial. But that decision may influence or even predetermine the verdict if it 
causes pivotal evidence to be withheld from the jury.148 Juries can only decide cases based on 
the admissible evidence presented to it. Is truth finding compromised by protecting 
complainants and witnesses in criminal trials? The reality is, that whenever allegations of a 
sexual nature are made, the sexual history of the complainant will be investigated by the 
police and the case papers viewed by lawyers on both sides at the pretrial stage. As Birch 
points out: 
In many cases, it will also happen that, however sensitive the investigation, and 
however well treated the complainant, at the end of the trial, a jury has little more to 
JRRQWKDQRQHSHUVRQ¶VZRUGDJDLQVWDQRWKHU¶V(YHQLIDOOWKHSRSXODUVWHUHRW\SHVRI
µUHDO¶UDSHFRXOGEHGHEXQNHGDWRQFHWKHQHHGWRVDWLVI\WKHFULPLQDOEXUGHQRISURRI
will ensure that the outcome of cases turning on credibility remains inherently 
XQSUHGLFWDEOH¶149 
It will be shown in this chapter, that the presumption of innocence of defendants has been 
seriously eroded in sexual offence trials based on the following line of reasoning adopted by 
policymakers in the 1990s. 
From the 1970s onwards, successive governments have consistently followed a policy of 
creating and maintaining a victim-centred criminal justice system; evidence concerning 
victims of miscarriages of justice was overlooked to accommodate this stance. Can justice be 
done to both complainants and defendants where victim-oriented legislation under both 
section 41 of the YJCEA 1999 and section 100 of the CJA 2003, narrowly determine the 
RFFDVLRQVZKHQDFRPSODLQDQW¶V%&(FDQEHXVHGDVGHIHQFHPDWHULDO"$UHVWDWXWRU\YLFWLPV¶
shields helpful in redressing the baODQFHRILQMXVWLFHFDXVHGE\WKHGHIHQGDQW¶VVKLHOGDW
common-law, or do they defeat the object of the fact-finding process?  
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(ii) The common law position of complainants in sexual offence cases 
 
Historically sexual offence trials typically included evidence RIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDO
history with the accused or a third party, until Parliament intervened. It has passed three 
complainant/witness protection statutes. The first complainant protection statute was section 
2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, hereafter, the SO(A)A, followed by section 
41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA) and in rapid succession, 
section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA). 
The common law rules on BCE were defendant-centred: they afforded a virtual carte blanche 
in allowing the BCE of a complainant as part of his defence. In essence, complainants in 
sexual offence cases at common law were often subjected to irrelevant intrusion into their 
sexual history as a defence tactic to discredit her complaint when she was being-cross 
H[DPLQHG-XGJHVZHUHSRZHUOHVVµWRSUHYHQWFRXQVHOLQVLVWLQJRQDZLWQHVVEHLQJFRPSHOOHG
to answer a scandalous question wholly irrelevant to the issue and barely relevant to the 
FUHGLELOLW\RIWKHZLWQHVVHV¶150 But after 1898, if the defendant gave evidence, he was 
afforded considerable immunity by the Criminal Evidence Act.  
7KHFRPPRQODZUXOHVRQWKHFRPSODLQDQWV¶%&(LQVH[XDORIIHQFHVZHUHVKDSHGDURXQGWKH
crime of rape. A 17th century writer, Hale, defined UDSHDVµXQODZIXOLQWHUFRXUVHZLWKD
ZRPDQZLWKRXWKHUFRQVHQWE\IHDUIRUFHRUIUDXG¶6H[XDOLQWHUFRXUVHEHFRPHVXQODZIXO
when the woman does not consent.151 The cross-examination on the sexual history of the 
complainant at common law had a dual purposeLQUDSHFDVHVHYLGHQFHRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶V
notoriously bad character as an unchaste woman was both admissible and relevant to the 
issue of consent and the collateral issue of credibility. Past sexual behaviour revealed in open 
court could cause the jury to be morally indignant and prejudge the witness.152 However, as 
long as the revelation of past sexual conduct was relevant to an issue such as credibility, it 
was permissible.153 
7KHHDUOLHVWUHFRUGHGFDVHZKHUHWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOSDVWZDVVRXJKWWREe used is 
found in R v Hodgson: 
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There, counsel for the accused sought to ask the complainant if she had previously 
had intercourse a) with other men, and b) with a person named. Counsel offered to 
FDOOHYLGHQFHWRVKRZWKDWWKHJLUO³KDGEHHQFDXJKWLQEHG a year before (the) charge 
ZLWKD\RXQJPDQ´DQGIXUWKHURIIHUHGWKH\RXQJPDQWRSURYHKHKDGKDG
intercourse with her. The trial judge ruled that the complainant was not bound to 
DQVZHUWKHTXHVWLRQVEHFDXVHWKH\³WHQGHGWRFULPLQDWHDQGGLVJUDFH´KHU He 
excluded the evidence, but referred the issue to the rest of the judges who confirmed 
the correctness of his decision.154 
In R v Clarke,155 HYLGHQFHWKDWDZRPDQZDVDSURVWLWXWHµDZRPDQRIDEDQGRQHGFKDUDFWHU¶
was considered to be relevant to the issue of consent. This was confirmed in R v Tissington156 
ZKLFKLQFOXGHGµVROLFLWDWLRQ¶ 
Under the ruling in Barker,157 evidence such as prostitution, bad sexual reputation or prior 
FRQVHQVXDOUHODWLRQVZLWKWKHGHIHQGDQWFRXOGEHDGGXFHGDVEHLQJUHOHYDQWWRWKHZRPDQ¶V
credibility and consent in rape cases.158 In other words, the complainant had a propensity to 
consent to sex in general and her bad character made it more likely that she was a liar. 
In R v Clay159 evidence that the complainant was a reputed prostitute was admissible to show 
µJHQHUDOEDGFKDUDFWHU¶DOVRZDVHYLGHQFHRIFRPPRQSURVWLWXWLRQLQR v Riley.160 Evidence 
that the complainant was a PHUFHQDU\SURVWLWXWHRUDZRPDQRIµQRWRULRXVO\ORRVHPRUDOV¶
was admitted in later cases such as Greatbanks,161 Bashir,162 and Krausz.163 
The common law criteria and judicial interpretation were considered to be too lax and were 
widely regarded as an important factor inhibiting complainants from pressing their 
allegations, and from being prepared to testify in support of them.164 There was clear 
inequality of treatment between the parties as concerns the use of BCE to discredit each other 
at trial. However, in the latter part of 20th FHQWXU\YLFWLPV¶ULJKWVFDPSDLJQHUVVXFFHVVIXOO\
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influenced social attitudes which were considered to be a barrier to the reporting of sexual 
offences.165 
Campaigners wanted witness protection in the form of restraints on the admissibility of the 
FRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOSDVW7KHUHZDVDJURZLQJFRQVHQVXVWKDWWKHODZKLWKHUWRXQGXO\
IDYRXUHGWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWVRYHUWKDWRIWKHYLFWLPDOVRWKDWFURVV-examination of a 
woman about her private life made the trial an ordeal for her.166 
Concern over the treatment of victims of sexual offences came to the forefront following the 
+RXVHRI/RUGV¶GHFLVLRQLQDPP v Morgan.167 The ruling was that in a rape trial, if the 
defendant genuinely believed that a woman was consenting to sexual intercourse, he should 
be acquitted, because the lack of belief was a constituent element of the offence which the 
prosecution had to prove.  
The Heilbron Committee168 set up to examine the implications of this decision, was of the 
opinion that it paved the way for juries to accept bogus defences. The Committee also 
decided to include in its remit the treatment of rape complainants under cross-examination, 
particularly on whether the use of sexual history evidence between the complainant and the 
defendant or a third party was still relevant. The Committee was dubious about whether the 
personal history and character of a rape victim could be of very much relevance; often it 
clouded real issues. The admission of sensitive personal material in a cross-examination was 
inimical to the fair trial of the essential issues and could cause humiliation and distress to the 
complainant, yet it conceded that relevant and proper cross-examination, even though it 
distresses, must be permitted to ensure a fair trial.169 
The Heilbron Committee concluded that questions ought not to be asked, nor evidence 
admitted, except with the leave of the trial judge, but it conceded that there would be certain 
types of case where a total ban would be unjust to the accused.170 Its report was the precursor 
of section 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. It specifically addressed the 
problems which rape complainants encountered, including the use of irrelevant sexual history 
HYLGHQFHRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKLUGSDUWLHVE\WKHGHIHQGDQWThe 
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Committee also examined areas of evidence, practice and procedure followed in rape cases 
generally.171 It accepted that women were being subjected to searching, irrelevant cross-
examinations but it saw no merit in eliciting evidence which sought to stigmatise the 
FRPSODLQDQWLQWHUPVRIKHUFUHGLELOLW\RUWRLQIULQJHKHUULJKWWRSURWHFWLRQLHWKHYLFWLP¶V
right to a fair trial of the allegations.172 
In the 1970s, social mores had changed; there was a much greater acceptance of sex outside 
PDUULDJHDQGDZRPDQ¶VFKRLFHRISDUWQHUV173 The Heilbron Committee officially recognised 
WKDWDFRPSODLQDQW¶VSURPLVFXLW\QHLWKHUUHIOHFWHGRQDFRPSODLQDQW¶VWUXWKIXOQHVVQRUKHU
willingness to consent when she was making allegations of rape. It also considered that 
society had progressed from being judgmental about extramarital sex;174 it was also 
XQQHFHVVDU\WRDGGXFHWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VUHODWLRQVhips with third parties, unless the trial 
judge determined otherwise.175 The Group agreed, however, that the relationship of the 
complainant and the accused would remain relevant to facts in issue and therefore should still 
be admissible. They argued against WKHXVHRIHYLGHQFHRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOSDVWZLWK
third parties, unless LWZDVVWULNLQJO\VLPLODUWRWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VEHKDYLRXUEHIRUHRUVRRQ
after the alleged offence; or that to exclude such evidence, would be unfair to the accused.176 
The 5HSRUWUHFRPPHQGHGVRPHOHJDOUHVWULFWLRQVWRDGPLWWLQJWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDO
history177 which were contained in the passing of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
1976. 
 
(iii) S. 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 
7KH+HLOEURQ&RPPLWWHH¶VUHFRPPHQGDtions were largely taken on board in the shape of the 
1976 Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act. Cross and Tapper comment that this legislation 
(SO(A)A 1976) had not precisely followed the prescription of the Committee, especially in 
allowing a greater discretionary element, which empirical studies subsequently suggested was 
being applied too leniently.178 
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S. 2 (1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 comprised the following terms: 
If at a trial any person is for the time being charged with a rape offence to which he 
pleads not guilty, then, except with leave of the judge, no evidence, and no question in 
cross-examination shall be adduced or asked at the trial, about any sexual experience 
of a complainant with a person other than that defendant.  
S.2 (1) SURKLELWHGWKHXVHRIDUDSHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOKLVWRU\ZLWKDSHUVRQRWKHUWKDQWKH
accused, but did not affect cases where the accused adduced evidence of his own relationship 
with the complainant on the issue of consent.179 It has been argued that allowing cross-
examination of a complainant about any sexual relationship the parties may have had with 
each other gives the wrong impression to the jury on the grounds that acquaintance sexual 
liaison was more likely to have been consensual than intercourse with a stranger.180  
8QGHUVHFWLRQMXGJHVKDGWKHGLVFUHWLRQZKHWKHUWRH[FOXGHWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶V%&(DQGLQ
R v Lawrence,181 it was held that questions about her relationships with other men should be 
allowed only where they might reasonably, properly directed, in the summing up, to take a 
GLIIHUHQWYLHZRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VHYLGHQFHIURPWKDWZKLFKWKH\PLJKWWDNHLIWKHTXHVWLRQ
or series or questions was or were not allowed. But for complainants, the law was still not 
shielding them enough from scrutiny of their private lives; defendants could still besmirch the 
FRPSODLQDQW¶VFKDUDFWHUE\XVLQJLUUHOHYDQWFROODWHUDOHYLGHQFHWRZLQRYHUWKHMXU\ 
Whilst section 2 of the 1976 Act wDVGHVLJQHGWRHTXDOL]HWKHSULYLOHJHVRIµVKLHOG¶WKDW
defendants accused of rape had previously enjoyed as concerns their sexual history and 
character, its remit did not include other sexual offences, such as those committed against 
minors. It was therefore limited in scope: 
(3) In subsection (1) of this section "complainant" means a woman upon whom, in a 
charge for a rape offence to which the trial in question relates, it is alleged that rape was 
committed, attempted or proposed. 
Clearly, there were deficiencies in the provisions of the SO(A)A 1976:  
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x WKHUHVWULFWLRQVRQVH[XDOKLVWRU\GLGQRWFRYHUWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH
defendant; 
x the Act only applied to rape cases and this meant could create a lack of congruence 
with for sexual offences not covered by the Act; 
x WKH$FWZDVFRQFHUQHGZLWKVH[XDOKLVWRU\UDWKHUWKDQWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDO
EHKDYLRXUDQGFUHDWHGDORRSKROHWRDGPLWWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VSHUVRQDOHYLGHQFHWKDW
was not, stricto sensu, related to prior sexual history; 
x the intention of section 2 of the SO(A)A 1976 also was thwarted by judicial leniency - 
for example allowing evidence that a complainant was promiscuous as relevant to the 
LVVXHRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VEHOLHILQFRQVHQW 
x the lack of a blanket ban on such evidence inevitably gave rise to appeals against 
conviction as the appellant could argue that judicial discretion had been improperly 
exercised.182 
 
(iv) Background policy which shaped the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999 
Between the passage of SO(A)A 1976, and the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
<-&($YLFWLPV¶ULJKWVFDPSDLJQHUVDGYRFDWHGIRUDQHYHQPRUHUHVWULFWLYH
DSSURDFKWRWKHXVHRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOKLVWRU\HYLGHQFHZKHWKHUFRQFHUQLQJWKLUG
parties or her prior relationship with the accused. There had already been a policy change in 
legal proceedings due to the interpretation of a positive obligation to include the protection of 
victims and vulnerable witnesses due to a 1996 landmark European Court of Human Rights 
case, Doorson v The Netherlands:183 
 
It is true that Article 6 does not explicitly require the interests of witnesses in general, 
and those of victims called upon to testify in particular, to be taken into consideration. 
However their life, liberty or security of person may be at stake, as may interests 
coming generally with in the ambit of Article 8 [everyone has a right to respect for 
his/her private life] . Such interests of witnesses and victims are in principle protected 
by other, substantive provisions of the Convention, which imply that Contracting 
States should organise their criminal proceedings in such a way that those interests 
are not unjustifiably imperilled. Against this background, principles of fair trial also 




 [1996] 22 EHRR 330, para.70. 
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require that in appropriate cases the interests of the defence are balanced against 
those of witnesses or victims called upon to testify. 
The YJCEA 1999 was created against the backdrop of political manifestos which aimed to 
give more rights to more classes of complainant. In the 1980s, researchers, practitioners and 
politicians offered a platform to the treatment of victims in general within the legal system.184 
Information packs for families of victims of homicide, for example, came to be issued by the 
Home Office in 1990 under a Conservative government as a result of campaigning by Victim 
6XSSRUW,QWKH\KDGDOVRFUHDWHG9LFWLPV¶&KDUWHUVZKLFKWKHVXEVHTXHQW/DERXU
Government adopted.185 The Labour Party manifesto had stated that greater protection would 
be provided for victims in rape and serious sexual offence trials and for those subject to 
intimidation, including witnesses.186 The criminal justice system, henceforth, would be 
shaped to accommodate victims.187 $9LFWLPV¶&RGHRI3UDFWLFHLQZDVDSURGXFWRIWKH
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 - the first statutory rights for victims. The 
Code of Practice was designed to enhance the experiences of victims within the criminal 
MXVWLFHV\VWHPSROLFHDQGSUREDWLRQVHUYLFHVZHUHDOVRERXQGE\WKH&RGH¶VVWLSXODWLRQV
Court officials ZHUHPDQGDWHGWREHV\PSDWKHWLFWRZDUGVWKHYLFWLP¶VRUGHDOSDUWLFXODUO\LQ
rape and sexual offence trials. 
Justice for All stated that the government had passed the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 to implement the recommendations of the Speaking Up for Justice Report 
in 1988.188 The Executive Summary included, inter alia, rebalancing the criminal justice 
system in favour of the victim and giving the police and prosecution the tools to bring more 
criminals to justice.189 
Home Office-commissioned research conducted by Professor Temkin,190 discussed the 
outdated and deficient section 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976. The 
Working Party concluded that the law should be amended to provide a more structured 
approach to (judicial) decision-taking and set out more clearly when evidence of previous 
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sexual history could be admitted in cases of rape and be extended to cover a much wider 
range of serious sexual offences.191 
7KHVDPH5HSRUWZDVPLQGIXORIWKHULVNRIFRPSURPLVLQJWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWto a fair trial 
XQGHUSURSRVHGUHIRUPVWRUHVWULFWWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶V%&(WKXVLWVXJJHVWHGWKDWMXGLFLDO
discretion to admit such evidence should not be abolished altogether (to this extent it agreed 
ZLWKWKH+HLOEURQ5HSRUW¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVEDFNLQ). Instead, it favoured a statutory 
definition of the circumstances when it could be admitted.192 The YJCEA 1999 therefore 
went further than the single-issue of rape that was the remit of the Heilbron Committee.  
,Q&DQDGDWKH&RXUW¶VRSLQLRQLQR v Seaboyer, R v Gayme 193 was influential in taking 
reforms further in England. The Canadian Court had to interpret section 276 of the Criminal 
Code which excluded sexual history evidence as relevant to the issue of consent or 
credibility. The Court was wary of legislation (section 276) which fettered the rights of the 
defendant to have a fair trial because it created a blanket ban on any evidence of sexual 
activity whether tendered for an irrelevant or misleading purpose (such as the victim was 
FRQVHQWLQJRUXQUHOLDEOHRUDYDOLGRQH7KHµSLJHRQKROH¶DSSURDFKFRXOGQRWGHDOZLWKWKHVH
issues because it was predicting relevancy on a series of categories. It therefore had the 
potential to exclude otherwise highly admissible evidence which may be highly relevant to 
WKHGHIHQFH'HVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWWKLVVHFWLRQZDVFDSDEOHRIFRQWUDYHQLQJDQDFFXVHG¶s rights 
under the Canadian Charter in some circumstances, it remained operative except in the 
limited and rare circumstances where it would have an unconstitutional effect.  
Notwithstanding the experience of the Canadian court, other jurisdictions also adopted a rigid 
pigeon-hole approach to sexual history evidence. In Michigan, the state, which was designed 
to remove judicial discretion on a case-by-case assessment, in the light of problematic cases 
like Hackett194. In 1992, New South Wales had adopted the inflexible approach under section 
409 B Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)195 but in several cases in the 1990s the trial judges stayed 
proceedings on the basis that the defendant could not have a fair trial under section 409 B and 
the NSW Law Reform Commission therefore recommended a return to a judicial discretion 
to remove the injustice. 196 
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England itself adopted a more rigid approach to witness protection by passing the YJCEA in 
1999. In 1998, a Home Office Report concluded that there was overwhelming evidence that 
the FRXUWVZHUHXVLQJVH[XDOKLVWRU\HYLGHQFHWRGLVFUHGLWWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VFKDUDFWHULQWKH
eyes of the jury.197  
,Q7HPNLQ¶VYLHZWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUGµUHOHYDQFH¶WRGHWHUPLQHDGPLVVLELOLW\RIVH[XDO
history evidence frequently involves distortion.198 A consequence of the decision in 
Morgan199 had been that cross-examination of witnesses on their mode of dress, behaviour 
and past sexual conduct could be admitted on the grounds of being relevant to a defence of 
consent. Temkin thought that the use of such HYLGHQFHFRXOGEHDµGLUW\WDFWLF¶ZKLFK
discriminated against women and effectively breached the Bar Code of Conduct on treating 
clients equally, therefore the decision needed to be overruled.200 
7HPNLQZDVVFHSWLFDODERXWWKH+RPH2IILFH¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQ that the Lord Chief Justice 
issue a practice direction to barristers prohibiting them from aggressive and/or inappropriate 
cross-H[DPLQDWLRQVVLQFHWKHUHZDVQRGHILQLWLRQRIZKDWFRQVWLWXWHGµDSSURSULDWH¶FURVV-
examination. The Home Office study concluded that present court practice was falling short 
of the aims of the existing law,201 though the interviewed barristers did not think that much 
more needed to be done.202 
The Report interviewed prosecution and defendant legal practitioners of both genders who 
had experience in rape trials and found they held stereotypical views of rape complainants.203 
At the same time, the interviewees also shed light on the fact that not all obstacles to a 
successful prosecution could be imputed to the fear by a complainant that her private life 
might be probed. Barristers representing defendants also showed the reality of what actually 
RFFXUUHGDWVH[XDORIIHQFHWULDOVZKHUHWKHZRUGRIRQHSDUW\LVFRQWHVWHGE\DQRWKHU¶V 
+LQGUDQFHVWKDWZHUHQRWUHODWHGWRWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVexual history included: 
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x The forum of trial, with complainants feeling more at ease giving their evidence-in-
chief-in smaller, more intimate courtrooms.204 
x The advocates felt that the witness herself could be a hindrance through her 
appearance, her behaviour and lifestyle.205 Women were seen by some barristers to be 
their own worst enemies.206 
x One barrister considered that it was pointless to prosecute cases where the 
complainant and her partner had a permanent relationship.207  
x The interviewed barristers mainly agreed that the Crown Prosecution Service was 
competent in bringing prosecutions, even where cases lacked corroboration.208 
x Some practitioners thought that inexperienced, low-paid prosecution counsel could 
affect the outcome of a rape trial.209 
One interviewed barrister explained that a defending barrister needed to adopt a strategy to 
VHFXUHDQDFTXLWWDOLQDFRQWHVWHGFDVH,IWKHEDUULVWHU¶VEULHIZHUHWRGHIHQGKHUFOLHQWVKH
had little option other than to undermine the credibility of the defendant. Some of the 
strategies she listed were questionable and would fall short of professional standards today. 
6XFKVWUDWHJLHVLQFOXGHGPDOLJQLQJWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VEHKDYLRXUWRVKRZWKDWVKHKDG
brought the incident upon herself, that she lacked common sense;210 the way she was dressed 
at the time of the incident and maligning her sexual character.211 Most barristers in the same 
study agreed they would apply for leave to adduce the sexual character evidence (which was 
then governed under section 2 of the SO(A)A 1976), with one barrister doing so if he thought 
WKHFRPSODLQDQWFRXOGEHSRUWUD\HGDVDµVOXW¶WRVHFXUHDQDFTXLWWDO212 Several barristers did 
not believe that such evidence was relevant unless there was a similar fact type situation. One 
barrister stated:  
A jury must consider that if she sleeps with nine out of ten men, why is it that she 
ZRXOGQ¶WVOHHSZLWKWKLVRQHI think it is relevant in almost every case where consent 
is the defence.213 
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Temkin points out that the interviewed barristers thought that judges were careful to take a 
serious approach to sexual history evidence.214 But they had little difficulty in making 
successful applications to the judge under the 1976 Act.215 Temkin was in favour curtailing 
the judicial discretion that opened the door to cross-examinations on a FRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDO
history. But she also thought that barristers would try to circumvent the proposed law: 
The study illustrates that sexual history evidence was regarded by most of the 
barristers as an important defence tool. They were also confident that if they framed 
their argument carefully they would be able to convince the judge to permit it.216  
The Home Office study sample of barristers had experience of both prosecuting and 
defending in rape cases, with female barristers tending to represent the defendant.217 Some 
conceded that among older male barristers defending rape cases, the cross-examination style 
of the complainant was unpleasant and it came across about what particular views they 
held.218 Bullying and harassment still occurred, though the interviewed advocates considered 
that this was poor advocacy and unproductive.219 Defendants also risked losing face in front 
of the jury if such harassment tactics were adopted. 220 Temkin considered that aggressive 
defence tactics were also not assisted by lame prosecutions. In the study, barristers mainly 
had an unchallenging attitude towards the construction of rape in the courtroom; some shared 
the prejudiced assumptions that have for so long disfigured rape trials.221 
Temkin favoured the structured approach of the Home Office recommendations that were 
subsequently incorporated in section 41 YJCEA 1999, which would prohibit cross-
H[DPLQDWLRQVRQWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOKLVWRU\VDYHIRUIRXUH[FHSWLRQV 
x where consent would not be in issue; 
x where the defendant mistakenly believes the complainant consented; 
x HYLGHQFHRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOEHKDYLRXUDWRUDURXQGWKHWLPHRIWKHFKDUJH
(similar fact type situations); 
x to rebut sexual history evidence adduced by the prosecution.222 
                                                          
214




 Ibid, p.247. 
217
 Ibid, p.228. 
218




 Ibid, p.229. 
221
 Ibid, p.240. 
222
 Ibid, p.247. 
P a g e  |   
 
(v) Section 41 of the YJCEA 1999 and its remit 
The recommendations of Speaking Up for Justice 1998 were concretised by section 41 
YJCEA 1999. This should have removed the double standard of sexual morality, whereby the 
jury in a sexual offences trial was told about the victim¶VVH[XDOSDVWEXWWKHVDPHMXURUV
were prevented from learning whether the defendant had previously committed crimes of 
sexual assault.223 
Section 41 aimed to decrease judicial discretion and to exclude irrelevant and prejudicial 
evidence in the spirit of section 276 of the previously discussed Canadian code .The Act also 
H[WHQGHGWKHUDQJHRIVH[XDORIIHQFHVXQGHUVHFWLRQVRWKDW³VH[XDORIIHQFH´PHDQWD
rape or burglary with intent to rape; (b) (unlawful intercourse, indecent assault, forcible 
abduction etc.); (c) unlawful intercourse with person receiving treatment for mental disorder 
by member of hospital staff etc.); (d) indecent conduct towards child under 14) and (e) 
incitement of child under 16 to commit incest).  
S.5HVWULFWLRQVRQHYLGHQFHRUTXHVWLRQVDERXWFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOKLVWRU\ 
(1) If at a trial a person is charged with a sexual offence, then, except with the leave of the 
court²  
(a) no evidence may be adduced, and  
(b) no question may be asked in cross-examination,  
by or on behalf of any accused at the trial, about any sexual behaviour of the complainant. 
(2) The court may give leave in relation to any evidence or question only on an application 
made by or on behalf of an accused, and may not give such leave unless it is satisfied ²  
(a) that subsection (3) or (5) applies, and  
(b) that a refusal of leave might have the result of rendering unsafe a conclusion of the jury 
or (as the case may be) the court on any relevant issue in the case.  
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(3) This subsection applies if the evidence or question relates to a relevant issue in the case 
and either²  
(a) that issue is not an issue of consent or  
(b) it is an issue of consent and the sexual behaviour of the complainant to which the 
evidence or question relates is alleged to have taken place at or about the same time as the 
event which is the subject matter of the charge against the accused; or 
(c) it is an issue of consent and the sexual behaviour of the complainant to which the 
evidence or question relates is alleged to have been, in any respect, so similar²  
(i) to any sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to evidence adduced or to be 
adduced by or on behalf of the accused) took place as part of the event which is the subject 
matter of the charge against the accused, or  
(ii) to any other sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to such evidence) took 
place at or about the same time as that event, 224  
that the similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence. 
Section 41 is a UDSHVKLHOGGHVLJQHGWRSUHYHQWGHIHQGDQWVIURPLPSXJQLQJWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶V
character.225 It does not include other non-defendants. Section 100 of the CJA 2003 
subsequently remedied this defect 
Section 41 (1) (b) does not include any issue as to the belief of the accused that the 
complainant consented. If the defendant mistakenly believes that there had been consent, the 
test is whether the evidence or cross-examination relates to a relevant issue in the case.226 
This section was regarded as overly restrictive as it failed to take into account any continuum 
of relationship between the complainant and the defendant.227 
The question of when a section 41 application is most likely to be made depends on the type 
of explanation asserted when a defendant is faced with sexual allegations. The most common 
type of defence involves a fact in issue; i.e., the incident occurred, but the complainant 
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consented or he had reasonable belief that she consented, therefore no crime occurred. 
Sections 41 (3) (b) and (c) might be applicable. Another fact in dispute might be that the 
defendant asserts that nothing ever happened. Since no activity is alleged to have happened, it 
LVOHVVOLNHO\WKDWWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOEHKDYLRXUZRXOGEH relevant and therefore a 
section 41 application would neither be appropriate nor succeed. The defendant might allege 
that nothing occurred, but that the complainant is promiscuous. Unless the defence is arguing 
that a different perpetrator among her encounters violated her, section 41 would prohibit the 
cross-examination of the complainant on her third-party relationships as the evidence has no 
EHDULQJRQDIDFWLQLVVXHDQGZRXOGEHFODVVLILHGDVLPSXJQLQJWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VFUHGLELOLW\ 
7KHPHDQLQJRIµVH[XDOEHKDYLRXU¶LVVHWRXWLQVHFWLRQ42(1) Interpretation and application of 
section 41 of the YJCEA 1999: 
F³VH[XDOEHKDYLRXU´PHDQVDQ\VH[XDOEHKDYLRXURURWKHUVH[XDOH[SHULHQFHZKHWKHURU
not involving any accused or other person, but excluding (except in section 41(3)(c)(i) and 
(5)(a)) anything alleged to have taken place as part of the event which is the subject matter of 
the charge against the accused; and (d) subject to any order made under subsection (2), 
³VH[XDORIIHQFH´VKDOOEHFRQVWUXHGLn accordance with section 62. 
The prohibition is applicable to both the sexual experience of the complainant with the 
accused and/or her third party relationships.  
 
(vi) Appeals referring to use of section 41 YJCEA 1999 
The House of Lords decision in R v A228 effectively restored to judges the right to decide 
what constituted relevant sexual history, thereby overriding section 41. The Lords had 
recognised that an orthodox approach to section 41 restricted the cross-examination of a 
FRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOKLVWRU\ too narrowly and this risked encroaching on Article 6 of the 
(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWVDVFRQFHUQVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWWRDIDLUWULDO/RUG
Hope stated in R v A: 
In the type of case which I have instanced where a man, who may be innocent, wishes 
to give evidence of previous acts of sexual intercourse with the complainant in the 
course of a recent close and affectionate relationship, such evidence would be a 
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central and essential part of his defence, and I consider that to deny him the 
opportunity to cross-examine the complainant and to give such evidence would 
compromise the overall fairness of the hearing and would deny him the essence of a 
IDLUWULDO«WKHULJKWRIDGHIHQGDQWWRFDOOUHOHYDQWHYLGHQFHZKHUHWKHDEVHQFHRI
such evidence may give rise to an unjust conviction, is an absolute right which cannot 
be qualified by considerations of public interest, no matter how well founded that 
public interest may be.229 
The section has remained problematic and far from the shield that it was intended to be. 
a) Claims of Consent  
Section 41 (3) (c) of the YJCEA 1999 was raised as a ground of appeal in R v T, a 
complainant wished to adduce that he and his partner had has consensual sex on a climbing 
frame three weeks before the current allegation of rape which was alleged to have occurred at 
the same place. The Court of Appeal held that cross-examination on this issue ought to have 
been allowed.230 Yet in R v Harris, the defendant had not been allowed to cross-examine the 
complainant on the issue that the complainant had admitted to picking up strangers and 
having sexual intercourse with them.231 It would therefore appear that the longer back in time 
the previous consensual relationship (in terms of years) the more likely the court will refuse a 
cross-examination. 
In R v Mukadi a GHIHQGDQW¶VFRQYLFWLRQIRUUDSHZDVVXFFHVVIXOO\DSSHDOHGEHFDXVHWKHWULDO
judge had refused a section 42 (1) (c) application for complainant to be cross-examined about 
a previous incident which the defendant claimed been relevant to the issue of consent: 
Had the jury heard the evidence [that]  - VKHKDGVWHSSHGLQWRDVWUDQJHU¶VFDUDQG
exchanged phone numbers with the driver before stepping out and heading for 
7HVFR¶VZKHUHVKHKDGWKHQHQFRXQWHUHGWKHDSSHOODQW- it could have caused them to 
take a different view of her evidence about her state of mind and her reason for 
accompanying the appellant and what she did or did not do or did or did not consent 
to prior to the act of intercourse.232 
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b) Age of consent as defence claim  
In HCSA cases, it is possible for the defendant to plead consent under sections 41(3)(b) or (c) 
where he claims that the relationship between the parties had started when the complainant 
was of consensual age. There is authority for this in the appeal case: R v F.233 The 
complainant had alleged that she was raped by her stepfather as a child. The defendant denied 
having underage sex with his stepdaughter, but affirmed that the pair had a consensual 
relationship as adults, which was provable by the existence of videotaped evidence of their 
sexual acts and erotic photographs. The Court of Appeal stated that where sexual behaviour 
related to a relevant fact in issue, then subject to section 41 (4) and assuming the criteria for 
admissibility had been established, the court lacked any discretion to refuse to admit, to limit 
the admission of, such evidence.  
The jury in R v F ought to have been allowed to see the videotape in question in order to 
assess for itself whether the relationship was consensual. Moreover, the prosecution itself had 
adduced evidence of the full consensual nature of the adult relationship to show that the 
longstanding relationship between the parties was indicative of a history of abuse. The 
defendant had been denied the opportunity of asking the complainant questions about the 
erotic photographs and videotapes of the parties to show that the complaint of CSA was 
brought about by the ending of the adult relationship. This evidence would also have been 
admissible as non-defendant bad character type under section 100 CJA 2003. Sections 41(1) 
(a) and (b) of section 100 clearly stipulate that no question regarding past sexual conduct will 
be raised and cross-examined unless court leave be given.  
 
(c) False allegation claims by the defendant  
Section 41 was designed to limit the sexual history of the complainant but it does not cover 
false allegations made by the complainant, because the evidence or cross examination relates 
to past lies234 not past sexual behaviour. This admissibility is controlled by the judge who 
needs to be satisfied that it was the complainant made the allegation; that it was false235 and 
that there must be a strong evidential basis based on fact.236  
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For example, where the defendant alleges that the complainant had a motive to lie as a result 
RIWKHEUHDNXSRIDFRQVHQVXDOUHODWLRQVKLSWKHUHYHODWLRQRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDO
relationship with the defendant would be admissible even if incidentally the information 
would impugn her character, as was held in R v Martin.237  
The appellant was convicted of indecent assault in respect of an act of forced oral sex. His 
defence was that he was elsewhere at the time and the complainant had fabricated the 
incident because he had rejected her advances two days before the incident, after she 
performed an act of oral sex upon him. The trial judge allowed cross-examination in respect 
of the alleged rejection of sexual advances, but refused to permit any reference to the oral sex 
before the rejection. The Court of Appeal considered that whilst one purpose of the proposed 
questions was to impugn the credibility of the complainant, another was to strengthen the 
defence case. Arguably, that rejection could have been said to be more hurtful if she had 
performed an act of oral sex upon him and then been rejected.  
In CSA cases, a defendant is still permitted with leave to cross-examine a complainant under 
the YJCEA, section 41(3)(c) where a defendant has denied the allegations and asserts that the 
accuser has a prior history of making allegations of CSA against others. Under the ruling in R 
v T and H,238 manifestly false allegations may be admissible, but the defence must have 
proper grounds for suggesting that the allegations were made and substantiated. Evidence 
which conforms to both criteria would not fall foul RIEHLQJµDERXW¶DFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDO
behaviour.  
In R v Shino Garaxo239 WKHDSSHOODQWKDGZDQWHGWRPDNHXVHRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VWZRSULRU
allegations of assault which had not been pursued, but which might have been regarded by 
the jury as false if they had heard a cross-examination about her crime reference number for 
WKHµVRFLDO¶VHFXULW\DQGDUHIXVDOWRFR-operate with police whilst being under the influence 
RIGUXJVDWWKHWLPHRQHRIWKHDOOHJDWLRQVZDVPDGH«WKHMXGJHVKRXOGKDYHSHUPLWWHG
cross-examination on these two matters.240 
Similarly, in R v James Lloyd241 the Court of Appeal held that questions would not have been 
about the sexual behaviour of the complainant and therefore ought to have been admitted. 
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The defendant was not asserting that the complainant had indulged in a sexual act, but that 
she was the author of a falsified diary entry and had lied about a friend making it: 
We consider that the judge failed to focus on the real issue of relevance, namely the 
genuineness of the diary entries. Instead, he focused on the sexual allegation made by 
CH against the appellant.242 
Other relevant aspects of section 41 include:  
x 6XEVHFWLRQGLVDOORZVHYLGHQFHZKLFKPHUHO\LPSXJQVWKHZLWQHVV¶FKDUDFWHU
(irrelevant evidence). Since BCE is a tactic designed to discredit the opposing party, it 
may well be that legitimate defence evidence has been prohibited where it crosses the 
line of a general character debasement and as material that relates to the issue in 
question, giving rise to a possible miscarriage of justice.243 
x Subsection (5) (a) (b) and (c) relates to the prosecutLRQ¶VRZQXVHRIWKHZLWQHVV¶
sexual history and the extent to which the accused may rebut or explain it. 
Section 41 is not DSSOLFDEOHWRGHIHQGDQWVZKRZLVKWRKDYHWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDO
history excluded for their own tactical purposes, even where the prosecution itself has 
adduced such evidence. In R v Soroya, it was argued on appeal that WKHFRPSODLQDQW¶V
previous sexual history was wrongly introduced by the prosecution at trial in 
circumstances which would not have been permitted to the defence. If so, this might 
KDYHFRQVWLWXWHGDEUHDFKRIWKHDSSHOODQW¶VULJKWWRDIDLUWULDODQGLQIULQJHGWKH
requirement that there VKRXOGEH³HTXDOLW\RIDUPV´EHWZHHQSURVHFXWLRQDQGGHIHQFH 
244 It was held that the prosecution had tactical reasons for adducing evidence of the 
FRPSODLQDQW¶VIDOVHVWDWHPHQWWKDWVKHZDVDYLUJLQEHIRUHVKHKDGEHHQUDSHGE\WKH
defendant 245 
«FRQVLGHUDWLon should be given to the protective effect of section 78 of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984«WKHSURYLVLRQLVSHUIHFWO\DSWWREHGHSOR\HGLQDQ
appropriate case, where it is thought by the judge that the impact of section 41 of the 
1999 Act on the defendant may produce an adverse effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings.246 
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x Section (6) only permits the cross-examination of the complainant in specific 




There are other problems with the workability of section 41. In a contested rape trial, the 
FRPSODLQDQW¶VVLPLODUFKDUDFWHUHYLGHQFHFDQEHXVHGWRLQIHUFRQVHQWWKHVH[XDODFWLVQRWLQ
dispute, but the circumstance in which it took place, is the key issue. Judges may try to 
SURKLELWWKHHYLGHQFHZKHUHXVLQJWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VFKDUDFWHUHYLGHQFHDSSHDUVWREHDWDFWLF
designed to impugn the witness, rather than show a course of conduct which infers that the 
complainant did consent. In sexual offence cases where consent does not apply, such as child 
sexual abuse, the similar character evidence can be used to prove that the complainant is 
lying about the present allegations and has done so on previous occasions. A judge also has to 
consider whether there is substance to the claims about prior false allegations of a sexual 
QDWXUHRUZKHWKHUWKHHYLGHQFHLVDGHIHQGDQW¶VVPHDU-tactic. It may not become apparent 
XQWLOWKHWULDOLVKHDUGWKDWWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VFKDUDFWHUHYLGHQFHVKRXOGEHDGPLVVLEOHDQG
that, post-conviction the Court of Appeal has to reappraise whether the pre-trial prohibition 
DFWXDOO\GHSULYHGWKHDSSHOODQWRIKLVOHJLWLPDWHGHIHQFH,WLVVXEPLWWHGWKDWDFRPSODLQDQW¶V
similar character evidence may be of little value in rape cases where consent is in issue, but 
still plays a vital role in false allegation defences.  
Redmayne argued that section 41(3)(c) was obfuscatory legislation. Parliament had intended 
to make the admission of sexual history evidence to prove consent exceptional - the 
coincidence test which works tolerably well in some similar fact cases (ones like Smith)247 
but not when applied to sexual history 248 He was particularly concerned about the use of the 
FRPSODLQDQW¶VSULRUPLVFRQGXFWWRLQIHUFRQVHQWLQDUDSHWULDO'UDZLQJWKLVSDUDOOHOWKH
Heilbron Committee proposed an inclusionary rule for sexual history evidence based on 
µVWULNLQJVLPLODULW\¶ZKLle Canadian rape shield legislation adopted an approach based on 
µIRUELGGHQUHDVRQLQJ¶249 Some United States jurisdictions allow sexual history evidence 
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complainant (a) is more likely to have consented to the sexual activity that forms the subject matter of the 
FKDUJHRUELVOHVVZRUWK\RIEHOLHI¶$OVRLWVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLQR v Darrach [2000] 2 SCR 443 esp. at [2], [35]. 
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ZKLFKHVWDEOLVKHVDµSDWWHUQ¶7KH<-&($WRRNWKHVLPLODUIDFWVDSSURDFKWRR6HFWLRQ
41 lays down a general rule excluding sexual history evidence on the issue of consent, 
whether the sexual history is with the defendant or with third parties. Such evidence may well 
be prejudicial, in that it might lead the jury to take a dim view of the complainant; it also 
invades her privacy. In all the common law jurisdictions adopting the similar fact exception, 
5HGPD\QHREVHUYHVWKDWWKH\XVHHXSKHPLVWLFSUR[\ZRUGLQJVXFKDVµSDWWHUQ¶µVLPLODULW\¶
RUµQRQ-FRLQFLGHQFH¶250  
A defendant in a rape trial can bolster his claim by showing that the complainant has a track-
record of consenting, and therefore latterly consented to intercourse with the defendant.251 
7KHUHLVDXWKRULW\IRUVWDWLQJWKDWXVHRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VSULRUPLVFRQGXFWXQGHUVHFWLRQ
(3) (c) (i) need not be strikingly similar.  
«7KHFRQWH[WDQGWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHHYLGHQFHLVQRWVRPXFKWRVKRZIURPSDVWHYHQWV
that history has been repeated, as to indicate a state of mind on the part of the 
complainant towards the defendant which is potentially highly relevant to her state of 
mind on the occasion in question. The language used is thus not quite the language of 
Boardman.252 
/RUG&O\GH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLQ R v A was followed in the appeal case R v Tahed.253 The 
appellant had been accused of rape and indecent assault. At the original trial, a cross-
examination application under section 41(3)(c)(i) of the YJCEA 1999 had originally failed, 
on the grounds that an incident of consensual sex between the parties some 3-4 weeks earlier 
was considered to be insufficiently contemporaneous to be relevant. The Court of Appeal 
KHOGWKDWWKHHDUOLHULQFLGHQWZDVDGPLVVLEOHRQWKHJURXQGVWKDWLWZDVµVLPLODU¶DQGLW
RYHUWXUQHGWKHFRQYLFWLRQ+RZHYHUWKLVLVQRWWKHRQO\FRQWH[WLQZKLFKWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶V
bad character evidence can be used. It can also be an essential piece of evidence that can be 
used where the defendant negates the allegations, claims that they are a fabrication or where 
complainant has previously made false allegations on one or several occasions. 
If the defendant is claiming that the complainant has a track record in deliberately making 
false allegations, this is also suggestive of criminality (perjury) on the part of the 
complainant. A ruling needs to be sought from the judge for any proposed questions about 
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alleged previous false complaints. However, if a section 41(3)(c) application to obtain leave 
to cross-examine the complainant on prior false allegations is deemed to appear as a witness 
credibility attack, the judge will refuse it on the grounds set out in section 41(4). A refused 
application can sometimes deprive a defendant of a legitimate defence. For instance, R v T 
and R v H254 the defendants had been convicted of sexual abuse of minors. They appealed 
against a ruling that the questions which they wished to put to their respective complainants 
were prohibited by reason of section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999. 
RT wished to cross-examine the complainant about why she had not raised allegations 
against him on an earlier occasion when she had been asked about her sexual history by the 
police in connection with alleged episodes of abuse by other males.255 MH wanted to ask 
questions designed to identify a pattern of lying on the part of the complainant in respect of 
both sexual and non-sexual matters. Each appellant submitted that such lines of questioning 
ZHUHQRWDERXW³VH[XDOEHKDYLRXU´ZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJRIVHFWLRQWKH\ZHUHDERXWWKH
FRPSODLQDQWV¶SUHYLRXVUHVSRQVHVWRcertain relevant questions and were therefore excluded 
from the ambit of section 41 of the Act.  
The Court allowed the appeals, on the grounds that section 41 of the Act had to be given a 
purposive interpretation256 and even if, contrary to section 41(4), the questions were directed 
SULQFLSDOO\DWWKHFRPSODLQDQWV¶FUHGLELOLW\WKH\ZHUHQRWDXWRPDWLFDOO\SUHFOXGHGE\WKH$FW
from being raised. R. v A was considered. Both issues were highly material in the context of 
their respective cases and it was important for the court to draw the distinction between 
TXHVWLRQV³DERXW´DQ\VH[XDOEHKDYLRXUDQGWKRVHZKLFKDOWKRXJKUHIHUULQJWRSUHYLRXV
statements about sexual experience, did not require verification into the truth of them. This 
case illustrates that a cross-H[DPLQDWLRQRIDFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOEHKDYLRXUPD\EH
permitted to show that she had a motive for fabricated evidence, even if allowing it offends 
against section 41(4) which disallows questions testing credibility. 
In a later case, Garaxo,257 the defendant was also prevented from cross-examining the 
FRPSODLQDQW¶VHYLGHQFHDGGXFHGE\WKHSURVHFXWLRQWKDWVKHKDGPDGHSULRUDOOHJDWLRQVWZLFH
before. The appeal succeeded, as he ought to have been permitted to cross-examine on this 
                                                          
254
 [2001] EWCA Crim 1877. 
255
 Paras 5-8 of this judgement. 
256
 Supra, para 36. 
257
 R v Garaxo [2005] All ER (D) 363 (Apr). 
P a g e  |   
point to demonstrate the falsity of the prior allegations; prior allegations therefore do not 
UHODWHWRWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOEHKDYLRXU 
 
A full set of trial and appeal papers were obtained for a case258 that had already been the 
subject of an appeal: R v W.259 Prior allegations of CSA made by the complainant against 
GLIIHUHQWSHRSOHEXWQRWSURFHHGHGZLWKZHUHQRWLQWKLVFDVHGHHPHGWREHUHJDUGHGDVµEDG
FKDUDFWHU¶XQGHUVHFWLRQRIWKH&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH$FWIt should be noted that 
allegations of CSA that had been recorded against a defendant but not prosecuted, this would 
EHUHJDUGHGDVµEDGFKDUDFWHU¶XQGHr section 101 of the CJA 2003. 
Can it be argued that prior allegations should not be used in evidence against the 
complainant? Birch and Taylor hold that defence counsel bend the rules of the YJCEA 1999 
by adducing evidence of prior complaints even where there is no basis for supposing them to 
be untrue.260 They gave an example of where prior complaints had been made by children in 
care homes who were interviewed by police as suspected victims under the operations to 
uncover past abuse in the 1990s. The children might have been abused, but the cases against 
the accused had gone no further until the widespread police operations. They argued: 
«MXULHVDre popularly supposed to reason that a person who makes many complaints 
is more likely to be lying. This tactic is clearly prejudicial to the victim of past institutional 
abuse whose previous complaints may have been brushed aside for no good reason.261  
Therefore, juries can be misled by hearing a cross-examination that reveals unfounded 
DOOHJDWLRQVRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDODFWLYLW\Birch contends, that unproved false 
allegations of sexual abuse could be deemed to be about DFRPSODLQDQWV¶VH[XDOEHKDYLRXU
and should therefore be excluded.262 She considered the case of B, a child sexual abuse case, 
where the accused alleged that B had made prior false allegations of abuse by a third party on 
a different occasion. Such evidence was permitted, even though the prior complaint had been 
dropped by the police on other grounds (the allegation was not necessarily false). Birch 
argues that a prior allegation should be conclusively false in order for it to be admitted. She 
also mentions WKDWWKLVHYLGHQFHZDVQRWµDERXW¶DFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOKLVWRU\EXWRQFH
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mentioned in court as an alleged prior allegation of a sexual nature, such evidence could be 
FRQVWUXHGDVEHLQJDERXWWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOEHKDYLRXU 
It appears the decision R v T and H263 has now clarified the position on the use of false 
allegations, with the ruling that there must be truth in the substance of prior false allegations 
before they can be revealed. 
Selective censorship therefore can skew the fact-finding process in a criminal trial. 
 
(viii) Is there still a place for section 41 of the YJCEA 1999 post section 100 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003? 
Ought section 41 YJCEA to have been repealed, given the further enactment of complainant 
protection under section 100 of the CJA ".LEEOH¶VUHVHDUFKRQZKHWKHUMXGJHVDUH
exercising their discretion competently,264 indicates that on the whole, they know when 
evidence is relevant and therefore admissible. However, the two-stage gateway process of 
both Acts is sometimes misunderstood by practitioners. 
Tapper argues that section 41 YJCEA is difficult to interpret and apply.265 He cites the case 
of R v Mokrecovas,266 where apparently relevant evidence had been considered (and rejected 
by the trial judge) under the wrong gateway of section 41. The appellant tried to argue that 
WKHGHFLVLRQKDGGHSULYHGKLPRIWKHFKDQFHWRXVHWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOKLVWRU\ZLWKD
third party, which could have been admitted under a different gateway. 
M, who was due to stand trial accused of rape, appealed under the Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996 section 35 (interlocutory appeal) against the decision that the defence 
would not be able to cross examine the complainant about an allegation that prior to the 
DOOHJHGUDSHVKHKDGKDGFRQVHQVXDOVH[XDOLQWHUFRXUVHRQWZRSUHYLRXVRFFDVLRQVZLWK0¶V
brother. M submitted that the case fell to be considered within the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 section 41(3)(a) and not as originally argued, within section 41(3)(b) and 
(c) of the 1999 Act. He contended that the issue was not one of consent, but rather one of the 
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motives the complainant may have had for lying about the offence, but the court rejected this 
argument.267 
If trial lawyer misunderstands the gateways of admissibility in a section 41 application, the 
chance to reuse valuable material for an appeal may therefore be lost. Judicial refusal to allow 
a cross-examination under section 41 YJCEA 1999, particularly in rape cases, where the 
question was whether the complainant consented under section 41 (3)(c), has been a point of 
law in appeals against conviction, but it would appear that the Court of Appeal seldom 
decides to overturn the conviction, which tend to suggest that trial judges have been careful in 
deciding when to exclude complainant sexual history on the whole. 
Out of 21 appeal cases relating to section 41, two-thirds were dismissed in the first five years 
of its passing.268 To overturn a conviction, the breach of section 41 would have to meet a very 
high threshold. For example. in R v F269 the accused was the stepfather of the complainant, V. 
V had alleged rape and sexual abuse from the age of 7 until she was 16 years old. F denied 
the allegations, but explained that V had been in a sexual and cohabiting relationship with F 
from the age of 18 until the relationship ended six years later. V admitted that they had been 
in a relationship, but that it was coercive. F stated that the relationship was consensual and 
loving and that V had made the allegations maliciously when the relationship ended. The trial 
judge allowed evidence about the adult relationship, but refused the jury to see video and 
photographic evidence which showed that the relationship was one where V did willingly 
submit to F. It was held on appeal that the trial had wrongly excluded this latter piece of 
evidence under section 41. 
A sound point is made by Khan,270 that section 41 may have fulfilled its aim of restricting 
sexual history evidence, but the four exceptions cannot predict exactly what type of previous 
sexual history evidence may be relevant to a defence. It has led to contexts in which broadly 
similar relevant evidence which had been admissible within the time limit was inadmissible 
for being outside of it. In the former context the jury can at least see that the complainant and 
the defendant were not complete strangers to each other; that the existence of a former or pre-
existing relationship may indicate a legitimate defence for a defendant pleading consent. The 
safeguards cannot prevent the unexpected, either. If a judge informs a jury to disregard 
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inadmissible sexual history evidence which subsequently came to light during a trial, the jury 
PD\VWLOOWDNHDGLIIHUHQWYLHZRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VYHUVLRQRIHYHQWV 
 
There is a European dimension here ± WKH9LFWLPV¶'LUHFWLve 2012/29/EU raises the 
competing human rights issues of the complainant and the defendant . It has been argued that 
the gateway for allowing prior sexual conduct under section 41(3)(c) is still too broad and 
VWLOOH[SRVHVYLFWLPV¶SULYDWHOLYHVXQQHFHVVDrily. Londono argues that there is a conflict of 
interest between Article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights - which prohibits the torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment of victims, contrasted with the rights of a defendant to have 
a fair trial under Article 6. She argues that the European Court of Human Rights has a 
positive duty to protect the rights of the victim under Article 3.271 In the case of R v A,272 
ZKHUHWKH/DZ/RUGVPHQWLRQHGWKDWYLFWLPV¶ULJKWVPXVWQRWEHYLRODWHGZKLOVWJLYLQJ
evidence, there was no mention made of the positive duties owed to the victim under Article 
3 to conduct an effective examination capable of leading to the punishment of the offender. 
She points out that the right to cross-examine a witness is not an absolute one.273 In SN v 
Sweden,274 the complainant was a minor who did not give evidence in court but via 
VWDWHPHQWVPDGHWRSROLFH'HIHQFH¶VFRXQVHOZDVQRWSUHVHQWEXWKHFRXOGKDYHKDG
questions put to the officer in charge conducting the interview. This right was not exercised 
and the ECHR found no breach of Article 6(3)(d). By contrast, in PS v Germany,275 the 
defendant was convicted of sexually abusing an eight-year-old girl. The trial evidence 
FRQVLVWHGRIVWDWHPHQWVPDGHE\WKHJLUO¶VPRWKHUFRQFHUQLQJWKHDOOHJDWLRQVWRJHWKHUZLWK
the police interview with the girl. The ECHR held that there had been a violation of Article 
6(3)(d) as the accused had been denied the opportunity of having questions put directly to the 
girl.  
 
The right to challenge prosecution evidence is certainly imperative as far as later ECHR 
rulings are concerned. In W.S. v. Poland, No. 21508/02, 19 June 2007, the Court found it 
unacceptable that the victim was never questioned by the prosecutor; nor was it acceptable 
that an applicant was only able to watch video testimony of the victim, which was the sole 
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evidence used to convict him; see A.S. v. Finland, No. 40156/07, 28 September 2010. But in 
Ruban and Others v. Spain, No. 41640/04, 13 September 2005, the Court gave the national 
system flexibility to determine the level of confrontation required for sexual assault cases. 
(ix) Prior research on the judicial approach to section 41 of the YJCEA 1999 
Dennis 276 highlights the Home Office Report 20/06277which provides empirical information 
as to the efficacy of section 41 YJCEA 1999 in protecting witnesses from unwarranted 
intrusion into their sexual history. Two hundred and thirty-six rape trials were tracked over a 
three month period in England and Wales in 2003. In just under a quarter of these trials, the 
GHIHQFHVRXJKWWRDGGXFHWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOKLVWRU\DQGLQWZR-thirds of cases, leave 
was given. Critics of section 41 may argue that this means that leave to cross-examine the 
complainant on sexual history has not been confined to exceptional circumstances; however, 
it may be indicative of an improvement on the repealed section 2 of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 2006. This is because in three quarters of the rape trials, leave to adduce 
section 41 evidence was not sought, and that out of the remaining quarter where it was sought 
and obtained, the application was likely to have some merit. There is the caveat, however, 
that leave was often sought at the time that the complainant was giving evidence in court and 
not pretrial. In a study of 23 rape trials, a number of cases included a cross-examination of 
the complainant without reference to section 41.278 This circumvention of the leave rules 
could have happened where the prosecution adduced the evidence itself; where there was 
PXWXDODJUHHPHQWRQERWKVLGHVEXWDJDLQVWWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VZLVKHVZKHUHWKHGHIHQFH
was unaware of the rules or ignored them altogether.  
The Report also highlighted the ignorance of practitioners of the pre-trial application 
requirements in the Crown Court rules, which were subsequently placed in Part 36 of the 
Criminal Procedure Rules in 2005. The Report commented that sexual history evidence 
occurred in the majority of sexual offence trials and prominently where the accused had a 
prior relationship with the complainant. However, there were very few instances in the study 
where questioning the complainant was lengthy and humiliating.279 
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The research postdates the House of Lords decision in R v A280 where it was held that judges 
should be able to determine where the line should be drawn in relation to the relevance of 
sexual behaviour between the complainant and the defendant, which allowed them to 
overstep the exception constraints of subsections 41(3)(b) and 41(3)(c) of the YJCEA. Whilst 
section 41 pursued desirable goals, the methods adopted amounted to legislative overkill.281 
Courts were increasingly seeing cases where the complainant had been in a relationship with 
the accused. There was no sense in leaving out truly relevant evidence on their relationship 
with each other on an arbitrary basis and cause an unfair trial. In R v A282 the Law Lords 
UHGHVLJQHGWKHµVLPLODUIDFWJDWHZD\¶WRXQVKDFNOHMXGJHVIURPDOHJLVODWLYHVWUDLWMDFNHW
imposed by section 41(3)(c). The Law Lords sidestepped section 41 and restored judicial 
discretion as to when sexual history evidence would be adduced. Temkin regarded the 
decision in R v A as retrograde, as it re-empowered judges to have the final say on what was 
admissible evidence, rather than be dictated by strict statutory codification.283  
+RZHYHULQ.LEEOH¶VUHVHDUFK284 on whether judges were applying section 41 fairly, he 
concluded that that the judiciary were generally acting competently (and by implication also 
keeping a rein on barrister cross-examinations). Rook QC commented on the finding: 
We must not allow the public to beguiled by the myth that section 41 needs tightening 
up because judges are not applying it rigorously. This is a complete myth. The section 
41 regime is not a soft option. Of course we must outlaw the twin myths, but myths 
can cut both ways, and then used to justify reform on a fallacious basis.285 
In a research survey, 70 circuit judges in England and Wales were interviewed and were 
largely in agreement that the R v A decision to restore some measure of judicial discretion 
(the Steyn test) rendered section 41 workable and prevented potential injustice, particularly in 
relation to excluding prior sexual history between the complainant and the defendant.286 
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The judges also disagreed with the claim of that sexual history evidence was used in an 
DWWHPSWWRGLVFUHGLWWKHYLFWLP¶VFKDUDFWHULQWKHH\HVRIWKHMXU\287 nor was there 
³RYHUZKHOPLQJHYLGHQFH´DVWKH5HSRUWFODLPHGWKDWWKHSUHVHQWSUDFWLFHof the courts in 
relation to the use of sexual history evidence was unsatisfactory.  
Given four mock rape scenarios, the judges were mainly consistent in their approach to 
sexual history admissibility, both in terms of whether the complainant should be allowed to 
be questioned and the extent to which evidence and questioning should be allowed. Judges 
were also sceptical that sexual history evidence was overwhelmingly prejudicial against the 
complainant; in some cases, the judges felt that the presentation oIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDO
history could rebound adversely on the defendant.  
Kibble argues that section 41 had as its intent the abolition of outmoded, sexist based sexual 
conduct evidence (under subsection 41(4)), but instead, it had the effect of barring evidence 
which may be essential to the presentation of a legitimate defence, hence to a fair trial. 288 He 
cites the case of R v Martin289 LQZKLFK-XVWLFH&UDQHLQGLFDWHGWKDWµKHPLJKWEHSUHSDUHGWR
draw down subsection 41(4) where it is necessary to do so to allow questioning or evidence 
WKDWLVHVVHQWLDOWRDIDLUWULDO¶290 
Arguably, section 41 YJCEA 1999 and section 100 CJA 2003, discussed next, already act as 
a sufficient control barrier for cross-examining on issues that are sensitive and personal to 
complainants. To bar cross-examination of all sensitive material relating to complainants 
would breach the equality of arms principle, because the State would then place the defence 
at a substantial disadvantage in terms of presenting its case according to Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
Professor Temkin, considered that the 1999 Act should have been taken a step further to 
H[FOXGHHYLGHQFHRIDOPRVWDQ\IRUPRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOKLVWRU\DVVHFWLRQZDV
more generous to defence interests than restrictions in the US, Canada, Australia (New South 
Wales) and Scotland. 291 However, Birch suggested that were this to happen, juries could be 
misled about the type of relationship that had existed between the parties, leading them to 
speculate that the context was a stranger offence rather than acquaintance, with psychological 
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studies indicating that participants took a harsher view of offences by a stranger than an 
acquaintance. Juries could also speculate that the parties had been in a prior relationship if not 
properly informed.292 
Home Office research into the impact of section 41 of the YJCEA 1999 suggests that it had 
no effect on attrition in rape cases.293 9LFWLPV¶ULJKWVDGYRFDWHVVWURYHWRUHGXFHDFTXLWWDOVE\
FDPSDLJQLQJIRUPD[LPXPOHJDOSURKLELWLRQRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOKLVWRU\LQDWULDOLQ
order to encourage reports of sexual offences and the attendance of complainants in court to 
increase the chances of a taking a prosecution to term to get a conviction. In 2002, the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V:KLWH3DSHUJustice for All aimed to further rebalance the system in favour of 
victims, witnesses and communities.294 
However, the Criminal Justice Bill on bad character reforms for non-defendants was 
FULWLFLVHGIRULWVSRWHQWLDOWRXQGHUPLQHWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWWRDIDLUWULDO295 The Law 
Commission recommended equable provisions for all parties, be they complainants, 
defendants or witnesses by prohibiting the use of their bad character for no good reason 




WRUHPRYHWKHVWLJPDRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOKLVWRU\WRSUHYHQWit from being used to 
attack her credibility. The same cannot be said for section 101 where the sexual behaviour of 
the defendant can suggest that not only is he being untruthful in denying that sexual 
misconduct occurred, but also that virtually any past sexual misconduct can be shown to 
demonstrate that he has a propensity to commit sexual offences, including the current one. If 
VHFWLRQZDVGHVLJQHGWRDFWDVDFRXQWHUZHLJKWWRWKHDGPLVVLELOLW\RIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶V
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(1) In criminal proceedings evidence of the bad character of a person other than the 
defendant is admissible if and only if 
 (a) it is important explanatory evidence,  
(b) it has substantial probative value in relation to a matter which  
(i) is a matter in issue in the proceedings, and 
(ii) is of substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole, 
 or (c) all parties to the proceedings agree to the evidence being admissible. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) evidence is important explanatory evidence if(a) 
without it, the court or jury would find it impossible or difficult properly to understand other 
evidence in the case, and (b) its value for understanding the case as a whole is substantial. 
(3) In assessing the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (1) (b) the 
court must have regard to the following factors (and to any others it considers relevant)(a) 
the nature and number of the events, or other things, to which the evidence relates; 
(b) when those events or things are alleged to have happened or existed; 
(c) where- 
(i) the evidence is evidence of a pHUVRQ¶VPLVFRQGXFWDQG 
(ii) it is suggested that the evidence has probative value by reason of similarity 
between that misconduct and other alleged misconduct, the nature and extent of the 




(ii) it is suggested that that person is also responsible for the misconduct charged, 
and 
(iii) the identity of the person responsible for the misconduct charged is disputed, 
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the extent to which the evidence shows or tends to show that the same person was responsible 
each time. 
(4) Except where subsection (1) (c) applies, evidence of the bad character of a person other 
than the defendant must not be given without leave of the court. 
Unless both parties agree to the use of the bad character material, (section 100(1)(c)), leave of 
the court will be required.  
It would appear that non-defendants do benefit from the greater restrictions as to the 
admissibility of bad character evidence generally, as set out in R v Somanathan,297 where the 
court stated that section 100 CJA imposes an enhanced relevance test on such evidence.298 
3DUDJUDSKRIWKH([SODQDWRU\1RWHVGRHVUHIHUWRµDQHQKDQFHGUHOHYDQFHWHVW¶EXWRQO\LQ
relation to section 100 of the Act. The terms of that section clearly impose a higher test in 
respect of the introduction of a non-GHIHQGDQW¶Vbad character than the test for the 
LQWURGXFWLRQRIDGHIHQGDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHU 
The defendant may find it difficult to use general bad character evidence to discredit a 
complainant or witness. It must relate to the incident in question at the current trial, 
suggesting that the BCE should be contemporaneous and specific. In R v Benguit,299 B was 
FRQYLFWHGRIPXUGHU7KHSURVHFXWLRQKDGFRQWHQGHGWKDW%ZDVD³NQLIHFDUULHU´7KH&RXUW
VDLGWKDWWKLVZDVHYLGHQFHRI³EDGFKDUDFWHU´DQGWKDWLWGLGQRWFRPHZLWKLQVHFWLRQDRI
the CJA 2003 because: 
«WKHHYLGHQFHZDVQRWWRHVWDEOLVKVRPuch that the appellant had the knife on him 
that day, but to establish that he was the sort of person who carried a knife. That 
seems to us to mean that it was evidence of bad character in a general sense and was 
insufficiently related to the actual offence itself as to be evidence admissible under 
section 98.300 
Contrast the requirement for specific BCE of non-defendants with that of section 101 of the 
CJA 2003, which admits propensity evidence under section 101(1)(d) read in conjunction 
with section 103 of the same. Section 101 is not limited to propensity, because section 103(1) 
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XVHVWKHZRUG³LQFOXGH´LHLWincludes propensity but it is not confined to propensity as 
discussed in R v Highton.301  
Thus there is inequality between the parties as concerns the rules on the use of propensity 
evidence, with section 100 disallowing evidence of general bad conduct even when part of 
the evidence does relate to the current facts in issue. Under section 103, the prosecution may 
use propensity evidence against the accused where it is trying to show that the accused has a 
tendency to misbehave or to be untruthful. In credibility-based trials, the section 100 
restriction on the use of a non-GHIHQGDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHUGHSULYHVWKHGHIHQGDQWRISRWHQWLDOO\
vital material to sKRZDFRPSODLQDQW¶VSURSHQVLW\WRWHOOOLHVLQFOXGLQJXQWUXWKIXOQHVVRIWKH
present allegation/s. 
In R v Hussain (Mohammed),302 a rape trial, the defendant disputed non-consensual 
intercourse between the parties and asserted the complainant in truth made sexual advances 
WRZDUGVKLPDQGPDVWXUEDWHGKLP7KHWULDOMXGJHKDGUXOHGWKDWWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VJHQHUDO
creditworthiness was central to the case but he had prohibited the jury from hearing about the 
FRPSODLQDQW¶VSUHYLRXVFRQYLFWLRQVRYHUDQXPEHURI\HDUV, including battery, burglary, 
robbery , shoplifting and taking a motor vehicle without consent. The Court of Appeal held 
that he should also have ruled that the convictions were so numerous, varied and recent that 
they were of substantial probative value upon the issue of whether her accusation against the 
appellant was worthy of belief. It was for the jury to judge whether in the particular factual 
context of the present case her general bad character was of any assistance to them in 
resolving who was telling the truth.303 
(x) Comments on section 100 CJA 2003 
1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKDWVHFWLRQUHIHUVWRµHYLGHQFH¶DQGQRWµTXHVWLRQV¶RUµDQDOOHJDWLRQ¶
the section is clearly intended to restrict any cross-examination that is calculated to 
undermine the credibility of a non-defendant witness. It is therefore wider reaching than the 
µFRPSODLQDQWVRQO\¶DPELWRIVHFWLRQRIWKH62$$DQGVHFWLRQ<-&($
This may include any prosecution witness, any defence witness or even the testimony of a 
deceased witness. 
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If the defendant wishes to discredit the credibility of a prosecution witness, it is possible for a 
trial court to allow evidence of his/her bad character under section 100 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 under the following gateways: 
x Important explanatory evidence as defined in section 100(2)(a), being evidence 
which, if it were excluded, the court or jury would find it impossible or difficult 
properly to understand other evidence in the case and where its value for 
understanding the case as a whole is substantial.  
x Substantial probative value of evidence which must mean that the bad character 
evidence has an enhanced quality of proving or disproving a matter in issue. That 
assessment must be considered not as a generalised and hypothetical question but 
specifically within its practical and fact sensitive context.304The court must have 
regard to the following factors and to any others it considers relevant: 
(a) the nature and number of the events or other things to which the evidence 
relates;  
(b) when those events or things are alleged to have happened or existed; 
FZKHUHLWKHHYLGHQFHLVHYLGHQFHRIDSHUVRQ¶VPLVFRQGXFWDQGLLLWLV
suggested that the evidence has probative value by reason of similarity between 
that misconduct, the nature and extent of the similarities and the dissimilarities 
between each of the alleged instances of misconduct. 
Under section 100(4), any such evidence may only be given with leave of the court. 
In Hanson, Gilmore and Pickstone,305 the court clarified that subject to judicial ruling on 
admissibility, previous convictions were capable of being disclosed. In disputed matters, it 
was expected that minimum undisputed facts would be admitted. But what about other forms 
RIµSDVWPLVFRQGXFW¶WKDWKDYHEHHQDGPLWWHGIRUD trial according to case law and what has 
been disputed on appeal? 
8QGHUVHFWLRQDSURVHFXWLRQZLWQHVV¶FRQYLFWLRQVDUHXQLPSRUWDQW.306 Nor is a previous 
arrest for an offence held against the non-defendant; see R v Weir and Others.307 
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The purpose of the enhanced relevance test is to shield prosecution witnesses from having 
their previous convictions of peripheral importance used to impugn them. The law also 
shields non-defendants. In Yaxley-Lennon,308 a crucial defence witness had a caution for 
cocaine possession which was inadmissible evidence under section 100 (1) CJA 2003, 
because the caution did not have substantial probative value in relation to her credibility.  
Although the CJA 2003 repeals former rules for admitting bad character evidence, it still has 
some residual use of the common law where judges have had difficulty determining whether 
evidence is admissible under statute. The reforms have been designed to bring prosecution 
cases to trial by allowing an expansion of secondary evidence. The new legislation has 
restricted the use of bad character evidence against complainants unless it is highly relevant 
DQGKDVµHQKDQFHGYDOXH¶This difference was also acknowledged by the Home Office.309  
If a defendant asserts that a complainant has a history of making false accusations, this 
evidence could be admitted as bad character under section 98 of CJA 2003, but would have to 
SDVVWKHµHQKDQFHGUHOHYDQFH¶WHVWXQGHUVHFWLRQRIWKHVDPH,IWKHGHIHQGDQWLVDVVHUWLQJ
that the current allegation is false, this would be outside the remit of section 98 according to 
section 98 (a) of the CJA 2003. However, it should fall within section 98 (b) of the same as a 
IDOVHDOOHJDWLRQFRXOGEHFRQVWUXHGDVEHLQJµHYLGHQFHRIPLVFRQGXFWLQFRQQHFWLRQZith the 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQRUSURVHFXWLRQRIWKDWRIIHQFH¶RULIWKHGHIHQGDQWFDQSURGXFHHYLGHQFHWKDWWKH
prosecution witness made one or more false allegations on a separate occasion to show that 
s/he is not creditworthy in the current case. Even the 1970s Heilbron Report, above, 
FRQVLGHUHGWKDWWKHUHZDVYDOLGLW\LQDOORZLQJµVWULNLQJO\VLPLODU¶PLVFRQGXFWHYLGHQFH
against prosecution witnesses, in the same way as similar fact evidence has been and still is 
XVHGWRVKRZDGHIHQGDQW¶VSURSHQVLW\WRFRPPLWWKe type of offence or which he for 
currently indicted.310 
,IWKHGHIHQGDQWZLVKHVWRUDLVHPDWWHUVDERXWWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOEHKDYLRXUKHQHHGVWR
seek leave under both section 100 (4) and section 41 of the YJCEA 1999. If the defendant 
wishes to assert that the complainant has made false allegations in the past, the judge may 
allow questioning at cross-examination, but will usually draw a line on further questioning 
once an admission or negation has been made by the complainant according to the rule of 
finality. 
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-XGJHVPD\IRUELGWKHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHSURVHFXWLRQZLWQHVV¶%&(LIWKHHYLGHQFHVWUDGGOHV
KHUVH[XDODFWLYLW\6RPHPD\UHJDUGSULRUDOOHJDWLRQVDVµVH[XDODFWLYLW\¶DVZHOODVEHLQJ
potential misconduct evidence claimed by the defence to be a false allegation under section 
98 (b) CJA 2003, unless the prior false allegation is proved. The Court of Appeal has had to 
reconsider whether a false allegation claim should have been entertained by the trial judge. 
In R v David Stephenson 311the Court of Appeal had to consider whether the trial judge been 
wrong to refuse leave to cross-examine a complainant in a sexual abuse case on her previous 
bad character in order to determine her propensity for untruthfulness. The complainant, C, 
made allegations of historic sexual abuse (rape and indecency with a child) against S, 
following therapy for psychological disorders involving the resurfacing of suppressed 
memories. C and S were known to each other and had lived together with a family for three 
years. C alleged that she had been abused since the age of 13 by S. S denied all the offences 
but was convicted and appealed on two grounds. He argued that the judge should have 
admitted evidence that C had made similar allegations against every male she had ever had 
contact with and that she had been damaged by her life experiences and had developed a 
pattern of making false allegations against men.  
It was argued that the judge had been wrong to disallow S to cross-examine C on her sexual 
history under section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. S further 
contended that the judge had erred in refusing leave to cross examine C on her bad character 
under section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The Court of Appeal held that there had 
been no misapplication of section 41 YJCEA 1999, because the original application for leave 
WRFURVVH[DPLQH&ZDVEDVHGRQ&¶VUHODWLRQVKLSVVSHFLILFDOO\ZLWKWZRRWKHUPHQ7KH
judge viewing the application left matters open for S to make a further application but none 
ZDVPDGH7KHDSSHDOMXGJHVWKRXJKWWKDWWKHQDWXUHRI6¶VDSSOLFDWLRQDVDUJXHGDWDSSHDO
ZDVQRWDSSDUHQWWRWKHMXGJHDWWULDORQWKHDYDLODEOHGRFXPHQWV)XUWKHUPRUH6¶VDUJXPHQW
that he was wrongly prevented from developing a case that C made accusations against other 
men related to her credibility and ability to tell the truth, not her sexual history. As concerns 
VHFWLRQ&-$WKHDSSHDOMXGJHVIRUPHGWKHYLHZWKDWKDG6DUJXHGDWWULDOWKDW&¶V
allegations were part of a wider behaviour, tKHMXGJHPLJKWKDYHDFFHSWHGWKDW&¶VSURSHQVLW\
as to truthfulness was of substantial probative value. The Court was satisfied that even if S 
had been allowed to cross examine C, her previous convictions were for minor matters that 
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occurred in her teens a ORQJWLPHSULRUWRKHUJLYLQJHYLGHQFHDW6¶VWULDO7KH&RXUWRI
Appeal upheld the conviction.  
Child sexual abuse appeal case involving non-GLVFORVXUHRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VDOOHJHG
bad character  
In R v V 312 the appellant had been charged with sexually abusing his daughter. The 
complainant was aged 13 at the time of the rape and assault allegations and aged 14 at trial. 
The defendant wished to adduce evidence that J had previously made a false allegation and 
other bad character evidence using the provisions of section 100 (4) CJA 2003.  
7KHUHZHUHVHYHUDOLQVWDQFHVRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHUWKDW9ZLVKHGWRDGGXFHIn 
the first incident, J and a friend had at one time complained to a police officer of discharge in 
their underpants as if they had been sexually assaulted. The girls had been medically 
examined and the incident was no-crimed by the police. The trial judge refused leave as there 
was no basis for saying that the allegations were false. The second incident involved an 
admission by J that she had falsely told friends she had been pushed by a schoolteacher. The 
trial judge disallowed this evidence under section 100 (1)(b) because it lacked substantial 
probative value. The third incident involved J telling her mother that a man (not V) had held a 
knife to her throat and put his fingers inside her knickers. J became aggressive towards her 
mother for reporting the matter to police, who then had to file the matter as undetected. The 
judge refused to admit this evidence; again deciding that there was no basis for the evidence 
WREHIDOVH2QWKLVLVVXH9KDGREWDLQHGDYLGHRFRQYHUVDWLRQZKHUH-¶VIULHQG&VDLGWKDW-
had admitted that this complaint was false. 
As to the first incident with the two giUOV¶FRPSODLQWVWKHDSSHDOMXGJHVVWDWHGWKDWWKH
proposed questions to J would have led to the suggestion that she had imagined the incident. 
There was no proper evidential basis for allowing the cross examination; it was therefore 
correct not to allow it under section 41 (3) (a) and section 41(4) of the YJCEA 1999. The 
DOOHJHGDVVDXOWE\DWHDFKHUµH[DJJHUDWHGWRIHOORZSXSLOVDIWHUVRPHHYHU\GD\FODVVURRP
PLVEHKDYLRXURQ-¶VSDUW¶313 did not amount to reprehensible conduct under section 112 (1) 
when read in conjunction with section 98 of the CJA 2003. Furthermore, even if that conduct 
had arguably been reprehensible, it still did not satisfy the test under section 100 (1) (b) - the 
substantive probative value requirement. The third incident did pass the test for admissibility 
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under section 100 of the CJA 2003. The video interview showed that there was sufficient 
evidence for asserting that the statement made by J had been untrue. A cross-examination 
should have been permitted.  
The case hinged on the credibility of both V and J. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the 
jury had been made aware that J already had some sexual experience and had not always 
behaved well. Thus, if a defendant alleges that a complainant has a history of fabricating 
allegations of sexual abuse, the allegation must effectively be proved and on record to avoid 
being prohibited in a cross-examination. 
Are section  41 YJCEA 1999 and section 100 CJA 2003 complementary? Practitioners have 
to negotiate, not one, but two sets of hurdles when making an application to admit a 
FRPSODLQDQW¶V%&(EHFDXVHVHFWLRQKDVQRWEHHQVXSHUVHGHGE\section 100 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003,314 as clarified in R v F.315 The tandem effect is permitted under 
section 112(3)(b) of the CJA 2003, which states that this provision does not affect the 
exclusion of evidence under section 41 YJCEA 1999; and section 41(8) of the YJCEA does 
not allow any evidence to be adduced or question asked under section 41 that would 
otherwise be inadmissible. 
Section 41 of YJCEA 1999 and section 100 of the CJA 2003 have been the subject of 
appeals, often in specific categories of crime such as sexual offences, with most convictions 
being upheld. Having two statutes to negotiate is unwieldy and may cause misinterpretation 





It has already been argued that complainants are not treated equally compared with 
defendants since complainants may not object in person to a revelation of bad character at 
trial. Under section 100 of the CJA 2003, at the pre-trial hearing: the judge weeds out 
irrelevant evidence on her behalf. A rejected application to admit BCE is official objection by 
WKHFRXUWWRWKHHYLGHQFH¶VDGPLVVLRQ%XWWKHJDWHZD\VWKURXJKZKLFKWKH GHIHQGDQW¶VEDG
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FKDUDFWHUFDQSDVVDUHPXFKZLGHU7KHUHIRUHDOWKRXJKWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VFKDUDFWHUHYLGHQFH
process denies her an active role in what BCE may be revealed in a cross-examination, the 
FRPSODLQDQW¶V%&(VWLOOKDVWRSDVVDQHQKDQFHGUHOHYDQFH WHVWDVZHOODVEHLQJµLPSRUWDQW
H[SODQDWRU\HYLGHQFH¶XQGHUVHFWLRQD&-$7KH&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH$FWVHFWLRQ
100 was drafted with the enhanced relevance test being the higher threshold for admitting the 
FRPSODLQDQW¶V%&(:KDWDUHWKHURRWs of this disparity? 
The 2002 White Paper, which led to the radical reforms of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, was 
arguably, ideology based and it edited submissions from the public which did not fit squarely 
with its own reform agenda:316 
... the processes of evidence collection and deployment did not comply with the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VWKHRUHWLFDODQGPHWKRGRORJLFDOGLFWDWHVRIµHYLGHQFH-based-SROLF\¶DVD
guiding principle in all public policymaking. 
Key evidence, which called into question the wisdom of the planned criminal justice reforms 
because miscarriages of justice might occur, was ignored at the discussion stage.317 Also, the 
way in which the evidence was obtained, selected and deployed did not reflect the views 
expressed of groups and/or individuals with the most to contribute in the reform of the 
criminal justice system.318 Known victims of miscarriage of justice were not included. 
Naughton points out that if the government had been intent on rebalancing the system in 
favour of victims, there would need to have been the inclusion of an analysis of the extent 
and consequences caused by miscarriages of justice. There was no attempt at ascertaining the 
scale and harm caused to the wrongfully convicted, nor any prediction of the consequences of 
diluting and removing safeguards from injustice caused by future changes to the criminal 
justice system.319 This was because the agenda was victim-centred.320 
The media had reported governmental plans to overhaul historically valued legal safeguards 
such as the double jeopardy rule, the restrictions on the use of jury trials, the revelation of 
previous criminal records, etc. Given the fast-track approach adopted by the government to 
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push through the criminal justice system reforms, there was surprisingly little debate from 
academia itself at any stage of the processes.321  
Naughton argues that the 2002 White Paper was based on civil-servant generated findings, 
posing as proper evidence based policy (EBP). The evidence which led to the radical reforms 
of the criminal justice system was shrouded in obscurity for political expediency.  
The responses to Justice for All were simply not made available for public information and/or 
scrutiny. The names of the organizations that took part in the Justice for All consultation were 
recorded, the names of the individuals who made a submission to the process were blacked 
out. This presented a particular barrier to any attempted research into the supposed public 
consultation and further deems this policy document as an intrinsically private governmental 
affair.322 
Crime victims were not the only stakeholders in the consultation process as any human 
system can make mistakes and that miscarriages of justice can, and do, occur. The 
consultation took no account whatever of the forms of social, psychological, or financial 
harm caused to victims of miscarriage of justice who have successfully overturned their 
wrongful criminal convictions in England and Wales. It equally neglected the same forms of 
indirect harm caused by wrongful criminal convictions to wives/husbands/partners of 
miscarriage of justice victims, to their parents, children, friends and to communities when 
victims are wrongly convicted of criminal offences.323  
The overemphasis on victims of crime at government policy level helps to explain why the 
legislation is more favourable towards crime victims. 




not to report and to withdraw reported complaints. Complainants fear the cross-examination 
VWDJHRISURFHHGLQJVWKHPRVW¶324 This reticence of complainants to report alleged crimes is 
the key reason why section 41 YJCEA 1999 and section 100 CJA 2003 were passed. The 
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MXGLFLDU\KDVWREDODQFHWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVHQVLELOLWLHVDJDLQVWWKHULJKWVRIWKHGHIHQGDQW
when they are asked to determine whether bad character, sexual past or sexual behaviour 
evidence is sufficiently important or its value sufficiently probative to justify admission. 
The adversarial court system is governed by the principle of orality, which may prevent 
vulnerable and intimidated witnesses from giving their best evidence, whatever modifications 
are made to accommodate them.325 The changes in the bad character laws under the YJCEA 
1999 and the CJA 2003 were designed to elicit the best evidence from vulnerable 
complainants and witnesses without unnecessary intrusion into their personal history. 
Tensions between rights of the victim and defendant under the European Convention 
$UWLFOHRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWVVWDWHVWKDWµHYHU\RQHKDVWKHULJKW
to respect for his private and family life, his home and KLVFRUUHVSRQGHQFH¶$UJXDEO\WKH
UHFHQWWLJKWHQLQJRIWKHXVHRIDFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOKLVWRU\LQFRQWHVWHGVH[XDORIIHQFH
trials conforms to this principle. However, Article 8(2) is a qualified right: 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of his right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
«IRUWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHULJKWVDQGIUHHGRPVRIRWKHUV 
Therefore, the rights of the victim, such as to be free from psychological hindrance when 
giving evidence, are conditional upon the right of the defendant to have a fair trial under the 
adversarial system so that the accused may challenge his accuser in open court by means of 
cross-H[DPLQLQJWKHDFFXVHU¶VHYLGHQFH 326 In English law, it is at the cross-examination 
stage in court where the defendant may challenge the prosecution witness. Judges have an 
active role in deciding whether a cross-examination is overstepping the line. A convicted 
defendant may decide to appeal on the grounds that the trial judge was wrong to have 
SURKLELWHGWKHUHYHODWLRQRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶V%&(DVZHOODVEHLQJDYLRODWLRQRIKLVULJKWWR
a fair trial.  
Burton, Evans and Sanders conclude that complainants would be better served by the 
inquisitorial legal process.327 7KHFRPSODLQDQW¶VZLWQHVVVWDWHPHQWZRXOGEHYLGHRWDSHG$
cross-examination could take place in camera. The videotaping would allow the complainant 
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to narrate authentically rather than the current process of having his/her statement taken by an 
investigator only to be scribed by the police and typed up in a witness statement.328 Cross-
examinations could then be allowed on delicate matters, provided that they are relevant, taped 
and shown to the jury in court. 
This method is designed tRUHVSHFWERWKWKHULJKWVRIYLFWLPVQRWWRVXIIHUµKXPLOLDWLQJDQG
GHJUDGLQJ¶WUHDWPHQWXQGHU$UWLFOHRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQDWWKHVDPHWLPHDV
allowing the defendant to cross-examine or have the complainant cross-examined under 
Article 6 of the same and perhaps reduce the psychological barriers victims face when 
deciding to report crimes, but dispense with the fear of being in the courtroom. 
Academics such as Londono, maintain that the present BCE laws affecting complainants still 
flout Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.329 She argues that both section 
41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 and the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 
section 100, still fail to protect the complainant from humiliating and degrading treatment 
when her sexual history is adduced in cross-examination by the defence, even if relevant to 
IDFWVLQLVVXHZKLFKPD\XQGHUPLQHWKHSURVHFXWLRQ¶VFDVHDQGZRXOGWKHUHIRUHEHDWWKH
H[SHQVHRIWKHDFFXVHG¶VULJKWVWRDIDLUWULDOXQGHU$UWLFOH<HWLQIDFW-finding, if the search 
for the truth of the substance of the allegation is compromised to the extent that key evidence 
is left out of the equation, there is the risk that a trial will be unfair to the defendant ± 
evidence which might exonerate him at trial or be sufficient grounds to argue for a wrongful 
conviction appeal. 
Policymakers have acknowledged the quandary of a person who comes forward and makes a 
formal complaint: µ7RRRIWHQWKHSHUFHSWLRQLVWKDWYLFWLPVDQGZLWQHVVHVDUHWKHRQHVRQ
trial, rathHUWKDQWKHVXVSHFW¶330 However, if one assumes that what a complainant says is 
true, this implies that the accused is prima facie culpable before the trial, thereby reversing 
the presumption of innocence.  
The tenet that prior sexual experience shows a propensity to consent and a lack of veracity 
DERXWWKHDOOHJDWLRQDUHQRWWKHRQO\µUDSHP\WKV¶QRUDUHWKH\QHFHVVDULO\WKHPRVW
damaging.331 Is it helpful to conceal from the jury potentially relevant material under the 
restrictions of section 41 YJCEA 1999 at a time when juries are become increasingly 
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entrusted to hear sensitive evidence? The Justice for All White paper commented on the need 
for juries to have access to relevant evidence: 
Magistrates, judges and juries should be trusted to give appropriate evidence the 
ZHLJKWLWGHVHUYHVZKHQWKH\H[HUFLVHWKHLUMXGJHPHQW«WKHUXOHVRIHYLGHQFHQHHGWR
be rewritten to ensure that they have included all relevant material to help them to 
reach a just verdict. The rules should be coherent, consistent and realistic...332 
%LUFKSRLQWVRXWWKHSDUDGR[RIWKH:KLWHSDSHU¶VFRQILGHQFHLQDMXU\¶VPDWXULW\DQGPRGHUQ
mindset, yet section 41 YJCEA was premised on the assumption that juries held anachronistic 
views on evidence about sexuality, which, if true, meant that they were incapable of assessing 
sexual history evidence impartially. This approach, she states, paves the way for justifying 
even more restrictions on juries hearing sexual history evidence, effectively amounting to a 
blanket ban.333 She makes a strong point, that bowdlerising relevant sexual history material 
risks skewing the truth-finding mission of the jury. At the same time, little is known about 
KRZPXFKZHLJKWLVJLYHQWRDFRPSODLQDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHUHYLGHQFHE\MXULHV7KLVLV
because researchers are currently forbidden in the UK from canvassing jurors under section 8 
of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.334 It is difficult to see why juries should decide serious 
cases with the reasoning of their verdicts kept secret by law in a democratic society which 
values openness and accountability on matters conducted in the public interest in the public 
forum of the courtroom.  
There has been recent agitation by campaigners for more victim-centred rights within the 
criminal justice system, perhaps due to victories they have made in persuading criminal law-
makers to draft laws that are more favourable to them. A July 2009 government report 
GLVFXVVHGZKHWKHUWKHUROHRIWKH&URZQVKRXOGFKDQJHWREHFRPHWKHµYLFWLP¶VDGYRFDWH¶
rather than representative of the public interest.335 
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1LFROD3DGILHOGVDLGWKDWWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWRµUHEDODQFH¶WKHV\VWHPLQIDYRXU
RIYLFWLPVFDQH[DJJHUDWHWKHUROHRIWKHYLFWLPLQWKHSURVHFXWLRQSURFHVV¶336 
Robin White noted that there had to be distance between the victim anGWKHSURVHFXWRUµ2QH
IRUPRISURVHFXWRULQGHSHQGHQFHLQWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWLVLQGHSHQGHQFHIURPWKHYLFWLP¶337 
He went on to distinguish between the role of the prosecutor with regard to the victim and to 
the criminal justice system:  
...prosecution by a public prosecutor is not necessarily in the interests of the victim. It 
may or may not be, but the point of the criminal justice system is to identify who did 
WKHZURQJWKLQJDQGPDNHWKDWLQGLYLGXDOVXEMHFWWRDSHQDOW\¶338 
Sir Ken Macdonald QC noted in his final lecture as Director of Public Prosecutions that: 
It will never be possible, in adversarial proceedings governed appropriately by 
Article 6, for the interests of victims to overcome those of defendants.339 
By analogy, it is arguable that as section 100 CJA 2003 is partisan legislation, given the 
WLJKWHUUHVWULFWLRQVRIWKHXVHRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶V%&(LWWKHUHIRUHSUHVXSSRVHVWKDWWKH
prosecution is dealing with a (proved) victim rather than a complainant. The criminal justice 
system is designed to test whether a complaint of a crime can be formally substantiated. 
The changes in bad character legislation in 1999 and 2003 were premised on low attrition 
UDWHVLQUDSHFDVHVZKLFKFODLPVPDNHUVDUJXHGZDVGXHWRWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VUHWLFHQFHWR
report a crime or give evidence at trial. What other factors could cause a low report rate? As 
Naughton pointed out, victims of false allegations were not party to the formal consultation 
on criminal justice system reform.340  
At the same time, a Metropolitan Police report (London area) found that there was still 
XQGHUUHSRUWLQJRIVH[XDORIIHQFHVEHFDXVHFDVHVDUHVWLOOEHLQJµQR-FULPHG¶HYHQZKHUHWKH\DUH
not unsubstantiated.341 In 80% of the crimed allegations a suspect was identified, approximately 
three quarters (73%) of which led to an arrest.342 One in three rape allegations were no/not 
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crimed, an increase from one in four at the time of the 2005 Review.343 One quarter of crimed 
rape allegations resulted in a charge by the CPS. Following arrest, just under a half of suspects 
(44%) were charged.344 Of the 115 suspects charged by the CPS, 36 (one in three) were 
convicted.345  
 
Whilst concerns do remain about the low report rate of sexual offences, are many investigators 
reaching competent decisions not to pursue certain complaints? There may be legitimate reasons 
ZK\DQLQYHVWLJDWLRQLVµQR-FULPHG¶DQGWKLVPD\LQFOXGHFDVHVZKLFKPD\EHOHIWRQILOHXQWLO
more evidence against the accused is discovered to reactivate matters). Other no-crimed cases 
may be solved because the complaint was withdrawn because its maker admitted to fabricating 
LW%URZQDQG+RUYDWK¶VSDPSKOHWFULWLFLVLQJWKHUDSHDWWULWLRQUDWHFLWHVWKHUHVHDUFKFRQFOXVLRQ
RI 6WDQNR DQG :LOOLDPV ZKLFK LQGLFDWHG WKDW µonly about ten per cent of allegations were 
UHJDUGHGDV IDOVH¶346 Campaigners seeking to improve the lot of victims of sexual offences 
focus on rape attrition rates to justify the passing of more laws to enhance the prospects of 
obtaining more rape convictions, but downplay statistics which indicate that there is also a 
problem with manifestly false allegations and wrongful convictions.  
 
Understandably, campaigners for both victims of sexual offences and false allegations of these 
offences will not want nebulous data to risk adulterating their cause. The temptation is to ignore 
false positives and false negatives so as not to throw doubt on those genuine cases. In the case 
of historic child sexual abuse, without forensic proof or proof that a crime has occurred, the 
need to investigate each case fully and impartially becomes imperative, given the dire 
consequences of false negatives of abuse (acquittal of the guilty) or false positives (innocent 
found guilty).347 
 
Assuming that the Metropolitan police report on rape attrition is accurate in its methodology, 
the percentage of false allegations is low, but when the sample numbers are analysed more 
carefully, the number of false reports is still scores of accused, rather than a few. The 
Metropolitan Police study indicated that in 2005, 11% of allegations were false.348 These were 
cases in which the complainant admitted that the allegations were false or that the evidence 
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substantiated that the original allegation had no basis in fact. 72 out of 677 rape allegations were 
no-crimed in this way. In 2006, 4% of allegations (28 complaints) were categorised as false. 
The police research shows that dozens were still subjected to a false allegation.349 Rape statistics 
also tend not to show successfully appealed cases where the accused was tried and convicted, 
ZKLFK WKHUHIRUH FRXOG EH DGGHG WR IDOVH UHSRUW ILJXUHV LI µIDOVH¶ FDQ LQFOXGH ZURQJIXO
convictions). More empirical research on false allegations in sexual offences should be 
undertaken, such as that of the Crown Prosecution Service in 2013 on false allegations of rape, 




Decision 2001/220/JHA.351 Paragraph (4) states that Member states should approximate their 
laws and legislations to the extent necessary to attain the objective of affording victims of 
crime a high level of protection, both witness protection and privacy at legal proceedings. 
3DUDJUDSKVWDWHVWKHYLFWLPV¶QHHGVVKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGLQDFRPSUHKHQVLYHDQG
coordinated manner, avoiding partial and inconsistent decisions which may give rise to 
secondary victimisation. Under paragraph (8) rules and practices regarding the standing and 
main rights of victims have to be approximated, with particular regard to the right to be 
treated with respect for their dignity and the right to be protected at the various stages of 





firm evidence of serious intent to intrude upon their privacy.  
 
This section could therefore be interpreted as including the right to respect for a private life 
under Article 8 of the European Convention, such as the right to individual sexuality and the 
right to psychological integrity.352  
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Under paragraph (11) of the Framework Decision, suitable and adequate training should be 
given to persons coming into contact with victims. This provision can apply not only to 
police who interview complainants, but also legal staff on both the prosecution and defence 
side who also question them. The Bar Council of England and Wales contributed to a 
consultation which reviewed the efficacy of the Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA.353 It 
advised that member states should ensure that new practitioner programmes and that 
continuing professional development requirements includes training in how to handle victims 
and witnesses, not just for the police, prosecutors and judges, but also for defence lawyers.354  
It was in favour of identifying vulnerable witnesses who would benefit from special 
provisions such as pre-recorded cross examinations, screens, and live video links given 
elsewhere transmitted into the courtroom. It regarded children as vulnerable victims who 
required these provisions, but it also suggested identifying vulnerable victims by assessing 
their personal and case-specific attributes to tailor the special measures to the personal needs 
of these victims.355 The existing Framework Decision contained sensible suggestions, but it 
had not been implemented by numerous member states, therefore it recommended that the 
Framework be contained in a directive.356  
Following this advice, the European Parliament adopted Directive 2012/29/EU. This 
Directive sets out minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of 
crime with special regards to the vulnerable, including children.357 It enhances and 
complements the Framework Decision already in place on the standing of victims in legal 
proceedings but it is more powerful because member states are mandated to ensure that 
measures are available to protect complainants from secondary victimisation, especially by 
protecting their dignity during questioning and when testifying.358 Article 24 provides for an 
additional set of available measures for child victims. Member states are obliged to guarantee 
that all interviews with the child victim may be audio visually recorded and that such 
recorded interviews may be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. It is for the member 
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states to determine procedural rules for these recordings. These provisions may have direct 
effect - an individual can invoke them before national courts.359 
 
7KH'LUHFWLYH¶V$UWLFOHSURYLVLRQKDVDOUHDG\EHHQFULWLFLVHGIRUXQGHUPLQLQJWKHULJKWRI
the defendant to examine or have examined witnesses against him cross examined under 
Article 6 (3) (d) because member states no longer have the discretion to determine the 
recording of obtaining evidence from complainants who are deemed vulnerable (and 
therefore offered special treatment) under the new rules.360 In England, the pre-recording of 
interviews with child victims is already permitted, but the Directive will now allow any other 
complainant deemed vulnerable to be allowed to have a pre-recorded interview. According to 
Vanhatalo v Finland, no. 22692/93, 18 Oct 1995, sexual abuse cases victims need not testify 
as long as there is some corroborating evidence available for examination. 
 
The extent of any measure protecting specific needs of victims should be determined without 
prejudice to the rights of the defence and in accordance with the rules of judicial discretion.361 
According to its preamble, the Directive shall respect all fundamental rights and principles 
recognised in the Charter of the Rights of the European Union, including the right to a fair 
trial, the rights of the child, and the right to dignity.362 The European Court of Justice has held 
in Pupino 363 that protective measures for victims must be designed in such a way that the 
right to fair trial is respected. The yardstick for what constitutes a fair trial for the accused 
was also discussed. In dispute was whether the Italian justice system could extend the 
availability of special measures to five-year-old children who alleged to have been physically 
assaulted by their primary school teacher where the national law explicitly stated that the 
national measures applied to complainants of sexual offences. The ruling effectively allowed 




victims, yet there must be a real concern that the requirements implied by the VXVSHFW¶VULJKWV
to a fair trial under Article 6 have been diluted. Nevertheless, as long as criminal proceedings 
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are considered to be fair in the aggregate as discussed in Pupino, above, these developments 
are considered by the Court to be consistent with Article 6.  
 
The impact of the legislation favouring victims can be illustrated in this way: the trial of a 
defendant in absentia in open court is not encouraged,365 yet he may now be tried with his 
alleged victim in absentia (in a pre-recording, not as a live witness in open court). Whilst 
these conditions may be less intimidating and embarrassing for complainants, their 
demeanour (body language) in a pre-recording may differ from the performance they would 
otherwise have given in the courtroom before the jury. The defendant, by contrast, is denied 
the opportunity of giving his evidence under these more comfortable conditions, where 
allegations impugning his sexual conduct are made in the courtroom and they may also be 
reported in the Press which may adversely affect his own faPLO\¶VULJKWVWRUHVSHFWIRU
privacy. If pre-recording complainants for their evidence-in-chief were to be universally 
applied to adults as well as children, it is suggested that directions by the judge would have to 
be given to explain that demeanour can be affected by the type of condition to which each 
party is subjected to offset the greater advantage complainants offered to complainants. 
In England, the prosecution side is still represented by the Crown, but it is likely that there 
will emerge a second µSURVHFXWRU¶- the victim - against whom an accused must amount a 
defence, given the increasing latitude and status afforded to victims under the new EU 
Directive for victims. Are we witnessing a reconceptualization of what constitutes a fair trial, 
privileging the protection of interests over those of the defendant? The problem with this new 
concept is that we are losing sight of the original reasons for ensuring the right to a fair trial - 
it is a truth seeking tool, guided by a set of rules designed to keep the delicate balance 
between the two goals of punishing perpetrators of crimes at trial and preventing the 
punishment of innocent people.366 
It is true that the right to defend oneself does not provide for an unlimited right to use any 
kind of defence argument,367 but it has been shown in this thesis that there have been 
EUHDFKHVRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWWRDIDLUWULDOZKLFKKDYHEHHQVXFFHVVIXOO\DSSHDOHGZKHUH
legitimate defence cross-H[DPLQDWLRQTXHVWLRQVRQWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VVH[XDOSDVWRUFRQGXFW
had been wrongly censored by the trial court. 
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$GYRFDWHVRIYLFWLPV¶ULJKWVPD\DUJXHWKDWWKHUHLVQRZWHFKQLFDOHTXLOLEULXPRYHUIDLUWULDO
rights and protections for defendants and victims, but given the modifications favouring the 
latter without counterbalancing measures for the accused, there appears to be a trade-off 
favouring victims.368  
(xv) Conclusion 
Policymakers have attempted to encourage the reporting and prosecution of sexual offences 
such as rape by providing greater protection to complainants in the matter of their being 
questioned about their sexual history and bad character, not only because such information is 
considered to be irrelevant and detracts from main issues in such a trial, but also because 
witnesses are reluctant to have their private lives probed in a public forum. 
:KLOVWUHFHQWSROLF\DQGODZRQµEDGFKDUDFWHU¶KDYHEHHQWDLORUHGWRDFFRPPRGDWHD
FRPSODLQDQW¶VQHHGVWRSURWHFWLQWUXVLRQLQWRKHUSULYDWHOLIHLWLVGLIILFXOWWRVHHKRZMXVWLFH
is served to both complainants and defendants, where bad character evidence statutes have 
been informed by selective evidence-based policy (as criticized by Naughton) and a 
(mistaken) assumption that the judiciary (revisions in policy since R v A) cannot be entrusted 
with the delicate matter of determining the merits of bad character applications. The 
provisions considered above need to be revisited. 
Both victims of abuse and the falsely accused need to have their experiences taken seriously. 
A criminal justice system favouring only victims of sexual offences, including and especially 
child sexual abuse, risks imprisoning innocent parties accused of such crimes for a long time; 
moreover, children of people who are falsely accused of child abuse and sexual crimes may 
be socially stigmatized and psychologically damaged by those who condemn the convicted 
parent. Comparatively little is said of the trauma and stigma attached to those accused of 
VH[XDORIIHQFHVZKHUHWKHDOOHJDWLRQVWXUQRXWWREHIDOVHE\WKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VRZQ
admission or where the defendant is acquitted or appeals successfully. Anonymity for such 
defendants is not a new concept, and should also be revisited. 
Clearly, cross-examination of complainants on issues intimate to them should never involve 
irrelevant questions which would inIULQJH$UWLFOHRIWKHYLFWLP¶VULJKWWRUHVSHFWIRUKHU
privacy. It is likely that we are going to see more applications by the prosecution to video-
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record the testimony of both children and adults deemed vulnerable in the UK in sexual 
offence cases giveQWKHGLUHFWO\HIIHFWLYHULJKWVDIIRUGHGE\WKHQHZ9LFWLPV¶'LUHFWLYH
Whilst their testimony would still be played to an open court, they would be spared the 
trauma of personal appearance before strangers in court. Any inadmissible evidence relating 
to their private lives can be redacted by the judge after leave to admit video recorded 
evidence in chief under section 27 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 
Under section 27 (2) and (3) of the same, the court may direct that any part of the recording 
be excluded. Section 27 (2) permits editing of inadmissible evidence but this is subject to an 
µLQWHUHVWVRIMXVWLFH¶WHVWZKLFKFRQVLGHUVZKHWKHUDQ\SUHMXGLFHWKHDFFXVHGPLJKWLQFXU
would be outweighed by allowing these special measures in whole or in part (27 (3).  
Article 6 remains a limited or special right which cannot be completely balanced against the 
rights of other individuals369. If a defendant raises an issue which is part of his legitimate 
defence which pertains to an aspect of the comSODLQDQW¶VSULYDWHOLIHWKHQFHQVRULQJXVHRI
this evidence would deprive the defendant of a fair trial and he risks being wrongfully 
FRQYLFWHG+RZHYHUWKH9LFWLPV¶'LUHFWLYH(8KDVEHHQVKDSHGE\$UWLFOH± the 
psychological harm complainants may suffer by appearing in court in front of their alleged 
assailants, and Article 8 on the right of victims to respect for a private life. At trial, pressure 
is on the defendant ± who will have the charges, his life, family and reputation fully exposed 
to the court and public eye ± he has not been accorded any protective privileges afforded 
XQGHUWKH'LUHFWLYHZKLFKKDYHEHHQFRQVWUXFWHGE\WKHYLFWLP¶VGLVFRXUVH 
7KH%DU¶VFRGHRIFRQGXFWDQGPRGHUQMXGLFLDOWUDLQLQJPDQXDOVQRZRIIHUDGYLFHRQWKH
rights of and treatment of victims during cross-examinations. Logically, defence counsel 
should by now be more sensitised to avoid stereotyping complainants and subjecting them to 
unethical cross-examination as previously exposed by Temkin.370 Indeed, the English Bar 
actively promoted the Directive favouring victims. However, it is submitted that the right to a 
fair trial for the defendant can only be honoured by a robust cross-examination of relevant 
facts in issue argued by the defendant in contested proceedings. In HCSA trials the cross-
examination may be the only means by which an innocent defendant can rebut the allegations 
made against him, and any attempts to erode this right must be assessed. 
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Chapter VI     'HYHORSPHQWVFRQFHUQLQJWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHUHYLGHQFH 
in sexual offence cases and the impact on the fairness of proceedings 
 
 
This chapter explores the evolution of the use of bad character evidence which can be 
produced by the prosecution against the defendant and asks whether the accused in HCSA 
cases is more disadvantaged than defendants accused of different crimes.  
Where previous convictions are disclosed to an English jury and they are of a similar nature 
to the current allegations being tried, it will be seen through mock jury research and Canadian 
research (using real jury opinions) that previous convictions are given great importance when 
applied to current CSA cases. What measures could be taken to ensure that a jury can try a 
CSA case impartially? 
Given that admission of bad character evidence often turns on the issue of predisposition, the 
chapter also has regard to the recent literature on recidivism to assess whether sex offenders, 
particularly CSA offenders are more likely to reoffend for the same or similar crimes in the 
future. Could psychology literature be useful for understanding which categories of offender 
in serious crimes are actually most likely to be recidivists for the same/similar offences?  
The chapter comprises the following elements: 
(i) Evidence of character? 
(ii)  The evolution of bad character evidence 
(iii) Reform of bad character evidence 
(iv) Policy underlying the erosion of safeguards for the use of BCE 
(v) Comparative practice 
(vi) Prior research on previous convictions and predisposition to criminality 
(vii) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 and its impact on sexual offence trials 
 
(viii) Functions of the seven gateways 
(ix)  Safeguards from abuse 
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(i) Evidence of character? 
While a defendant was always allowed to adduce evidence of reputation in his community to 
demonstrate good character,1 the prosecution were restricted ± they could present evidence in 
rebuttal of good character or adduce evidence that the accused was the kind of person who 
was predisposed to commit an offence and/or to show that he had actually committed the 
offence charged by proof of convictions. This was established in Makin v Attorney-General 




concerned, there is the danger that without guidance, it may give bad character evidence 
undue weight over other evidence (reasoning prejudice). If it reaches the conclusion that the 
DFFXVHGLVDµEDG¶PDQLWPD\QRWGHFLGHWRJLYHKLPWKHEHQHILWRIDQ\GRXEWPRUDO
prejudice).4 Character evidence is founded on moral premises$SHUVRQRIµJRRG¶FKDUDFWHU
means someone possesses moral skills and sensibilities that enable him to act well and which 
are in keeping with respecting the dignity of others and proper concern for their welfare5, 
ZKHUHDVVRPHRQHZLWKDµEDG¶FKDUDFWHUOacks these moral sensibilities and skills, has little 
interest in extending them or shirks the value of so doing and aims to show little regard for 
the dignity and welfare of others.6 In law, however, a good character means nothing more 
than not having previous convictions, rather than being an upstanding and community 
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(ii) The evolution of bad character evidence  
Sexual offences, particularly those which involve multiple allegations against the defendant, 
have often involved the presentation of bad character evidence, classified as similar fact 
evidence (SFE) under the old regime of part-statute section 1(3) of the Criminal Evidence Act 
1898, and part-common law. Cross-admissibility of allegations joined on a current indictment 
has the same effect as well: this evidence can be brought in chief so as to show a pattern of 
misconduct of similar or same offences. This therefore shows the tribunal of fact that the 
accused has the propensity (natural inclination) to commit the type of crime with which he has 
been charged. The law used to be concerned with distancing itself from convicting defendants 
merely on the grounds that they had a propensity to commit the current crime, as set out in 
0DNLQY1HZ6RXWK:DOHVµEXWWKHPHUHIDFWWKDWWKHHYLGHQFHDGGXFHGWHQGVWRVKRZWKH
commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before 
the MXU\¶8 
Lippke states that criminal defendants are not to be found guilty or punished by the state 
merely because they have chequered pasts; that judges and juries should not decide the fate of 
FULPLQDOGHIHQGDQWVEDVHGRQVWHUHRW\SLFDOHYLGHQFH3HRSOH¶V conduct can change over time 
and they may even desist; therefore, greater care should be taken where past misdemeanours 
have become antiquated. Conversely, it is also thought that, even though it is possible for 
people to act out of character, when it comes to behaviour, someone may often or usually 
behave in a particular way.9 Nowadays, the question of what constitutes a propensity in law is 
more difficult to ask, as some might argue that a single prior misconduct may be sufficient to 
convince a judge to place it before a jury as propensity evidence in a current trial. Since 2003, 
it would appear that a single prior conviction showing a tendency to unusual behaviour such 
as sexual offence against a minor or fire setting can be accepted as propensity as set out in R 
v Hanson. 10 It will be shown later that the Lloyd-Bostock study verified how prejudicial just 
a single conviction for a child sexual offence can be when a jury hears about irrespective of 
whether the current charge is similar or dissimilar.11 
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The reason for the abolition of the old bad character statute and the common law relating 
thereto, was that it was perceived as suffering from defects which distort the trial process, 
make tactical decisions paramount and inhibit the defence in presenting its case to the fact 
finders whilst often exposing witnesses to gratuitous and humiliating exposure of long 
forgotten misconduct.12 
If a defendant did not testify in court, he could not be cross-examined on his bad character. 
7KHGHIHQGDQW¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHFRXOd then attack the character of prosecution witnesses with 
LPSXQLW\+HFRXOGRQO\ORVHKLVµVKLHOG¶IDFHDFURVV-examination) if he appeared in court 
and either asserted that he was a person of good character under section 1(f) (ii) of the 
Criminal Evidence Act 1898, or if he attacked a prosecution witness in court under section 1 
(f) (ii) or if he attacked the character of a co-defendant under section 1 (f) (iii). The attacks on 
witnesses other than the defendant had to be more than an emphatic denial of the charges. 
Effectively, the accused was afforded tactical advantages to conceal his bad character over 
those of the complainant and other witnesses at trial. The exception, though, was similar fact 
evidence (SFE).  
The courts were gradually persuaded that, in some instances, the facts of events in similar 
crimes could form part of important background evidence to help juries evaluate whether the 
accused had committed the current offence. SFE could be admitted in chief as part of the 
SURVHFXWLRQ¶VFDVHDJDinst the accused under section 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. It 
was the task of the judge to decide in advance the probative value against the possible 
SUHMXGLFHWKDWFRXOGLPSDFWRQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFDVH1RUPDOO\WKHSURVHFXWLRQZDVQRW
permitted to allow evidence of other crimes that did not form part of the present indictment, 
but if the other crimes appeared to be relevant to an issue placed before the jury, such as 
showing criminal intent, or to prove that the present offence could not logically be accidental, 
or to rebut a defence that the accused might have had, then it was permitted.13 It was evidence 
RIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSURSHQVLW\RUGLVSRVLWLRQWRPLVFRQGXFWKLPVHOILQJHQHUDORUVSHFLILFZD\V
and did not need to be criminal conduct.14 The detHUPLQDWLRQRIµVLPLODUIDFW¶HYLGHQFHZDV
essentially a process of classification, because fact A may have features in common with fact 
B, but they may also have features not in common, otherwise they would be identical.15 
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SFE was mainly used for murder and other serious trials16 as evidence to allow juries to 
evaluate whether prior circumstances of past misconduct could be connected with the issue of 
whether the accused committed the present allegation(s). The common law only permitted a 
narrow, categorical approach to the use of SFE to obviate the general prohibition on its use. A 
jury was forbidden from being allowed to hear evidence which would lead to the conclusion 
that the accused was likely to have committed the current offence judging from his criminal 
conduct or character, except in cases where SFE was allowed. Not only the jury could err on 
the use of SFE, but also judges struggled with the concept of SFE and the criteria for its 
admissibility to the jury. 
In sexual offence cases, public revulsion towards the alleged offender would have been 
evident by the revelation of a past sexual crime, as much then as now. Certain patterns of 
behaviour could be perceived to be part of the indivisibility and permanent nature of the 
DFFXVHG¶VFKDUDFWHULQFOXGLQJDnd especially sexual offences. Murphy contended that the 
doctrine of indivisibility should be abrogated. He thought that the history of bad character 
ZDVEDVHGRQWKHµFULPLQDOFODVV¶WKHRU\ZKLFKVWHUHRW\SHGFHUWDLQFULPHVDVEHLQJJHUPDQH
to common criminals or else sexually deviant criminals.17 
If significant background information on a defendant is held back, juries may wrongly acquit 
a sexual offender. But equally, if the background information were freely admissible, given 
the emotional aspect in sexual offence trials, juries may also be more likely to deliver a 
wrongful conviction. Therefore, when defendants were finally allowed to testify, cross-
examination on bad character was controlled by section 1 (f) of the Criminal Evidence Act 
1898, so that it was forbidden for the prosecution to lead or ask the defendant in cross-
examination about bad character evidence which was more prejudicial than probative. 18 The 
exclusionary rule was consistent with the safeguard in the criminal justice system that 
defendants are innocent until they are proved guilty.19 
The landmark case was Makin v AG for New South Wales.20 The co-accused, a couple called 
the Makins, were being tried for the murder of a child whom they had taken into their care for 
payment after having advertised to foster unwanted children. Both denied murdering the 
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child. However, the prosecution wanted and received permission to lead evidence that a total 
RIWKLUWHHQERGLHVRIFKLOGUHQKDGEHHQIRXQGEXULHGDWWKHFRXSOH¶VUHQWHGSUHPLVHV7KH
evidence was used by the prosecution to rebut the possible defence of accidental death, and 
increase the likelihood that the present victim had been murdered. It was also designed to 
show that the defendants were predisposed to commit the discreditable act in issue as it was 
used to corroborate the commission of the crime (actus reus) and that the accused had the 
mens rea to do this - showing that circumstantially it was unlikely that all thirteen deaths 
were accidental. The safeguard set out in Makin was that SFE should not be used at trial 
merely because it seemed relevant to the count on the indictment, but because it was both 
relevant and probative. This ruling was followed in R v Smith,21 another murder trial where 
the accused denied murdering his wife and profiteering from insurance paid out after her 
GHDWK7KHFRXUWDOORZHGHYLGHQFHWRVKRZWKDWWZRRWKHURIWKHDFFXVHG¶VIRUPHUZLYHVKDG
been found drowned in the bath like the latest victim, and that the accused had also gained 
financially as a result of their deaths. Once again, there was probative value in allowing the 
jury to hear strikingly similar circumstantial facts which the court regarded as overruling any 
prejudice to the accused arising from the revelations. The problem with admitting SFE in 
sexual offence cases, is not the use of relevant and probative evidence, but the emotionality 
of fact finders, which may obfuscate the logic of the use of such evidence. Similar facts might 
be of probative weight in relation to the fact alleged, but they may influence the minds of 
jurymen unduly when the crime alleged is one of a revolting character and the person has not 
been trained to think judicially, the prejudice must sometimes be insurmountable.22 
The SFE principle was extended to sexual offence cases when judges came under pressure to 
secure more convictions from the early 20th century onwards, particularly in relation to 
homosexual offences. In R v Sims,23 a buggery trial, the judge allowed evidence of three 
different male complainants to be admitted in the same trial as being mutually supportive that 
the offence had occurred. The significance of the use of bad character evidence in Sims, was 
that in murder cases, the jury heard strikingly similar facts that were concrete, whereas in 
sexual offence cases, the jury was now able to hear strikingly similar allegations, i.e., 
unproven facts. It would have been more correct to have classified this type of evidence as 
similar allegation evidence and not SFE. Webster argues that the threshold for admission of 
SFE had been thus lowered.24 
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The issue of similar allegation evidence arose again in the case of Boardman25 when a 
teacher was accused of buggery by three adolescent boys. The accused appealed his 
conviction and it went as far as the House of Lords. The Law Lords held the view that the 
allegations were rightly relevant and cross-admissible to counts involving the characteristic 
that the defendant played the passive role in the homosexual conduct. Yet, this case was the 
first time that there had been discussion about the difference between a series of allegations 
which were all denied by the accused, from those types of case such as Smith26 and Makin 27 
which had concerned the undisputed evidence of previous deaths, or as Lord Cross had 
SRLQWHGRXWµWKHUHZDVQRTXHVWLRQRIWKHZLWQHVVIRUWKHSURVHFXWLRQWHOOLQJOLHV¶28 With the 
present case, he thought it wise to consider the possibility of fabrication:  
In such circumstances, the first question which arises is obviously whether his 
accusers may not have put their heads together to concoct false evidence and if there 
is any real chance of this having occurred the similar fact evidence must be excluded. 
In DPP v Boardman,29 the Law Lords were found to have used two different tests, rather than 
a different application of the same test for determining whether allegations of buggery made 
by different boys known to the accused, were cross-admissible as SFE. Lords Morris, Cross 
and Wilberforce preferred a prejudice-based test while Lords Hailsham and Salmon preferred 
an irrelevance-EDVHGWHVW&RPSDUH/RUG+DLOVKDP¶VFRPPHQWVZLWKWKRVHRI/RUG&URVV 
If the inadmissible chain of reasoning is the only purpose for which the evidence is 
adduced as a matter of law, the evidence itself is not admissible. If there is some other 
relevant, probative purpose than for the forbidden type of reasoning, the evidence is 
admitted, but should be made subject to a warning from the judge that the jury must 
eschew the forbidden reasoning.30 
Lord Cross: 
«LWLVQRWSRVVLEOHWRFRPSLOHDQH[KDXVWLYHOLVWRIWKHVRUWRIFDVHVLQZKLFKVLPLODU
fact" evidence is admissible. The question must always be whether the similar fact 
evidence taken together with the other evidence would do no more than raise or 
strengthen a suspicion that the accused committed the offence with which he is 
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charged or would point so strongly to his guilt that only an ultra-cautious jury, if they 
accepted it as true, would acquit in face of it.31 
The Lords proposed specific safeguards before allowing similar allegation evidence to be 
admitted: the trial judge had to assess whether the probative value of such evidence 
outweighed its prejudicial effect. If the similar fact evidence was so weak, so unreliable or so 
contaminated that its probative value was outweighed by its capacity to prejudice a jury, then 
it ought to be excluded. Also, the other allegations made against the accused had to be 
strikingly similar.32 
The crucial difference between the tests based on irrelevance and prejudice was that 
reasoning from bad disposition was prohibited under the former, while permitted, but only 
under certain conditions, under the latter. A rule that states a particular line of reasoning is 
forbidden is clearly logically inconsistent and irreconcilable with a rule that states that that 
line of reasoning is permissible under certain conditions.  
If a defendant made an outright denial of the offence, particularly in child sexual abuse cases, 
the court could exclude relative and probative evidence, thereby affording the defendant a 
shield. For example, in R v Lewis 33 the court allowed evidence of paedophilic tendencies 
where the defendant had said that touching the child was accidental or innocent, but 
disallowed it where he denied a particular incident had taken place. In R v Wright, 34 the 
courts made a similar ruling. The Law Commission cited these cases as an example of where 
justice was too defendant-centred.35 
However, in DPP v P 36 one of the safeguards for defendants was removed when Lord 
0DFND\UHOD[HGWKHµVWULNLQJVLPLODULW\¶FULWHULRQWRWKHLVVXHRILGHQWLI\LQJDSHUSHWUDWRU, 
«7KHHVVHQWLDl feature of evidence which was to be admitted was that its probative 
force in support of the allegation that an accused person committed a crime was sufficiently 
great to make it just to admit the evidence, notwithstanding that it was prejudicial to the 
accused as tending to show that he was guilty of another crime.37 
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Inferentially, it was unlikely that several independent witnesses would falsely attribute even 
vaguely similar conduct to the same person, and the unlikelihood of coincidence increased 
with WKHµPRUHSHFXOLDUWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGWKHJUHDWHUWKHQXPEHURILQVWDQFHV¶38 The 
Law Commission thought that SFE could be used to demonstrate a criminal purpose,39 e.g., a 
doctor performing abortions on two of his girlfriends at different times, to rebut a defence of 
medical examination on a procurement charge, R v Bond,40 or knowledge, by reference to an 
illegal drug importation case R v Peters.41 In the latter case, the defendant alleged that 
amphetamines had been put in his car without his knowledge, but evidence of the discovery 
of small amounts of cannabis at his address was allowed to rebut the defence. SFE can also 
be used to show that a death is not attributable to natural causes (Smith, supra) but to the 
actions of the accused.42 
(iii) Reform of bad character evidence 
These bad character rules, prior to the 2003 Criminal Justice Act (CJA), were regarded as 
being unjust for complainants, excluding relevant evidence. The Law Commission was asked 
to review bad character provisions.43 It delivered its report in 2001 and this resulted in 
Parliament placing all of the rules governing bad character in criminal cases into a single 
statute, whether for defendants, witnesses or third parties, and whether going to credit or 
directly to the issue in a case.44 It will be seen, however, that far from simplifying the rules, 
3DUOLDPHQW¶VGHILQLWLRQXQGHUVHFWLRQRIWKH&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH$FWLVVREURDGWKDWLW
merits separate treatment in the next section of this chapter. 
From the 1990s onwards, interest groups put pressure on the then Government to improve the 
attrition rate in rape cases, as well to increase convictions in child sex offence cases, after the 
high-profile murder and sexual abuse of Sarah Payne.45 The Law Commission also 
considered the findings of Lloyd-Bostock, when it advocated freeing judges from the 
prevailing statutory and case-law restraints imposed upon them when deciding whether to 
allow juries to hear previous convictions and other misconduct evidence. The Commission 
thought that these modifications were possible and permissible, as long as certain statutory 
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safeguards were put in place. Their proposed Criminal Evidence Bill (2001) for the terms of 
use of BCE as propensity evidence was as follows: 
 
Evidence going to a matter in issue 
(1) Evidence falls within this section if the following two conditions are met. 
(2) The first condition is that the evidence has substantial probative value in relation to a 
matter which 
(a) is a matter in issue in the proceedings, and 
(b) is of substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole. 
(3) The second condition is that the court is satisfied that 
(a) in all the circumstances of the case, the evidence carries no risk of prejudice to the 
defendant, or  
(b) that, taking account of the risk of prejudice, the interests of justice nevertheless 
require the evidence to be admissible in view of 
(i) how much probative value it has in relation to the matter in issue,  
(ii) what other evidence has been, or can be, given on that matter and, 
(iii) how important that matter is in the context of the case as a whole.46  
This part of the Criminal Evidence Bill shows that the Law Commission was fully aware of 
the potentially prejudicial effect of BCE.47 In the interest of fairness, such evidence was not 
supposed to be used as the only part of the prosecution case other than the allegation itself 
(see other evidence stated in the above draft), and in addition, the prior BCE was supposed to 
have substantial probative value in showing a pattern of behaviour to show predisposition to 
commit the current offence.48 
The Law Commission tried to limit the type of bad character evidence other than previous 
convictions, but the opposite effect occurred when the definition of bad character under 
section 98 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 itself and court rulings extended the remit of 
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BCE. These changes could henceforth assist the prosecution in adducing background 
evidence that was more contentious and of a lesser standard to obtain successful convictions. 
Section 99 of the CJA 2003 abolished the old common law rules for similar fact evidence: 
(1) The common law rules governing the admissibility of evidence of bad character in 
criminal (not civil) proceedings are abolished. 
(2) Subsection (1) is subject to section 118(1) insofar as it preserves the rule under 
ZKLFKLQFULPLQDOSURFHHGLQJVDSHUVRQ¶VUHSXWDWLRQLVDGPLVVLEOHIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRI
proving his bad character. 
The concept of bad character is defined under section 98 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003.There are two types of bad character that section 98 recognises: 
5HIHUHQFHVLQWKLV&KDSWHUWRHYLGHQFHRIDSHUVRQ¶V³EDGFKDUDFWHU´DUHWRHYLGHQFH
of, or of a disposition towards, misconduct on his part, other than evidence which ± 
(a) has to do with the alleged facts of the offence with which the defendant is charged, 
or 
(b) is evidence of misconduct in connection with the investigation or prosecution of 
that offence. 
The section 98 exclusion must be related to evidence where there is some nexus in time 
between the offence with which the defendant is charged and the evidence of misconduct 
which the prosecution seek to adduce.49  
According to R v McNeil,50 section 98 (b) is eYLGHQFHRIPLVFRQGXFWZKLFK³KDVWRGRZLWK
WKHDOOHJHGIDFWVRIWKHRIIHQFHZLWKZKLFKWKHGHIHQGDQWLVFKDUJHG´DQGLVDQH[FHSWLRQRI
prima facie broad application. The words encompass evidence relating to the alleged facts of 
an offence which would have been admissible under the common law outside the context of 
bad character, or they embrace anything directly relevant to the offence charged, provided at 
any rate it was contemporaneous with and closely associated with its alleged facts. 
Previous convictions or prior cautions are typical examples of bad character, but the concept 
may now also include investigations prior to the accused being charged or prosecuted. 
Evidence of bad character is presumed to be true unless there is material to suggest the 
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contrary under section 109 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Defendants do have a right to 
challenge the use of bad character evidence. In R v C51 it was stated that the defendant should 
produce a detailed statement that identifies all the ingredients of the case that he will advance 
for the purposes of proving that he did not commit the crime of which he was been convicted. 
A bare assertion that he did not commit the offence is inadequate. 
The statutory definition of bad character permits conduct arising out of a conviction or even 
an acquittal, as determined in R v Z; 52 this case also decided that it also includes evidence of 
a number of charges being tried concurrently which may also be cross-admissible in respect 
of the other charges. The police are now permLWWHGWRWUDFNDVXVSHFW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHUKLVWRU\
at the investigatory stage to include it as part of a prospective prosecution. The proposed bad 
FKDUDFWHUHYLGHQFHWREHXVHGLVVHWRXWLQWKHSROLFH¶V0*EDGFKDUDFWHUGDQJHURXV
offender) document. It includes previous convictions and this information may be added to 
WKHSURVHFXWLRQ¶VILOHV53 Particulars of the offence should be more detailed than they appear 
RQWKH3ROLFH1DWLRQDO&RPSXWHUHVSHFLDOO\DVFRQFHUQVWKHRIIHQGHU¶Vmodus operandi, 
concurrent charges, offences that were taken into consideration, cautions, reprimands and 
ILQDOZDUQLQJVµ3UREDWLYH¶HYLGHQFHLVDOVRLQFOXGHGZKLFKLVGHILQHGDVHYLGHQFHWKDWLV
other than a conviction, outstanding investigations, acquittals, discontinuances, previous 




112 of the Criminal Justice AcW7KHSXUSRVHRIIUDPLQJVHFWLRQDVµUHSUHKHQVLEOH
EHKDYLRXU¶ZDVWRDYRLGDUJXPHQWDERXWZKHWKHUDSDUWLFXODUDFWDPRXQWHGWRDQRIIHQFH
where no charge or conviction resulted. This definition differs from the draft version 
published by the Law Commission. Section 112 of the CJA 2003 states that misconduct 
means the commission of an offence or other reprehensible behaviour, whereas the Law 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VGUDIWVWDWXWHUHDG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Commission of an offence or behaviour that, in the opinion of the court, might be 
viewed with disapproval by a reasonable person.55 
7KHFRQFHSWRIµUHSUHKHQVLEOHEHKDYLRXU¶LVRSHQWRLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLVLWDVXEMHFWLYHWHVWRUWKH
PRUHREMHFWLYHµPDQRQWKH&ODSKDPEHQG\EXV¶"56 MPs thought that the draft version was 
too broad and KDUPIXOWRWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VLQWHUHVWV<HWXQGHUWKHFXUUHQWSURYLVLRQVZKDWLV
now accepted as misconduct evidence indicates that the effect of the new definition was the 
VDPHµ5HSUHKHQVLEOHFRQGXFW¶VKRXOGEHYLHZHGREMHFWLYHO\DQGWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWZKHther 
the public would regard such conduct as reprehensible, such as racism, bullying and a bad 
record at work for misconduct, a parent who has had a child taken into care and petty theft 
from employers.57 
A 2009 Ministry of Justice study found that reprehensible evidence was infrequently adduced 
(only 12 cases over the studied period in between February and October 2006)58 but that 
particular study included: images from the internet in a case of alleged sexual assault; the fact 
that one defendant made a large number of nuisance calls to his alleged rape victim; and in 
another case, allegations that the defendant had previously sexually assaulted the 
complainant.59 The study found that law enforcement and prosecution lawyers were reluctant 
WRXVHµUHSUHKHQVLEOHEHKDYLRXU¶DVLWZDVQRWFOHDUO\XQGHUVWRRGE\WKHP)RUWKHVDNHRI
certainty, the Court of Appeal decision in R v Hanson,60 advised that the safe approach would 
be to seek to use previous convictions which should be related to the same offence, but 
reprehensible behaviour could be especially of value in domestic violence cases, where police 
logs could be brought in about prior domestic incidents.61 
The concept of bad character is fluid and nowadays there is a more cautious approach as to 
what should be included. For example, modern mores would not generally support the view 
that evidence of homosexuality would amount to such as had occurred in R v Bishop.62 
However, the papers of one of the cases that were volunteered for this study raised the issue 
of a trial proceeding even when evidence that the trial judge had tried to exclude was 
accidentally shown to the jury.  X, a teacher, had been accused of eight counts of sexually 
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assaulting two boys who had been pupils of his in the late 1980s until 1990, when they would 
have been aged 12 years and onwards.63 'XULQJWKHSROLFHLQYHVWLJDWLRQRI;¶VKRPHLQ
they seized a male homosexual pornographic magazine and a mainstream, legal, gay 
pornographic video. These items were on the exhibits list prepared by the Crown Prosecution 
Service, but the trial judge ordered them to be removed from the list as shown to the jury. The  
implication was that this evidence would weigh against a favourable assessment of the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VFKDUDFWHU However, these items on the exhibits list were only partially removed 
and some remained accessible to the jury. 
The judge tried to correct the prejudice that this evidence might have caused by asking the 
jury to disregard it. X was found guilty of all counts by a 10-1 majority and received a three-
year prison sentence. X felt that the jury may have been swayed by evidence even though the 
pornography the police had seized was not contemporaneously dated with the allegations, 
was legal and was not indicative of an interest in paedophilia or ephebophilia, but simply 
showed an interest in gay erotica? The trial judge felt it necessary to direct the jury to put it 
out of their minds, but in a climate of heightened concern it X felt that the jurors had drawn a 
link or at least disapproval in respect of ;¶VVH[XDOpredispositions and the charges against 
him.  
In a not dissimilar case, Lord Wilberforce pointed out how careful trial judges had to be:   
«LQMXGJLQJZKHWKHURQHIDFWLVSUREDWLYHRIDQRWKHUH[SHULHQFHSOD\VDVODUJHDSODFHDV
logic. And in matters of experience it is for the judge to keep close to current mores. What is 
striking in one age is normal in another: the perversions of yesterday may be the routine or 
the fashion of tomorrow. The ultimate test has to be applied by the jury using similar 
qualities of experience and common sense after a fair presentation of the dangers either way 
of admission or of rejection. Finally, whether the judge has properly used and stated the 
ingredients of experience and common sense may be reviewed by the Court of Appeal.64 
(iv) Policy underlying the erosion of safeguards for the use of BCE 
Before looking in detail at s.101, it is worth exploring the underlying reason for the erosion of 
the safeguards to admit SFE? Homosexuality was partially decriminalised in 1967 between 
consenting males aged 21 and over65 and by 1994, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994 reduced the age of consent between males to 16. The change to the SFE rules was 
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probably guided by the widespread concern about child sexual abuse in the care homes which 
were being investigated by police forces in England and Wales. A public inquiry had been 
held to examine the extent of the abuse and whether the police forces had been competent to 
find perpetrators thereof: 
In relation to allegations of sexual abuse . . . questions of corroboration clouded the issue 
for much of the period, but at least since the House of Lords decision in DPP v P (1991), the 
prosecution of those against whom more than one similar offence (or type of offence) is 
alleged has been made procedurally and evidentially easier.66 
Elsewhere, in the US during the 1990s, there was strong political pressure to obtain more 
convictions for sexual offences against children. This resulted in changes to the Federal Rules 
of Evidence 413, 414 and 415 which rendered previous convictions for sexual offences 
admissible in current trials for sexual assault, child molestation and civil cases involving 
sexual assaults or child molestation.67 US policy may have also been a contributory factor in 
influencing the reforms in the UK. 
By the end of the 20th century, there was the perception that too few criminals were being 
caught or convicted. One of the reasons for this was that juries were being denied the chance 
to hear important background evidence about previous misconduct, especially previous 
convictions. The old bad character rules used to restrict the occasions when the jury could be 
informed about them, to respect the principle of the presumption of innocence of the accused. 
+RZHYHULWZDVQRZIHOWWKDWYLFWLPV¶ULJKWVVKRXOGDOVREHUHVSHFWHGDQGWKLVFRXOGRQO\EH
achieved by discussion about how they could be better served. In the policy paper Justice for 
AllWKH/DERXU3DUW\SOHGJHGWRDOORZWKHFRXUWWREHLQIRUPHGRIDGHIHQGDQW¶VSUHYLRXV
FRQYLFWLRQVZKHUHDSSURSULDWHDVRQHZD\RIµUHEDODQFLQJWKHFULPLQDOMXVWLFHV\VWHPLQ
IDYRXURIWKHYLFWLP¶68 It envisaged a simplified and modern approach to evidence, to convict 
the guilty and acquit the innocent, which meant relaxing the prevailing restrictions as to when 
relevant previous convictions could be heard. The main aim of the reforms was to secure 
more convictions for sex offenders, particularly child sex offenders. In 2001, Roy Whiting 
was accused and found guilty of the murder and sexual assault of nine year old Sarah Payne. 
This particular case epitomised perceived injustice to victims, yet as has been pointed out, the 
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jury convicted Whiting despite it being prevented from hearing about his previous conviction 
for abduction.69  
Government policy to relax3 the rules of evidence had also been guided by judicial decisions 
which had already called for change: The Law Lords in the Attorney-*HQHUDO¶V5HIHUHQFH1R
3, 199970 had stated that fairness of proceedings was meant to apply to all sides, - the 
accused, the victim and the public, - which was part of the developing principle of human 
rights legislation. The old similar fact principle had already been modified to include 
previous acquittals of the accused in R v Z,71 and the Government sought to reinforce the 
judgment by legislation. It intended to allow relevant previous conviction evidence provided 
that the prejudicial effect did not outweigh its probative value.72 
At the time, less than a quarter of sexual crimes recorded by the police were being 
prosecuted, which was doing little to instil public confidence in the criminal justice system. 
Research had also been conducted into the outcomes of rape reports, one of the most 
comprehensive surveys analysed the attrition rate in 19 European countries. It was found that 
conviction rates of rape in the UK had declined substantially since 1977, based on the 
following data: from 1977-1981 the rate was 30%, from 1993-1997 it was down to 10% and 
from 1998-2001 it had gone down further to 8%, resulting in a decrease of 22% from the 
earliest to the latest recorded periods. The lowest conviction rates were mainly in 
jurisdictions with adversarial systems, except Sweden, which had a 10% conviction rate.73 
The Government had already referred to the Law Commission to consider evidence of 
previous misconduct in criminal proceedings in 1994.74 Reforms to bad character evidence 
were drafted in a Criminal JustLFH%LOOFDOOHGWKHµYLFWLPV¶MXVWLFHELOO¶E\WKHWKHQ3ULPH
Minister Blair.75 
There already had been concern about defendants being convicted of numerous crimes with 
judges ordering acquittals, because they had admitted forbidden bad character evidence at 
trial. For example, in Beggs,76 the defendant had been convicted of slashing a man to death 
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on a murder charge, but the judge had allowed the jury to hear about several incidents where 
he had cut men ± the conviction was successfully appealed. In 2001, he was convicted again 
for murder. Juries could also be forbidden from hearing about serial offending of a similar 
QDWXUH6LPRQ%HUNRZLW]ZDVDFTXLWWHGRIEXUJOLQJWKHRIILFHVRI3DGG\$VKGRZQ¶VVROLFLWRU
DQGVWHDOLQJPDWHULDOUHODWLQJWRWKLVSROLWLFLDQ¶Vaffair with his personal assistant; yet he 
already had 230 (undisclosed to the jury) previous convictions for burglary.77 
 
(v) Comparative practice 
 
Again before looking at the current rules regarding BCE, it is useful to look at the research 
and the practice in civil law countries. The high attrition rate in serious crimes such as sexual 
offences and unjust outcomes where bad character evidence had been used, or omitted, led to 
debate about whether to carry on with the existing unsatisfactory bad character rules or to 
reform them. The question was, to what extent should the threshold of the bad character 
HYLGHQFHEHORZHUHG",QFRQWLQHQWDO(XURSHUHYHODWLRQRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHUIURP
the outset of the trial was already commonplace. The fact-finding judge or jury would 
inevitably be influenced by these antecedents as well as the judge being able to deliver 
sentence more promptly at a single hearing. Furthermore, previous convictions on the 
Continent were admitted as evidence of guilt, not merely credit.78 
Use of bad character evidence on the Continent: 
Two examples show the different approaches taken on continental Europe 
Norway  
The Norwegian Ministry of Justice was contacted for this study to discover out how bad 
character evidence in the form of previous convictions was permitted to be used in 
subsequent trials.79 The ministry were asked:   
Since the passing of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, greater use is now made of 
previous convictions and misconduct evidence in the UK. I understand that many EU 
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countries adduce bad character evidence in chief as a matter of course. If your 
country allows previous convictions, how does your criminal justice system safeguard 
against unfairness to the accused who risks being judged on his record? If a 
defendant hotly disputes the use of the previous conviction because he states he was 
wrongly convicted, may he appeal the use thereof in the current trial, and how? 
Their reply was: 
Evidence of the bad character of an accused may be presented to the extent the court 
allows. The court will normally refuse bad character evidence without relevance to 
the case. Evidence which may have direct significance for the case in question will 
normally have to be allowed. Notwithstanding the main rule, the defence may always 
present relevant evidence of the good character of the person indicted. The 
prosecutor may then always present counter-evidence. Written statements on the 
reputation of the accused indicted may never be used as evidence. 
The court may only refuse evidence of previous convictions if a conviction is of no 
importance to the present case. This may be the case for old or unrelated offences. It 
is in principle up to the court to decide at which stage of a trial previous convictions 
are to be presented. However, to reduce the risk of a previous conviction influencing 
on the decision of whether the accused is guilty, previous convictions will ± in a jury 
case ± normally be presented only after the accused has been found guilty, but before 
the sentencing. If the previous conviction is of special relevance to the question of 
whether the person is guilty, it will normally be allowed at an earlier stage of the 
trial. In cases without a jury, evidence of previous convictions is presented before the 
conviction but at the very end of the trial ( 
Croatia80 
&URDWLDQRWRQO\XVHVSUHYLRXVFRQYLFWLRQVDWWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VWULDOWKHUHDUHDOVRVSHFLDO
provisions for sex offenders concerning when their offences are spent: 
The Republic of Croatia has brought a new Act the legal effects of convictions, 
criminal records and rehabilitation which regulates the legal effects of convictions, 
the organisation, management, accessibility, transmission and deletion of information 
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extracted from criminal records, international exchanges of information extracted 
from criminal records, and rehabilitation. 
«FULPLQDOUHFRUGVVKDOOEHRSHUDWHGIRUQDWLRQDOVRIWKH5HSXEOLFRI&URDWLDDQGIRU
legal entities established in the Republic of Croatia against whom a final conviction 
in respect of a criminal offence has been handed down outside the Republic of 
Croatia. 
Criminal records shall also contain a list of persons against whom a final conviction 
has been handed down in respect of criminal offences of sexual abuse and 
exploitation of children and other criminal offences against children. We do not have 
a separate file which is related to the sexual offenders against children, these data are 
incorporated in our general register.  
Of course, such data are available to the courts, Public Attorneys and police forces 
IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRILQYHVWLJDWLRQRIFULPLQDORIIHQFHVRUFRXUWWULDOV«7KHFRXUWFDQ
obtain information about previous convictions any time during the trial  
A conviction is deleted from the criminal record within a specific period after the 
perpetrator have served a sentence. The condition is that he/she has not committed a 
new crime in this time. The deadlines for deleting a conviction depend on the level 
and type of sanction.  
There GRHVQRWDSSHDUWREHDQ\WKLQJWRVXJJHVWLQ(XURSHDQODZWKDWDGPLWWLQJDGHIHQGDQW¶V
bad character is contrary to a fair trial. The Law Commission had to consider whether any 
reforms to the bad character provisions could constitute a breach of Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It found that the European Court of Human Rights allowed 
each member state to determine questions on the admissibility of evidence. A particular rule 
of evidence may cause an unfair trial on the facts in any system, but neither the Strasbourg 
Court nor the European Commission have established that any particular rule of bad character 
evidence is impermissible.81 
In X v Denmark,82 the European Commission held that as many member states already 
provided for the disclosure of previous convictions in their criminal procedure, there was no 
EUHDFKRI$UWLFOHRQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWVWRKDYHDIDLUWULDODQGWKLVGHFLVLRQZDV
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endorsed in Unterpertinger v Austria. 83 Given the Denmark case involved trial by jury and 
the Austrian case was before lay judges, therefore there were no grounds for arguing that the 
UK could not look to continental systems when considering relaxation on the use of bad 
character evidence.84 
Arguably, English law under the old statutes and case law concerning bad character were far 
more defendant-protective than on the continent. Perhaps this was because it was felt that in 
terms of power balance, it was the State that fixed the rules of evidence when trying the 
accused as an individual, who needed protection from abuse of power. Not everyone has felt 
that the accused should have special protection. Jeremy Bentham argued that all logically 
relevant material should be admissible on the basis of rectitude of decision, with suitable 
guidance as to its weight.85 Bentham also thought that the rights of the accused were the 
SURGXFWRIµVHQWLPHQWDOOLEHUDOLVP¶86 7KHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHULWLVµJRRG¶RUµEDG¶WRREWDLQ
more convictions by using prior BCE depends on whether one is supportive of the rights of 
the defendant over the complainant or vice versa.  
(vi) Prior research on previous convictions and predisposition to criminality 
But would the prospective reforms to bad character evidence in England follow a continental 
approach to admitting bad character, or would there still be restraints? Although English law 
had traditionally and generally taken the tenet that no-one should be judged on their past 
record, there already was the exception that past records could be exposed if they were 
admissible as SFE. This concession was designed to allow fact-finders to ascertain the truth 
(sufficient probability) even though the bad character might be so prejudicial as to 
FRPSURPLVHWKHDFFXVHG¶VULJKWWRDIDLUWULDO0XUSK\VWDWHVWKDWEULQJLQJLQWKHDFFXVHG¶V
bad character has a fundamental and often determinative impact on the outcome of a 
criminal trial; jury directions do not generally mitigate the impact the prejudicial evidence 
has on it.87  
This notion is borne out by the Lloyd-Bostock study which looked at the psychological 
impact of certain types of bad character revealed to jurors: sexual offences against children 
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DVSULRUPLVFRQGXFWDGYHUVHO\DIIHFWVWKHMXU\¶VDWWLWXGHWRWKHDFFXVHGZKDWHYHUWKHFXUUHQW
allegations on trial.88 
In 1994, the Home Secretary asked the Law Commission to consider the law of England and 
Wales relating to evidence of previous misconduct in criminal proceedings and to make 
appropriate recommendations to the existing law and trial process. The Commission 
published its report in 2001. It sought a guided and structured approach for decision-takers 
(the judges) to arrive at predictable and consistent decisions when allowing the use of bad 
character evidence as it was mindful that fact-finders, both lay and professional, were 
susceptible, however much they tried to avoid it, to having their good judgment either 
overborne or distorted by prejudice.89 
The Commission accepted that both defendants and non-defendants should be spared having 
their previous misconduct for no good reason.90 ,WDOVRWKRXJKWWKDWDSHUVRQ¶VFKDUDFWHU
should not be regarded as indivisible:91 only sufficiently relevant parts92 should be revealed to 
the fact-finders and then only to the extent that it was necessary to serve the interests of 
justice and under guidance about the risks inherent in such evidence.  
The Law Commission referred to the Lloyd-Bostock study to find out about the psychology 
of juries who hear about bad character. The study was conducted because, hitherto, there had 
been little empirical researFKLQWKLVDUHD7KHUHVXOWVRIWKLVVWXG\LQGLFDWHGWKDWDGHIHQGDQW¶V
previous criminal record evoked stereotypes of typical criminality and therefore over-caution 
DERXWUHYHDOLQJDGHIHQGDQW¶VFULPLQDOUHFRUGZHUHZHOOMXVWLILHG$GGLWLRQDOO\WKHVWXG\ 
WKRXJKWWKDWGLUHFWLRQVWRMXULHVWRDYRLGµIRUELGGHQUHDVRQLQJ¶- they should not assume the 
defendant must be guilty merely because he has a criminal past when they heard of the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VSUHYLRXVFRQYLFWLRQVZDVXQUHDOLVWLF-XULHVZHUHWROGWKDWSUHvious convictions 
only went to the credibility of the defendant and not whether he was guilty of the current 
RIIHQFH3DUDGR[LFDOO\ZKHQWKH\KHDUGDERXWDGHIHQGDQW¶VJRRGFKDUDFWHULIKHKDGRQH
the juries were able to assess the probability of whether he had committed the current offence 
as well as his credibility. That the defence should have asymmetric weight given to his good 
character was a relic from the nineteenth century based on fairness, not logic, as it harked 
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EDFNWRµMXGLFLDODWWHPSWVWRredress the procedural disabilities from which the accused 
VXIIHUHGLQWULDOVRQLQGLFWPHQW¶93 
The problem with expanding the use of bad character evidence of variable quality is that it 
increases the risk that innocent defendants may be found guilty. This has been found in both 
real and mock juror trials. In a US study, there was a 27 percent higher chance of being 
convicted in cases where a previous conviction was disclosed, contrasted with cases without 
disclosure.94 Doob and Kirshenbaum95 found this was a similar outcome in mock juror trials. 
&ODU\DQG6KDIIHU¶VVWXG\XVLQJJURXSVRIIRXUSV\FKRORJ\VWXGHQWVDVPRFNMXURUVIRXQGQR
impact on conviction rates,96 but the reason for the difference could be ascribed to previous 
conviction being for a juvenile offence (the prior offence was therefore stale and more 
latitude might have been given for immaturity). Wissler and Sacks and Cornish and Sealy 
found that defendants were less likely to be found guilty if they had minor dissimilar 
previous convictions, but not more serious dissimilar ones. The Lloyd-Bostock study 
conducted in the UK indicated that mock jurors were affected by similar previous 
convictions both old and recent, but not old dissimilar convictions, although real lay 
magistrates who also participated in that study were affected thereby. However, if the 
dissimilar conviction is for a more serious crime, such as rape or murder, the effect was 
unfavourable.97  
&DQUHYHDOLQJWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSUHYLRXVFRQYLFWLRQVEHYDOXDEOHIRUDVVHVVLQJZKHWKHUD
defendant could be guilty of the current charges against him, provided that it is not the only 
piece of evidence that is used to incriminate him? The problem with sexual offence cases is 
that they are frequently credibility contests between the complainant and the defendant; the 
further back in time the allegations, there may be even less or no forensic evidence to build a 
prosecution. Therefore, previous convictions become more significant as part of the present 
case, rather than as a peripheral element. Spencer had advocated that paedophilic tendencies 
and convictions should be allowed in child abuse cases on the grounds that such evidence 
µWHOOVXVVRPHWKLQJPRUHLPSRUWant and more directly relevant than previous convictions for 
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WKHIWRUDVVDXOW¶98 The problem with bad character evidence is that it is often more 
immediately linked to the ultimate issue of guilt itself than other types of evidence which 
therefore makes bad character evidence a powerful tool for the prosecution.99 
The Lloyd-Bostock study revealed that both charges and previous convictions for child 
sexual offences were more likely to disgust juries than any other type of misconduct, thereby 
prejudicing the defendant from the outset.100 It is the task of fact-finders to look at evidence 
dispassionately. In Canada, an attempt has been made to reduce the effects of blind prejudice 
in child sexual offence cases by allowing potential jurors for such trials to be excused if they 
feel that they could not judge the case fairly. A sociological study of this provision showed 
that 36 per cent stated on oath that they could not be impartial.101 It should also not be 
forgotten that juries are not a single entity, but comprise individuals whose educational levels 
vary, as well as their capacities for complex reasoning. 
This is an especially powerful reason to avoid putting weakly probative character 
evidence in their hands and it might be a reason for not providing them with highly 
probative character evidence. 102 
It has been said that if juries are properly directed by trial judges, then they could know the 
purpose of the BCE. Yet, prior research shows that many jurors do not even understand the 
presumption of innocence, and presume the defendant guilty until proven innocent. This calls 
into question whether juries are generally able to understand directions such as the use of 
misconduct evidence.103 
In the UK, juries are not permitted to be canvassed either before being selected for service or 
to interview them about their role as a juror post-trial. The Lloyd-Bostock study therefore 
suffered from the defect that the outcomes were simulated, though the study attempted to 
create lifelike conditions to gauge the psychological impact of the jury hearing about 
specified previous convictions.104 Prior research indicates that juries are more likely to find a 
defendant guilty if he has similar previous convictions or when they are told at the trial about 
a similar concurrent charge. The opposite occurred when juries heard about recent dissimilar 




'HQWDQG5)OLQµ&KLOGUHQDV:LWQHVVHV¶ (Wiley 1992), writing of the law before DPP v. P [1991] 2 A.C. 447. 
99
 Para 29 of judgment of British Columbia Court of Appeal in R v Corbett [1988]1 S.C.R. 670 (Canadian case on 
use of previous convictions in cross examination against a defendant). 
100
 Fn 11, Lloyd-Bostock study, p.749. 
101
 Ibid Lloyd-Bostock, p.737. 
102
 Fn 5, Lippke: op cit, p.186. 
103
 Ibid, p.187. 
104
 Fn 11, Lloyd-Bostock study, p.735. 
P a g e  |   
convictions that were not serious.105 Jurors in mock trials in Canada and the US appeared to 
EHFRQIXVHGDERXWGLUHFWLRQVRQµIRUELGGHQUHDVRQLQJ¶ZKHUHMXULHVPD\RQO\FRQVLGHU
whether the bad character evidence used against the defendant goes only to his credibility and 
QRWKLVSURSHQVLW\\HWLQ&RUQLVKDQG6HDO\¶VUHVHDUFKRQWKHMXU\¶VDELOLW\WRGLVUHJDUGD
previous conviction upon judicial direction, it did so, but in further research, the opposite 
outcome occurred. In a simulation study by Grant, where previous convictions for child 
sexual offences were revealed, the jury was more concerned about wrongfully acquitting the 
defendant than avoiding a wrongful conviction.106 
If a defendant is facing charges of child sexual abuse and a jury gets to hear about a previous 
conviction for the same, he is more likely to be convicted on the current charges than for a 
defendant accused of non-sexual offences with a prior criminal record for a non-sexual 
offence. Under the Lloyd-Bostock simulated conditions, 25% of the defendants who had 
previously committed and were currently on similar charges, were convicted. This outcome is 
to be compared with 16.7% or lower for other offences.107 The study also asked juries about 
their impressions of defendants who had previous convictions for child sexual assaults. His 
testimony was not only perceived as being the least credible, but also more likely to commit 
the offence for which he was on charges, whether they were sexual assaults on a child or of a 
different type. He was regarded as being the least trustworthy, most deserving of punishment, 
most likely to have committed undetected crimes, would definitely not be given a job 
involving looking after children and thought to be most likely to tell lies in court.108 This is a 
surprising outcome, considering that the mock jurors did not think that people who had 
previous convictions for handling stolen goods had low credibility. In fact, the latter was 
rated most believed, even marginally above someone who had a good character. The Lloyd-
Bostock report concluded that very thin information about a previous conviction was 
sufficient to evoke a rich stereotype, so that a recent similar conviction, especially where it 
was for the sexual abuse of a child, was potentially damaging for no reason the law admits.109 
If juries have arbitrary views of defendants who are on current child abuse charges who have 
similar previous convictions, surely the same phenomenon occurs where a defendant with no 
previous convictions on multiple charges of sexual offences on minors which are cross-
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admissible? The Lloyd-Bostock study concluded that, even given the limitations of its own 
study: 
If we assume that, amongst defendants with similar previous convictions, some are 
innocent of the current offence, we have good grounds to infer that routinely 
revealing previous convictions would indeed increase the risk of convicting an 
innocent man.110 
Neither the Lloyd-Bostock study nor the Law Commission report dealt with the possibility 
that some prior convictions may have been wrongfully decided or that an innocent defendant 
might be induced to plead guilty to avoid receiving a harsher sanction were he to plead not 
guilty and be convicted at trial. Therefore, juries may be given a rather sketchy impression 
DERXWDGHIHQGDQW¶VFULPLQDOSDVWZKLFKPD\QRWEHDOOWKDWKHOSIXOLQDVVHVVLQJKLVWUXH
character. Where the criminal record is more persistent and recent and supported by 
WHVWLPRQ\IURPRWKHUVDERXWWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFULminal nature, more can be gleaned, though it 
may not be known completely.  
Stale convictions dating from more than five or ten years may not tell juries much about the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VFXUUHQWSURSHQVLW\RUKLVFDSDFLW\IRUVHOI-reform.111 In R v Dhooper,112 a 
conviction for manslaughter was quashed after the judge admitted evidence of a previous 
conviction relating to an offence some 13 years previously, without referring to the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 section 101(4) and the length of time between the earlier offence and the 
alleged offence. The opposite may be true where old convictions show a continuing 
propensity are adduced (Hanson, supra). An old caution may also be admitted if it is 
sufficiently similar to the instant offence. In R v Woodhouse113 a conviction for sexual 
activity with a child was upheld, as the judge had been entitled to allow prosecution evidence 
of a similar incident over 10 years earlier for which the offender had received a caution, as it 
had similarities to the instant offence.  
K, one of the volunteers who provided details of their case for this study, had a previous 
conviction for sexual assaults on an underage step-daughter dating back to 1985.114 Seven 
years later, he was accused of raping and sexually assaulting his two natural daughters, 
products of his first marriage, when they were aged 3 and upwards, in the 1970s. The stale 
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conviction was admitted, even though it differed from the new case (they were comparatively 
minor assaults), and even though the defendant pre-trial now lived alone and was considered 
to be no longer a danger to family members. He was convicted of the new matters, and 
received a sentence of 15 years imprisonment. K felt strongly that the previous case had been 
damning to his prospects of a fair trial in the later case.   
The Law Commission agreed with expanding the circumstances under which bad character 
evidence could be adduced, but past records unrelated to the current charges are not supposed 
to be sufficiently probative and too prejudicial to be used. Past convictions for a specific 
FXUUHQWRIIHQFHPD\KHOSWRDQVZHUTXHVWLRQVDERXWWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VPRWLYHNQRZOHGJH
modus operandi or crime pattern or rebut a defence in a more logical way instead of being 
used to depict the accused as having a bad character and therefore more likely to have 
committed the current crime.115 Specific BCE may also assist, where perhaps a 
preponderance of the evidence supports a conclusion that the defendant is guilty. In other 
words, there are more or stronger reasons for judging him guilty than for judging him not 
guilty.116 
The BCE itself has to have validity: it should be reliable, fresh and specific and should not be 
the main evidence for prosecution, as per se it is unlikely to satisfy the reasonable doubt 
standard to secure a conviction.117 
The value of recidivism studies to estimate the likelihood of current criminality 
Propensity to commit a crime is a complex criminological issue. In 2002, retrospective 
research (Soothill et al) was carried out to identify factors which may indicate and/or predict 
the commission of further serious crimes by reference to the types of prior conviction which 
offenders of serious crimes had.118 The purpose of the study was for the police and probation 
services to identify what kind of risk the offenders posed to society in terms of sanction and 
VDIHJXDUGLQJWKHFRPPXQLW\7KHVWXG\¶VFRQFOXVLRQZDVFDXWLRXVDQGVSHFXODWLYHUHTXLULQJ
more detailed data sources to challenge or confirm this observation.119 The study found that 
certain serious types of prior offence which appeared to be dissimilar to the one the subjects 
                                                          
115
 Fn 5, Lippke: op cit p.175. 
116
 Ibid Lippke, p.179. 
117
 Ibid. p.184. 
118
 K Soothill, et al, Murder and Serious Sexual Assault: What criminal histories can future serious offending, 
(Police Research Series 2002), Paper 144. 
119
 Fn 118, Soothill study, p.41. 
P a g e  |   
subsequently committed were often at minimum indicative of a future serious crime against 
the person. 
The Lloyd-Bostock study had examined what kind of evidence could be prejudicial and 
therefRUHVXEMHFWLYHEDVHGRQMXURUV¶DQGPDJLVWUDWHV¶LPSUHVVLRQVDERXWWKHSUHGLFWLYHYDOXH
of previous convictions of defendants on current charges. But the 2002 Home Office paper by 
Soothill et al was attempting to examine behavioural patterns of offenders in a more scientific 
way. Although the main purpose of the study was for risk assessment, the findings also tried 
to work out the probability of an offender carrying out future serious violent and sexual 
crimes. If the Lloyd-Bostock study showed that juries could be swayed by merely hearing 
about a conviction without further details, the Soothill study subsequently suggested that 
previous convictions for rare and unusual serious offences do indicate a high and statistically 
significant likelihood of subsequent serious offending.120 The Law Commission had also 
DJUHHGWKDWµSDVWPLVEHKDYLRXUFDQEHDGPLWWHGZKHUHWKHUHDUHFORVHDQGXQXVXDOVLPLODULWLHV
EHWZHHQWKHSDVWDQGSUHVHQWVLWXDWLRQV¶121  
Some psychologists had postulated that people had relatively stable personality traits;122 
others thought that behaviour could change according to the situation. The two diametric 
views came to were known as the person-situation debate. Today, the interaction of both 
personality and situations are considered important factors in explaining behaviour, but only 
over long periods of time can stable overall differences in behaviour be discerned.123 It is 
risky to be over-reliant on past behaviour when determining whether a current offence 
occurred, because character is only one facet for a jury to consider. More recent research has 
focused on long-term recidivism outcomes to predict whether a record offending, particularly 
sexual offending, can be fairly said to have value in both criminal trials and for post-
sentencing treatment and rehabilitation of offenders. The problem with using previous 
convictions in a current trial, is that even apparently forensic methods of predicting future 
behaviour of dangerous offenders have shown false positives by at least 50 per cent. 124  
A study based on two-year reconviction rates for sexual offences indicated a surprisingly low 
figure, compared with robbery, another serious, uncommon crime, which may be due to 
successful rehabilitation of the offender on prison programmes or low problems in detection 
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and proof on sexual offences.125 7KLVUHVHDUFKLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK6RRWKLOODQG$FNHUOH\¶V
earlier study over a 21-year period of the recidivism rate of child sex offenders convicted in 
1973, where it was shown that the vast majority had not been reconvicted for similar sexual 
offences.126 
Whilst someone with a conviction for robbery will remain more likely to commit another 
robbery than someone without a previous conviction, the likelihood decreases the longer the 
time goes without reoffending. Multiple convictions (7-10 previous convictions) are twice as 
likely to be convicted of a crime as those with only one previous conviction. Whilst many 
young people commit crimes, most will desist at some point.127  
Whilst there are commonalities in risk factors between sexual and non-sexual offenders, there 
are also some features that are uniquely related to sexual recidivism. A history of offending 
both for sex offender and non sex offenders has consistently been shown to relate to further 
sexual offending. The higher the number of offences and the more varied the history of 
sexual offending, the more likely he is to continue in this offending behaviour.128 Father-
daughter incest offenders have the lowest rate of re-offending, whereas offenders who have 
male victims or victims unrelated to them or who engage in a variety of contact and non-
contact offences demonstrate higher rates of recidivism. An enduring propensity for sexual 
offending combined with a willingness to disregard the rights of others are the best predictors 
of sexual recidivism.129 
No single study is sufficient to determine what is or is not a risk factor for future sexual 
offending. As society has given more attention to these offences, so has independent research 
into recidivism and follow-up studies. Hanson and Morton-Bourgon located 37 studies 
between 1995 and 2003 as well as 10 updates in their 1998 work, which has increased 
knowledge of the risk factors for sexual recidivism. They identified two risk factors, static 
(unchangeable) and dynamic (aspects of the offender that are liable to change). A major 
predictor of general and violent recidivism among sexual offenders which are static include 
an antisocial orientation indicated by antisocial traits and personality and a history of rule 
violations.130 In terms of dynamics, high category deviants have socio-affective dysfunctions 
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such as feelings of inadequacy and emotional identification with children, a tendency to dwell 
on negative emotional states, and poor self-management abilities such as an impulsive 
lifestyle. High deviancy child sex offenders display high levels of sexual preoccupation and 
high levels of sexual arousal to children. Lower level deviants show very low levels of these 
characteristics and are more socially adept.131  
The ability to predict the risk of further offending by people who have committed a sexual 
offence remains contentious. It has been argued that statistics do not support the stereotype of 
µLQYHWHUDWH¶VH[RIIHQGHUIRUZKRPUHFLGLYLVPLVLQHYLWDEOHHYHQZLWKLQVSHFLILFRIIHQce 
types such as paedophilia.132 There are different rates of recidivism for different types of sex 
offenders. A 2002 study by Hood found, that all offenders in their study who had offended 
against children and then reconvicted for a sexual offence had originally been convicted of an 
extra-familial sexual crime. After six years, 32% of the extra-familial group had been 
imprisoned again for a sexual or a serious violent crime. Similarly, earlier work published in 
England (Fisher 1994) noted that non-familial sexual abusers of boys reoffended between 
DQGRIWKHWLPH7KHFRPSDUDWLYHILJXUHLQ+RRG¶VVWXG\IRUPHQZKRRULJLQDOO\
offended against adults was 7.5% reconviction for a sexual offence after six years, and 15% 
reconviction for a sexual or serious violent crime. 133 Similar patterns were evident in other 
countries. Marshall and Barbaree (1990) noted different rates of recidivism for different types 
of sex offenders. Exhibitionists, for example, had the highest rate of recidivism, ranging from 
41-71%. Non-familial child sexual abusers showed the next highest rate of reoffending (10-
40%), followed by rapists (7-35%) and finally familial child sexual abusers (4-10%). Child 
molesters with male victims showed a higher rate of recidivism than those with female 
victims (35% v. 18%; Quinsey et al. 1995).134 A methodological analysis of recidivism 
studies of sex offenders assessed six official sources on 251 rapists and child molesters 
discharged from a treatment centre in Massachusetts over a 25-year period (Prentky et al. 
1997). The research found high variability in reported recidivism depending on the methods 
and definitions used.  
In essence, research on sex offending consistently shows relatively low rates of recidivism 
relative to all other types of offending. Different rates of recidivism are apparent for different 
types of sex offenders. However, sexual offenders remain at risk of reoffending often long 
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after their discharge from custody. Marshall argues that a person should be considered a 
potential sexual recidivist if he has ever been convicted of a sexual offence, regardless of the 
nature of any further offending.135  
Harris and Hanson conducted in 2004 a meta-analysis of ten Anglo-American follow-up 
studies of adult male sex offenders (4724 participants). Recidivism for any sexual re-offense 
was 14% within 5-year, 20% within a 10-year and 24% within a 15-year follow-up period 
and this outcome was similar for sub-groups of rapists and child molesters. Offenders with a 
prior recorded sexual offence had recidivism rates that were double the rate of first-time 
sexual offenders.136  
Rettenberger et al more recently conducted a study of recidivism among 1115 male convicted 
and imprisoned sex offenders - rapists and child molesters. Their sample did not include 
psychiatrically/outpatient treated offenders, it was limited to a ten-year follow-up period and 
restricted to just one penal system (Austrian) to which they were permitted access. However, 
they noted that their recidivism rate for these sub-groups of offenders was lower than Hanson 
DQG%XLVVLHUH¶VPHWD-analytic review on sex offender 4-5 year follow-up recidivism studies 
which had an 18.9% re-offending rate for rapists and 12.7% for child molesters.  
The Rettenburger study found that the rapist sub-JURXS¶VUHFLGLYLVPUDWHZDVFRPSDUHG
with 8% for the child molesters. First-time offenders were significantly less likely to sexually 
reoffend than those with previous sexual convictions. Rapists tended to have higher rates of 
reconviction for general and violent crimes due to differences in their psychopathic 
personality traits. Lifestyle impulsivity and pervasive anger are likely to be more relevant for 
rapists, but constructs related to sexual deviance like degree and fixation of paraphilic 
interests seem to be of major importance for child molesters. Their impact of previous 
offences on the predictability of future crimes tallied with prior research: there was a stable 
and significant association between the number of previous general, violent and sexual 
offences with a significant increase in violent and recidivism rates.137 
It is not only researchers who have concluded that previous convictions could indicate 
criminal predisposition. The Police Federation of England and Wales welcomed the Home 
SecretDU\¶VDQQRXQFHPHQWWKDWMXULHVZRXOGEHDOORZHGWRKHDUSUHYLRXVUHOHYDQWFRQYLFWLRQV
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given past cases where juries acquitted a defendant and were then informed that about 
catalogue a of relevant previous convictions. However, Mark Leech, editor of Prisons 
Handbook and founder of ex-SULVRQHU¶VFKDULW\Unlock thought that the new rules were ill 
conceived and caused by political posturing. The fact that an offence has been committed in 
the past does not automatically mean that they have committed the current one; legal goal 
posts were being moved to facilitate convictions, not necessarily to improve the standards of 
justice.138  
(vii) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 and its impact on sexual offence trials 
In the light of such comparative experience and sociological and psychological research, we 
have a basis for assessing the 2003 reforms. By 2002, not only had the safeguards of judicial 
weighing of prejudice against probative value and striking similarity been eroded, but also R 
v Z139 now allowed for bad character evidence of a lesser standard to go before juries - 
previous acquittals. Thus, when the Law Commission found that there were grounds for 
widening the range of bad character evidence, it was merely continuing what had already 
been set in motion.140 
There were several underlying reasons for reforming the bad character provisions. Firstly, 
SULRUEDGFKDUDFWHUFDQEHXVHGDWWKHLQYHVWLJDWRU\VWDJHWRLGHQWLI\DSRVVLEOHVXVSHFW¶V
modus operandi as well as at trial for juries to identify whether the accused is the criminal or 
that he committed this particular current crime. Secondly, bad character evidence can be used 
to try to persuade a suspect to plead guilty rather than go to full trial. Furthermore, the 
reforms allow the prosecution to adduce the bad character as being pertinent to the current 
allegations.141 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 codified the old bad character rules and broadened its scope, 
with section 101 solely governing the admissibility of bad character evidence of the 
defendant. The reforms were GHVLJQHGWREHPRUHLQFOXVLYHRIDGHIHQGDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHUE\
contrast, non-defendants such as complainants, prosecution and defendant witnesses and third 
parties would be more protected from character attacks by raising the admissibility threshold 
WRµHQKDQFHGUHOHYDQFH¶$OWKRXJKWKHQHZ$FWDEROLVKHGSUHYLRXVFRPPRQODZDQGPRVWROG
statutory provisions under section 99, it was anticipated that judges and lawyers would 
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continue to think in terms of old case law when applying standards contained in the Act.142 
7KLVFDQRFFXUIRUH[DPSOHZKHUHWKHGHIHQGDQWODXQFKHVDQDWWDFNRQDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶V
character, be it a prosecution witness or a third party. Section 101(g) draws heavily on pre-
2003 case law. Also, Hanson143 confirmed that 2003 authorities will continue to apply to the 
extent that they are compatible with section 106.144 
Under section 101(1) there are seven gateways through which BCE may be admitted. 
(a) All the parties may agree to the admissibility of the evidence; 
(b) The evidence may be adduced by the defendant himself or is given in answer to a 
question asked by him in cross examination and intended to elicit it; 
(c) It is important explanatory evidence; 
(d) It is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the 
prosecution; 
(e) It has a substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue between 
a defendant and a co-defendant; 
(f) It is evidence to correct a false impression given by the defendant or  
(g) 7KHGHIHQGDQWKDVPDGHDQDWWDFNRQDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VFKDUDFWHU 
 
(viii) Functions of the seven gateways 
 
Gateway (a) would have been available as an option under the old rules. Once the defendant 
has decided to reveal his own bad character, this evidence may be used by the tribunal of fact 
for any purpose.145 
Gateway (b) preserves the status quo where an accused might want to introduce his prior bad 
character for tactical reasons, perhaps as damage limitation to avoid the revelation being used 
by the prosecution as a surprise to the jury; or it could have stronger value as part of the 
accused¶VGHIHQFH)RUH[DPSOHWKH%&(PD\EHVWDOHDQGRUGLVVLPLODUWRWKHFXUUHQW
charges, and therefore arguably the accused is less likely to have committed the latter, or 
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perhaps it is alibi evidence, such as the accused was in prison at the time of the current 
allegations and it was therefore impossible for him to have committed the current offences.  
Gateway (c) This gateway is premised on the pre-existing common law principle that 
background evidence may be used in a subsequent trial.146 It may be used where it is 
necessary to place before the jury evidence of part of a continual background of history 
relevant to the offence charged in the indictment and without the totality of which the account 
placed before the jury would be incomplete or incomprehensible, then the fact that the whole 
account involves including evidence establishing the commission of an offence with which 
the accused is not charged is not of itself a ground for excluding the evidence. If background 
evidence shows the accused in a particularly bad light, this may be a factor to be taken into 
account in deciding whether it would be excluded in the discretion of the court on the ground 
that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs it probative value. A court will not 
UHDGLO\LQWHUIHUHZLWKDWULDOMXGJH¶VGHFLVLRQRQGLVFUHWLRQ 
(YLGHQFHRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHULVDGPLVVLEOHLILWLVLPSRUWDQWH[SODQDWRU\
evidence. Under section 98 of the CJA 2003, the bad character that may be used can be of a 
lesser standard than a conviction. This section must be read in conjunction with section 102 
which states that important explanatory evidence is such that without it, the court or jury 
would find it impossible or difficult to understand other evidence in the case and (b) its value 
for understanding the case is substantial. In essence, the evidence must be both important and 
explanatory. It is not permitted to use the important explanatory evidence gateway, where the 
SULPHSXUSRVHLVWRVKRZWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSURSHQVLW\147 which has different safeguards under 
gateway (d) of this Act. 
R v Lee148 perfectly illustrates how important it is for prosecutors and judges to allow 
evidence through the right gateway. Lee had been accused of seven historic sexual offences 
against his step-daughter A and her friend, B. The prosecution case was that on three separate 
occasions when she was aged 11, the defendant had indecently assaulted A by touching her 
vagina while she was in bed. A had reported the abuse to her school. Social services were 
notified and they in turn informed the police. The defendant denied the allegations. At the 
trial, the prosecution sought to rely on bad character evidence that A had stated that, when 
she was aged 16, the defendant had planted a camcorder in the bathroom to film her bathing. 
The prosecution further sought to adduce evidence that, after A had left home aged 16, she 
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had returned for a visit and had found on the home computer indecent images of children 
which she believed had been uploaded by the defendant. TKHSURVHFXWLRQ¶VVWDQFHZDVWKDW
the evidence explained how events had progressed and it was an explanation for why A had 
left home aged 16. The Judge found that to exclude the evidence would leave a lacuna in the 
events. The Judge admitted the evidence under gateway (c) section 101(1) of the Criminal 
-XVWLFH$FWDV³LPSRUWDQWH[SODQDWRU\HYLGHQFH´ 
,QKHUVXPPLQJXSWKH-XGJHQDUUDWHGWKHHYLGHQFHLQWHUPVZKLFKUHFRXQWHG$¶VHYLGHQFHLQ
such a way that suggested that the evidence showed a propensity. The Judge gave a 
conventional direction on cross-admissibility. She had not directed the jury as to the proper 
approach to propensity evidence. The defendant was convicted of indecent assault. He 
appealed against conviction and submitted that the Judge had erred in allowing the 
SURVHFXWLRQWRDGGXFHEDGFKDUDFWHUHYLGHQFHDV³LPSRUWDQWH[SODQDWRU\HYLGHQFH´,QWKH
summing up, she had incorrectly referred to the evidence admitted as evidence of propensity 
but had not been asked to admit it on this basis. The appeal was allowed since the evidence 
could not properly be described as important explanatory evidence. Accordingly, it was not 
admissible under gateway (c), which had to be read in conjunction with section 102 of the 
2003 Act. The other evidence in the case was not impossible to understand without 
consideration of the evidence in question. It was impossible to exclude the possibility that the 
jury had relied on the two pieces of evidence as evidence of propensity to commit the instant 
offences.  
Gateway (c) is not commonly used according in the 2009 Ministry of Justice study; it was 
cited in only 13% of applications, of which 73% related to previous convictions.149 
*DWHZD\ G PDNHV WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V EDG FKDUDFWHU DEOH WR EH DGPLWWHG DV SDUW RI WKH
SURVHFXWLRQ¶VFDVH LWPXVWEHUHOHYDQW WRDQLPSRUWDQW LVVXHEHWZHHQWKHGHIHQGDQWDQGWKH
SURVHFXWLRQ 6HFWLRQ  GHILQHV ³LPSRUWDQW PDWWHU DV EHLQJ D PDWWHU RI VXEVWDQWLDO
LPSRUWDQFHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHFDVHDVDZKROH´7KHLVVXHPXVWEHLPSRUWDQt, relevant and 
relate to that issue. According to section 103, matters in issue include (a) evidence of propensity 
to commit offences of the kind with which the accused is charged, except where his having a 
propensity makes it no more likely that he is guilty of the offence or (b) a propensity to be 
XQWUXWKIXOEXW LWPD\QRWEHDGGXFHGZKHUH LW LVQRWVXJJHVWHG WKDW WKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFDVH LV
untruthful. (It would appear to apply to cases where the defendant does not dispute the facts of 
the case, but disputes that he committed an offence by so doing. The context is usually 
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FRPPLWWLQJ DQ RIIHQFH¶150 This reasoning led the court to conclude that any previous 
convictions could only be capable of displaying a propensity to be untruthful if they satisfied 
the following criteria: 
 
(a) In the present case, truthfulness is an issue and 
(b) In the earlier case(s), there was either: 
(i) A plea of not guilty coupled with an account given by the defendant which the jury have 
disbelieved, or 
(ii) The way in which the offence was committed showed such a propensity, for example by 
making false representations. 
Propensity may include previous convictions of the same description or same Secretary of 
State prescribed category as the current offence. Gateway (d) has been the most appealed. 
Hanson151 helped to clarify when it should be admitted and used. The appellants were 
disputing the use of BCE against them under section 101 (d) of the CJA 2003. This was the 
first Court of Appeal case that dealt with the substantive provisions relating to the 
DGPLVVLELOLW\RIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSDVWEDGFKDUDFWHUXQGHUWKH&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH$FW7KH
Court of Appeal had advised prosecutors to beDULQPLQGWKDW3DUOLDPHQW¶VSXUSRVHLQWKH
legislation was to assist in the evidence based conviction of the guilty, without putting those 
ZKRDUHQRWJXLOW\DWULVNRIFRQYLFWLRQE\SUHMXGLFH7KHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIDGHIHQGDQW¶V
previous convictions, should be based on the particular circumstances of each case.152 
The Court of Appeal had set out the test for allowing propensity evidence. It has to be asked: 
(i) whether the history of convictions establish a propensity to commit offences of the kind 
charged;  
(ii) whether that propensity makes it more likely that the defendant committed the offence 
charged;  
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(iii) whether it is unjust to rely on the convictions of the same description or category and, in 
any event, whether the proceedings would be unfair if they were admitted. 
Section 103 (2) is not exhaustive of the types of convictions which might be relied on to 
show evidence of propensity to commit offences of the same kind. Equally, simply because 
an offence falls within the same description or category is not necessarily sufficient to show a 
propensity. There is no minimum number of events that are required to show propensity. The 
fewer the number of convictions, the weaker the evidence of propensity is likely to be. 
However, a single previous conviction may show evidence of propensity where the offence 
discloses unusual tendencies or the modus operandi discloses significant features. The Court 
RI$SSHDOGUDZVRQWKHµROG¶VLPLODUIDFWHYLGHQFHWHVWH[HPSOLILHGLQDPP v P153 to illustrate 
its point.  
In a Ministry of Justice 2009 study, gateway (d) featured in 77% of applications, with 93% 
relating to previous convictions.154 The apparent wide scope of gateway (d) is tempered by 
section 101 (3) which makes it mandatory for the court to exclude the BCE if it would have a 
significantly adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings. Evidence that is apparently highly 
prejudicial may be adduced, with the prejudicial effect ostensibly being controlled by the 
OLPLWRILQIRUPDWLRQWKHMXU\KDVDERXWWKHSDUWLFXODUVRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSUevious convictions. 
In child sexual offence trials, considerable latitude may be given to include stale BCE that is 
similar to the allegations in the instant case and even a charge of sexual abuse on a child.155 
This latitude should be contrasted with a non-sexual offence case: old similar convictions 
might be excluded on the interests of justice discretion under section 101 (3). For instance, in 
R v George Kenneth Baker156 the defendant appealed the use of previous convictions in a 
sexual assault charge. The previous convictions of the appellant were as follows. On 24th 
April 1989, when the defendant was 24 years old, he had been convicted in the Crown Court 
at Birmingham of attempted rape. The following facts were never put before the jury: in the 
early hours of January 1989, he had dragged the victim onto a grassed area and indecently 
assaulted her by fondling her breasts under her clothing. He had ripped her trousers, inserted 
fingers into her vagina, exposed himself and attempted intercourse but was frightened off by 
neighbours alerted by the screaming of the victim. He was arrested 30 minutes later. That had 
occurred 22 years before the trial in question. 
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The second conviction had occurred on 20th December 1996, where he had pleaded guilty to 
three counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl aged under 16. The facts which again 
were not known to the jury were as follows. The victim in that matter was aged under 14 
when the first offence took place. During the summer of 1995, she befriended the appellant as 
he worked in the local record shop. One evening prior to her 14th birthday, the defendant 
called at her house while her mother was out. He then had full sexual intercourse with the 
girl. They then had sexual intercourse on two further occasions during 1995 and 1996. The 
victim made a brief entry in her diary recording that intercourse had occurred on the relevant 
days. It appeared that her mother had read the diary and discovered that she had had sex with 
the appellant. She questioned her daughter and later informed the police. The prosecution 
applied to put before the jury those matters as evidence of propensity under section 101(1) (d) 
of the Criminal Justice . That was disputed on behalf of the appellant.  
The judge dismissed the case. He had had regard to the guidance given by this court in R v 
Hanson.157 He held that although these had occurred a long time ago, the appellant had been 
an adult. The admission of these offences would help the jury as they were plainly evidence 
of propensity. Thirdly, that it was not unfair to do so provided that the details were restricted 
to the mere fact of the date of the conviction and its nature. None of the details was made 
available.158 
*DWHZD\HDGPLWVDGHIHQGDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHUZKHUHWKHUHLVDQLPSRUWDQWPDWWHULQLVVXH
between a defendant and a co-GHIHQGDQW³,PSRUWDQWPDWWHU´LVDVXEVWDQWLDOPDWWHURI
substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole. The gateway is available only to 
the defence, not the prosecution. If the nature or conduct of the defence undermines the co-
defendant, then the co-GHIHQGDQW¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHFDQXVHHYLGHQFHWKDWLVUHOHYDQWWRVKRZ
that he has the propensity to be untruthful under section 104. This part of the act would 
appear to reflect the old common law provisions. Gateway (e) arguably fetters a co-defendant 
from exposing the co-DFFXVHG¶VXQWUXWKIXOFKDUDFWHUXQMXVWLILDEO\DVKHFDQRQO\GRVRZKHUH
the co-accused has undermined his own defence. However, once bad character evidence of 
the co-GHIHQGDQWKDVSDVVHGWKHµSUREDWLYHTXDOLW\WHVW¶WKHUHLVQRSRZHUWRH[FOXGHLW159  
*DWHZD\IHQDEOHVDGHIHQGDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHUWREHDGPLWWHGZKHUHKHKDVRIIHUHGDIDOVH
impression to law enforcement and the court. Under section 105, the defendant himself must 
have caused the express or implied assertion, and this could have occurred even before police 
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have cautioned him, during interview under caution, by a witness he calls, or in reply to a 
TXHVWLRQDVNHGRQKLVEHKDOIRUHYHQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRXUWURRPDSSHDUDQFH7KHGHIHQGDQW
will not be protected from this gateway if he does not appear in court. This is much broader 
leeway than under the common law. The defendant can rescue himself from the onslaught of 
(f) if he withdraws the false remark that had been made, and it can be edited from pre-trial 
interview documents. This was discussed in R v Ullah.160 The appeal court held that by 
claiming never to have acted dishonestly in a prepared statement, a client with a conviction 
for dishonesty gave a false impression and opened gateway (f) to character. It appears that the 
defence did not make the Crown aware that it had resiled from that impression and thus 
withdrawn it as it is entitled to under section 105(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.The 
only type of rebuttal evidence that can be used against the defendant is that which corrects the 
false impression. The safeguard for admissibility is under section 105(1)(b); any bad 
character evidence admitted through this gateway must have probative value in correcting the 
alleged false impression. 
*DWHZD\J7KHGHIHQGDQW¶VEDGFKDUDFWHUPD\EHEURXJKWLQZKHUHhe has made an attack 
on another person, whether or not a prosecution witness. In R v Edwards, the appellant had 
been convicted of two counts of common assault and having a bladed weapon in a public 
place. He had previous convictions for robbery and dwelling-house burglary that were 
thirteen years old at the time of the trial, and given their staleness, the Recorder had initially 
UHIXVHGWKHSURVHFXWLRQ¶VDSSOLFDWLRQWRKDYHWKHPLQFOXGHGXQGHUVHFWLRQGLQ
UHODWLRQWRWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFUHGLELOLW\161 However, during the trial, the defendant had 
attacked the characters of the two police officers who had apprehended him, claiming that he 
had been gratuitously and offensively treated by them. The Recorder then allowed the jury to 
hear the previous convictions by virtue of section 101(1)(g). The Court of Appeal agreed with 
his decision.162 
Gateway (g) can be used if the defendant attacks someone at the questioning stage, interview 
or charge or at the trial itself. It differs from the common law rules, because (g) can be used 
against the defendant even where he does not make a court appearance. If evidence is 
DGPLWWHGXQGHUVHFWLRQJEHFDXVHWKHGHIHQGDQWPDNHVDQDWWDFNRQDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶V
character, it may be relevant not only to his credibility but also incidentally to propensity to 
commit offences of the kind charged.163 The way in which the evidence is to be used is meant 
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to be controlled by section 101 (3) ± an application by the defence to exclude it on the 
grounds of unfairness.164 If the evidence is double pronged ± UHODWLQJERWKWKHGHIHQGDQW¶V
credibility and propensity, the judge must give the jury warnings as to the relevance and 
value of the evidence.  
(ix) Safeguards from abuse of the seven gateways 
 
The old common law used to protect defendants from abuse of the bad character rules by 
excluding prejudice that outweighed its probative value,165 and later through the provisions 
section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) (exclusion of unfair 
evidence): 
(1) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the 
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard 
to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was 
obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the 
fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude 
evidence. 
There has been debate about whether PACE has been superseded by section 101(3) and (4) of 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The court must not admit evidence under section 101(1)(d) or 
(g), if on an application by the defendant to exclude it, it appears to the court that the 
admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings 
that the court ought not to admit it. This means that, under these circumstances, it is now 
mandatory for the court to exclude the evidence. It would be rare for a court to exclude 
relevant important explanatory evidence, although a defendant may have grounds under 
section 101(3) where the misconduct evidence is stale, the court must have regard, in 
particular, to the length of time between the matters to which that evidence relates and the 
matters which form the subject of the sentence charged. The old common law guidance for 
excluding bad character evidence was that judges should weigh up whether its prejudicial 
effect outweighed its probative value. It would appear that Parliament intended section 
101(3) to be the test without further reference to common law cases. 
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According to the 2009 Ministry of Justice study on bad character applications, by far the most 
successful for the presentation of previous convictions was through the propensity gateway, 
(d) of section 101 of the CJA 2003. In 91% of determined applications, the evidence put 
IRUZDUGWRVKRZEDGFKDUDFWHUZDVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSUHYLRXVFRQYLFWLRQV166 Some police 
PHPEHUVZHUHQRWVXUHDERXWZKDWFRQVWLWXWHGµPLVFRQGXFWHYLGHQFH¶VXFKDVSUHYLRXV
aFTXLWWDOVRUDUUHVWV7KLVFRXOGH[SODLQZK\%&(XQGHUµUHSUHKHQVLEOHEHKDYLRXU¶ZDV
seldom used.167 The Crown Prosecution Service criticised the police for sending them 
incomplete MG16 forms, as particulars of the prior offence may be more relevant than its 
mere description of type. The CPS applications were mainly those which raised the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VSUHYLRXVFRQYLFWLRQVDQGUHODWHGWRWKHDFFXVHG¶VSURSHQVLW\WRFRPPLWFULPH,Q





(x) Problems with identifying tainted bad character evidence 
 
Should we be concerned about the use of propensity evidence to obtain convictions in sexual 
offences? After all, the use of propensity evidence was not unusual in sexual offence cases 
under the common law. But are there adequate legal safeguards for weeding out unreliable 
evidence that should never be admissible? Unreliability can be identified in the following 
instances: collusion and contamination. Keane explained the power of similar fact evidence 
to the Home Affairs Select Committee in 2002.169 At the time, historic CSA indictments often 
contained a number of counts which could be cross-admissible as SFE because they were 
relevant to the admission of guilt. Evidence falling short of this could be excluded, or juries 
could be directed by the judge to consider each count separately as to whether or not the 
accused was guilty, or severance and separate trials could be ordered as permitted under the 
Indictment Act 1915.170 Nowadays, where a defendant is charged with two or more offences 
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in the same criminal proceedings, it has the effect as if each offence were charged in separate 
proceedings under section 112(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
The problem with SFE and bad character evidence generally was that, in some cases, there 
was the real risk of collusion between complainants or contamination of their evidence. This 
risk arises where there is evidence to suggest that the complainants have deliberately 
concocted false evidence by conspiracy or collaboration or where their evidence has been 
innocently contaminated, i.e., influenced by knowledge of the account of another 
complainant, whether acquired from direct discussion with another victim, indirectly through 
a third party, e.g., a social services department seeking potential complainants, or from media 
publicity. The problem is compounded, of course, if there is a prospect of compensation or 
some other motive for giving false evidence. Until R v H,171 the preponderance of authority 
favoured the judicial exclusion of such tainted evidence. There are cogent reasons to support 
such exclusion. If, there being no question of collusion or contamination, a number of 
witnesses give evidence of separate but similar incidents, their evidence has probative force 
because of the unlikelihood of coincidence, and the greater the number of incidents and the 
more striking or unusual the similarities, then the greater the probative force of their 
evidence. Thus if similarities are the result of collusion or contamination, the probative force 
disappears. Prior to R v H there was reasonably clear authority that if there was a real risk of 
collusion, the evidence should be excluded rather than left to the jury, with a suitable 
warning.  
In R v H, these cases were overruled. R v H involved sexual offences against a daughter and a 
step-daughter between whom, the parties agreed, there existed a risk of collusion. Lord 
Mackay LC held that on a defence application to exclude the SFE where collusion is in 
question,  
(i)... the judge should decide the question of admissibility on the basis that the similar facts 
are true and apply the test in DPP v P. Generally collusion is not relevant at this stage. 172 
 
(ii) If a submission is made raising a question of collusion in such a way as to cause the 
judge difficulty in applying the test in DPP v P, the judge may be compelled to hold a trial 
within a trial to decide admissibility.  
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(iii) If the evidence is admitted and evidence is also adduced in the course of the trial which 
indicates that no reasonable jury could accept the evidence as free from collusion, the judge 
should direct the jury that it cannot be relied upon as corroboration or for any other purpose 
adverse to the defence. 
(iv) Where this is not so but the question of collusion has been raised, the judge must direct 
the jury that they may rely upon the evidence as corroboration if satisfied that it is free from 
collusion, but that if not so satisfied they cannot rely upon it as corroboration or for any 
other purpose adverse to the defence.173 
.HDQHFULWLFLVHGWKH+RXVHRI/RUGV¶GHFLVLRQDVLWZRXOGEHZURQJIRUWKHMXGJHWRUXOHRQ
the question of collusion, because he would inevitably be drawn into considering whether the 
evidence is untrue and hence whether there is a possibility that the accused is innocent, the 
very question for the jury.174 Any case where a judge stopped a case on the grounds of 
collusion might prevent justice for victims who also knew each other in contexts such as 
sibling relationships or as care homes residents. 
He also argues, however, that the danger of admitting contaminated evidence was seriously 
underplayed by the House. There can be no guarantee that directions of the kind set out in 
(iii) and (iv) above will have the effect of removing the obvious prejudice likely to be caused 
by admission of the evidence.175 Thus, there is a serious risk that despite such directions, the 
jury will follow a forbidden line of reasoning that since the accused appears to have the 
disposition towards the type of misconduct in question, he is guilty of the misconduct alleged. 
If a conviction results, it is, in effect, unappealable. The record will show that the judge 
properly applied the test under DPP v P and then directed the jury in accordance with R v H 
but not, of course, what happened in the jury room.  
In R v H, Lord Mackay held that where there is a series of similar allegations, it should 
generally be presumed that they are true.176 There are several problems with this 
presumption. Firstly, judges were now being asked to assess the probative value of statements 
without knowing whether or not they were reliable, secondly if the allegations prima facie are 
to be taken to be true, the presumption of innocence must necessarily be reversed. In cases 
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where the witnesses have put their heads together, the evidence is obviously worthless.177 
7KHUHIRUH.HDQH¶VFRQFHUQVRXJKWWREHKHHGHG 
The Law Commission also examined the possibility of contamination and collusion. Yet, 
ultimately it decided that courts should not investigate whether evidence suffers from 
collusion or contamination, but take it at face value, unless it was unrealistic so to do.178 It 
felt that the prosecution should not be unduly overburdened with disproving collusion or 
contamination: this would require a voir dire hearing in a large number of cases with the 
delays and possible collapse of such cases.179 Nor did it think it was the role of the trial judge 
to usurp the role of the jury in judging the truthfulness of complainants who knew each other 
or who had mixed together. Nevertheless, it agreed that where judges could see that evidence 
in depositions, if taken at their highest, would not prove the facts it was adduced to prove, 
they should not admit it.180 The Law Commission envisaged a policing role for the judge, 
whose duty was to check the quality of the evidence under review and withdraw a case where 
evidence has been admitted which is highly prejudicial, where a direction from the judge may 
not adequately guard against prejudice.181 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 included the safeguard provision discussed by the Law 
Commission under section 107 which allows a case to be stopped where the evidence turns 
out to be contaminated: 
,IRQDGHIHQGDQW¶VWULDOEHIRUHDMXGJHDQGMXU\IRUDQRIIHQFH² 
(a)evidence of his bad character has been admitted under any of paragraphs (c) to (g) of 
section 101(1), and 
(b)the court is satisfied at any time after the close of the case for the prosecution that² 
(i)the evidence is contaminated, and (ii)the contamination is such that, considering the 
importance of the evidence to the case against the defendant, his conviction of the offence 
would be unsafe, 
                                                          
177
 R v H [1995] 2 All E R per /RUG1LFKROOVSVHHDOVRµ&DVH&RPPHQWµ6HYHUDQFH- counts alleging 
VH[XDORIIHQFHVDJDLQVW\RXQJJLUOV¶&ULP/5SS-860. 
178
 Fn 35, Law Commission, p.184. 
179
 Ibid, para 15.22, pp.189-190. 
180
 Ibid, para 15.23, p.190. 
181
 Ibid para 15.24, p.190. 
P a g e  |   
the court must either direct the jury to acquit the defendant of the offence or, if it considers 
that there ought to be a retrial, discharge the jury. 
The real problem with the use of bad character evidence is to ensure that it is substantiated 
and untainted. The Law Commission conceded that the latter problem could result in 
wrongful convictions, whether complainants actively conspire or the investigatory method 
itself causes contamination or (innocent) collusion.182 If the safeguards under section 107 of 
the CJA 2003 are to be effective, this means that where historic allegations are contested, it 
should be incumbent on the police and the Crown Prosecution Service to ensure that the 
criminal justice system itself has not generated tainted evidence.  
(xi) Conclusion 
This chapter sought to discover whether the admissibility of bad character evidence under 
changes in the law might operate in a way which is prejudicial to the fair trial of the 
defendant in these cases.  
The 2000 Lloyd-Bostock study indicates that juries are definitely prejudiced against anyone 
convicted of such crimes even to the extent that juries will be influenced into thinking it more 
likely that a defendant accused of a current non-sexual offence is guilty if he has a prior 
record of a child sexual offence. However, research shows how several sequential convictions 
might reveal a proclivity and tendency to criminality, but more scientific research need to be 
done on criminal behaviour, including sexual offences as it has already been shown that there 
is a low reconviction rate for the latter (Redmayne) which may be ascribed to low detection 
rates or desistence. 
Both the UK and legal systems of continental Europe are familiar with bad character 
evidence. The UK system has generally favoured an exclusionary approach compared with 
the inclusionary one of some continental legal systems. The effect of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 has been to move towards the approach of the continental system. It has been shown 
that the European Court of Human Rights has been reluctant to interfere with the autonomy 
of member states to regulate their own evidence rules, as long as in the aggregate, the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWWRDIDLUWULDOLVQRWFRPSURPLVHG 
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,WLVVXEPLWWHGWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWWRDIDLUWULDOLPSOLHVWKat law enforcement, the 
Crown Prosecution Service and the Courts themselves should all be vigilant about filtering 
case documentation to ensure that evidence in cases has not suffered from collusion and 
contamination due to investigatory procedures. This reinforces the earlier conclusion that 
future investigations of historic CSA cases should take place in official police interviewing 
suites with audio-YLVXDOUHFRUGLQJVRIDOODGXOWFRPSODLQDQWV7KH/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
recommendation that if a judge can determine on the papers that there has been concoction, 
then the evidence should not be admitted, is clearly sound.183 
Certainly courts should also be careful about admitting bad character evidence where the 
defendant applies to have it excluded on the grounds that it was defamatory or wrongful, and 
provides evidence to support this claim, whether or not previously appealed.  
Finally, given that merely hearing allegations of child abuse provoke such strong negative 
reactions as indicated by the Lloyd-Bostock findings, it would be in the interests of a fair trial 
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Chapter VII  Conclusion 
 
 
The purpose of this study has been to discover whether, given intense public concern about 
child abuse and recent significant developments in law and procedure, those accused of historic 
sexual child abuse are able to obtain a fair trial. It began to answer that question by 
contextualising it within an understanding of the problem of child abuse, the public reaction to 
it and the impact of that reaction on the criminal justice system.  
It was only from the mid-20th century onwards with improved medical knowledge and cultural 
change that the extent of child abuse in both families and institutions became fully 
acknowledged and subjected to increasing criminal investigation and sanction. The intense and 
sustained public concern about this issue since the 1980s in particular has had a tremendous 
cultural and psychological impact on law and society. 
It is in this context that specific aspects of the investigation and trial of HCSA cases have been 
considered. Although most of them such as the identification and interviewing of complainants, 
the long delay before allegations are made, the protection of witnesses from intrusive and 
oppressive questioning, and the revelation of the past character of defendants are of course of 
general effect and concern throughout the criminal justice system, it has been shown that their 
impact upon the investigation and trial of HCSA cases has been in many instances especially 
problematic. 
It has been shown that the identification and interviewing of complainants raises particular 
problems in historic cases. For example, the reliability and integrity of evidence elicited years 
after the events complained of is especially difficult to assess. It is suggested that the audio-
video recording of interviews be made compulsory from the earliest stage of investigations of 
historic cases so that it might be possible for a fairer and more rigorous evaluation of the 
evidence to be conducted at the trial stage. This is one of the most important of the suggested 
reforms to help to reduce potential miscarriages of justice. Safe investigatory techniques, 
properly resourced, should be improved. 
 
It has also been shown that the solicitation of complainants through dip sampling, and the 
possibilities of financial compensation being made known to interviewees by police, lawyers 
or others, renders evidence obtained from such sources vulnerable to the implication of 
collusion and inducement. It is found that the bringing into contact by the police of potential 
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witnesses after many years provides ample scope for the contamination of evidence or even 
collusion between witnesses for ulterior motives. It is suggested that stricter protocols be 
elaborated for handling potential witnesses in these circumstances.  
It has been shown that in dealing with events that occurred years or even decades earlier - the 
frailty of memory - especially where children are concerned, and the difficulty of obtaining 
reliable independent evidence of a documentary or other character, simply of themselves 
point to the desirability of that Parliament should consider passing a continental-style statute 
of limitation. This type of statute could take into consideration factors such as the sentence 
for the offence (the more serious the offence, the longer the time limit for being able to make 
a complaint) as well when the complainant is no longer under dominion of the alleged 
offender. 
 
A case has also been made for a more careful and perhaps more sympathetic approach by the 
judiciary to the weight to be given to the absence, after years or decades, of documentary 
evidence likely to be helpful to the defendant, especially where a reasonable expectation exists 
(in institutional cases for example) that it should have been available. The onus should also be 
on the prosecution to show that a defendant would not be disadvantaged by the loss or 
unavailability of a significant and relevant piece of defence evidence in a delayed prosecution 
as suggested by Ring.1 
It has been shown that the courts are sometimes overly reluctant to permit questioning of 
complainants, notwithstanding judicial qualification of s.41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999, and the introduction of s.100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Policy 
considerations concerning the rape attrition rate (the gap between reported offences and 
convictions) and the respectful treatment of women and particularly child witnesses have 
clearly had a significant impact in the framing and application of the current law on this 
issue. Sympathy for such witnesses is entirely understandable, but has to be balanced against 
the need to allow defendants to adduce evidence that is relevant to the determination of their 
guilt. 
It should be noted that s.100 was designed to work in tandem with s.41, not supersede it, so 
that if defence material regarding the sexual behaviour of the complainant could be admitted, 
under s.41, it should not be blocked by use of the gateway criteria under s.100. A defendant 
                                                          
1
 65LQJµ%H\RQGWKH5HDFKRI-XVWLFH"&RPSODLQDQW'HOD\LQ+LVWRULF&KLOG6H[XDO$EXVH&DVHVDQGWKH5LJKW
WRD)DLU7ULDO¶-XGLFLDO6WXGLHV,QVWLWXWH Journal, pp.184-185. 
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wishing to cross-examine a complainant about a previous sexual allegation which he claims 
was false, has to obtain leave under both s.41 and s.100 of the CJA 2003.2 It is therefore 
submitted that incontrovertible evidence of fabrication of sexual allegations ought to be 
admitted where it forms part of the defence case. The decision in R v Flint3 introduced a 
welcome corrective note in 2005, in pointing out WKDWDWULDOMXGJH¶VREOLJDWLRQWRVHHWKDWWKH
interests of a complainant were protected did not permit him or her, by way of a general 
discretion, to prevent the proper deployment of evidence falling within the ambit permitted 
by s.41 of the Act. Merely because cross-H[DPLQDWLRQPLJKWLPSXJQDFRPSODLQDQW¶V
credibility, it did not necessarily follow that that was its main purpose. It is submitted that this 
approach should be built upon and more robustly applied. 
Finally, it has been shown that the extension by s.101 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 of the 
types of bad character evidence that could be admitted against the defendant, may unfairly 
prejudice the trial of the defendant in HCSA cases. As discussed, s.101 (d) of the Act 
provides that even a single previous conviction may be admitted as propensity evidence. The 
probative value of such evidence in the grave, highly charged and emotive context of HCSA 
cases should, in many cases, be clearly outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the fairness of 
the trial to render it admissible. It is recommended that prospective jurors be asked in 
advance whether they think that they could reach an impartial verdict on the child sexual 
abuse case they would be hearing. 
Considerable and commendable headway has been made to enable victims to come forward 
and to provide them not only with adequate protection but also with respectful treatment in 
the criminal justice system. These measures however have to co-exist with, and be balanced 
against, the right of the defendant to a fair trial. Article 8 of the ECHR may safeguard respect 
for privacy and family life under 8(1) but this right is subject to the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others under 8(2). Procedures and laws governing sexual offences, therefore, 
PXVWQRWHQFURDFKXSRQ$UWLFOHWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWWRDIDLUWULDO&URVVexamination of 
FRPSODLQDQWVRQIDFWVWKDWDUHJHQXLQHO\UHOHYDQWWRDGHIHQGDQW¶VFDVHHYHQLIVHQVLWLYH
must be permitted. Pre-recording cross-examinations of victims could also safeguard the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWWRDIDLUWULDOXQGHU$UWLFOHGZLWKRut unduly encroaching on Article 8.  
                                                          
2
 R v V, CA [2006] EWCA Crim 1901. 
3
 [2005] EWCA Crim 493. 
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It is submitted that the development of a much more prominent focus on the victim or 
possible victim is operating to undermine the presumption of innocence of the defendant and 
the procedural and evidential safeguards which protect that principle, and especially in cases 
concerning child sexual abuse. The many cases considered in this study which have involved 
convictions being overturned suggests that there are cases every year in which an individual 
is wrongly condemned and imprisoned as a child sexual abuser. It should be remembered that 
in most of these cases the defendants served, or would have served, lengthy sentences and 
suffered social and institutional stigma whilst in the prison system. If miscarriages of justice 
are to be avoided in this area then critical circumspection about the current law and practice is 
crucial. 
The conclusions which are set out above have been arrived at not only on the basis of 
analysing each of the discrete dimensions of the problem which have been addressed but also 
in utilising a holistic methodology which has brought together background context, the 
earliest steps of police investigation, the underlying challenge posed by delayed allegations, 
and two very distinct evidential rule developments concerning the complainant and defendant 
respectively. Of course, many issues can be broken down and approached in similar ways but 
it is submitted that the prosecution of historic child sexual abuse is an issue which cannot 
properly be understood without distinct analysis of the key dimensions addressed here whilst 
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Appendix A 
 
Criminal Cases Review Commission results on appealed cases from 1997-2012 involving 
a sexual offence 
Name : A Reference Number: 812/08 Date Referred to Court: 27/03/2009 Offence: Rape 
Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 23/07/2009 
Name: A Derek Reference Number: 161/97 Date Referred to Court: 30/11/1998 Offence: 
Indecent assault, rape Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 14/03/2000 
Name: ALLEN, Stewart Reference Number: 541/05 Date Referred to Court: 20/07/2006 
Offence: Indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 
12/06/2007 
Name: B Reference Number: 477/05 Date Referred to Court: 14/02/2007 Offence: Rape; 
indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 27/07/2007 
Name: B Reference Number: 390/04 Date Referred to Court: 02/05/2006 Offence: Rape 
(x2); buggery (x2); indecency with a child Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 14/12/2006 
Name: B Reference Number: 714/08 Date Referred to Court: 20/05/2009 Offence: 22 
counts of making an indecent photograph or pseudo-photograph of children Appeal 
Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 03/12/2009 
Name: BEATTY, David Reference Number: 199/02 Date Referred to Court: 10/06/2005 
Offence: Rape; kidnap; threats to kill Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 17/10/2006 
Name: BJS Reference Number: 516/99 Date Referred to Court: 13/06/2001 Offence: 
Rape Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 25/02/2002 
Name: BLACKWELL, Warren Reference Number: 723/03 Date Referred to Court: 
02/02/2006 Offence: Indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 12/09/2006 
Name: BOND Ernest Reference Number: 884/97 Date Referred to Court: 07/02/2001 
Offence: Conspiracy to commit indecent assault, indecent assault (x2) Appeal Outcome: 
Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 30/10/2003 
Name: BROMFIELD Milton Reference Number: 515/00 Date Referred to Court: 
30/10/2001 Offence: Rape Appeal Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 
14/02/2002 
Name: BROOKE, Ian Reference Number: 683/01 Date Referred to Court: 08/12/2004 
Offence: Rape (x3); buggery; indecent assault (x3) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of 
Appeal Outcome: 15/06/2006 
Name: BROWN Kevin Reference Number: 659/97 Date Referred to Court: 29/08/2001 
Offence: Rape Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 22/01/2004 
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Name: CLIBERY Anthony Mark Reference Number: 95/00 Date Referred to Court: 
15/10/2001 Offence: Rape (x2) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 
19/07/2005 
Name: D Reference Number: 745/07 Date Referred to Court: 10/06/2009 Offence: Rape; 
Assault by penetration Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 05/03/2010 
Name: EMM Reference Number: 402/01 Date Referred to Court: 11/03/2003 Offence: 
Incest; Indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 13/10/2005 
Name: F Reference Number: 794/08 Date Referred to Court: 23/07/2009 Offence: Rape 
(anal); indecent assault (x3) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 
06/05/2010 
Name: F Reginald Reference Number: 106/97 Date Referred to Court: 11/12/1998 
Offence: Indecent assault, incest (x4) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 14/02/2002 
R v GG [2005] EWCA Crim 1792 (CCRC referral on domestic historic sexual abuse). 
Conviction upheld. 
Name: FLETCHER, Joseph Reference Number: 923/05 Date Referred to Court: 
22/02/2007 Offence: Indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 31/07/2007 
Name: H Reference Number: 509/03 Date Referred to Court: 29/09/2004 Offence: 
Indecent assault (x2); rape (x3) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 
30/06/2005 
Name: H Dennis Reference Number: 199/97 Date Referred to Court: 12/12/2000 
Offence: Rape, Assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm, Indecent Assault (x3) Appeal 
Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 17/07/2002 
Name: HAKALA Peter Ian Reference Number: 169/97 Date Referred to Court: 
05/06/2000 Offence: Rape (x3), assault occasioning actual bodily harm Appeal Outcome: 
Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 19/03/2002 
Name: HAMMILL, Martin Reference Number: 576/03 Date Referred to Court: 
26/06/2007 Offence: Unlawful sexual intercourse; indecent assault Appeal Outcome: 
Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 23/10/2008 
Name: HEMPSTON, David Reference Number: 129/04 Date Referred to Court: 
27/01/2006 Offence: Common assault (x3); burglary with intent to rape; rape; attempt to 
render incapable or fesistance with intent; assault occasioning actual bodily harm Appeal 
Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 30/10/2006 
Name: HESMER, Alan Reference Number: 25/04 Date Referred to Court: 19/09/2006 
Offence: Attempted indecent assault; indecent assault (x2) Appeal Outcome: Not Available 
Date of Appeal Outcome: N/A 
Name: HOWE, Paul Reference Number: 193/08 Date Referred to Court: 03/03/2009 
Offence: Making indecent photographs or pseudo-photographs of children Appeal 
Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 03/12/2009 
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Name: IRWIN, Paul Reference Number: 391/02 Date Referred to Court: 16/12/2003 
Offence: Rape Appeal Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 09/11/2004 
Name: J Reference Number: 95/07 Date Referred to Court: 24/02/2010 Offence: indecent 
assault (x8); rape (x4); incest, buggery and attempted rape Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date 
of Appeal Outcome: 14/05/2010 
Name: JARVIS, Mark Reference Number: 150/05 Date Referred to Court: 10/08/2005 
Offence: Rape; robbery (2); kidnapping Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 04/07/2006 
Name: JF Reference Number: 687/07 Date Referred to Court: 03/10/2008 Offence: Rape. 
Causing or inciting a child under the age of 13 to engage in sexual activity.  Sexual assault.   
Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 27/01/2009 
Name: JUVENILE A Reference Number: 1026/98 Date Referred to Court: 15/02/2001 
Offence: Rape Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 11/12/2002 
Name: JUVENILE C Reference Number: 149/01 Date Referred to Court: 26/02/2002 
Offence: Indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 
11/10/2002 
Name: K Reference Number: 736/06 Date Referred to Court: 01/05/2007 Offence: 
Indecency with a child (x3); indecent assault (x3) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of 
Appeal Outcome: 28/09/2007 
Name: K, Jason Reference Number: 413/04 Date Referred to Court: 04/08/2005 Offence: 
Rape; indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 12/01/2006 
Name: L Reference Number: 800/03 Date Referred to Court: 03/08/2005 Offence: Rape; 
indecent assault (x4) Appeal Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 08/12/2005 
Name: L Reference Number: 874/06 Date Referred to Court: 12/03/2010 Offence: rape 
(x2); attempted rape; gross indecency with a child and indecent assault Appeal Outcome: 
Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 02/12/2010 
Name: LAY, Andrew Reference Number: 965/05 Date Referred to Court: 14/08/2006 
Offence: Indecent assault (x2); unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under 16 (x2); gross 
indecency with a child; making an indecent photograph of a child (x25) Appeal Outcome: 
Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 07/11/2006 
Name: MILLER, David Reference Number: 557/09 Date Referred to Court: 15/12/2009 
Offence: possession of indecent pseudo photographs of a child (x4) Appeal Outcome: 
Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 25/11/2010 
Name: MORRIS Andrew Robert Reference Number: 77/01 Date Referred to Court: 
15/05/2001 Offence: Indecent Assault (x2) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 05/02/2003 
Name: Mr F Reference Number: 591/02 Date Referred to Court: 25/09/2008 Offence: 
Indecency with a child, indecent assault & rape Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 13/05/2009 
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Name: N Reference Number: 263/08 Date Referred to Court: 13/05/2010 Offence: 
Attempted rape; sexual assault of a child under 13 (x5) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of 
Appeal Outcome: 29/10/2010 
Name: Nicholson, Michael Reference Number: 669/04 Date Referred to Court: 
21/10/2004 Offence: Possession of indecent photographs of children Appeal Outcome: 
Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 26/10/2004 
Name: O Reference Number: 633/08 Date Referred to Court: 11/06/2010 Offence: 
Indecent assault (x7); rape Appeal Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 04/11/2010 
Name: O Reference Number: 145/07 Date Referred to Court: 25/06/2009 Offence: Rape 
Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 09/02/2011 
Name: O Reference Number: 191/01 Date Referred to Court: 20/01/2004 Offence: Rape; 
indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 04/08/2004 
Name: P Reference Number: 748/03 Date Referred to Court: 14/02/2005 Offence: Rape 
Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 01/11/2005 
Name: P Reference Number: 686/02 Date Referred to Court: 18/11/2003 Offence: Rape; 
Assault occasioning actual bodily harm Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 13/05/2004 
Name: P Reference Number: 456/02 Date Referred to Court: 22/03/2006 Offence: 
Indecent assault on a female below age 13 (x2) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 24/01/2007 
Name: P Reference Number: 976/05 Date Referred to Court: 25/08/2010 Offence: Rape 
Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 10/02/2011 
Name: P Michael Reference Number: 270/97 Date Referred to Court: 23/10/1998 
Offence: Indecent Assault (x3), rape (x3) Appeal Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 20/07/1999 
Name: P Peter Reference Number: 527/97 Date Referred to Court: 26/01/2000 Offence: 
Indecent Assault, Rape, Attempted Rape Appeal Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 30/11/2001 
Name: PARKIN, David Reference Number: 420/02 Date Referred to Court: 16/12/2003 
Offence: Rape Appeal Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 09/11/2004 
Name: POPAT Chetan Reference Number: 207/99 Date Referred to Court: 17/05/1999 
Offence: Attempted rape, indecent assault (x2), intimidating a witness Appeal Outcome: 
Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 30/07/1999 
Name: PURVIS Dominic Reference Number: 204/07 Date Referred to Court: 04/06/2008 
Offence: Possessing indecent images Appeal Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 
31/07/2008 
Name: Q Reference Number: 432/09 Date Referred to Court: 07/09/2010 Offence: Rape; 
indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Not Available 
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Name: R Reference Number: 63/07 Date Referred to Court: 20/09/2010 Offence: 
ttempted buggery; indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 
25/01/2011 Judgment: Not Available 
Name: R Reference Number: 301/05 Date Referred to Court: 13/02/2006 Offence: Rape 
(x3); buggery; indecent assault (x6) Appeal Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 
15/02/2007 
Name: ROBOTHAM, John Reference Number: 323/05 Date Referred to Court: 
19/02/2007 Offence: Indecent assault on a male Appeal Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal 
Outcome: N/A 
Name: ROWE, Christopher Reference Number: 227/06 Date Referred to Court: 
09/01/2008 Offence: Possession of indecent photographs of a child Appeal Outcome: 
Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 04/11/2008 
Name: S Reference Number: 316/07 Date Referred to Court: 04/09/2008 Offence: Rape 
Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 13/10/2009 
Name: S Reference Number: 198/03 Date Referred to Court: 28/09/2006 Offence: 
Indecent assault (x4); rape (x4) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 
08/06/2007 
Name: S Reference Number: 34/08 Date Referred to Court: 02/03/2011 Offence: 
Indecent assault on a female under 14 Appeal Outcome: Not Available Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 
Name: SHAW Cornelius Renny Reference Number: 277/97 Date Referred to Court: 
09/02/2000 Offence: Rape and indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 15/02/2001 
Name: SHAW Olbie Reference Number: 167/00 Date Referred to Court: 28/03/2000 
Offence: Rape, Indecent Assault Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 
15/02/2001 
Name: SHEEHAN, Peter Reference Number: 236/02 Date Referred to Court: 30/09/2004 
Offence: Indecent assault (x2) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 
10/11/2005 
Name: SIDDALL, John Reference Number: 511/00 Date Referred to Court: 08/12/2004 
Offence: Indecent assault (x3); indecency with a child Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of 
Appeal Outcome: 15/06/2006 
Name: SMITH Allen Reference Number: 205/97 Date Referred to Court: 25/01/2000 
Offence: Rape Appeal Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 30/07/2002 
Name: SMITH Shane Stepon Reference Number: 290/00 Date Referred to Court: 
19/12/2001 Offence: Attempted rape; burglary with intent to rape Appeal Outcome: 
Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 24/03/2003 
Name: SMITH, Peter Reference Number: 230/04 Date Referred to Court: 22/09/2004 
Offence: Indecent assault (x3) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 
03/03/2005 
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Name: SOLOMON, Dean Reference Number: 337/03 Date Referred to Court: 
18/12/2006 Offence: Rape (x2); indecent assault; buggery; attempted buggery Appeal 
Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 22/10/2007 
Name: T Reference Number: 516/06 Date Referred to Court: 13/09/2007 Offence: 
Indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 19/05/2008 
Name: TUNBRIDGE, Justin Reference Number: 88/05Date Referred to Court: 
08/02/2007Offence: Indecent assault (x2) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 17/04/2008 
Name: U Reference Number: 868/07Date Referred to Court: 23/03/2011Offence: Rape 
Appeal Outcome: Not Available Date of Appeal Outcome: 
Name: V Reference Number: 231/07 Date Referred to Court: 24/03/2011Offence: Rape 
[anal], contrary to section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003Appeal Outcome: Not 
Available Date of Appeal Outcome: 
Name: V Reference Number: 201/08 Date Referred to Court: 26/07/2011Offence: 
Buggery, Indecency with a child, Indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Not Available Date of 
Appeal Outcome: 
Name: W Reference Number: 441/06 Date Referred to Court: 29/03/2007Offence: 
Buggery; rape (x2); indecent assault (x11) Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 19/05/2008 
Name: W Reference Number: 549/03Date Referred to Court: 29/11/2004 Offence: Rape 
Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 01/03/2005 
Name: W Graham Reference Number: 689/98Date Referred to Court: 
22/10/1998Offence: Indecent assault and rape Appeal Outcome: Upheld Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 19/01/1999 
Name: WALTERS Christopher Patrick Reference Number: 441/98Date Referred to 
Court: 08/05/2001Offence: Rape Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 
17/06/2002 
Name: WARREN, Leslie Reference Number: 549/03Date Referred to Court: 
29/11/2004Offence: Rape Appeal Outcome: Quashed Date of Appeal Outcome: 
01/03/2005 
Name: WHITEHEAD, Ian Reference Number: 241/04 
Date Referred to Court: 08/03/2005Offence: Indecent assault (x6) Appeal Outcome: 
Upheld Date of Appeal Outcome: 23/06/2006 
Name: X Reference Number: 706/08Date Referred to Court: 19/07/2011Offence: 
Indecent assault (x2); Attempted rape; Rape Appeal Outcome: Not Available Date of 
Appeal Outcome: 
Name: Y Reference Number: 101/11Date Referred to Court: 26/07/2011Offence: 
Attempted rape, Indecent assault Appeal Outcome: Not Available Date of Appeal 
Outcome: 
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Appendix B 
Historic child sexual abuse cases: ones that miscarried 
R v Robert Francis O'Brien Court of Appeal [2000] Crim. L.R. 863 Criminal Division No: 
200000738/Y3 20 March 2000 
$SSHOODQWZDV+HDGPDVWHURI6W0DU\¶V+DOO3UHSDUDWRU\6FKRROIRU6WRQH\KXUVW&ROOHJH
Tried in 2000. Four complainants from said School, allegations ranging from 1972 and 1998, 
four pupils alleging indecent assault. N and R were 1970s pupils, A and C pupils from 1990s. 
Allegations from two different eras were considered by the Court of Appeal to be too 
dissimilar to have been tried together: 
In the context of the criminal law and procedure, in our judgment, the longer the gap 
in time between two separate alleged offences, the clearer must be the nexus required, 
both to constitute a sufficient relationship between the events to give rise to a series 
within the Indictment Rules and to give rise to the admissibility of evidence in relation 
to one period to prove offences in relation to the other. In the words of Lord MacKay 
LQ3WKHUHPXVWEH³VWURQJSUREDWLYHIRUFH´LIWKHHYLGHQFHRIRQHLVWREHDGPLVVLEOH
in relation to the other. We do not find in the four matters to which Mr Webster 
referred strong probative force. Indeed, it seems to us that those matters, properly 
analysed, do not provide much, if any, probative force. That being so, the learned 
judge, in our judgment, was wrong to permit these offences to be tried together. 
Convictions quashed. 
R. v B (Brian S) [2003] EWCA Crim 319 
Complaint of sexual abuse made 30 years after incident. The Court of Appeal stated that there 




B appealed against his convictions for indecently assaulting the complainant, his 
stepdaughter, 30 years previously. During the period when the offences had taken place, the 
complainant had been aged between 7 and 11-years-old. Prior to trial, B had applied for a 
stay of proceedings on the basis that due to the delay that had occurred since the incidents, 
which had taken place 30 years before a complaint was made, and the difficulty in obtaining 
witnesses, the trial would amount to an abuse of process. That application was refused. B 
appealed on the ground that the evidence was unreliable and unsupported by any independent 
evidence. Held, allowing the appeal and quashing the convictions, due to the delay and 
limited evidence available, the convictions were not safe. B had been unable to defend 
himself or effectively cross-examine the complainant. In the interests of justice the 
convictions should be set aside. 
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R v Basil Rigby Williams and Michael James Lawson [2003] EWCA Crim 693 
Miscarriage case involving historic allegations of abuse in children's homes (Operation Care). 
Conviction quashed upon fresh evidence). Each of the appellants was in the past a member of 
the staff at a Residential Community Home near Liverpool, which cared for boys under 17 
with disturbed backgrounds, and in July 1996 social services and the police began to 
investigate allegations that members of staff at that home had sexually abused boys in their 
FDUH7KDWLQYHVWLJDWLRQZDVJLYHQWKHFRGHQDPH³2SHUDWLRQ&DUH´7KHLQYHVWLJDWLRQ
involved circulating former residents, and inviting them to contact the police if they had 
complaints. The separate prosecutions of the two appellants were part of the results of that 
operation. Williams-Rigby was tried first, and to some extent the course of the later trial of 
Lawson was affected by the conviction of Williams-Rigby. There was also one complainant 
who was common to both trials. 
 
The fresh evidence (contemporaneous/eyewitnesses) 
New witness for the appellant, -RKQ.HOODKHU+HZDVDGPLWWHGWR6W*HRUJH¶VLQ-XQH
and was happy there. He told us that he saw no sign of physical or sexual abuse, and was 
treated "perfect" by Williams-Rigby. He was never aware of anyone entering the dormitory 
which he shared with BS and MO after the lights had been put out, and he would have known 
had anyone done so, especially if it had happened three or four times per week. He regarded 
as impossible the suggestion that anyone might come into the dormitory and sexually abuse a 
boy who slept there without any other boy in the dormitory being aware of what was 
happening. He only visited Williams-5LJE\¶VIODWRQFHIRUWHDDFRXSOHRIGD\VEHIRUHKHOHIW
In cross-examination Kellaher did make the extravagant claim that those in the dormitory did 
not sleep until 3 or 4 a.m., but in general his evidence appeared to the Court of Appeal to be 
credible. It was not contended on behalf of the Crown that either Kellaher or Robert Harrison 
could and should have been produced by the defence as witnesses at the trial.  
New witness for the appellant, Harrison. Since 1995 he has been serving a life sentence for 
PXUGHUEXWLQ-XQHKHWRRZHQWWR6W*HRUJH¶VDQGZDVLQWKHGRUPLWRU\ZLWK%6DQG
MO. He was treated very well, and experienced no sexual or physical abuse. At that time he 
was very small, and Williams-Rigby was someone whom he regarded as fair. He too rejected 
the idea that anyone could have visited the dormitory late and taken a boy or boys out, or 
forced himself on a boy, without the other boys knowing. Williams-Rigby never visited the 
dormitory, except perhaps to check, after lights out, and his own visits to Williams-5LJE\¶V
flat had been during the day, never after 8 p.m. Harrison, like Kellaher, was regarded by the 
Court of Appeal as an apparently credible witness. 
 
Conclusion: Williams-Rigby. 
The fresh evidence which was is capable of belief. Plainly it would have been admissible at 
the trial, and it is accepted that there is a reasonable explanation to the failure to adduce it 
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then, so the only remaining matter to be considered pursuant to section 23(2) of the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1968 is whether that fresh evidence affords any ground for allowing the appeal. 
The fresh evidence directly undermined the evidence of two of the complainants, BS and 
MO, and the evidence of MO may well have assisted the jury to reach a conclusion in relation 
to ML and WM. 
2Q/DZVRQ¶VFRQYLFWLRQV 
There had been concern about how the jury might have interpreted evidence about a police 
document called Scene 22. This was a list drawn up by the police of 91 members of staff who 
had been under suspicion or arrested as a result of Operation Care. The investigation had 
involved circulating former residents and asking them to contact police if they had 
complaints to make. At the trial Detective Superintendent Robbins agreed under cross-
examination that following letters (sent by the police) addressed to former pupils at the 
school there had been 8 or 9 who had complained about Lawson, out of about 8,600 with 
whom Lawson would have been in contact during the indictment period. There were some 16 
or so other witnesses upon whom the prosecution would seek to rely. 
These complainants have not combined in some sort of witch hunt against this 
defendant alone ± others have also been accused. And of course it is relevant in the 
arguments that Mr Fordham put forward about the large number of pupils who have 
passed through over the years and the small number of complaints, because you know 
that there are other complaints and other subjects of complaint. 
Appeal counsel had raised the issue of police contamination to the Court of Appeal: There 
was no video or audio tape of the first contact between a complainant and a police officer in 
response to the letters sent out to those conducting Operation Care, and the risk of 
contamination was something. Lawson had been convicted on the unsupported testimony of a 
complainant with a criminal history and Counsel had suggested that at the time a stronger 
care warning as advised in Makanjuola [1995] 2 Cr App R 469, but this was rejected as a 
point of law for the appeal.  
The naming of those listed in the Scene 22 document was, to say the least, 
unfortunate, and in the light of what has happened to all of them it is impossible for 
us to bHVDWLVILHGWKDWWKHQDPLQJGLGQRWGLVWRUW/DZVRQ¶VWULDO:HDOVRKDYH
serious reservations about the admissibility of (and fairness of admitting) the 
convictions of Williams-Rigby. 
R v Birks (Dene) Court of Appeal, 20 December 2002 [2002] EWCA Crim 3091; [2003] 2 
Cr. App. R. 7; [2003] Crim. L.R. 401; Independent, March 10, 2003 
 
N.B.: Case decided before the passing of section 120 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 
which now allows a recent complaint as a previous consistent statement to bolster a 
FRPSODLQDQW¶VFUHGLELOLW\ 
On 3rd May 2002 the appellant, Dene Birks, was found guilty of three counts of indecent 
assault and one count of indecency with a child. The complainant was 19 at the time of the 
trial, but her evidence concerned what had happened to her when she was a young child. She 
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gave evidence that she was sexually abused by the appellant and that it happened about once 
a month for about twelve months and finished when she was about 6 to 7 years old, that is 
some thirteen or fourteen years before trial. This would have made the appellant 18 to 19 
years old at the time of the alleged offending. Thus the complainant alleged that the abuse 
began when she was 5 or 6 years old. 
The Court of Appeal was reluctant to accept the ground of appeal, but was, at that time, 
bound by the doctrine of recent complaint. 




out of the television programme should not have been admitted at all, but secondly, if it could 
have been admitted at the outset (which occurred when the material before the court about 
what the complainant would say was that she had made her complaint some two months after 
the end of the appellant's conduct), the judge should have reviewed his decision and, in the 
event, discharged the jury once the evidence had emerged in the cross-examination of the 
complainant that her complaint might have been made up to six months after the end of the 
appellant's conduct towards her and also in the light of the mother's evidence of the complaint 
being made a year later. 
At the initial stage when the judge was asked to rule about the admissibility of the complaint, 
the judge exercised his discretion to admit this evidence, basing himself upon the case of R v 
Valentine [1996] 2 Cr App R 213, and, in particular, a passage in the judgment of Roch LJ, 
giving the judgment of this court in that case, at 223G to 224A as follows:  
The authorities establish that a complaint can be recent and admissible, although it 
may not have been made at the first opportunity which presented itself. What is the 
first reasonable opportunity will depend on the circumstances including the character 
of the complainant and the relationship between the complainant and the person to 
whom she complained and the persons to whom she might have complained but did 
not do so. It is enough if it is the first reasonable opportunity. Further, a complaint 
ZLOOQRWEHLQDGPLVVLEOHPHUHO\EHFDXVHWKHUHKDVEHHQDQHDUOLHUFRPSODLQW« 
She said first about two months after the last incident, though she accepted when she was 
cross-H[DPLQHGLWFRXOGEHORQJHULWFRXOGEHVL[PRQWKVEXWVKHVDLGµ:KHQ\RX¶UHOLWWOH
DVVHVVLQJWLPHVSDQVLVYHU\GLIILFXOW¶« 
...[t]he judge erred in this case, in admitting the recent complaint evidence in the first place, 
but, a fortiori, in not discharging the jury once it emerged that the time in question was not 
simply two months, but up to six months or even a year. 
...the evidence of the confrontation between the mother and the appellant and the significance 
RURWKHUZLVHRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VOLHWKDWVXFKFRQIURQWDWLRQKDGQHYHUWDNHQSODFHZDVLWVHOI
the product of the admission of the evidence of complaint. The position is, therefore, that, in a 
case which depended essentially upon the credibility of the complainant vis-à-vis that of the 
appellant, not only was her credibility assisted by the admission of this evidence, but further 
P a g e  |   
HYLGHQFHSRVVLEO\WRWKHSUHMXGLFHRIWKHDSSHOODQWUHJDUGLQJWKHPRWKHU¶VFRQIURQWDWLRQZLWK
him came in upon coat-tails. Mr Quirke submits that it may be that if the evidence of 
confrontation had not come in as a result of the evidence of recent complaint, then it could 
have been admissible by some other means. But even if this is the case, he accepts that in 
such a situation no more evidence of the complaint would have been put before the jury than 
was necessary to set up the background to the confrontation. In that even the force of the 
evidence relating to the manner in which the complaint arose spontaneously out of the 
television programme would not have been before the jury. We therefore are unable to accept 
his submission that we should regard these convictions as nevertheless safe. In these 
circumstances, we feel bound to quash the convictions and allow the appeal. 
...we feel that, although bound by the doctrine of recent complaint in the way that we have 
described in our judgment, it would be preferable if the law could develop in the way which 
...subject to appropriate directions of course, it is undesirable for juries to be kept in the dark 
as to what has happened between the time, sometimes many years or even decades in the 
past, of the alleged abuse and the time at which they are trying the case. If complaints, albeit 
not recent complaints in the existing sense of that term, have come forward in circumstances 
which are safe to put before the jury for their evaluation, then we think that they should be. 
Ultimately it would be for the jury, subject to proper directions, to decide what they make of 
a proper narrative of events which would explain to them how it is that the charges put before 
them for their decision arise when they do, either against the background, depending on the 
facts of the case, of a complete silence of decades, however that is explained, or against some 
other possibly highly significant background. 
In this connection we would also observe that in the Criminal Justice Bill which has recently 
been published, the doctrine of recent complaint, as an exception to the prohibition on the 
admission of previous consistent statements, has been extended from the case of sexual crime 
WRDOOFULPHV:HUHIHUWRFODXVHRIWKHGUDIW%LOOKHDGHG³2WKHUSUHYLRXVVWDWHPHQWVRI
ZLWQHVVHV´8QGHUVXEFODXVHGRQHRIWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRUWKHDGPLVsion of previous 
statements is:  
³7KHFRPSODLQWZDVPDGHDVVRRQDVFRXOGUHDVRQDEO\EHH[SHFWHGDIWHUWKHDOOHJHG
FRQGXFW´ 
Were a new statute to be enacted in those terms, we could also visualise arguments, on the 
RQHKDQGWKDWWKHZRUGV³DVVRRQDV´ZHre strong words, pointing to a necessarily early 
complaint, but, on the other hand, we could visualise arguments that, in the context of an 
entirely new legislative beginning, where the test was laid down in statutory language, the 
RYHUDOOH[SUHVVLRQ³PDGH DVVRRQDVFRXOGUHDVRQDEO\EHH[SHFWHGDIWHUWKHDOOHJHGFRQGXFW´
could permit of a broader test, which would allow the sort of complaint in question in this 
case or even more delayed complaints, depending upon all the circumstances. 
29. However, we also note in the Explanatory Notes published in connection with this Bill, at 
paragraph 346 the following:  
³7KLVH[WHQGVWKHFRPPRQODZUXOHNQRZQDVUHFHQWFRPSODLQW´ 
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We can also visualise an argument being made on the basis of that sort of comment that the 
legislative intent was not to go beyond the circumstances previously found in the common 
law relating to recent complaint. We draw attention in this context to these provisions of the 
Criminal Justice Bill because it seems to us that it might be helpful to consider the 
circumstances and submissions made in this case for the purpose of defining any new 
legislative rule. 
Nevertheless, for the reasons we have given, our decision on the present law must be that the 
judge erred in this case and the appeal must be allowed. 
R v J [2004] UKHL 42, [2005] 1 All ER 1 
David Carrington-Jones was released on October 16, 2007, after spending six years in jail for 
a rape, having been previously found guilty on two counts of rape and sexual assault against a 
pair of teenage sisters in December 2000. One of the complainants subsequently admitted to 
police she made up the allegations against her stepfather Mr Carrington-Jones because she 
µGLGQRWOLNHKLP¶,WKDVWUDQVpired that the girl had previously made up other allegations of 
rape against her brother, fiancée, stepfather and even a customer at her work, but the jury was 
not told of this, and Mr Carrington-Jones was sentenced to a ten-year jail term. He was later 
refused parole hearings because of his refusal to admit his guilt.  
$QYHU'DXG(?6KHLNKY7KH&URZQ [2006] EWCA Crim 2625 
>0*¶V@DOOHJDWLRQVDUHSUHGLFDWHGXSRQWKHUHEHLQJDQRSSRUWXQLW\IRUWKHRIIHQFHWREH
committed. If there was no opportunity there could be no offence, and the evidence which we 
have, the possibility of there being an opportunity is low. [MG] was in B house and said he 
QHYHUPRYHGIURP%KRXVH« 
Missing documents, in particular the staff rota and the personnel records, were likely to be 
highly relevant to two issues in this case, First, whether the appellant would have come into 
contact with MG so as to have the opportunity to win his trust as MG alleged that he had; 
secondly, whether the appellant had the opportunity to commit these offences against MG. 
Now in those circumstances, the very existence of those documents would provide the means 
by which the Defendant could show beyond doubt reverse alibi. He is denied that opportunity 
because of the absence of those records. We submit there cannot be a clearer example of 
there being prejudice to the Defendant because of a consequence of delay, the consequence of 
GHOD\EHLQJWKHDEVHQFHHLWKHUWKURXJKGHVWUXFWLRQRUPLVOD\LQJRIWKRVHFULWLFDOUHFRUGV´ 
Mr Goose made the point that the appellant did not have to be on duty to commit the offence 
and therefore the records would not necessarily assist. As to the personnel records, he 
submitted that they might not show whether he was still living at the home and therefore 
would not necessarily assist. 
Mr Cosgrove replied in part:  
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³«ZHVXEPLWLWZLOOQRWGRWRVXJJHVWWKDWWKLVRIIHQFHFRXOGKDYHEHHQFRPPLWWHGZKHQ0U
Sheikh was not on duty. That is not consistent in our submission with the evidence given by 
[MG] who spoke about him being working on house B on a number of occasions over a 
period of time as the trust built up, and indeed his evidence about what occurred on the night 
in question, namely the complaint and the locking in the room, making sure he was secure, 
are consistent only witKWKDW0U(?6KHLNKZDVRQGXW\DQGWKHUHIRUHLWLVQRWSRVVLEOHWRWU\WR
wriggle out of the notion that whether or not he was on duty is a highly relevant 
consideration. Unfortunately all concerned had overlooked the complainant's evidence that 
when he had spoken to the appellant about the bullying and the suggestion had been made to 
lock the dormitory door, the appellant was on duty. In any event, one might expect that if a 
door to a dormitory is to be locked from the outside, with the attendant dangers, it would be 
done by a member of staff who was on duty. 
R. v Smolinski (Mark Paul) [2004] EWCA Crim 1270; [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 40; Times, 
May 28, 2004; [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 40, 
 
An appeal against conviction for historic indecent assault on children on the basis that the 
case should have been stayed as an abuse of proves due to the delayed prosecution. 
 
If it had not been for the matter of the (mixed) verdicts, to which we have referred, we 
would have found it difficult to interfere with the conviction which took place in this 
case. We do not think it is right for this court to lay down the principle that because of 
the period which has elapsed (twenty years) when the complainant has given a reason 
for the delay, it is inevitably the case that the convictions will be unsafe. However, 
where there has been a long period of delay such as existed in this case, and where 
the complainants are young, as they were here (6 and 7 respectively at the time 
matters happened), this court should scrutinise convictions with particular care. 
Likewise, we consider that trial judges should scrutinise the evidence with particular 
care and come to a conclusion whether or not it is safe for the matter to be left to the 
jury. 
In this case, looking at the matter as a whole, bearing in mind there are 
discrepancies, bearing in mind that the elder sister, until reminded by her younger 
sister, was apparently oblivious of what was alleged to have happened earlier, 
bearing in mind the conclusion which the jury came to on the first count but were 
unable to come to the same conclusion on the second count, that this is a case where 
the conviction is unsafe. Accordingly, we will therefore allow the appeal. 
The judges also advised that any abuse of process hearing should take place after the 
evidence has been called at trial. 
R. v A (Paul) [2005] EWCA Crim 2941 
 
Admissibility; Delay; Indecent assault;  
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The Court of Appeal held that the convictions are unsafe for the following reasons:  
first, the delay of nineteen to 29 years between offences and trial in a case where the defence 
was one of complete denial; 
secondly, the prejudice occa9sioned to the appellant by the unavailability of medical and 
Social Services records;  
third, the prejudice occasioned by the inability to trace potential defence witnesses from the 
Samaritans; 
fourth, the prejudice occasioned by the impossibility of viewing the scene of the alleged 
offences; fifth, prejudice occasioned by the death of the mother;  
sixth, the failure of the Hampshire and Suffolk police forces to keep adequate records; 
 seventh, the failure of the judge to discharge the jury after hearing the inadmissible evidence 
of violence;  
eighth, his failure to direct the jury adequately on the impact of delay on the formulation and 
conduct of the appellant's defence;  
ninth, his failure to direct the jury that any previous consistent statement by the complainant 
could not be taken as evidence of the truth of its contents;  
tenth, the acquittal of the appellant by the jury on counts 4 and 5 of the indictment, which 
depended, as did counts 1-3, on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant whose 
credibility was in issue.  
The fact that verdicts are apparently logically inconsistent does not make the verdicts 
complained of unsafe unless the only explanation must or might be that the jury were 
confused or adopted the wrong approach. R v McCluskey 98 Cr App R 216 is referred to. 
Nonetheless this is another factor, counsel submits, that the court can take into account when 
deciding on the safety of the convictions. He further submits that, given the way in which the 
verdicts were returned, it is difficult to avoid a suspicion that the jury arrived at an improper 
compromise. 
But given the inadmissible evidence heard by the jury (regarding new allegations that the 
accused had been violent towards his wife, the sole defence witness to rebut the 
FRPSODLQDQW¶VILYHXQFRUURERUDWHGDOOHJDWLRQVLPSDFWLQJDVLWYHU\SRVVLEO\GLGXSRQWKHLU
assessment of a witness important, if not vital, to the defence and one said to have been to a 
degree complicit in the offending, and given the other factors to which we have referred and 
to which we have had regard, we are unable to regard these convictions as safe. 
 
R v Flint [2005] EWCA Crim 493 
 
The trial Judge had unreasonably refused jury to view real evidence (video recordings) for 
cross-examination. The cross-examination of evidence in the video was relevance to fact in 
issue under s.41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 
:KHUHVRIWKHDSSOLHGDWULDOMXGJH¶VREOigation to see that the interests of a complainant 
were protected did not permit him or her, by way of a general discretion, to prevent the 
proper deployment of evidence falling within the ambit permitted by s.41 of the Act. Merely 
because cross-examination of a complainant might impugn her credibility, it did not 
necessarily follow that that was its main purpose. 
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R v Chapman [2006] EWCA Crim 1656  
Misdirection on delay and good character. Unavailability of defence witnesses due to deaths. 
The first point of law related to the directions which the trial judge ought to have given to the 
jury in relation to the lapse of time between the allegations made by the complainant and the 
time when this applicant was interviewed in November 2001, with the trial a year later. The 
lapse of time in this case, as in so many others, between the facts giving rise to the complaint 
and the interview of this applicant in November 2001, had considerable impact on his 
defence. As we have said, his defence was that nothing untoward had taken place; it was a 
complete denial. He said, as we have pointed out, that he had very little opportunity to be 
alone with the complainant and had only baby-sat on a few occasions for short periods. The 
delay clearly prevented any precision in the evidence which he could give, still less which 
any witness to be called on his behalf could give. Moreover, as is clear from the nature of the 
cross-H[DPLQDWLRQRIWKHFRPSODLQDQWLWZDVSDUWRIWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VFDVHWKDWWKHFRPSODLQDQW
had been looked afWHUE\DVWHSIDWKHU¶VQLHFHDJLUOFDOOHG=KDOLQLEHWZHHQDQG
She could not be called to give evidence because she died in 2004. Moreover, in the house 
where most of the offences were alleged to have taken place, where this applicant lived, there 
lived also his father. He spent most of the day downstairs and might have given further 
evidence to support the defence case of lack of opportunity. He died in 1994. These were 
quite specific disadvantages under which the defence laboured as a result of the delay. 
Moreover, there was, as in so many other cases like this, a general disadvantage of the 
defence arising from the inability to adduce evidence of the demeanour of the complainant, 
perhaps with the defendant or on her own, which might suggest that she did not give the 
appearance of suffering in the way she described that she was suffering. It also diminished 
the possibility of identifying features to suggest either exaggeration or fabrication. 
In the instant case, not only did the judge fail to give any warning, he appears positively to 
have encouraged the jury to disregard the delay.  
The impact of the delay trenches on the fairness of the trial so far as the defendant is 
concerned and it is that feature of which the jury should be instructed in cases where the issue 
RIGHOD\VKRXOGIRUPSDUWRIWKHMXGJH¶VGLUHFWLRQV 
The essential importance of good character evidence is that the jury should not reach a 
FRQFOXGHGYLHZDVWRWKHWUXWKIXOQHVVRIDFRPSODLQDQW¶VHYLGHQFHZLWKRXWWDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQt 
the two important features of the good character of the defendant, both of which are relevant 
WRWKHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHWUXWKIXOQHVVRIWKHFRPSODLQDQW¶VDFFRXQW,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHSURFHVV
by which the jury reached a conclusion as to the truth of the allegations requires, in 
accordance with proper directions from a judge, the jury to take into account the good 
character of the defendant. 
No explanation was given to the jury as to why it was necessary to do so, in other words to 
enable the witness to be more at ease, nor was any warning given that it should not be 
considered prejudicial to the accused. 
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There was a further serious defect in the failure of the judge to draw attention to certain 
comments made by the questioners during the course of the interview with the complainant. 
As commonly occurs, words were uttered by the interviewers designed to put the witness at 
rest, to give her peace of mind and to encourage her. Such words were spoken during the 
course of the interview, for example, the complainant said:  
,MXVWGRQ¶WZDQWLWWRKDSSHQWRP\VLVWHUV42ND\1RERG\GHVHUYHVWRKDSSHQWRWKHP
You've got the perspective right; he is wrong, not you."  
Other similar expressions were uttered by the interviewers. It was, in our view, in this 
particular case incumbent on the judge, if those matters were to be before the jury - and we 
make no criticism of the decision to allow them to go before the jury - to warn the jury that 
the apparent approbation of the interviewers was not any indication as to where the truth lay.  
R. v Clark (Nigel Paul) [2006] EWCA Crim 231 
 
The allegations were of systematic, historic abuse of both girls when they were aged between 
WRLQ$¶VFDVHEHWZHHQWR,WZDVVXEPLWWHGWKDWWKHHYLGHQFHRIWKHVHFRQG
complainant, A, should have been excluded pursuant to section 78 of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984. It was said that her recollections may have been the product of 
hypnotherapy and not an accurate recollection of what had occurred. There was also some 
concern, because research showed that the public believed a person under hypnosis was 
incapable of telling a lie. Secondly, it was submitted that HYHQLI$¶VHYLGHQFHZDVDGPLWWHG
the defence ought to have been entitled to call the evidence of Dr Naish as to the dangers of 
evidence produced through hypnotherapy. The judge ruled against this application on both 
WKHEDVLVUXOLQJWKDW$¶VHYLGHQFHVKould be heard by the jury and the evidence of Dr Naish 
should not be admitted. 
Conviction quashed, retrial ordered. 
 
R. v H (Michael John) [2006] EWCA Crim 994  
 
Historic child sexual abuse; Delay; Indecent assault; Jury directions  
 
The Court of Appeal had to assess what the weight the jury had attached to a disclosure of 




submitted on behalf of the appellant by Mr Storey that this was a material error because in a 
case where essentially the issue was: which of two, KD and the appellant, were telling the 
truth, the jury would be bound to look for evidence which supported one or other. It is 
submitted that the evidence of the three other witnesses who were relied on as supporting 
KD's evidence (Susan Tunstall, Nicola and Christopher Scales) was individually weak and 
insignificant. Accordingly, it was all the more important for the judge correctly to identify the 
HYLGHQFHWKDWZDVVDLGWRVXSSRUW.'¶VHYLGHQFH 
Conviction quashed, retrial ordered. 
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Counsel for the appellant relied on a number of authorities which stress the need for a judge 
to give a careful direction to a jury when dealing with alleged historic abuse. He submitted 
that the directions given by the judge in this case did not measure up to the required standard. 
Crown Counsel conceded that fuller directions could have been given, but his submission was 
that the directions given by the judge were in all the circumstances adequate. 
Court of Appeal directed that: 
Whilst it will now be rare for a court to stay such proceedings, the jury should be 
alerted to the difficulties which delay causes to a defendant. The Judicial Studies 
Board specimen directions provide a fair draft for judges to follow, always bearing in 
mind that it is for the judge to tailor his or her directions to the evidence in the 
individual case. In our judgment it is important for the judge to point out in brief 
terms the difficulties which may face a defendant in answering allegations of historic 
abuse, such as: the longer the time, the more difficult it may be for the defendant to 
answer the allegations; passage of time dims memories and may deprive a defendant 
of evidence which would have assisted him. In our view it is also desirable to couple 
these directions with a reference to the burden of proof. 
R. v. Robson and others [2006] EWCA Crim 2754  
On the correct approach to an abuse of process application in cases involving historic 
allegations (in the appealed case, of cruelty from a care home involving multiple defendants). 
They raise the issue as to whether, either at the close of the prosecution case, or at the close 
of the defence case, the judge should have intervened to withdraw the allegations from the 
jury on the basis that no jury could safely convict. They also raise an issue as to the proper 
way the judge should have directed the jury about such incidents. 
The Court of Appeal agreed that stronger judicial guidance should be offered to juries when 
discrepancies arose from the evidence of complainants in HCSA cases. 
 Such an approach is not correct in relation to evidence of events which took place 
many years before, of which the sources were young and vulnerable witnesses. It is not 
sufficient, in giving such a ruling, for a judge merely to comment that it is for a jury to assess 
the impact of discrepancies. On the contrary, as we have said, it is for the judge to assess the 
significance of the discrepancies and to rule whether their impact upon the quality of the 
evidence is such that no jury could safely convict on the Counts to which they relate. 
...we suggest that in cases such as this, posing complicated factual issues arising out 
of historical events, time would be well spent in seeking the assistance of counsel as to 
which pieces of evidence go to which Counts and the significant controversies which 
arise out of that evidence. By such means a judge, with the assistance of counsel, can 
give directions as to fact to the jury which do, in reality, assist them to focus on the 
significant issues which arise under the separate Counts. If this process takes time 
DQGFDXVHVGHOD\EHIRUHWKHMXU\¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQLWLVZHVXJJHVWWLPHZHOOVSHQW,W
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must not be forgotten that the witnesses were purporting to identify teachers as being 
responsible for this fight, possibly some twenty-six years previously.  
There was such a lack of clear, reliable and consistent evidence, coupled with a significantly 
inaccurate direction as to lead us to the conclusion that the verdicts on several of the Count 
were unsafe. 
R. v Siddall (John Stephen) and Brooke[2006] EWCA Crim 1353 
 
Siddall was convicted on two counts of indecent assault (courts 4±5) on a girl called RW 
between 10th October 1985 and 13th May 1986 by engaging her in sexual intercourse and 
two counts (6 and 7) of indecency with a child and indecent assault between 12th December 
1987 and 13th February 1988, the child concerned being PW. He was acquitted of 3 counts of 
indecent assault (counts 1±3) on a girl called JF between 20th June 1985 and 23 January 
1986. He received a total sentence of 4 years imprisonment. 
Brooke was charged with counts of indecent assault, rape and buggery of the same RW. He 
was acquitted of one charge of indecent assault in the Lake District (count 1) but convicted of 
two charges of rape between 11th May and 7th December 1986 (counts 2 and 3), one charge 
of buggery (count 4) between the same dates. He was also convicted on 3 counts of indecent 
assault (counts 5±7) on a girl called AMS between 16th June and 1st November 1986 and one 
count of rape (count 11) of the same girl between the same dates. He received a total sentence 
of 10 years imprisonment. 
CCRC referral in 2004, new evidence as follows: 
x (A) Allegations of rape made by RW but not disclosed by RW in the course of her 
disclosures to officers responsible for Operation Clyde (the relevant police 
investigation into incidents at R and W) and Operation Care (another investigation in 
relation to a care home on Merseyside to which RW was subsequently sent). These 
allegations derived from information contained in contemporaneous records recovered 
E\WKH&&5&IURP1XJHQW&DUH6RFLHW\ILOHVUHODWLQJWR5:¶VWLPHDW&LQ
0HUVH\VLGHZKLFKWKHPVHOYHVFRQWDLQHGLQIRUPDWLRQDERXW5:¶VWLPHDW:DQG
from Social Services files compiled in and around 1998 in connection with care 
proceedings relating to RW's children; 
x (B) Other information contained in these files; 
x (C) Information contained in applications to the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
$XWKRULW\³&,&$´LQUHODWLRQERWKWR6LGGDOODQGDQRWKHUSHUVRQWKLVWLPHDW&
Wilfred Jollie who was tried in Liverpool in May 2001 but against whom the Crown 
decided to proceed no further as a result of RW's cross-examination; 
x (D) Allegations made, subsequent to trial, by JF of penetrative sex by Siddall, no such 
allegations having been made by JF during the trial of the counts of indecent assault 
of which Siddall was in any event acquitted. 
In the unused material, RW both in her witness statement and in her evidence at trial had 
alleged that only 3 or 4 acts of sexual intercourse had occurred with Siddall, she had 
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subsequently alleged frequent sexual intercourse, almost as a matter of routine, in her 
DSSOLFDWLRQWR&,&$7KH&URZQKDVKRZHYHUEHHQDEOHWRVKRZWKDW5:¶VLQLWLDO&,&$
application was in similar terms to those of the contents of an interview conducted with RW 
on 13th December 1996 in the presence of a social worker June Bailey, WPC Annette 
+ROOLGD\DQG5:¶VWKHQSDUWQHU5RODQG'D\,QWKLVLQWHUYLHZ5:VDLGWKDWVKHFRXOGQRW
remember how sex began with Siddall at R but that it went on XQWLOVKHZHQWWR:³,WZDV
OLNHDURXWLQH´ 
The Crown could not positively say (since the relevant documentation is now lost) that it was 
DFWXDOO\VHQWWRWKHDSSHOODQW¶VWKHQVROLFLWRUV6RPHPDWHULDOSUHVHQWHGE\6LGGDOO¶VQHZ
defence team showed that the previous defence team (or, at any rate, Siddall personally) did 
have access to the contents of an interview of 13th December so far as it related to Siddall 
VLQFHZKHQ6LGGDOO¶VHPSOR\PHQWZDVWHUPLQDWHGE\WKHORFDODXWKRULW\KHEURXJKW
proceedings for unfair dismissal before a Leeds Industrial Tribunal in which the relevant 
parts of the interview were disclosed and he made a written response to the allegations 
contained in it. It was the other material discovered by the CCRC that should cause the court 
to have concerns about the safety of the conviction.  
Doubt was now cast on the verdicts jury had reached about Brooke. RW had claimed that she 
has been raped by 12 taxi drivers. RW had also previously accused boyfriends, by two male 
strangers when she had absconded, a husband, her natural father and other care workers of 
sexually assaulting her on different occasions. 
A report of the matter in 1986 had been disclosed both counsel for the Crown and for the 
defence could have taken appropriate decisions about how to deal with it. The report had 
been created when RW had been admitted to care home, W.  
Appeal court concerned that the jury had been given a false picture about this matter overall. 
Witness who had created the report had been called by Brooke in order to deal with the first 
count of the indictment of indecent assault on which he was, in the event, acquitted. This 
defence witness had impressed the jury. But nobody thought to ask about the contents of her 
July 1986 document because nobody knew it existed. 
Convictions of both defendants were quashed.  
R v Charnley Court of Appeal [2007] EWCA Crim 1354 
 
Child abuse case. Jury had failed to return majority verdicts on remaining 5 counts (they had 
decided properly on19 acquittals).  
Came to the attention of the trial judge by a juror who wrote to him about the wrong verdict 
delivered by the foreman: 
 
We had 24 counts to consider and managed to reach a unanimous verdict of not guilty 
for 19 of the counts. However, the remaining five counts were split. One count 8 for 
majority of guilty and four counts 9 - 3 majority of guilty. 
.. The following day there was an article in the local press informing the defendant 
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KDGEHHQVHQWHQFHGWR\HDUV¶LPSULVRQPHQW6LQFHWKLVKDVRFFXUUHG,KDYHEHHQ
questioning the authenticity of the defendant's sentence as I am led to believe a 
minimum accepted majority sentencing is 10-2. This has caused me great concern. 
 
The prohibitions in section 8(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 do not extend to 
investigations by or on behalf of the Court into possible jury irregularities (R v Mirza [2005] 
1 AC 1118). 
The CCRC was permitted to interview 11 out of 12 jurors to ascertain the error which led to 
the overtXUQLQJRI&KDUQOH\¶VFRQYLFWLRQ 
R v T [2008] EWCA Crim 484 
$QXQPDUULHGPDQLQKLVVZDVDFFXVHGE\DUHODWLYH¶VVRQZLWKDKLVWRU\RIGUXJDQG
alcohol problems. Friends of the accuser joined in to make marginal claims with rumour 
playing a potent rule in a close knit rural community. Convicted at a second trial after the first 
ended with a hung jury. 
The appellant (T) appealed against his conviction for various sexual offences against two 
young boys. The victims complained to the police some years after the commission of the 
offences. The Crown relied on evidence from three other young men, each of whom spoke of 
DVLQJOHLQFLGHQWRIVH[XDOLPSURSULHW\WRZDUGVKLPVHOIRQ7¶VSDUWPDQ\\HDUVEHIRUH7KH
evidence of the unproved allegations was admitted pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
s.101 (1)(d) DVEHLQJUHOHYDQWWR7¶VSURSHQVLW\WRPROHVWDGROHVFHQWER\VVH[XDOO\7KHMXGJH
also admitted hearsay evidence from people to whom the five young men had, at different 
times, made their complaints and given descriptions of what had taken place. T submitted that 
(1) the hearsay evidence and the bad character evidence had not been properly summed up to 
the jury, and as a result the jury were misdirected into giving the evidence undue weight 
without the necessary safeguards. The jury should have been directed in clear terms that they 
should consider the case of each of the complainants and the three additional witnesses 
separately, and only if they were sure of the reliability and accuracy of the evidence of that 
SDUWLFXODUZLWQHVVFRXOGWKH\WDNHLWLQWRDFFRXQWDVHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWLQJWKH&URZQ¶VFDVH
because it showed the relevant propensity; (2) the judge had failed to give him the benefit and 
full weight of the second limb of the standard good character direction. The jury were not 
told they should give weight to his good character; (3) the hearsay evidence should not have 
been admitted. It could only have been admitted under s.120(4) and s.120(7) in relation to the 
two complainants on the indictment, and not in relation to the other three witnesses. 
R v D [2007] Court of Appeal Criminal Division 
Uncorroborated historic allegations of rape and other offences made against a man of 
exemplary character by a former neighbour from a broken home with a long history of 
psycho-social problems. Disclosure of medical and counselling records had been refused by 
the prosecution at trial. The Court of Appeal ordered disclosure of records which led to the 
conviction being quashed. 
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A retrial was requested by the prosecution and a leading psychiatrist and psychologist 
undermined the reliability of the complainant. The D passed away prior to the onset of trial. 
Permission to publish the Court of Appeal judgment is still pending.  
 
R v B [2007] Court of Appeal - Conviction quashed.  
B was accused by an adult daughter after a property dispute. The twelve year old daughter of 
a former partner who lived opposite the main accuser also made allegations of abuse aged 3 
despite having previously denied abuse during a previous unrelated child protection 
investigation. Leave to appeal was granted out of time and the conviction quashed by the full 
court. 
R v Joynson [2008] EWCA Crim 3049  
7KH&RXUWRI$SSHDOTXDVKHGWKLVFDUHU¶VFRQYLFWLRQ'HOD\DQGIRUHQVLFGLVDGYDQWDJHFDXVHG
thereby are the appeal points. 
On 27 November 2007, ...the appellant was convicted of twelve counts of indecent assault on 
a male contrary to section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and of two counts of buggery 
contrary to section 12 RIWKHVDPH$FW+HZDVVHQWHQFHGWRDWRWDORIWKLUWHHQ\HDUV¶
imprisonment. The courts have sadly become familiar with sexual abuse cases going back 
many years, but, as the trial judge recognised, the period of delay in this case was by any 
standards exceptional. Moreover, it was delay in the complainants giving evidence about 
events which were alleged to have occurred during their childhood (in one instance as young 
as 8). The surprising apparent powers of recall of witnesses 35 years and more after the event 
impressed the judge, but did not lessen the importance of the absence of contemporaneous 
evidence by which to test the degree to which such apparent recall was true and reliable 
recall. 
Having identified in summary the nature of the significant prejudice in this case, we must 
consider whether the case was so strong and/or whether there were sufficient safeguards that 
the convictions may nevertheless be regarded as safe, despite such prejudice. This is a fact-
specific exercise and it calls for close scrutiny. As to the first, it is difficult to isolate 
consideration of the strength of the case from what the missing documents would or might 
have shown. For example, if contemporaneous documents had shown that as a schoolboy PF 
complained about Eagles, not the appellant, and that his evidence about the appellant's 
references to DC were an instance of his memory playing him false 35 years after the event, 
the case would inevitably have appeared less strong than otherwise, for the defence would 
then have been able to say that on the two points where contemporaneous objective evidence 
existed, it demonstrated that the seemingly credible recollection of the witness was wrong. 
We turn to consider the adequacy of the safeguards. One safeguard was the ability of Mr 
Barlow to cross-examine the complainants and other witnesses, to which the judge referred. 
However, the effectiveness of any cross-examination must be dependent on the material to be 
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deployed. In one case there may be ample other material and the significance of missing 
material may therefore be small. In another case the absence of material which previously 
existed may be critical. 
In relation to PF, the defence, as Mr Gosling has rightly submitted, had available to it the 
contradiction between PF and his mother. It also had the evidence of the appellant himself 
that he had left the school before DC arrived. In relation to those issues the jury was left with 
the word of one witness against another. They lacked contemporaneous evidence which 
would have settled those points. There was no objective evidence to show that PF was wrong. 
Without that material the effectiveness of any cross-examination was bound to be reduced. 
We also find it difficult in this case to see how the specific prejudice which we have 
LGHQWLILHGFRXOGEHQXOOLILHGRUPDGHSUDFWLFDOO\KDUPOHVVE\D³VWURQJGLUHFWLRQ´$MXU\
could be warned -and indeed this jury was properly warned - to consider with special care the 
risk of memories becoming unreliable through passage of time, but, as the judge also 
correctly directed them, the jury had to decide the case on the evidence. No general warning 
could in this case be a substitute for the documents which were missing. 
This court is always slow to allow an appeal against a conviction where the case has been 
handled with care by an experienced judge and the jury has reached its conclusions of fact 
after hearing all the witnesses. Nevertheless, we must stand back from the case and ask 
ourselves whether we regard the convictions as safe. The case as presented to us may be a 
little different from the way it was presented to the judge when he read the skeleton 
arguments which were before him, but we are troubled by the very great delay and its 
particular consequences in the context of the specific allegations in this case. We have 
reached the conclusion that we cannot regard these convictions as safe. 
R. v Aston (Stephen Leslie) [2010] EWCA Crim 3067 
Convictions for child sex offences were unsafe where fresh evidence was presented that was 
based on new developments in medical understanding relating to the physical signs of child 
sexual abuse. 
The appellant (X), upon a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, appealed 
against his convictions for rape, attempted rape, gross indecency with a child and indecent 
assault. The victims (V) had alleged that they were sexually abused by their babysitter, X. V 
were medically examined by two experts whose uncontested medical evidence at trial 
supported allegations that one of V had been subjected to penetrative abuse. X had argued 
that although there had apparently been abuse, he was not the perpetrator. Approximately 
nine years after X was convicted, the commission obtained fresh expert opinion, in view of 
UHVHDUFKFDUULHGRXWVLQFH;¶VWULDOZKLFKVLJQLILFDQWO\DOWHUHGPHGLFDONQRZOHGJHLQUHODWLRQ
to the physical signs of child sexual abuse. A rHSRUWSURGXFHGE\WKHFRPPLVVLRQ¶VH[SHUW
concluded that the medical findings of the trial experts were no longer supportive of abuse. X 
DSSHDOHGDQGWKHDSSHDOZDVQRWRSSRVHGE\WKH&URZQ7KHLVVXHZDVZKHWKHU;¶V
conviction was safe in light of the fresh evidence and the developments in medical 
understanding.  
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Appeal allowed. (1) At trial X was inhibited from exploring the question of whether abuse 
had taken place. Such caution was understandable given the state of medical knowledge and 
evidence and, had the new medical evidence been available, it would have transformed the 
shape of the trial. Therefore the fresh evidence was admitted (see para.19 of judgment). (2) 
The question for the court in light of the new evidence was not whether it believed X was 
JXLOW\EXWZKHWKHUWKHFRQYLFWLRQVZHUHUHJDUGHGDVVDIH,QWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV;¶V
convictions were not safe and were therefore quashed. 
Under sections 9 to 12 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 , where a person has been convicted 
RQLQGLFWPHQW«WKH&RPPLVVLRQPD\DWDQ\WLPHUHIHUWKHUHVXOWLQJFRQYLFWLRQ«WRWKH
&RXUWRI$SSHDO«as appropriate.  
2. By section 13 of the Act, a reference shall not be made unless the Commission consider 
WKDWWKHUHLVDUHDOSRVVLELOLW\WKDWWKHFRQYLFWLRQ«ZRXOGQRWEHXSKHOGZHUHWKHUHIHUHQFHWR
be made.  
R v GJB [2011] EWCA Crim 867. Historic sexual abuse; conviction found to be unsafe on 
appeal due to unfair summing up by the trial judge - unfair summing up had included giving 
undue credence to unsupported assertions made by the Crown in relation to memory. 
'HILFLHQFLHVLQDMXGJH¶VVXPPLQJXSZHUHVXFKDVWRUHQGHUDFRQYLFWLRQIRUKLVWRULFFKLOG
sex offences unsafe. 
The appellant (B) appealed against his conviction for buggery and indecency with a child. B 
had been convicted in 2007 of the sexual abuse of his two nephews (M and R) between 1989 
DQG0VWDWHGWKDWWKHEXJJHU\KDGWDNHQSODFHLQ%¶VEHGURRPZKHQ0ZDVDJed five 
DQGWKHSURVHFXWLRQVXJJHVWHGWKDW0¶VJRRGUHFROOHFWLRQRIWKHURRPZDVEHFDXVHKHKDG
been abused in it. R alleged that B had encouraged him to masturbate him when he was aged 
between 9 and 10. B was of previous good character. In summing up, the judge referred to B 
DVQRWKDYLQJDQ\H[SODQDWLRQIRU0¶VFOHDUUHFROOHFWLRQRIKLVEHGURRP+HJDYHD/XFDV
direction and also stated that B had failed to account for where he had been living for a year 
during the relevant period. Evidence produced post-trial confirmed that there had been no 
basis for that inference. The judge gave a good character direction but without specific 
reference to the passage of 18 years since the alleged offences. He referred to the difficulty of 
understanding why a child would or would not speak about what had allegedly happened and 
GHVFULEHGHYLGHQFHRIDFKDQJHLQ0¶VEHKDYLRXUHOLFLWHGLQFURVV-examination of R, as 
having opened "the can of worms". B submitted that the judge's summing up was defective.  
 
Appeal allowed. There was nothing to support the assertion that M's recollection of B's 
bedroom was accurate because he had been abused in it. There was no expert evidence to 
support the suggestion that such an incident would enhance a child's memory of his 
surroundings at the time. The suggestion should not have been made by the prosecution and 
should not have been given credence in the summing up. In fact, the judge might well have 
ZDUQHGWKHMXU\DJDLQVWDFWLQJRQLW+LVFRPPHQWUHJDUGLQJ%KDYLQJQRH[SODQDWLRQIRU0¶V
recollection had effectively reversed the burden of proof (see paras 10-12 of judgment). The 
P a g e  |   
Lucas direction was defective. It assumed that what B had said was incorrect and focused on 
whether B had deliberately lied whereas the jury should have been clearly directed to first 
consider whether they were satisfied that what B had said was incorrect. Only then could they 
proceed to consider whether he had deliberately lied (paras 13-15). The assumption that B 
could not account for the missing year had to have damaged his credibility. The interests of 
justice required that the evidence confirming there was no basis for that assumption should be 
taken into account and it followed that B's credibility had been wrongly damaged (paras 16-
%¶VJRRGFKDUDFWHUZDVrelevant to his credibility and his propensity to commit such 
offences, and he had been entitled to a full direction in respect of both. In historic sexual 
abuse cases there were two aspects of propensity to be considered. A person of good 
character was less likely to have committed the alleged offence. Given the passage of time 
since the alleged offences, the fact that a defendant had not committed any offence since then 
was also relevant and was particularly apt where the delay rendered it more difficult to 
defend the allegations. In the instant case, the good character direction had not been 
sufficiently tailored to the facts (paras 18-24). The judge had been entitled to comment on the 
reluctance of victims of sexual abuse to speak about it for a long time. However, it was 
LPSRUWDQWWKDWWKHJXLOWRIWKHGHIHQGDQWVKRXOGQRWEHDVVXPHG7KHGHIHQGDQW¶VFDVHKDGQRW
been made clear and the direction should have been preceded by making the comment 
conditional on the abuse having happened rather than the assumption that it had. 
R v RP [2011] EWCA 1764  
The case concerned historic allegations of sexual offences by two sisters against a father. The 
allegations were made after a brother had visited a clairvoyant who said two sisters were 
abused. The complaints were bizarre and extreme within a background of alleged extreme 
physical abuse. The defence case was that none of the allegations was true and that the 
complainants were motivated by malice through acrimonious family disputes. The appellant 
received negative advice from trial counsel and the case was reviewed. Leave was given for 
appeal outside time with fresh counsel. The conviction was quashed because of the one-sided 
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Appendix C 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Categories of Offences) Order 2004: 
 
The Secretary of State, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by section 103(4)(b) of 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003[1] hereby makes the following Order, a draft of which has n 
laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament: 
1.(1) This Order may be cited as  2004 and shall come into force 14 days after the day on 
which it is made or on the day that sections 98 to 110 of the 2003 Act (Evidence of Bad 
Character) come into force, whichever is later. 
 
(2) In this Order "the 2003 Act" means the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
2. - (1) The categories of offences set out in Parts 1 and 2 of the Schedule to this Order are 
hereby prescribed for the purposes of section 103(4)(b) of the 2003 Act. 
(2) Two offences are of the same category as each other if they are included in the same Part 





Prescribed Categories of Offences 
PART 1 
THEFT CATEGORY 
1.An offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968[2] (theft). 
2.An offence under section 8 of that Act (robbery). 
3.An offence under section 9(1)(a) of that Act[3] (burglary) if it was committed with intent to 
commit an offence of stealing anything in the building or part of a building in question. 
4.An offence under section 9(1)(b) of that Act (burglary) if the offender stole or attempted to 
steal anything in the building or that part of it. 
5.An offence under section 10 of that Act (aggravated burglary) if the offender committed a 
burglary described in paragraph 3 or 4 of this Part of the Schedule. 
6.An offence under section 12 of that Act[4] (taking motor vehicle or other conveyance 
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without authority). 
7.An offence under section 12A of that Act[5] (aggravated vehicle-taking). 
8.An offence under section 22 of that Act (handling stolen goods). 
9.An offence under section 25 of that Act (going equipped for stealing). 
10.An offence under section 3 of the Theft Act 1978[6] (making off without payment). 
11.An offence of- 
(a) aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of an offence 
specified in this Part of this Schedule; or 
(b) attempting to commit an offence so specified. 
 
PART 2 
SEXUAL OFFENCES (PERSONS UNDER THE AGE OF 16) CATEGORY 
 
1.An offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956[7] (rape) if it was committed 
in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
2.An offence under section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956[8](intercourse with a girl 
under thirteen). 
3.An offence under section 6 of that Act[9] (intercourse with a girl under sixteen). 
4.An offence under section 7 of that Act[10] (intercourse with a defective) if it was 
committed in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
5.An offence under section 10 of that Act (incest by a man) if it was committed in relation to 
a person under the age of 16. 
6.An offence under section 11 of that Act (incest by a woman) if it was committed in relation 
to a person under the age of 16. 
7.An offence under section 12 of that Act[11] (buggery) if it was committed in relation to a 
person under the age of 16. 
8.An offence under section 13 of that Act[12] (indecency between men) if it was committed 
in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
9.An offence under section 14 of that Act (indecent assault on a woman) if it was committed 
in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
10.An offence under section 15 of that Act (indecent assault on a man) if it was committed in 
relation to a person under the age of 16. 
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11.An offence under section 128 of the Mental Health Act 1959[13] (sexual intercourse with 
patients) if it was committed in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
12.An offence under section 1 of the Indecency with Children Act 1960[14] (indecent 
conduct towards young child). 
13.An offence under section 54 of the Criminal Law Act 1977[15] (inciting a girl under 16 to 
have incestuous sexual intercourse). 
14.An offence under section 3 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000[16] (abuse of a 
position of trust) if it was committed in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
15.An offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003[17] (rape) if it was 
committed in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
16.An offence under section 2 of that Act (assault by penetration) if it was committed in 
relation to a person under the age of 16. 
17.An offence under section 3 of that Act (sexual assault) if it was committed in relation to a 
person under the age of 16. 
18.An offence under section 4 of that Act (causing a person to engage in sexual activity 
without consent) if it was committed in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
19.An offence under section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape of a child under 13). 
20.An offence under section 6 of that Act (assault of a child under 13 by penetration). 
21.An offence under section 7 of that Act (sexual assault of a child under 13). 
22.An offence under section 8 of that Act (causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in 
sexual activity). 
23.An offence under section 9 of that Act (sexual activity with a child). 
24.An offence under section 10 of that Act (causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual 
activity). 
25.An offence under section 14 of that Act if doing it will involve the commission of an 
offence under sections 9 and 10 of that Act (arranging or facilitating the commission of a 
child sex offence). 
26.An offence under section 16 of that Act (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity with a 
child) if it was committed in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
27.An offence under section 17 of that Act (abuse of position of trust: causing or inciting a 
child to engage in sexual activity) if it was committed in relation to a person under the age of 
16. 
28.An offence under section 25 of that Act (sexual activity with a child family member) if it 
was committed in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
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29.An offence under section 26 of that Act (inciting a child family member to engage in 
sexual activity) if it was committed in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
30.An offence under section 30 of that Act (sexual activity with a person with a mental 
disorder impeding choice) if it was committed in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
31.An offence under section 31 of that Act (causing or inciting a person with a mental 
disorder impeding choice to engage in sexual activity) if it was committed in relation to a 
person under the age of 16. 
32.An offence under section 34 of that Act (inducement, threat, or deception to procure 
activity with a person with a mental disorder) if it was committed in relation to a person 
under the age of 16. 
33.An offence under section 35 of that Act (causing a person with a mental disorder to 
engage in or agree to engage in sexual activity by inducement, threat or deception) if it was 
committed in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
34.An offence under section 38 of that Act (care workers: sexual activity with a person with a 
mental disorder) if it was committed in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
35.An offence under section 39 of that Act (care workers: causing or inciting sexual activity) 
if it was committed in relation to a person under the age of 16. 
36.An offence of- 
(a) aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or inciting the commission of an offence 
specified in this Part of this Schedule; or 
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Appendix D 
The case papers from convicted defendants and the issues they raise 
These are the cases of six volunteers who offered their case files for the purpose of this study. 
All six were convicted, appealed, and lost their appeals. In all six cases counsel advised on 
grounds of appeal. All six still protest their innocence. Their cases do not prove any 
proposition advanced in this study, but they do provide evidence of specific areas of concern 
on the part of those who contest the safety of their convictions and are included as illustrative 
examples of the concerns identified and explored in this study. 
R v F  
Forensic disadvantage caused to the defendant by a delayed prosecution 
The case of F provides an example of how delay can involve the loss of evidence. F had been 
convicted of anally raping X as a minor. This case was referred to the CCRC. The CCRC 
noticed that the original police notebooks were missing, mislaid over the years, so the 
contents of the notebooks could not be used to challenge prosecution witness inconsistencies.  
R v S 
Heightened public concern as possible influence on jury  
S was tried in June 2001 and convicted of sexual assaults against his two biological children 
(rape on three occasions and cruelty on four occasions all occurring between 1977-1985). A 
character witness statement obtained as part of an appeal, suggests that one of the reasons that 
6ZDVFRQYLFWHGPD\KDYHEHHQWKHPHGLDYLOLILFDWLRQRI6EHIRUHKLVWULDO6DUDK3D\QH¶s 
death had been highly publicised in July 2000. It was suggested that this extreme case of 
child abuse was still fresh in the minds of the media and the general public. 
R v W 
Bad character of the complainant 
Prior allegations of CSA made by the complainant against different people (but not 
proceeded with) were not in this case deemed to EHUHJDUGHGDVµEDGFKDUDFWHU¶XQGHUVHFWLRQ
100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  
R v X 
Bad character of the defendant 
X, a teacher, had been accused of eight counts of sexually assaulting two boys who had been 
pupils of his in the late 1980s until 1990, when they would have been aged 12 years and 
onwards. Items of gay pornography seized from the defendant were indicated on a list of 
exhibits sheet disclosed to the jury. This sheet was withdrawn by the trial judge and those 
entries partially but not wholly obliterated, with the description of some items remaining 
visible to the jury, which subsequently convicted him. 
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R v H 
Police trawling operations 
H was a care home employee, arrested by police in 1995 and charged with historic allegations 
of CSA alleged by six former care home inmates. He was convicted on some allegations and 
acquitted on others. The jury accepted the allegations of three out of the six complainants and 
delivered a mixed verdict for which received a four-year prison sentence. The complainants 
had been identified by the police investigation method of dip sampling, which H maintained 
had tainted the presentation of the case against him.  
R v K 
Bad character of the defendant/stale convictions; and claimed collusion of prosecution 
witnesses: 
Stale previous conviction for CSA was admitted in evidence in his trial; K argued that the 
case against him was contaminated when he alleged that some, not all, of the complainants 
had colluded before giving evidence.  
 
 
 
 
 
